BOSTON UNIVERSITY

GRADUATE SCHOOL

Dissertation

SOME TYPES OF PERSONALISM IN THE UNITED STATES

by

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To Four Vikings of the Spirit

CHESTER H. WELD
HAROLD C. CASE
ALBERT C. KNUDSON
EDGAR S. BRIGHTMAN

who have shown me the range

and power of religious living

SOME TYPES OF PERSONALISM IN THE UNITED STATES

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT

1. The Problem of the Dissertation.

The prominent position of personalism in the United States is the product of many interdependent thinkers. Moreover, as personalism has developed three specific types have emerged.

The problem of the investigation is thus twofold. First, it deals with historical development: Who were the specific thinkers in the history of American philosophy? What was the background, the intellectual objective, and the place of each in society and in philosophy? To what extent were they personalistic? How was their thought related? Second, it considers the chief types of personalism in the United States. Who are their most significant representatives? What are the basic ideas in each type? What is the influence of each?

An eminent personalist of today has suggested that historical research is one of the chief tasks confronting personalism.[1] The present writer concurs. Hence the purpose of this investigation is to study the development of personalism in the United States and to discuss the chief

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1. Brightman, Art. (1921), 168-170.

types of personalism as represented by Howison, Calkins, and Bowne.

2. A Definition of Personalism.

There are numerous definitions of personalism. Various views will become evident as the investigation progresses. In order to arrive at a working definition, however, several representative personalists may be quoted. Brightman has referred to personalism as the "theory that only persons are real: that all true being is personal."[2] Knudson has written:

> . . . We may define personalism as that form of idealism which gives equal recognition to both the pluralistic and monistic aspects of experience and which finds in the conscious unity, identity, and free activity of personality the key to the nature of reality and the solution of the ultimate problems of philosophy.[3]

Flewelling thinks of personalism in a similar manner, having written that it is "a modern term applied to any philosophy which considers personality the supreme value and the key to the meaning of life."[4] For the purposes of this dissertation the term personalism is used in the broad sense of any philosophical system which makes personality its fundamental principle in the various fields of philosophy such as episte-

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2. Brightman, ITP, 389.
3. Knudson, POP, 87.
4. Flewelling, Art. (1942), 229.

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B. A Definition of Personalism.

There are numerous definitions of personalism. Personalism will appear evident as the investigation progresses. In order to arrive at a working definition, however, several representative personalists may be quoted. Whitehead has referred to personalism as the "theory that only entities are real; that all else being is reckoned."[2] Hocking has written:

> . . . We may define personalism as that form of idealism which gives equal recognition to both the plurality and monistic aspects of experience and which finds in the conscious unity, identity, and free activity of personality the key to the mystery of reality and the solution of the ultimate problems of philosophy.[3]

Personalistic thinkers of personalism have slightly improved, having written that it is "a modern term applied to any philosophy which considers personality the highest value and the key to the meaning of life."[4] For the purposes of this dissertation the term personalism is used in the broad sense of any philosophical system which makes central the fundamental principle in the various fields of philosophy such as metaphy-

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2. Whitehead, ITC, 289.
3. Hocking, ICM, 27.
4. Flewelling, art. (Ibid.), 324.

mology, metaphysics, philosophy of education, aesthetics, ethics, social philosophy, and philosophy of religion.

It follows that systems which emphasize personality in one field or another will be considered even if they are not completely personalistic. Labels are often misleading. It is conceivable that one might rather be termed a great religious spirit than a Methodist or a Buddhist; or an American rather than a Republican or a Democrat; or a world citizen rather than a Chinese or Italian or Bulgarian. So in philosophy, labels are misused. Among the personalists, Whitman has been referred to variously as a naturalist, mystic, theist, pantheist, and transcendentalist. Cook,[5] a personalist, terms his system ideal realism, yet he has also been called a natural theist. Bowne, a plural-monistic personalist, terms himself a theistic idealist, a transcendental empiricist, an idealistic realist, and a realistic idealist. Hocking, who makes personality the key to reality, says he is not a personalist. He has written:

> Personally I am not a personalist. I do not think that any cooperating plurality of beings is a final fact. Their relations to one another indicate that they are not independently real: there is a One which explains their togetherness.[6]

Hocking's thought is, nevertheless, similar to that of Royce

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5. Cook was an eminent Congregational minister. His personalistic thought will be considered in the chapter dealing with plural-monistic personalism.
6. In a letter to the writer dated January 12, 1943.

mology, sociography, philosophy of education, aesthetics, ethics, social philosophy, and philosophy of religion.

It follows that systems which emphasize personality in one field or another will be considered even if they are not completely personalistic. Labels are often misleading. It is conceivable that one might rather be termed a great religious mystic than a Mohammedan or a theist; or an American rather than a Tagalog or a Japanese; or a social science rather than a Unitarian or Lutheran or Jainist or a Taoist. Among the personalists, Wilson has been referred to variously as a naturalist, realist, idealist, pragmatist, and transcendentalist. Cook,[5] a personalist, cites his system idealistic, yet he has also been called a natural realist. Bowne, a plural-monistic personalist, terms himself a rationalistic idealist, a transcendental empiricist, or idealistic realist, and a pluralistic idealist. Hocking, who makes personality the key to reality, says he is not a personalist. He has written:

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5. Cook was an ardent Swedenborgian mystic. His personalistic theism will be considered in the chapter entitled "A Plural-Monistic Personalism."

6. In a letter to the writer dated January 14, 1943.

and Calkins, who are absolutistic personalists. Harkness, who is in the Bowne-Brightman tradition, has said in conversation that she does not hold to personalism, which to her is simply the liberal tradition in America, but that she is a realistic theist. Confusion is increased when Wieman says that he does not know whether Brightman is a naturalist or a liberal.[7] Labels are not as important as the emphasis of the thinker or system. For that reason, then, as has been suggested, systems which emphasize personality will be considered in this dissertation even if they are not coherently and systematically personalistic.

Each of the three specific types of personalism to be discussed must be defined. Personalism has been classified into various types, as pluralism, atheistic pluralism, pantheistic personalism, absolute idealistic personalism, relativistic personalism, teleological personalism, theistic personalism, finitistic personalism, realistic personalism, panpsychistic personalism, and plural monism. Some of the representatives of these several schools are not American philosophers, hence their thought is outside the scope of this investigation. In dealing with personalism in the United States the chief types seem to have fallen logically into three basic categories (although it must be remembered that there are important differences within each type). The

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7. Wieman, GOR, 487n.

and Calvin, who are absolutistic personalists. Emerson, who is in the Jones-Bailyn-Brown tradition, has said in proposition that she does not hold to personalism, which so far is already the liberal tradition in America, but that she is a realistic idealist. Conversion is increasingly when change says that he does not know whether he is a nationalist or a liberal.[7] Labels are not as important as the emphasis of the thinker or system. For that reason, that, as has been suggested, systems which emphasize personality will be non-adhered in this discussion even, if they are not coherently and systematically personalistic.

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7. Hixson, op. cit.

first type is pluralistic personalism; it emphasizes the infinite uniqueness of every person. The second type is absolutistic personalism; it maintains that every person is part of the absolute person. The third type is plural-monistic; it holds to both the uniqueness of each person and to the cosmic significance of the Supreme Person who is the creator and sustainer of all the others.

3. The Work of Previous Investigators.

No important statement of personalism's position in the development of American philosophy has yet appeared. Little, in fact, until recently, has been written about the general history of American philosophy. In these writings, only casual references have been made to the types of personalism in America.

Three groups of previous investigators have been helpful, however, in the preparation of this dissertation. The first consists of the recent writers in the field of American philosophy. The writers and their works, in chronological order, are: Jones, Early American Philosophers (1898); Riley, American Philosophy (1907); Santayana, "The Genteel Tradition in American Philosophy" (1911); Riley, American Thought from Puritanism to Pragmatism (1915); Santayana, "Philosophical Opinion in America" (1918); Rogers, English and American Philosophy Since 1800 (1923); Ralph Barton

first type is primarily sentimental; it emphasizes the infinite worthiness of every person. The second type is monistic personalism; it implies that every person is part of the absolute reason. The third type is liberal-moralist; it holds to both the worthiness of each person and to the monistic significance of the Supreme Person who is the creator and sustainer of all the others.

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Perry, Philosophy of the Recent Past (1926); Cell, "Die Philosophie in Nordamerika," in volume five of Ueberweg's Grundriss Geschichte der Philosophie (1928); Charles M. Perry (ed.), The St. Louis Movement in Philosophy (1930); Schneider, The Puritan Mind (1930); Townsend, Philosophical Ideas in the United States (1934); Müller, Amerikanische Philosophie; Anderson and Fisch, Philosophy in America (1939); Muelder and Sears, The Development of American Philosophy (1940).

The second group of previous investigators is comprised of those writers who have given information about the life and thought of Johnson, Edwards, Alcott, Whitman, Davidson, Harris, and Royce. Reference will be made to these sources in the chapter concerning the development of personalism in the United States. Frequent use has also been made of the Dictionary of American Biography.

The third group of previous investigators are those individuals who have referred to types of personalism or who have given an account of the thought of the chief personalists, Howison, Calkins, and Bowne. Knudson has given a succinct statement of types of personalism in Philosophy of Personalism (1927). Kessler, in an unpublished doctoral dissertation, has ably treated the problem of Personalistic Monism Versus Pluralism from the absolutistic viewpoint (1919). The most important work on Howison is Buckham and Stratton, George Holmes Howison, Philosopher and Teacher

Perry, Philosophy of the Recent Past (1926); Weiss, "Philosophia in Nordamerika," in volume five of Ueberweg's Grundriss Geschichte der Philosophie (1928); Charles M. Perry (ed.), The 20th Century Philosophy (1930); Morris R. Cohen, The Faithless Mind (1930); Torgersen, Philosophical Ideas in the United States (1934); Wilder, Americanizing Philosophy; Anderson and Fisch, Philosophy in America (1939); Moulton and Sears, The Development of American Philosophy (1940).

The second group of previous investigators is composed of those writers who have given information about the life and thought of Dewey. Thereby, Alcorn, Eriksen, Davidson, Martin, and Ryan. Reference will be made to these sources in the chapter concerning the development of naturalism in the United States. Frequent use has also been made of the Dictionary of American Biography.

The third group of previous investigators are those individuals who have referred to some of Dewey's ideas or who have given an account of the thought of his contemporaries, Santayana, Dewey, and Royce. Jackson has given a succinct statement of types of personalism in Philosophy of Personalism (1941). Kaplan, in an unpublished doctoral dissertation, has ably treated the problem of Personalistic Monism Versus Pluralism from the idealistic viewpoint (1917). The most important work on Dewey's in Problems and Prospects, Dewey Selections, Philosophers and Teachers

(1934). The chief account of the life and thought of Calkins is Updike, In Memoriam, Mary Whiton Calkins (1931), which consists of a group of articles that will be referred to in the fourth chapter. The three most important general works on Bowne are Flewelling, Personalism and the Problems of Philosophy (1915), Knudson's above-mentioned Philosophy of Personalism, and McConnell, Borden Parker Bowne (1929). Numerous articles about Bowne—too many to list here—have appeared. Most significant among them is Brightman's "Personalism and the Influence of Bowne."[8] Reference will be made to others who have touched upon the problem of the dissertation as it develops. For the most part, original source material has been used; that is, the investigation is based upon the works of the personalists themselves.

4. The Scope and Importance of the Study.

The scope of the dissertation is at once broad and limited. It is a bold attempt to point out what has been previously neglected by personalists, that personalism is as indigenous in America as any thought system can be in a nation which exists in a world community of nations that are related to each other. It also points out that there are three dominant types of personalism in the United States—

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8. See Brightman, Art. (1927).

(1934). The other sketch of the life and thought of Galdós is Galdós, *In Memoriam*, *Mary Gordon Quilter* (1931), which consists of a group of articles that will be referred to in the fourth section. The three most important general works on Pérez are Alvarellos, *Personalism and the Problems of Philosophy* (1918), Ramsden's above-mentioned *Philosophy of Personality*, and McDonnell, *Gordon Parker Pérez* (1928). Numerous articles about Pérez--too many to list here--have appeared. Most significant among them is Andrade's "Personalism and the Philosophy of Pérez."[3] References will be made to others who have commented upon the problem of the discussion as it develops. For the most part, original source material has been used; that is, the investigation is based upon the works of the personalists themselves.

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The scope of the discussion is as wide as the field is limited. It is a bold attempt to point out what has been previously neglected by personalists, that personalism is as integral in Pérez's or any thought system as it is in a nation which exists in a world community of nations that are related to each other. It also points out that the Pérez doctrine type of personal'sm in the United States--

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3. See Bridgman, Art. (1927).

pluralistic, absolutistic, and plural-monistic.

The investigation, bold in what it attempts, is nevertheless limited in scope. It does not deal with personalism outside of the United States except as that influence occasionally bears upon the problem. It does not deal with the total history of personalism as a system. It does not delineate to any great extent the differences among the personalists within the three types considered. Not much is made of the differences in thought, for instance, in Bowne, Wilson, and Ladd, or of the differences in the views of Knudson, Brightman, and Flewelling. These differences, significant as they are, lie beyond the scope of this investigation. A final limitation is that the main body of the dissertation concludes with the work of Bowne. Reference is made to his large following, but no effort is made to give a complete view of contemporary personalism. While much use is made of the ideas of current personalists, the investigation does not pretend to be a systematic critique of the entire school of personalism. Despite the limitations, the writer hopes that the investigation will help to clarify the position of personalism in the United States.

5. The Method of Procedure.

One of the most important parts of the investigation is the discussion of the development of personalism in the

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E. The method of procedure.

One of the most important parts of the investigation
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United States. In this chapter the life and thought of each of the personalists who contributed to the establishment of a personalistic tradition in America up to the time of Howison, Calkins, and Bowne will be considered. These men are Johnson, Edwards, Alcott, Whitman, Davidson, Harris, and Royce. Throughout this chapter, effort will be made to indicate the relations of the thinkers to each other and to the personalistic heritage which gradually evolved.

The three distinct types of personalism that have been partially represented by the earlier personalists become clearly evident in the systems of Howison, Bowne, and Calkins. Their systems are not treated in that chronological order; rather a logical order is used. Howison, who was prominent before the other two and was also more closely related to the earlier American personalists, is considered first. Calkins' absolutistic personalism is then discussed, for it is in sharp contrast with Howison's pluralistic personalism. The third and final type considered is plural-monistic personalism, represented by Bowne. Bowne wrote many books before either Howison or Calkins published their significant works. His system is considered last, however, for four reasons. (1) It is the logical synthesis of the other two. (2) It gives the most coherent account of the varied aspects of experience, thereby doing justice to both pluralism and monism. (3) It is the most typical view in the history of American personalism. (4) Pluralistic-monis-

United States. In this chapter the life and thought of each of the personalities are contributed to the kaleidoscope of a personalistic tradition in America, up to the time of Bowne, Calkins, and Brightman will be considered. These men are Johnson, Ibershoff, Alcott, Whitman, Davidson, Ripley, and others. Throughout this chapter, effort will be made to trace the relations of the writers to each other and to the personalistic heritage which gradually evolved.

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tic personalism of the Bowne tradition is most widely held at the present time.

After an examination of the three types of personalism, comparisons will be made. Similarities and differences will be seen in the fields of epistemology, metaphysics, ethics, social philosophy, and philosophy of religion. A critical conclusion of the entire work will follow. In the appendix there will appear an abstract of the dissertation and an annotated edition of Whitman's "Personalism"—the first article published by that title in America.

The present study deals with two limited aspects of personalism, yet a greater knowledge of personalism's American heritage and its distinct types will indicate its position as a major system of philosophy in the United States.

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CHAPTER II

THE DEVELOPMENT OF PERSONALISM IN THE UNITED STATES

Personalism has developed steadily in the United States through the interpenetration of numerous philosophical ideas. Men and movements on a wide speculative frontier have contributed in comprehensive succession to its sharply-wrought ideas. As an integral part of the general history of American philosophy, personalism has been expanded and fortified with increased strength and clarity in each of the five recognized periods into which the broader philosophical history falls. These periods will be mentioned briefly to enable one to form a background against which he may discern the contributions made to personalism by such thinkers as Samuel Johnson, Jonathan Edwards, Amos Bronson Alcott, Walt Whitman, Thomas Davidson, William Torrey Harris, Josiah Royce, George Holmes Howison, Mary Whiton Calkins, and Borden Parker Bowne.

First, in the history of American philosophy, was the colonial period under British influence. Samuel Johnson, who published the first book on ethics in America (First Principles of Moral Philosophy, 1746), and Jonathan Edwards, who was for a brief time his student, were the most important figures. Although independent of each other in the source of their thought, they both adhered to personalistic

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First, in the history of American philosophy, was the colonial period under British influence. Samuel Johnson, who translated the first book on ethics in America (Elements Philosophica or Moral Philosophy, 1746), and Jonathan Edwards, who was for a brief time his student, were the most important figures. Although independent of each other in the sources of their thought, they both adhered to Berkeley's

ideas and left a "profound and lasting impression on the growing culture of the young nation."

The second period dated from the Revolution to about 1800. This brief interval, under slight French influence, was dominated by the deists who were significant to personalism in their sedulous support of liberal Christianity.

The third period, from about 1800 through the Civil War, was under German influence. The personalistic ideas that came from Germany to enlarge the American speculative enterprise were emphasis on personality, "the notion of the activity of mind as a part of the total cosmic process, and the view of mind as creative of reality in the levels above nature."[1] Of personalistic significance in this period, but also going somewhat beyond it, were Amos Bronson Alcott and Walt Whitman, the "poet of the wider Selfhood." In addition to their philosophical heritage, these two men envisaged a distinct American philosophy.

The fourth period was under the leadership of the St. Louis Philosophical Society, which was organized in 1866 by a group of men more intensely interested in German Idealism. The movement was "astonishingly effective," chiefly through The Journal of Speculative Philosophy which existed from

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1. See Alvin Samuel Haag's unpublished Boston University dissertation for an excellent treatment of Some German Influences in American Philosophical Thought From 1800 To 1850. This quotation is taken from the published abstract of the dissertation.

ideas and lack a "sufficient mass leading independently on the growing authority of the young nation."

The second period dated from the Revolution to about 1800. This period included, under strong influence, was dominated by the idea's way were significant or pertinent to their a direct effect of literal Christianity.

The third period, from about 1800 through the Civil War, was in a great influence. The transcendentalists ideas came from Germany to enlarge the American approbative controversial concepts on personality. "The position of the activity of man as a part of the total cosmic process, and the view of man as character of activity in the levels above nature," or transcendentalists influences in this period, but also going somewhat beyond it, were more pronounced about and was strongly, the "peak of the white Religion." In addition to the philosophical positions, there was developed a distinct American philosophy.

The fourth period was under the leadership of the St. Louis Philosophical Society, which was organized in 1866 by a group of men with intensely interested in German idealism. The movement was "extremely effective," mainly through the support of speculative philosophy which relates from

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1. Dr. Alvin Samuel Gregg introduction to Essays Philosophy, dissertation for an analytic treatment of Some Current Attitudes in American Philosophical Thought (New York: 1927 in 1931). This quotation is taken from the introduction of the dissertation.

1867 to 1893.[2] Personalism gained increased momentum in this period through the composite work of Thomas Davidson, William Torrey Harris, and George Holmes Howison.

The fifth period of American philosophy overlaps the fourth somewhat; it dates roughly from the middle of the last half of the nineteenth century to the present. There now develops a more consciously professional and American trend. Personalism was continued in the early part of this period by William Torrey Harris, who was during these years an educational administrator of profound influence rather than a metaphysician, Josiah Royce, George Holmes Howison, who was at this time a mature writer and beloved teacher, Mary Whiton Calkins, and Borden Parker Bowne. The last three, who are the main subjects of our investigation, brought the development of personalism in the United States to mature expression in specific types.

A personalistic form of idealism has been a dominant philosophy in America.[3] Moreover, on the basis of our in-

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2. The Journal was an excellent forum for the then young American philosophers, Pierce, James, Howison, Royce, and Dewey. It also enabled Americans to become "aware of their philosophical heritage." For excellent discussions of the St. Louis School see Townsend, PIUS, 116-130, Perry, Art. (1936), and Perry, SLM.
3. Santayana has rightly pointed out that idealism has been a dominant philosophy in America, little as he relished this fact. See his discussion of "The Genteel Tradition in American Philosophy," Art. (1911). ~~Kelley,~~ Wright, in his concise treatment of American philosophy, has written that "between about 1875 and 1900 almost every professor of

vestigation, it is discovered that in each period men contributed hard-won ideas that cohere in a personalistic ensemble which is most conspicuously represented by Howison, Calkins, and Bowne.

1. Samuel Johnson (1696-1722).

Samuel Johnson, a noted clergyman and educator, was the first American thinker to put the idea of self-activity at the center of his philosophy. Born at Guilford, Connecticut, the 14th of October, 1696, and of an excellent family background,[4] he was destined by his father to a life of business. His splendid education and fondness for books, however, enabled him to devote himself to the Church and the field of philosophy. He was attracted early to the latter through the writings of Descartes, Boyle, Locke, and Newton, against which he had been cautioned in his college days because of their corrupt influence.[5] The most permanent influence upon his thinking, however, was made by Bishop Berkeley, whom he met in Rhode Island upon the latter's visit there in

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philosophy in the country was an idealist, and the idealists remained in the majority for a decade or two later." HOMP, 485. Müller adds: "Vorherschaft des praktisch-moralischen und des personalistisch-individualistischen Denkens charakterisiert die amerikanische Philosophie." AP, 288.

4. Chandler, SJ, 1.
5. Johnson, Autobiography, first published in Schneider, SJ, I, 6.

vestigation, it is discovered that it was partial and conditioned mind-and-body state centre in a phenomenistic ensemble which is more dangerously represented by Emerson, Whitman, and Bergson.

4. Samuel Johnson (1709-1784).

Samuel Johnson, a noted eighteenth century moralist, was the first American thinker to put the idea of self-activity at the center of his philosophy. Born in Guilford, Connecticut, the 14th of October, 1709, and of an Episcopalian family background,[4] he was destined by his father to a life of business. His religious conversion and throughness for books, however, enabled him to devote himself to the Church and the field of philosophy. He was advanced early to the Indian ministry and writings of Berkeley, Locke, and Newton, against which he had been equipped in his college days by means of their original influence.[5] His most prominent influence upon his thinking, however, was made by Plato (whom he met in Moses Paine's) upon the intuitive vital idea in

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philosophy in the country was an idealist, and his thinking was centered in the reality for a "Maker or God Almighty." ibid. Quoted in: "Introducing the Pragmatism-Idealism not the pragmatism-intellectualism-activism-theism Dewey characterizes the mechanistic-theism." Op. cit., 203.

5. Dewey, op. cit., 1.

6. Johnson, Autobiography. First published in Scribner's, 1929.

1729. Although his new idealism did not make a profound impression upon colonial thought, it is recognized that Johnson was one of the most remarkable men of his century in America.[6]

Johnson's relationship to personalism may be seen in his emphasis upon self-activity in epistemology, metaphysics, and ethics. He added to Descartes' "I perceive," "I perceive and act, therefore I am."[7] He held much in common with Locke and Berkeley, yet he went beyond them. In Locke there are traces of an activistic view of mind; Berkeley defines spirit as active. Johnson emphasizes that activity still more. His ethical system, one of the first to be formulated in America, placed self-activity at the center.

a. Epistemology.

In the opening section of Elementa Philosophica, Johnson deals with the first principles of logic and metaphysics. There he traces the steps in the operation of the mind from its first sense impressions until it arrives at "that Perfection and Enjoyment of itself, which is the great End of its Being."[8] By mind, Johnson means any intelligent active being. It receives its knowledge from three sources.

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6. Cf. Nicholas Murray Butler, in his foreword to Schneider, SJ, I, v.
7. Jones, EAP, 31.
8. Johnson, NOE, 1.

1938. Although his new translations had been a profound inspiration upon Marshall Chapman, it is recognized that Hernandez was done of the most [illegible] in of his country in America.[7]

Johnson's relationship to [illegible] mysticism may be seen in the emphasis upon self-activity in moral choice, redemption, and ethics. He added to Emerson's "I [illegible] active and act", therefore, I am,"[8] an ethic which, in common with Locke and Berkeley, put no [illegible] beyond them. In Locke there was trace of an activity-view of mind: perceiving consists partly as passive. Johnson emphasizes that activity solely mind. The original system, one of the first to be translated in America, placed self-activity as the source.

a. Sotaberiaeg.

In the opening section of [illegible] Sotaberiaeg, Johnson deals with the first principle of [illegible] and theosophies. There he traces the [illegible] as the [illegible] of the mind from the first [illegible] transformations until it arrives at "that perfection and [illegible] of [illegible], which is the great end of the being."[9] By this, Johnson means the [illegible] active being. It [illegible] the [illegible] from other [illegible].

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6. Op. Nicholas Murray Butler, In his [illegible] to Sotaberiaeg, [illegible], p.
7. Jones, [illegible], [illegible].
8. Johnson, [illegible], 1.

First of all, the mind has perceptions of "objects ab extra" from passive use of the senses. These are simple ideas. Second, the mind has ideas of "objects ab intra," i.e., the mind is conscious, through imagination and memory, of objects not present to the senses. The third source is the "intellectual light," the power of conceiving abstracted or spiritual objects. This intuitive intellectual light is derived from the "universal Presence and Action of the DEITY, or a perpetual Communication with the great Father of Lights."[9] One might compare this analysis with that of John Locke. To be sure, Johnson does draw from Locke, nevertheless he adds the idea that the actions of the mind in gaining knowledge "flow from a Principle of Self-exertion,"[10] and that "we have within us a principle of conscious perception, intelligence, activity, and self-exertion."[11] The activity of a self is basic in such a theory of knowledge.

b. Metaphysics.

The idea of self-activity is also of capital importance in Johnson's metaphysics. This is seen in his discussion of causality when he distinguishes between apparent and

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9. Johnson, NOE, 13.
10. Ibid., 5.
11. Ibid., 2. Johnson transcended Berkeley here, as he did in his idea of "objects ab intra," for this idea of self-activity, while admitted by Berkeley, was not stressed in his writings.

vizad of all, the mind has perceptions of "objects in mind" from passive use of the senses. These are simple ideas. Second, the mind has ideas of "objects in mind," i.e., the mind is conscious, through imagination and memory, of objects not present to the senses. The third source is the "intellectual idea," the power of conceiving abstracted or complex objects. This intuitive intellectual light is derived from the "universal presence and action of the DEITY, or a personal communication with the great Father of lights."[9] One might compare this analysis with that of John Locke. Be sure, Johnson does draw from Locke, nevertheless he cites the line that the notions of the mind in gaining knowledge "flow from | intuition of self-existence,"[10] and that "we have within us a principle of conscious perception, intuitive, activity, and self-existence."[11] The activity of a mind is based in such a theory of knowledge.

b. Hierarchy.

The idea of self-activity is also of capital importance in Johnson's metaphysics. This is seen in his discussion of sensality when he distinguishes between apparent and

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9. Johnson, Moral, 16.
10. Ibid., 8.
11. Ibid., 8. Johnson commonplaced Barclay's Apology, as he did in his idea of "objects in mind." For this idea of self-activity, while admitted by Barclay, was not stressed in his writings.

real causes and between necessary and voluntary causes; both of these distinctions figure in most later personalism. "It appears," he wrote, "that only intelligent active Beings or Spirits, can be truly efficient Causes."[12] He refers to voluntary effects as those which "are produced by a free voluntary Cause acting from a Principle of conscious Design and Self-exertion."[13] In a letter to Bishop Berkeley he expressed this thought, saying, "A proper active efficient cause I can conceive none but Spirit; nor any action, strictly speaking, but where there is a Will."[14] Further, he reasons by analogy that inasmuch as there are active finite beings, there is an infinitely intelligent and active being, the "Father and Lord of all." This "infinite eternal Mind . . . comprehendeth all Space and Duration, and every Thing that is within His boundless intellect."[15] It maintains unity within multiplicity, identity through diversity, and its "whole is greater than either of its parts." It produces matter and form by "will and power." Finally, "The whole System of Spirits or intelligent Beings, as being endowed with Understanding, Counsel, Design and Liberty of Acting," is "under the Conduct and Moral Government of the DEITY."[16] The intelligent, self-activity of the Real is clearly

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12. Johnson, NOE, 21.
13. Ibid., 20-21.
14. Quoted by Schneider, SJ, II, 271.
15. Johnson, NOE, 35-36.
16. Johnson, ITSP, 6.

real causes and between necessary and voluntary causes; both of these distinctions figure in most later presentations. "It squares," he wrote, "that only intelligent beings should be subtle, and be only efficient beings."[12] He rejects the voluntary offends on those which "are produced by a free voluntary power coming from a principle of operations beside self-exertion."[13] In a letter to Samuel Dewsbury he expressed this thought, saying, "a proper active principle cause I can accordingly none but spirit; nor any action, strictly speaking, but where there is a will."[14] Further, he reasons by analogy that inasmuch as there are active principles here, there is an infinitely intelligent and active being, the "Father and Lord of all." This "infinite eternal Mind . . . doth comprehend all things and Duration, and every Mind that is within his Dominion is intelligent."[15] It maintains unity within multiplicity, identity through diversity, and its "whole is greater than either of its parts."[16] It produces matter and form by "will and power." Finally, "the world species of Spirits or intelligent beings, as being endowed with Understanding, Counsel, Design and liberty of Action, is under the Conduct and moral Government of the Deity."[17] The intelligent, self-reflexive of the Mind is clearly

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14. Johnson, EOC, 21.
15. Ibid., 21-22.
16. Quoted by Sullivan, 76, 77, 77f.
17. Johnson, Ibid, 22-23.
18. Johnson, Ibid, 6.

evident in all of Johnson's thought.

c. Ethics.

In 1746, Johnson published his First Principles of Moral Philosophy.[17] It "received the approbation of sober and thoughtful men,"[18] and was referred to by one leading New England theologian as "the most perfect piece of Ethics, and in the best form, that I have seen in any language."[19] The Ethics is divided into two sections. The first deals with such speculative questions as the nature of man, the

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17. The second edition of Johnson's Moral Philosophy was even more personalistic than the first. In the first edition he had written, concerning knowledge of self-existence: "I know that I am made, because I have a Being and did begin to be." P. 23. In the second edition he wrote in place of this: "I know that I have a Being, because I perceive and act. . . . I can have no Notion of the Existence of an intelligent active Being without conscious Perception and Activity." Pp. 22-23. Further, the second edition indicates a closer relationship of thought between Johnson and Bowne than between him and Howison or Calkins; in a statement that was in the second edition but not in the first Johnson wrote of God: "He is therefore the great Parent Mind, from whom derives all Light and Knowledge to every created Intelligence. . . ." P. 28. Finally, Johnson's more thorough personalism in the second edition is evidenced in a statement concerning mental health that antedated much modern psychology. It appeared only in the second edition. "As One's Conscience is properly One's self, it is the greatest Madness in the World, for a Man to live at a perpetual Variance with himself, and the first Point of Wisdom, always to keep Friends with himself." P. 83. The second edition appears in Elementa Philosophica, published by Benjamin Franklin in 1752.
18. Beardsley, LOSJ, 123.
19. In Benjamin Coleman's letter to Johnson, in Beardsley, LOSJ, 123.

author of man, and the end of his being. The second section considers the specific duties of practical ethics that result from the speculative. The essential idea of Johnson's ethical system is seen in his definition of moral philosophy and of moral good. Moral philosophy is, in part, "knowledge of the Moral World, or the World of intelligent free Agents."[20] "Moral Good consists in freely choosing and doing whatsoever Truth and right Reason dictate as necessary. . . ."[21]

Johnson's concern for self was clearly seen throughout his entire system. He wrote, regarding the nature of man, that it is evidently active and "can chuse or refuse, will or nill, act or not act, from a Principle of Self-exertion."[22] From this he argued that man's creator, the "Almighty Being," must "have Understanding, Knowledge, Will, Force, and Activity; must have Liberty, Choice, Deliberation, Self-exertion."[23] The end of man's being is to improve himself in this life so that he can become "eternally happy in the Enjoyment of GOD and all that is good."[24] From these basic truths it follows that man as a rational and free agent is obligated to himself, to God, and to his fellow-creatures. Johnson's metaphysical personalism found its climax in ethical personalism.

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20. Johnson, FPMP (1st ed.), 9.
21. Ibid., 10.
22. Ibid., 17-18.
23. Ibid., 24.
24. Ibid., 42.

2. Jonathan Edwards (1703-1758).

Another significant leader of colonial thought who also expressed personalistic ideas was Jonathan Edwards. Considered by his earliest biographer "one of the greatest, best, and most useful of men, that have lived in this age,"[25] he closely allied himself, as had Johnson, to the church and the field of education. The only son of a Puritan minister in a family of eleven children, he received an excellent education, first at the hands of his father and elder sisters, and later at Yale College. He entered college at twelve years of age and later graduated with the highest honors.[26] Evidence of his "rare intellectual precocity"[27] is seen in a letter he wrote when twelve years of age refuting the idea of the materiality of the soul, and in an undergraduate paper entitled Of Being. It is said that "even while a boy, he began to study with his pen in his hand";[28] and as a man he continued to be a prolific writer. All through life he was systematic and vigorous in method, original and penetrating in thought. It was during his college days that he became specifically interested in philosophy, after having read in his third year John Locke's Essay on Human Understanding.

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25. Hopkins, LCOE, iii. See also the more recent biographies: McGiffert, JE, and Winslow, JE.
26. Jones, EAP, 46-47.
27. Allen, JE, 3. For an indication of Edwards' superior intelligence see also Smyth, Art. (1890).
28. Dwight, LOE, 33.

The suggestions of personalism in his thought are chiefly evident in these early days of his intellectual development.

The source of Edwards' idealism has been a debatable question over the years, but now seems to be fairly well settled. While his thought is similar in some respects to that of Johnson and Berkeley, it is independent of them. In an early Life of Berkeley, Fraser maintained that Edwards was dependent upon Berkeley,[29] yet thirty years later he concluded in his four volume Works of George Berkeley, "I find no positive proof that Berkeley was known to Edwards when his Notes were written," and further, "We may conclude that they never met."[30] It is also of interest to note in regard to Johnson's influence that as a student at Yale Edwards was discontented with him as a tutor.[31] On the other hand, Edwards was indebted to Locke, as mentioned, to Newton, and to Cudworth. Gardiner suggests that he may have also been influenced by the early part of Descartes' Meditations and by John Norris' Theory of the Ideal or Intelligible World.[32]

a. Epistemology.

Some suggestions of Personalism are seen in Edwards' theory of knowledge. He begins with Locke's view that knowl-

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29. Fraser, LOB, 182-190.
30. Fraser, WOGB, IV, 398.
31. Cf. Gardiner, Art. (1900), 586, and Christie, Art. (1931), 30.
32. Gardiner, Op. cit., 590.

The suggestions of parenthesis in his thought are distinctly evident in these early days of his intellectual development.

The source of Bergson's idealism has been a tendencies question over the years, but now seems to be fairly well settled. Emile Bréhier is quoting in some measure to that of Boutroux and Ravaisson, as the interpretations of Bergson as early idea of Tendency. Bergson acknowledgments that philosophy was developing upon Ravaisson,[30] and calling Bergson later on concluded in his Cours volume Monde et Dieu Bréhier. It seems so possible great that Ravaisson was known to Bergson when his Notes were written, and further, "We may conclude that they never met."[31] It is also of interest to note in regard to Bergson's Sorbonne lectures that a manuscript of Felix Ravaisson was discovered with his on a table.[32] On the other hand, Ravaisson was indebted to Lachelier, as mentioned, to Boutroux, and to Gabriel Tarde. Bréhier suggests that Bergson may also have influenced by the early work of Boutroux' Contingence and by John Morell's Theory of the Idea of Intelligible Order.[33]

c. Intuitionism.

Some suggestions of Intuitionism are found in Bergson's theory of knowledge. In Bergson, the Intuition view that brings

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30. Bréhier, Op. cit., 1089-1090.
31. Bréhier, Op. cit., IV, 1089.
32. Cf. Henri Gouhier, "Ravaisson (1900), Les Fondements de l'Intuitionisme," 30.
33. Bréhier, Op. cit., 1089.

edge depends upon sensation, and that spirit is power, yet differs from him in greater emphasis on the importance of the mind as an "active Cause."[33] The mind actively deals with the sense data, organizing separate sensations into an objective, coherent order of experience, building up knowledge by perceiving the union or disunion of ideas. An intuitive, divine light vitalizes knowledge without itself providing information; the end of all knowledge is to "understand divine things."[34] Specific acts of the mind consist of understanding and will, both of which are "the highest kind of created existence." The understanding is concerned with such factors of experience as perception, reasoning, and memory, whereas the will includes such factors as the affections, desires, and volitions. It is to be observed that Edwards thus includes emotion under will. He defines the faculty of the will as "that Faculty or Power or Principle of Mind by which it is capable of <u>choosing</u>: an Act of the Will is the same as an act of <u>chusing</u> or <u>choice</u>."[35]

b. Psychology.

Consideration of the will leads one logically to

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33. Edwards, FOW, 50. See Locke, ECHU, Bk. II, chp. XXI, sec. 4.
34. Edwards, <u>Works</u>, IV, 6. By "Works" will be meant the four volume Worcester edition published by Robert Carter and Brothers in 1881, unless otherwise stated.
35. Edwards, FOW, 1.

edge depends upon association, and that spirit is sense, yet differs from him in greater capacity on the importance of the mind as an "active Cause."[55] The mind actively deals with the sense data, organizing separate sensations into an objective, coherent order of experience, building up knowledge by perceiving the union or disunion of ideas. An intuitive, divine light vitalizes knowledge without itself providing information; the end of all knowledge is to "understand divine things."[56] Specific acts of the mind consist of understanding and will, both of which are "the highest kind of created existence." The understanding is concerned with such faculties or operations as perception, reasoning, and memory, whereas the will includes such factors as the affections, desires, and volitions. It is to be observed that Edwards thus isolates emotion under will. He defines the faculty of the will as "that faculty or power or principle of mind by which it is capable of choosing: an act of the will is the same as an act of choosing or election."[57]

b. Teleology.

Organization of the all-items one identity to

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55. Edwards, NOV, 22. See Jones, TOMV, BK. II, chp. XXI, sec. 4.

56. Edwards, Works, IV, 8. By "Works" will be meant the four volume Worcester edition published by Jonathan Dorter and Brothers in 1852, unless otherwise stated.

57. Edwards, End, 1.

Edwards' concern for other psychological problems which he treats personalistically. He emphasizes, for example, personal identity, writing in his discourse, "Original Sin," "If we come to the personal identity of created intelligent beings . . . it cannot be denied that this is one thing essential to it."[36] He also emphasizes activity and accepts the theory of interaction common to personalists. The soul causes activity; the mind causes alterations in the body; the soul is the author of external actions. Finally, the affections are "very much the spring of men's action;"[37] and "the affections are no other than the more vigorous and sensible exercises of the inclination and will of the soul."[38]

While not directly relevant to personalistic theory, Edwards' observations of cases of conversion really mark the beginnings of modern psychology of religion. His critical analysis of the sense of guilt and sin, self-examination, and attainment of the "peace of God" on the part of his converts indicates his accurate knowledge of personality. He wrote of the conversions of the people of Northampton, Massachusetts:

> Commonly persons' minds immediately before this discovery of God's justice are exceedingly restless and in a kind of struggle and tumult, and sometimes in mere anguish; but generally, as soon as they have this conviction, it immediate-

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36. Edwards, Works, II, 487.
37. Edwards, Works, III, 6.
38. Ibid., 3.

Edwards' concern for other psychological problems which he treats personalistically. He emphasizes, for example, personal identity, writing in his discourses, "Original sin," "If we seem to the personal identity of preserve intelligent beings . . . It cannot be denied that this is one thing essential to it."[30] He also emphasizes activity and energy the theory of transmission common to personalists. The soul causes activity; the mind causes alterations in the body; the soul is the author of rational motions. Finally, the affections are "very much the spring of man's actions;"[27] and "the affections are no other than the more vigorous and sensible exercises of the inclination and will of the soul."[28]

While not directly pointed to personalistic theory, Edwards' observations of cause of conversion really mark the beginnings of modern psychology of religion. His critical analysis of the sense of guilt and sin, self-examination, and attainment of the "peace of God" on the part of his converts indicates his acute knowledge of personality. He wrote of the conversions of the people of Northampton, Massachusetts:

> Commonly persons' minds tumultuately before this discovery of God's justice are exceedingly distracted and in a kind of anguish and fright, and sometimes in more or less, commonly, as soon as they have this conviction, it immediate-

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26. Edwards, Works, II, 420.
27. Edwards, Works, III, 6.
28. Ibid., 5.

> ly brings their minds to a calm, and a before unexpected quietness and composure; and most frequently, though not always, the pressing weight upon their spirits is then taken away, and a general hope arises. . . .[39]

c. Metaphysics.

Self-activity and consciousness play a large part in Edwards' metaphysics.[40] His Calvinism, seen in some of his sermon titles, such as "Men Naturally God's Enemies," "The Eternity of Hell Torments," and "Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God," is especially evidenced in his attack on the "metaphysical notion of action and agency,"[41] by which he

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39. Edwards, NWOG, 41-42. See especially Edwards' objective account of the conversion of Abigail Hutchinson and of Phebe Bartlet. So important was this Narrative of the Surprising Work of God by Edwards that John Wesley published it in London in 1755 and sold copies for four pence. In his psychology of religious experience Edwards anticipated William James' monumental Gifford Lectures. When discussing the importance of suggestion and imitation in the conversion experience James says, "No one understands this better than Jonathan Edwards understood it already." James, VRE, 200n. See also Fay, APBJ, 46. Of greater importance to our investigation of the rise of personalism is the fact that Bowne recognized the importance of Edwards. Bowne wrote: "Edwards had not the language of modern psychology, but he had recognized the fact of suggestibility and the influence of expectation in the religious field with all clearness." Bowne, IOG, 141. It is also to be noted that Bowne was critical of the emotionalism of the early revival experiences "under Edwards's influence." Bowne, SIC, 214-215.
40. Edwards is recognized preëminently as a metaphysician. See Edwards, Works, II, 172, Townsend, PIUS, 39, and Gardiner, Art. (1900), 573.
41. Edwards, FOW, 198.

> by bringing death within his a reign, and a before unexpected quietness and nonchalance and most frequently, though not always, the punching weights upon their spirits is then taken away, and a general hope arises. . . .[39]

c. Metaphysics.

Self-activity and consciousness play a large part in Edwards' metaphysics.[40] His Christian, even in some of his sermon titles, such as "God Mechanically Good's Enemies," "The Eternity of Hell Torments," and "Glorious in the Hands of an Angry God," is essentially evidenced in his concept of an "metaphysical notion of action and agency,"[41] by which in

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39. Edwards, 1800, 11-12. The typically Edwards' objective account of the conversion of Abigail Hutchinson and of Jonathan Parsons. He discovered was this Experience of the Spiritual Work of God by Edwards that other revival cru-sades. It in Boston in 1735 and sold copies for two pence. In his psychology of religious experiences Ed-wards anticipated William James' Scientific Pluralism Lectures. When discussing the importance of suggestion and imitation in the conversion experiences Jonathan says, "No one understands this better than Jonathan Edwards understood it already." Ibid., VIII, 2000. See also Fay, 1934, 66. Of greater importance to our investigation of the role of personalism is the fact that Edwards recog-nized the importance of dynamic. Some words "Edwards had not the language of modern psychology, but he had recognized the fact of suggestibility and the influence of excitation in the emotions fluid which all over-mean." Edwards, 1934, 141. It is also to be noted that Edwards was notified of the consciousness of the early re-vival experiences "under Edwards's influence." Edwards, 1910, 224-225.

40. Edwards is pronounced "profoundly an a metaphysician. See Edwards, Scott, 71, 172; Hopkins, 1765, 43, and Gardiner, Ave. (1900), 87.

41. Edwards, 1970, 108.

means the Arminian view. It is only fair to Edwards, however, to see that he conscientiously and sincerely attempted to maintain the idea of freedom on a Calvinistic basis, suggesting that necessity is not inconsistent with liberty.[42] In fact, he denies the charge of determinism, saying that "Man is entirely, perfectly, and unspeakably different from a meer Machine, in that he has Reason and Understanding, and has a Faculty of Will, and so is capable of Volition and choice."[43] Further, in his discussion "Concerning God's Moral Government," he holds that men are created in the image of their Creator, writing, "They are voluntary agents, and can produce works of their own will, design and contrivance, as God does."[44] Man is different from all of the other parts of the world in that he can know his Creator, the end for which he is made, and can actively promote the end and design of creation.

Edwards' central metaphysical idea is that all existence is to be thought of in terms of consciousness. Conscious beings alone really exist. "AS BODIES, the objects of our external senses, are but the shadows of beings."[45]

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42. Bowne, in fact, supports Edwards against the charge of determinism writing, "Indeed, it would be much nearer the truth to say that Calvinists were first among modern theologians to affirm a natural freedom in man." Bowne, SIT, 417-418.
43. Edwards, FOW, 226.
44. Edwards, Works, I, 566.
45. Edwards, "The Mind," in Works (Dwight ed.), I, 697.

"This Infinite and Omnipresent being cannot be solid."[46] Space and time are ideas in God's mind. For man they are merely conditions of his finite existence. This is personalistic idealism, as Berkeley and, later, Bowne held it. The specifically personalistic ideas of Edwards appear chiefly in his early metaphysical writing. However, they blend with his later theology. Gardiner has written:

> It is scarcely to be doubted that had Edwards been asked at any time in his later years to state exactly what he thought of the constitution of the material universe, he would have replied in much the terms in which he had expressed the meditations of his youth, that its substance was the "infinitely exact and precise Divine idea, together with an answerable, perfectly exact and stable Will, with respect to correspondent communications to created minds, and effects on their minds."[47]

d. Ethics.

The moral part of the universe is for Edwards, as later for Kant's personalistic ethics, the "end of all the rest of creation."[48] Basic in his idea of ethics are the principles of will, volition and agency. Seen against the background of his Calvinistic attack on the Arminian notion of the liberty of the will, one might wonder whether or not

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46. Edwards, in "Notes on Natural Science," Works (Dwight ed.), I, 706. Edwards' early essays do not appear in the Worcester edition of his works.
47. Gardiner, Art. (1900), 595-596.
48. Edwards, Works, II, 223.

"this infinite and Omnipresent being cannot be seen, see
Seen and view the Image in God's mind. For men they are
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> It is assured to be doubted that had Swedenborg
> been asked at any time in his later years to
> state exactly what he thought of the creation
> of the material universe, he would have
> replied in much the same is which he had re-
> peated the revelations of his youth. Even the
> mechanism was the "infinitely small and precious
> divine idea, together with an essence, pure-
> ly very exact and subtle matter, with respect to
> correspondent communications to arrested minds,
> and effects on their minds."[40]

d. Ideas.

The moral work of the universe is for Swedenborg, as later for Kant's personalistic ethics, the "end of all the work of creation."[43] Basic in his idea of ethics are the principles of will, volition and energy. Even against the background of his dualistic ethics on the Kantian position of the liberty of the will, one might wonder whether or not

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40. Edwards, in "Notes on Natural Science," Works (Yale ed.), I, 707. Edwards' early essays do not appear in the Worcester edition of his works.
41. Swedenborg, Ark. (1907), 1st-Leo.
42. Edwards, Works, II, 404.

individuals could exert free moral choice. Edwards is an emphatic champion of moral choice, although it must be understood that he distinguishes between a moral agent as a ruler and one as a subject. God being the only ruler, man is necessarily a subject under his control (a view manifestly out of harmony with Kantian autonomy).[49] Within that framework of creation man has complete moral freedom. It has been pointed out that Edwards distinguished man from the machine on the basis of choice and the ability to act. Here he distinguishes man from the beasts "in those Faculties & Principles of Nature, whereby He is capable of moral Agency."[50] The highest virtue is love to God; the greatest moral excellency is holiness. God is man's first cause and his last end.

While no attempt has been made to catalogue completely all the varied thoughts of this eminent theologian and philosopher, it is evident that he contributed to the general development of personalistic thought in America. An active mind is basic in his epistemology. A dynamic soul is central in his psychology. His metaphysics rests upon the consciousness of the Real, and his ethics upon the action of a moral agent.

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49. See Brightman's treatment of moral autonomy and especially his reference to Kant, ML, 266-267.
50. Edwards, FOW, 30.

individuals could assert from moral obligation. Whereas in an absolute observation of moral conduct, although it must be understood that he distinguishes between a moral agent as a voluntary and one as a subject. God being the only moral, man is necessarily a subject under his control (a view consistently with of harmony with Kantian authority).[29] Within that transcendent or creation man has a complete moral freedom. It has been pointed out that Hegel distinguished man from the machine on the basis of choice and the ability to act. Hegel so distinguishes man from the brute "in those faculties of intelligence of thought, consequently in a capable of moral agency."[30] The highest virtue is love to God; the greatest moral culpability is pointless. God is merely first cause and his last end.

While no attempt has been made to establish comprehensively all the varied thoughts of this eminent theologian and philosopher, it is evident that he contributed to the general development of personalistic thought in America. An active mind is bound in his metaphysics. A dynamic soul is manifest in his psychology. His epistemology rests upon the consciousness of the Deity, and his ethics upon the action of a moral agent.

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29. See Bowne's treatment of moral obligation and especially his reference to Kant, MO, 28-29.
30. Elements, 203, 23.

3. Amos Bronson Alcott (1799-1888).

The period of American philosophy from the time of Edwards to that of Bronson Alcott has been called the age of reason and the period of enlightenment. Its spirit was revolutionary and forward-looking. Men rebelled against the tyrannies of Europe and planned for the future of America. Action was dominant. Thinking was based upon deism, utilitarianism, humanism, free-willism, and later, idealism. Two groups helped make possible a later union of Christianity and philosophy, such as took place especially in the work of Borden Parker Bowne, by supporting liberal Christianity. These were the deists and the later group of transcendentalists, both holding that God is rational, that man is a moral agent, and that the physical universe is subservient to sentient beings. Their views therefore belong roughly in the personalist tradition.

Among the deists, Ethan Allen (1737-1789) was an early leader. He revolted against Puritanism and attacked the Calvinistic system, yet maintained that God is wise and that man is a rational agent. Benjamin Franklin (1706-1790) typified the spirit of the day by rising from New England provincialism to world recognition. He was a conventional deist of the period, but represented enterprising social-mindedness. He wrote a book on ethics in addition to his <u>Poor Richard</u>. Thomas Paine (1737-1809) was the chief

popularizer of deism. His claim to philosophic distinction is his book, The Age of Reason. Elihu Palmer (1764-1806), a religious radical, held to a supreme Deity, and maintained that man is possessed of moral and intellectual faculties. Thomas Jefferson (1743-1826) was a zealous freethinker whose social and political thought grew out of philosophic reflection. He rejected the Calvinism of Edwards, but was concerned with just and good government based upon recognition of the worth of every person.

More akin to personalism in spirit was a gradually developing transcendentalism. It is represented by such stalwart leaders of American thought as William Ellery Channing (1780-1842), Theodore Parker (1810-1860), Henry David Thoreau (1817-1862), Ralph Waldo Emerson (1803-1882), Amos Bronson Alcott (1799-1888), and Walt Whitman (1819-1892). Transcendentalism combined Platonism and the mysticism of Plotinus, the ethical idealism of Calvinism, and romanticism. It emphasized the "divinity of nature, the worth of man, and the capacity of man to know the truth directly."[51]

Alcott was closely associated with this latter group of thinkers, and has been called the most transcendental of the transcendentalists.[52] He differed from them, however, as he did from the deists, in his clear-cut personalism. He

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51. Muelder and Sears, DAP, 112.
52. Bates, Art. (1928), 139.

popularizer of deism. His claim to philosophic distinction is his book, The Age of Reason. Milton Palmer (1908-1956), a religious radical, leads to a supreme belief, and maintains that man is possessed of moral and intellectual faculties. Thomas Jefferson (1743-1826) was a zealous democratic social and political thought grew out of philosophic reflection. He rejected the fallacies of history, but was convinced with just and good government based upon recognition of the worth of every person.

Some while to consciousness in Britain was a gradually developing transcendentalism. It is represented by such statesmen of American democracy as William Ellery Channing (1780-1842), Theodore Parker (1810-1860), Henry David Thoreau (1817-1862), Ralph Waldo Emerson (1803-1882), James Russell Lowell (1819-1891), and Walt Whitman (1819-1892). Transcendentalism combined elements and the experience of Platonism, the religious idealism of Christianity, and pantheistic. It emphasizes the "divinity of nature", the world of man, and the capacity of man to know the truth directly.[1]

Albert Moe closely associates with Walt Whitman's poem of Whitman, and has been called the most transcendental of the transcendentalists.[2] He differed from them, however, as he did from the deists, in his element-not mysticism. He

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[1]. Boulger and Lees, op. cit.
[2]. Moe, op. cit. (1890), 139.

was the first thorough-going personalist. He contended for personalistic ideas in conversation with Channing earlier than 1838, "defended his thesis of personality" against the arguments of Emerson in 1863, and defined his position in 1877. His biographer, Shepard, has written of him, "The ideas implicit in Personalism are discoverable in nearly everything that Alcott thought and said and did."[53]

Alcott came from humble, early American ancestry. His schooling was limited to what he obtained in the district school and from two clergymen. He had hoped to go to Yale, but did not because it was necessary to help support the large family of which he was a member. He spent four and a half years, with little success, peddling in Virginia and the Carolinas. Philosophy claimed him, and he returned to New England. There he developed his personalism from many sources. He was familiar with Plato, Locke, Berkeley, Kant, and Edwards, was a frequent visitor at the St. Louis School, and knew Brokmeyer, Whitman, Davidson, Harris and Howison. He had most of these men lecture at Concord and thought well enough of Harris to recommend him to President Eliot of Harvard for a position on its faculty.[54] A clergy-

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53. Shepard, PP, 497. See also 494 and 495, and Alcott, TT, 153. It is to be noted, however, that as far as the investigator can determine Whitman was the first American to use the word "personalism." See Whitman, Art. (1868).
54. Alcott knew Howison, one of the chief subjects of our investigation, well, for he was not only impressed with Howison in St. Louis but also, as head of the Concord

was the first thoroughgoing personalist. He contended for personalistic ideas in conversation with Channing during the fall of 1839. Referring his study of "personality" against the arguments of Emerson in 1842, and defined his position in 1877. His biographer, Bowne, has written of him, "The inner depths in Personalism are discoverable in nearly everything that Alcott thought and said and did."[30]

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30. Bowne, op. cit., 207. See also 206 and 208, and Alcott, op. cit., 105. It is to be noted, however, that so far as the inventor can determine Bowne was not first to use the word "personalism." See Bowne's Art. (1888).

31. Almost some Horticulture of his brief sojourns of one investigation, well, for he was not only interested with Emerson in St. Louis but also, as head of the Concord

man wrote of Alcott's insistence on the personality of God, that it grew "out of his rare inborn piety."[55] Shepard adds a similar thought when he says that Alcott's personalism was "a coalescence of thoughts and attitudes with which he had been all his life familiar," and that it was "worked out by his habitual integration of his own native materials."[56]

a. Metaphysics.

Alcott was an avowed personalist. He held that all separate persons are harmoniously related to the Supreme Person. "The Person," he wrote in his diary in 1874, "is the presupposition of all things and beings."[57] This idea of a Being that is self-determined and independent was, for him, a "new calculus." It was

> an organon alike serviceable to metaphysician and naturalist - whereby things answer to thought, facts are resolved into truths, images into ideas, matter into mind, power into personality, man into God; the One soul in all souls revealed as the Creative Spirit pulsating in all breasts, immanent in all atoms, prompting all wills, and personally embosoming

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School of Philosophy, had him lecture there many times. Howison lectured there in 1879 on "Philosophy from Leibnitz to Hegel," in 1882 after his return from Europe on "Present Aspects of Philosophy in Germany," and in 1883 on "Hume and Kant." He was also announced as lecturing there in 1885, 1886, and 1887.

55. Bartol, Art. (1888), 5.
56. Shepard, PP, 499.
57. Shepard, JOBA, 450. This idea resembles Bowne's frequent remark that "personality is the key to reality."

all persons in one unbroken synthesis of Being.[58]

The phenomenal world is only an aspect of mind, which in turn is "crowned in personality." Frequent are the expressions, "Nature is thought in solution," "Nature is thought immersed in matter," "The world is but the symbol of the mind,"[59] and thinking "is the finding of the Person or Self, distinct from matter and mortality."[60] All other metaphysical ideas such as space, time, and causality are to be thought of in terms of a person. "The Person wanting all is wanting."[61] Only in terms of personality can one understand the Real.

b. Philosophy of Education.

Alcott's personalism led him to a progressive educational philosophy far in advance of his day. He is spoken of by Morrow as "the greatest of all American schoolmasters,"[62] and by McCuskey as the "catalytic agent" for the educational progressives of today.[63] He hoped to educate the entire personality. His educational procedure "was directed toward the harmonious development of the physical,

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58. Alcott, TAB, 164.
59. Ibid., 174-176.
60. Alcott, TT, 135.
61. Alcott, TAB, 182.
62. Morrow, FOLW, 9. See also Haefner, ETAP, for a critical consideration of Alcott's philosophy of education.
63. McCuskey, BAT, 170.

all persons in one unbroken dynamics of be-
ing.[58]

The phenomenal world is only an aspect of mind, which in turn is "dreamed in personality." Responses are the reactions, "desires to towards in activities," "actions in thought involved in instinct," "the world is but the symbol of the mind,"[59] and thinking "is the finding of the Person or self, distinct from nature and activity."[60] All other embodied things such as mind, time, and causality are to be thought of in terms of a person. "For instance anything only is wanting,[61] only in terms of personality can one understand the Real.

b. Philosophy of Education.

Aiyadis personalism led him to a comprehensive educational philosophy far in advance of his day. In an review of by Morris as "the greatest of all Eastern educationists,"[62] and by McGaffey as the "socially alert" for his educational perspectives of today,[63] he based to educate the entire personality. His educational procedure "was directed toward the harmonious development of the physical,

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58. Alcott, PAR, 126.
59. Ibid., 174-175.
60. Alcott, TT, 132.
61. Alcott, PAR, 126.
62. Morris, BOAM, 9. Introduction Tagore, SHRI, "an critical consideration of Alcottis philosophy of education".
63. McGaffey, MAN, 170.

esthetic, intellectual, and moral natures. . . ."[64] He attempted to discipline and liberalize the mind, to relate his students to the great minds of the ages, and to bring individuals into a social sense of community. "Living at the breath [sic] of Shakespeare," he wrote, "the depth of Plato, the height of Christ, gives mastery, or if not that, a worthy discipleship."[65] He had great hope in youth, and was encouraged by the fact that young people did not derive information from authority and tradition, but were "ambitious of entering upon the study of the human spirit, its origin, duties, and destinies. . . ."[66] He was not always successful in his schools, yet that itself is a tribute to his educational philosophy. An example of this is the fact that his Temple School in Boston finally closed when many parents refused to send their children there because a colored girl had been admitted. The strong spiritual note prevalent in Alcott's program is further evidenced in his view that knowledge was not enough to make a person. Knowledge must be accompanied by love lest it "lapse from pure intellect into sense." Love, "the proper intellect of spirit and spring of intuition," enables us to "find ourselves in Him who is ever seeking us."[67] Through the development of mind men come

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64. Bates, Art. (1928), 139.
65. Alcott, TAB, 134.
66. Alcott, TT, 24.
67. Alcott, TAB, 185-186.

cabbalistic, logicistical, and moral nature. . . .[45] He attempted to discipline and liberalize the mind, to relate his students to the great minds of the ages, and to bring intellectual life a social sense of community. "Living as one breeds [sic] of Kindergarten," he wrote, "the depth of their the poverty of Gospel, glum monkery, of it was said, a unhappy disciplinarian."[46] He had great hope in youth, and was encouraged by the fact that young people did not derive information from authority and tradition, but were "conditions of entering upon the study of the human society, its origin, duties, and destinies. . . ."[47] He was not always successful in his endeavors, yet that itself is a testimony to his educational philosophy. An example of this is the fact that his Temple School in Boston finally closed when many parents refused to send their children there because a colored girl had been admitted. The strong religious note prevalent in Alcott's programs is further evidenced in his view that knowledge was not enough to make a person. Knowledge must be accompanied by love that it "begets true pure intellect from human." Love, "the power instinct of wisdom and spring of intuition," enables us to "take ourselves in life who is ever seeking us."[48] Through the development of mind was done

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45. Peace, art. (1868), 132.
46. Alcott, TAB, 132.
47. Alcott, TT, 24.
48. Alcott, TAB, 134-136.

into "the Palace of Power and Personality."[68]

c. Social Philosophy.

Alcott's social philosophy, based upon his metaphysical idea that all persons have eternal significance, was a voice of the future. He rejected the Puritan heritage of individualism, held so strongly by Emerson, to look forward with Whitman, Davidson, Harris and Howison to a more adequate form of social solidarity. As all finite persons are related to each other and to the Supreme Person in the spiritual realm, so all persons must be organized in society. The only sure means of freedom and happiness is in association.[69] "Personality," he wrote, "pertains to the state. . . Being one, states represent community of persons solely." The "richest crop" of a Christian community "is a virtuous and free population."[70] His liberal social philosophy is evidenced in the above-mentioned fact that he was concerned for the educational opportunities of negroes. He was half a century in advance of his day when he advocated the then

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68. Alcott, TAB, 178.
69. A modern personalist, Brightman, expresses a similar idea in the phrase "organic pluralism." Alcott and his personalistic contemporaries were striving for a balance between early American individualism and what has come to be totalitarianism. They sought an enlightened, well-organized civilization in which personality could be expressed most creatively.
70. Alcott, TT, 53-54.

radical idea that women must "possess equal privileges with man" in forming the laws of the state and in administering them.[71] He agrees here with Whitman, Calkins, and Bowne, and thereby was a voice of the future rather than one of the past. In this respect he was a more acute thinker than Emerson, and wrote in his journal September 12, 1868, that Emerson

> declines signing Lucy Stone's appeal for Woman's Right to Suffrage, but will write and send her his views. I will write and send her my signature. I say: "Gladly sign your appeal, assured that woman is soon to have her place in the state with every right of the citizen. What ideal republics have fabled, ours is to be. Nor need we fear the boldest experiments which the moral sense of the best women conceives and advocates."[72]

Shepard recounts an occasion when Alcott attended a meeting of the New England Labor League at seventy-five years of age. Alcott

> listened with keen interest to such 'declared radical men' and 'communists' as Colonel Green, Stephen Foster, E. H. Heywood, and John Orvis. He himself spoke at the convention, expressing approval of its general purposes and suggesting some of the quieter and less destructive ways by which reformers might do their work.[73]

"Labor," he later wrote, "is wholesome." It "humanizes, exalts."[74] Personality, then, finds its greatest expression

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71. Alcott, TAB, 90.
72. Shepard, JOBA, 389.
73. Shepard, PP, 498-499.
74. Alcott, TT, 50. This is especially similar to progressive social views expressed by Whitman, Davidson, and Calkins.

in actively co-operating with others in building the perfect moral community.

d. Philosophy of Religion.

The expansive thought of Alcott culminated in a personalistic philosophy of religion. Reality is spiritual; the Supreme Person is God; man, who has eternal worth, experiences immortality. What creeds a man possesses, what hymns are sung, or whether or not there is a prayer in a formal worship service are inconsequential questions to Alcott. "Religion is too essential to cling to any dogma."[75] The important thing is that "Personalism, the dependence of the many on the One . . . conducts by logical sequence to theism, idealism, and the positive faiths of the orthodox sects."[76] Alcott wrote in his diary of January 8, 1868, "I insist on Personal Theism, and the need of instrumental action for planting it."[77] In September of the following year, he wrote in Concord, "Plainly, the drift of thinking here in New England, if not elsewhere is toward a Personal Theism. . . ."[78] The Supreme Person is the creator and sustainer of the world and all life; He is transcendent yet immanent, the all in all.

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75. Alcott, TT, 102.
76. Ibid., 153.
77. Shepard, JOBA, 390.
78. Alcott, CD, 265.

in actively co-operating with others in uplifting the moral community."

d. Philosophy of Religion.

The imaginative thought of Alcott culminated in a personalistic philosophy of religion. Reality is spiritual: the supreme Person is God: man, who has eternal worth, experiences immortality. Man creeds a God worth serving, what Hymns are sung, or whether or not there is a prayer in a formal worship service are idiosyncratic questions to Alcott. "Religion is too essential to delay to any degree."[76] The important thing is that "Personality, the dominance of the many on the one . . . conducts by logical sequence to choice, idealism, and the positive faith of the enthusiast seeks."[77] Alcott wrote in his diary of January 6, 1866, "I insist on Personal Theism, and the need of instrumental action for planting it."[78] In the tenor of the Idealist year, he wrote in January, "Reality, the merit of idealism here in New England, is not elsewhere. It beyond a Personal Theism. . . ."[79] The supreme Person is the creator and sustainer of the world and, if later, he is transcendent yet immanent, the all in all.

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76. Alcott, TT, 103.
76. Ibid., 116.
77. Shepard, JOAM, 380.
78. Alcott, OT, 305.

Man, too, is a person of infinite worth. He is a "soul, informed by divine ideas, and bodying forth their image."[79] He utilizes will to progress from instinct to personality through the several stages of sense experience, understanding, fancy, reason, imagination, and conscience. He has freedom to create his own world. "Pure personal Power is above restraint or constraint, being a law in itself."[80] He is bound only by the Kantian categorical imperative. "None can escape THE PRESENCE, THE OUGHT is everywhere and imperative."[81] Finally, man is immortal; he "accepts nothing short of an eternity of fellowships in his illimitable future."[82] "Heaven is . . . our port and resting place sometime in the stream of ages."[83]

4. Walt Whitman (1819-1892).

Walt Whitman, the "American Giant" of literature, was likewise a champion of personalism. He was, as far as the author can determine, not only the first American to use the word, but also the first one to publish a magazine article entitled "Personalism."[84] He sang with spirit: "Chanter of

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79. Alcott, TAB, 166.
80. Alcott, TT, 158.
81. Ibid., 159.
82. Ibid., 174.
83. Alcott, TAB, 208.
84. See Galaxy, 5 (1868), 540-547. An annotated edition of this article appears in the appendix.

Man, too, is a person of infinite worth. He is a "soul, informed by divine idea, and bearing godlike image."[70] He delights will to progress from dualism to spirituality through the several stages of sense consciousness, understanding, fancy, reason, imagination, and contemplation. He has freedom to create his own world. "Very personal, come the above paintings or engravings, being a law in himself." He is bound only by one law--an ever-progressive imperative. "Love can change THE PROGRESS, THE MORAL is everywhere an imperative."[71] Finally, man is immortal; he "accepts the short of an eternity of following in his children's future."[72] "Heaven is . . . our path and reaching divine progress in the advance of age."[73]

4. Walt Whitman (1819-1892).

Walt Whitman, the "American Christ" of literature, was likewise a champion of humanitarian. He was, as Fox in his edition has determined, not only the first American to use the word, but also the first one to publish a magazine article entitled "Democratic."[74] He sang with Emerson: "Democracy or

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70. Alcott, SAM, 124.
71. Alcott, ST, 129.
72. Ibid., 130.
73. Ibid., 132.
74. Alcott, SAM, 208.
75. See Fox, 3 (1929), 160-167. An annotated edition of this article appears in his appendix.

Personality . . . I project the history of the future"[85] and, "I will be the bard of Personality."[86] He was Hegelian in his philosophy, yet paradoxically, was a "typical" personalist in the manner of Alcott or Bowne, rather than an absolutistic personalist as Harris, Royce or Calkins. He recognized the totality of the real, but defiantly advocated "Individuality . . . Identity . . . Personalism."[87] He agreed with Alcott that the many are dependent upon the one, and that the relationship between man and God is personal. He united social responsibility and individuality into his "typical" personalism, and proclaimed what has later been called "organic-pluralism." He spoke of "ensemble-Individuality,"[88] and chanted:

> ONE'S-SELF I sing, a simple separate person,
> Yet utter the word Democratic, the word En-
> Masse.[89]

a. Personalism in Whitman's Life.

Whitman was born May 31, 1819, in West Hills, New

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85. Whitman, LOG, 11.
86. Quoted by Shephard, WWP, 16.
87. Whitman, Art. (1868), 540.
88. Ibid., 542.
89. Whitman, LOG, 9. Miss Abbott, in an unpublished thesis entitled "The Personalism of Walt Whitman," declares that Whitman is a personalist in four respects. He maintains (1) that this is a personal world, (2) that the self is social, but also separate, (3) that the world is a function of intelligence, and (4) that the world is a revelation of the cosmic activity of a Supreme Will—God. See Abbott, PWW, 30-42.

Huntington, Long Island.[90] His father and mother were uneducated, and seemingly had little concern for his education. He left school at the age of thirteen, having learned only reading, writing, arithmetic, geography, and grammar. Nevertheless, he became a school teacher in Queens and Suffolk Counties at the age of eighteen, and in 1841 began his liberal journalistic work. As editor of the Daily Aurora in New York, he supported the Tyler Administration and defended Dickens (who was then on an American tour) for being a "democratic writer" against an attack from the Washington Globe. A few years later he became editor of the Brooklyn Eagle. He lost his job about 1846, however, because "he opposed his

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90. See any of the many biographies of Whitman for details of his life. Bliss Perry's Walt Whitman, published in 1906, has been, and in many ways still is, the "standard." Not a biography but extremely pertinent is Sara Abbott's above-mentioned unpublished Boston University master's thesis entitled The Personalism of Walt Whitman (1926). There are many recent biographies of considerable value. Louise Pound published an excellent sketch in 1935. See her Walt Whitman, ix-xlvi. In 1937 Edgar Lee Masters published his excellent study, Whitman. Two years later there appeared Newton Arvin's Whitman, and Esther Shephard's Walt Whitman's Pose. In 1941 Frances Winwar published American Giant. For an extremely critical review of this "provocative, seducing" biography, see Furness, Art. (1942)[1], 423-432. In 1942 Hugh l'Anson Fausset published Walt Whitman: Poet of Democracy. For a review of this book from the personalistic point of view see Furness, Art. (1942)[2], 557-560. A final biography of significance is Henry Seidel Canby's recent Walt Whitman: An American (1943). The definitive book on Whitman will perhaps be the one soon to be published by Furness. The present writer is indebted to Furness for allowing him to see the manuscript, especially Chapter 18, which is entitled "Personalism." — Whenever Specimen Days or Democratic Vistas are referred to, it will be to Pound's edition.

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employer on the question of the extension of slavery into newly acquired territory."[91] It was said that he established the Brooklyn Freeman in 1850 "to promulgate his favorite 'Free Soil,' and other reformatory doctrines."[92]

Whitman published his first edition of Leaves of Grass in 1855. Eight hundred copies were printed, but there were practically no sales. Emerson praised it; Whittier threw his presentation copy into the fire.[93] The second and third editions were as unsuccessful as the first.

Whitman spent the years from 1863 to 1873 as a volunteer nurse in the hospitals for Civil War casualties and as a clerk in Washington. An eye-witness gives an excellent account of how the poet expressed through his life a regard for the personality of the wounded and dying:

> Never shall I forget one night when I accompanied him on his rounds, through a hospital filled with those young Americans whose heroisms he has sung in deathless numbers. There were three rows of cots, and each cot bore its man. When he appeared, in passing along, there was a smile of welcome and affection on each face, however wan, and his presence seemed to light up the place, as it might be lit by the

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91. Pound, WW, xv. It will be recalled that a personalistic friend of Whitman, Alcott, saw his Temple School in Boston close June 22, 1839, because he had admitted a negro girl on the basis of respect for personality.
92. Quoted by Perry, WW, 49n.
93. Emerson wrote: "I find it the most extraordinary piece of wit and wisdom that America has yet contributed. . . . I greet you at the beginning of a great career." The Boston Post, however, commented upon its "exulting audacity of Priapus-worshipping obscenity." Quoted by Perry, WW, 99 and 101.

employer on the question of the retention of slavery into newly acquired territory.[91] It was said that he called-limited the popular Freeman in 1860 "to propagate his favorite 'Free Soil,' and other unfortunately doctrines."[92]

Dickson modified his first edition of Leaves of Grass in 1860. Eight hundred copies were printed, but seem were practically no sales. Emerson replied to Whitman above his pronouncement copy into one line.[93] Yet accept and hard editions were as necessarily as the first.

Dickson found the poems from 1855 to 1872 as a volume-book where in the Socialists for Civil War reminiscing and as a clerk in Washington. An over-thinness gives an excellent account of how the book concerned Lincoln. His Life a record for the personality of the wounded man dying:

> Never shall I forget one night when I encountered Walt on his rounds, through a horrible filled with long lines of wounded whose faces lean to lie among in dreadfully numbers. There were fewer rows of cots, and been not long the war. Then he approached, in passing along. Then was a medical relieve and attention on such face. Hundred was, and his presence seemed to lights on the sleep. As it might be lit by the

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91. Young, op. cit. It will be regretted that a pro-Southern friend of Whitman, Albert, was the vehicle chosen to be-tion close time to. Albert, however, he had submitted a negro list on the basis of respect for transcendentalists.

92. Quoted by Perry, op. cit.

93. Emerson wrote: "I find it the most extraordinary piece of wit and wisdom that America has yet contributed. . . . I greet you at the beginning of a great career." The Boston Post, however, commented upon his "exhibition of-nasty of intense-worship-ing community." Quoted by Perry, op. cit. pp. 101.

> Son of Love. From cot to cot they called him, often in tremulous tones, or whispers; they embraced him, they touched his hands, they gazed at him. To one he gave a few words of cheer, for another he wrote a letter home, to others he gave an orange, a few comfits, a cigar, a pipe and tobacco, a sheet of paper or a postage stamp, all of which and many other things were in his capacious haversack. From another he would receive a dying message for mother, a wife, or sweetheart; for another he would promise to go on an errand; to another, some special friend, very low, he would give a manly, farewell kiss. He did the things for them that no nurse or doctor could do, and he seemed to leave a benediction at every cot he passed. The lights had gleamed for many hours that night in the hospital before he left it, and as he took his way towards the door, you could hear the voice of many a stricken hero calling, "Walt, Walt, Walt! Come again, come again!"[94]

Whitman was a clerk in the Indian Bureau only a short time before he was dismissed because he possessed Leaves of Grass, which was "indecent literature." He was then a clerk in the Attorney General's Office until 1873, when he returned to Camden, as a cripple. He died March 26, 1892, at the age of seventy-three. The breadth of his personality is indicated by the readings at his funeral. They were from "Whitman, Confucius, Guatama, Jesus, the Koran, Isaiah, St. John, the Zend Avesta, and Plato."[95]

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94. Quoted from Page, CAP, 688. This war experience gave Whitman increased clarity of the social and political relationship between the eternal "I" and the many. He summed up the three years, saying: "It has given me my most fervent views of the true ensemble and extent of the States." SD, 97.
95. Perry, WW, 271.

b. Whitman's Relationship to Other Personalists.

Whitman developed his personalism legitimately from his own thought, the spirit of the day, and the views of both German and American idealists. In fact, he also learned from Plato, Socrates, and Christ. He wrote, in his poem "The Base of All Metaphysics,"

> . . . Having studied the new and antique, the
> Greek and Germanic systems,
> Kant having studied and stated, Fichte and
> Schelling and Hegel,
> Stated the lore of Plato, and Socrates greater
> than Plato,
> And greater than Socrates sought and stated,
> Christ divine having studied long,
> I see reminiscent to-day those Greek and Germanic systems,
> See the philosophies all. . . .[96]

Whitman must have been partially indebted to Socrates, Plato, and Christ for his belief in the objectivity of the ideal, the significance of self-activity, and the importance of persons as real. He gained some of his ethical personalism from Kant, more confidence in the ego as the fundamental reality from Fichte, and his poetic intellectual intuition from Schelling.[97] He was more deeply indebted to Hegel than to any of the others.[98] In Democratic Vistas he predicted

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96. Whitman, LOG, 101-102.
97. See Whitman's discussion in SD, 224.
98. Whitman knew only the English language, hence he read only translations and magazine articles. He learned Hegel chiefly from Gostwick's German Literature. See Fulguhm, Art. (1941), Masters, WHI, 68, and Perry, WW, 264-265. Perry has written that Whitman "loved . . . to brood upon the teachings of German philosophy. Even

b. Whitman's Relationship to Other Transcendentalists.

Whitman developed his pantheistic ideal directly from his own thought, the spirit of the age, and the views of both Emerson and Transcendentalists. In fact, he also learned from Alcott, Emerson, and others. He wrote, in his notes, "the book of all Nature."

> . . . Having absorbed the new and modern, the
> Greek and Roman, Asia,
> Egypt and Persia, Judea,
> Gaul, Britain, America and Africa, Science and
> Democracy and Science,
> Loaded his love of Kings, and Governments, Churches
> Arts, Laws,
> And produce thus Economics and Law, Religion,
> Thrilled divine Poetry, Musical Song,
> Then realizing the Union, Union, and Ion-
> manic Science,
> Seeking Spirituality, etc. . . .[5]

Whitman never have been specifically influenced by Emerson, Alcott, and others for his belief in the objectivity of the ideal, the significance of self-reliance, and the importance of poets as seers. He gained some of his ideas, perhaps, from Fourier, Jacob Boehme, and the transcendental Society from Boston, but his philosophy and belief differed from Transcendentalism.[6] He was more nearly indebted to Paine than to any of the others.[7] In Democratic Vistas he mentions

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5. Whitman, Leaves, 101-102.
6. See Whitman's discussion in Gr. Mag.
7. Whitman knew only the Transcendentalism, having no comprehensive relations and knowing nothing. Transcendentalism derived mainly from relatively modern sources, see Highlights, Leaves. (1855), Whitman, 1855, and Leaves, 1856-60. Perry has written that Whitman "Leaves . . . to depend upon the teachings of a Tom Paine." Perry

that America's poets would be "consistent with the Hegelian formulas and consistent with modern science."[99] In Specimen Days he says that Hegel's system becomes "a coherent metaphysical system . . . illuminating the thought of the universe, and satisfying the mystery thereof to the human mind, with a more consoling scientific assurance than any yet."[100]

Whitman transcended the German thinkers in his personalism by an appeal to the total personality rather than to one of its component parts. As one might criticize modern art for its barren appeal to only one or two factors of personality, so Whitman criticized the German thinkers.

> While the contributions which German Kant and Fichte and Schelling and Hegel have bequeath'd to humanity . . . are indispensable to the erudition of America's future, I should say that in all of them, and the best of them, when compared with the lightning flashes and flights of the old prophets and exaltés, the spiritual poets and poetry of all lands, (as in the Hebrew Bible,) there seems to be, nay certainly is, something lacking—something cold, a failure to satisfy the deepest emotions of the

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in his early manhood he had projected a course of Sunday evening lectures upon Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. The misty grandiose outlines of the Hegelian philosophy were particularly congenial to him." WW, 264. It is to be noted, however, that Whitman was not a systematic philosopher, nor a master of the systems of German philosophy as was his personalistic friend, Harris.

99. Whitman, DV, 324.

100. Whitman, SD, 225. In a footnote (226 n.) Whitman says that "It is strange to me that they [the formulas of Hegel] were born in Germany, or in the old world at all." That is, Whitman felt, with members of the St. Louis School and others, that Hegelian ideas were "an essential and crowning justification of New World democracy. . . ." SD, 226n.

> soul—a want of living glow, fondness, warmth, which the old exaltés and poets supply, and which the keenest modern philosophers so far do not.[101]

Whitman was related to the thought of many eminent Americans. William Channing and Theodore Parker were two of the few purchasers of his first edition of Leaves of Grass, Channing having bought his copy on Emerson's recommendation.[102] Whitman spoke in tribute of Thomas Paine on the anniversary of the latter's 140th birth-day.[103] He called Jefferson the "greatest of the great."[104] It is of particular significance to note here, however, that Whitman was a friend in person and thought of Alcott, who has been discussed, and Harris, who will be considered later. Whitman wrote, when on a visit in Concord to see Emerson and Alcott: "Near by stopp'd at the house of W. T. Harris, the Hegelian, who came out and we had a pleasant chat while I sat in the wagon."[105] Whitman knew Harris well from his St. Louis visit, and kept up his acquaintance by later correspondence.

The relationship between Whitman and Alcott is significant. Whitman entitled a magazine article "Personalism" in 1868;[106] Alcott defined personalism in his Table Talk,

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101. Whitman, SD, 227.
102. See Perry, WW, 98.
103. See SD, 120-122. Also Masters, WHI, 266.
104. Masters, WHI, 266. Also 49.
105. Whitman, SD, 244.
106. This is the first known use of the term personalism as applied to a philosophical system.

soul--a work of living glow, fondness, warmth, which the old worldly and poets amply, and which the honest modern philosophers do for do not.[102]

Whitman was related to the thought of many eminent Americans. William Cullen Bryant and Theodore Parker were two of the few patronages of his first edition of Leaves of Grass, thereby having bought his copy on Emerson's recommendation.[103] Whitman spoke in tribute of Thomas Paine on the anniversary of the Jefferson birth-day.[104] He called Jefferson the "greatest of our great."[105] It is of particular significance to note here, however, that Whitman was a friend in person and thought of Alcott, who has been disregarded, and Parris, who will be neglected later. Whitman wrote, when on a visit in Concord to see Emerson and Alcott: "Met by appointed at the house of A. T. Harris, the Hegelian, who came out and we had a pleasant time while I met in the again."[106] Whitman knew Harris well from his St. Louis visit, and kept up his acquaintance by letter correspondence.

The relationship between Whitman and Alcott is questionable. Whitman outlined a "Lecture on Lecture" in 1868;[107] Alcott defined conversation in his Table Talk.

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102. Whitman, SD, 227.
103. See Perry, WW, 38.
104. See SD, 130-132. Also Rugoff, WWI, 228.
105. Foster, WWI, 68n. Also CP.
106. Holmes, SD, 244.
107. This is the first known use of the term conversationalism as applied to a philosophical system.

published in 1877. Long before either of these dates, however, both men had exchanged ideas. Alcott visited Whitman in New York after the first edition of the Leaves of Grass. He wrote in his journal for October 4, 1856:

> To Brooklyn, and see Walt Whitman. I pass a couple of hours, and find him to be an extraordinary person, full of brute power, certainly of genius and audacity, and likely to make his mark on Young America. . . . I must meet him again.[107]

On November 10th of the same year he wrote: "This morning we [he was accompanied by Thoreau][108] called on Whitman. . . ."[109] An entry on November 20th indicates that Alcott not only visited, but drew from Whitman: "Swinton comes and we cross to Brooklyn and dine with Whitman. I am well paid for this visit, and bring home spoils for great uses."[110] On December 12th, Alcott wrote: "Today fair and sunny, and I walk for two hours in the Park. Walt Whitman comes, and we dine at Taylor's Saloon, discussing America, its men and institutions."[111] An indication of the philosophical nature of the discussions between these men and the many with whom they associated is given in an entry in Alcott's journal for December 28th, 1856:

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107. Shepard, JOBA, 286.
108. Thoreau called Whitman "the greatest democrat the world had seen." In a letter to Harrison Blake, quoted by Perry, WW, 119.
109. Shepard, JOBA, 289.
110. Ibid., 291. The present author's underlining.
111. Ibid., 293.

published in 1877. Long before either of these dates, however, both men had encountered Adams. Alcott visited Emerson in New York after the first edition of the Laws of Chance. He wrote in his journal for October 6, 1856:

> In Broadway, met Geo. Bell with him. I gave a couple of hours, and filled him to the ear with extraordinary persons, full of hearts warm, especially or genius and ebullity, and likely to make his mark on Young America. . . . . a much good man again.[107]

On November 11th of the same year he wrote: "Did something we Jim Adams mathematical or Tomson[108] called on Whitman. . . . .[109] An entry in November 6th indicates that Alcott not only visited, but drew from Emerson: "Emerson came and we crept to Brooklyn and dine with Whitman. I am well pole the Bain visit, but lighted upon Mills for prime case."[110] On December 12th, Alcott wrote: "Today Tuck and Amory, and I walk two hours in the fog. Talk Whitman poem, and he also at Taylor's dinner, discussing Emerson, the man and lecturer-book."[111] An indication of the relationship between Emerson and the mathematical genius of the Brooklyn Whitman can be had from a letter wherein Emerson is given in an order in a public journal for December 27th, 1856:

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107. Sheperd, 1938, 208.
108. Thomas called Whitman "the gentleman concerning the world that seem." In a letter to Emerson about, noted by Perry, 44, 212.
109. Sheperd, 1938, 209.
110. Ibid., 201. The Emerson authority entertaining.
111. Ibid., 203.

> There is company [at the home of Samuel Longfellow] in the evening and a Conversation, Walt Whitman being the observed—he coming in his Bloomers and behaving very becomingly, though not at home, very plainly, in parlours, and as hard to tame as Thoreau or any Sylvanus, or train in good keeping with the rest. Longfellow, Maxwell, Rice, Mr. and Mrs. Goodwin, Miss Parmalee, Miss Sedgwick, and many more are of the party, and the Conversation is spirited and metaphysical.[112]

Whitman, for his part, speaks of "My friend, A. B. Alcott."[113] He published an article entitled "Democracy" in December, 1867.[114] After Alcott read it, he wrote to Whitman:

> The scope and spirit of your paper on Democracy delight and satisfy me beyond all expectation, and I write without compliment or reserve to the man, the American Columbus, whose sagacity has thus sounded adventurously the sea of our Social Chaos and anchored his thought securely in soil of the newly discovered Atlantides about which Grecian Plato died dreaming.[115]

After Whitman published his "Personalism" article,[116] he wrote to his mother on April 30th, 1868: "I received today another letter from Old Mr. Alcott—I sent him the Galaxy with Personalism—and he compliments me highly and speaks of Mr. Emerson too and his friendliness to me. . . ."[117] Alcott wrote, in the letter Whitman referred to:

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112. Shepard, JOBA, 294. Underlining the author's.
113. SD, 242.
114. Galaxy, 4 (1867), 919-933.
115. From Concord, dated January 7, 1868. Quoted in Shephard, WWP, 254-255. There may be some significance in Alcott's signing himself, "Personally, A. Bronson Alcott."
116. Galaxy, 5 (1868), 540-547.
117. CPWOW, Vol. V (or Vol. VIII. The printing is inaccurate), 223.

> Yesterday came your noble paper on "Personalism." . . . Your thought is on the track of empire and sees the route to Personal Powers for the nation as for the individual, and never a people needed more the Cosmic thought to inspire and guide its action.[118]

Both Alcott and Whitman were similar in disagreeing with the hazy transcendentalism of their day. They recognized the reality of the individual without losing the sense of social solidarity. The concrete was not, to them, a nebulous idealism tinged with Oriental impersonalism, but a precise personalism closer to Bowne's type than to absolutism or pantheism.

c. Chief Personalistic Ideas.

It is evident that Whitman was personalistic in his concern for a person-centered educational system, in his ceaseless struggle for the rights of labor and the abolition of slavery, and in his passion for American democracy. He wrote of slaves: "Where others see a slave, a pariah, an emptier of privies, the Poet beholds what, when the days of the

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118. Quoted by Clifton Furness in an unpublished biography of Whitman, chp. XVIII, 28. Also in Furness, Art. (1942), 559. It is important to know that both the magazine articles, "Democracy" and "Personalism" were later combined and changed so as to be more personalistic, to form Whitman's celebrated Democratic Vistas, first published in 1871. Not even the official ten volume work of Whitman's prose contains these articles in their separate and original form.

> Yesterday were quite modern; now we are "personal-ism." . . . Liberty thought is on the brink of energy and does the write to "personal forces" for the nation as for the individual, and never a people needed more the Gospel thought to inspire and guide the nation.[1]

Both Alcott and Whitman were realists in discovering the many transcendentalists of their day. They recognized the reality of the individual without losing the merits of social authority. The concrete was not, to them, a religious idea-alism tinged with Oriental impersonality, but a practical possession closer to Emerson's type than to abstraction or metaphysics.

c. Social Transcendentalist Ideas.

It is evident that Whitman was unsympathetic to the concern for a person-centered cosmological system. In the secondary attempts for the rights of labor and the abolition of slavery, and in his passion for American democracy. In words of slavery: "Negro citizen are a slave, a punish, an vision of reviles, the foot bondage week, when the days of the

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1. Quoted by William Frances in an unpublished biography of Whitman, ch. XVIII, 20. Also in Thomson, Art. (1940), 220. It is interesting to know that both the transcendentalists, "Democracy" and "Transcendentalism" were later combined and changed as one to become democratic-ability, in fact Whitman's polytheistic "Democratic Vistas" first published in 1871. Yet even the original "Leaves" volume work of Whitman's poems combine these "religious" in their corporate and self-last form.

soul are accomplished, shall be the peer of God."[119] Regarding democracy, Whitman wrote: "To practically enter into politics is an important part of American personalism."[120]

Other areas of Whitman's thought also indicate his personalism. Nature, an expression of God, is significant only in relation to man. "Man, so diminutive, dilates beyond the sensible universe, competes with, outcopes space and time, mediating even one great idea."[121] Further, in the "Kosmos," "there is moral purpose:"[122] "The world, the race, the soul—in space and time the universes, all bound as is befitting each--all surely going somewhere."[123]

So, too, his aesthetics was person-centered. "America," he wrote, "demands a poetry that is bold, modern, and all-surrounding and kosmical. . . . It must place in the van, and hold up at all hazards, the banner of the divine pride of man in himself."[124] Every aesthetic experience must grip the entire person; the object must reveal reality. "The literature, songs, esthetics, &c., of a country," he wrote, "are of importance principally because they furnish the materials and suggestions of personality. . . ."[125]

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119. Whitman, Anti-slavery notes. Quoted by Furness, WWW, 83.
120. Whitman, Art. (1868), 544.
121. Whitman, DV, 322.
122. Ibid., 323.
123. Whitman, from "Going Somewhere," in LOG, 397.
124. Whitman, DV, 315.
125. Whitman, Art. (1868), 540. In a later footnote to this sentence, when it became part of Democratic Vistas, he

ryal are commingling, shall be the poet of joy. Rogers-ing Democracy, Whitman wrote: "To practically enter into politics is an important part of American personalism."[120]

Other areas of Whitman's thought also indicate his personalism. Matter, an expression of God, is significant only in relation to man. "Man, as discovered, dilates re-yond the sensible universe, commences with, encompasses space and time, modifying even the prime laws."[121] Further, in the "Common," "Space is equal outward: time equal inward. Up from the soul--in more and more the universe, all beyond as in matching each--all merely going and returning."[122]

So, too, his mobile-self was pressed-onward. "Upward-on," he wrote, "demands a sturdy step: it is bold, austere, and air-surrounding and lonesome! . . . . It must climb in the van, and hold up at all hazards, the banner of the divine write of man in himself."[123] Every manifestable correspondence must with the mobile person; the subject must reveal reality. "Men, literature, songs, publicist, &c., of a country," he wrote, "are of importance primarily because they furnish the material and suggestions of personality. . . ."[124]

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[120]. Whitman, Anti-slavery notes. Quoted by Rogers, op. cit., 85.
[121]. Whitman, Arch. (1855), 246.
[122]. Whitman, LV, 322.
[123]. Ibid., 305.
[124]. Whitman, Preface "Leaves Dropped," in 1860, 307.
[125]. Whitman, LV, 318.
[126]. Whitman, Arch. (1855), 360. In a letter Thoreau to Greeley mentioned, when it became part of Democratic Vistas, he

Whitman knew no religious training in his home; he distrusted creeds and forms; yet he was deeply religious. Religion develops the "whole man."[126] "Personalism fuses" and "favors" the elevation of "one's isolated Self" to "reach the divine levels."[127] God is personal. Finite persons are sacred, free, and immortal. Death is to be welcomed. "I swear I think there is nothing but immortality," he wrote.[128] Finally, with great zest, he sang: "I will cling fast to Thee, O God, though the waves buffet me, Thee, Thee at least I know."[129]

Whitman, more than any other personalist, identified personalism with the genius of America. He is the poet of democracy,[130] the chanter of personal opportunity and responsibility, the zestful proclaimer of a new humanism.[131] He prophetically sings:

> The New World, including in itself, and, indeed, founded upon, the all-levelling aggregate

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added: "After the rest is satiated, all interest culminates in the field of persons, and never flags there." Whitman, DV, 293n. This would indicate that Whitman's personalism was continually growing.

126. Whitman, DV, 319n.
127. Whitman, Art. (1868), 544.
128. Whitman, in "To Think of Time," LOG, 337.
129. Whitman, in "Prayer of Columbus," LOG, 324.
130. It has been pointed out that "Whitman is the announcer of a <u>democratic metaphysics</u>. His democracy means a cosmic democracy, far surpassing the merely political meaning." See Beck, Art. (1942), 20.
131. Flewelling, thinking of the increased recognition of personality through Bowne, called him "the morning star of this greater humanism." Flewelling, Art. (1922), 379.

Whitman knew no restrictions treating in his image: he distributed crowds and forms; yet he was deeply religious. Religion develops his "whole man." With "reconciliation chaos" and "favors" the elevation of "people isolated lately to reach the divine levels."[127] God is produced. "Finite presence are sacred, free, and immortal. Death is to be welcomed. "I swear I think there is nothing but immortality." He wrote, "Finally, with great ease, he sang: "I will sing that to These, O God, though the waves buffet me, I see, plain as land I know."[128]

Whitman, more than any other transcendentalist, identified personalities with the genius of America. He is the poet of democracy,[129] the chanter of personal sovereignty and responsibility, the spiritual president of a new humanism.[130] Transpersonality sings:

> The far-off, inclusive, I sing, and, the-
> dead, transfused upon, the all-levelling immensity

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when: "After the copy is painted, all tolerant colors merge in the finished picture, and never clings there." Whitman, BV, 2[illegible]. This would indicate that Whitman's transcendentalism was essentially aesthetic.

[128]. Whitman, BV, 31[illegible].

[127]. Whitman, ADC, (1855), 344.

[129]. Whitman, in "To Foster of Men," 1[illegible], 347.

[130]. Whitman, in "Prayer of Columbus," 1[illegible], 1[illegible].

[130]. It has been noticed that Walt Whitman is the exponent of a democratic transcendentalism. His democracy takes a cosmic dominance. "He surveyed the merely political scenes." See Abel, Det. (1[illegible]), 20.

[131]. Flewelling, studying of the transcendentalism of personality, stands to me, called him "the a cosmic star of this greater humanism." Flewelling, Ers. (1[illegible]), 370.

> of Democracy, we show it also including the all-varied, all-permitting, all-free theorem of Individuality, and erecting therefor a lofty and hitherto unoccupied framework or platform of Personalism . . . Religious, possessing the idea of the Infinite . . . realizing, above the rest, that known humanity, in deepest sense, is fair adhesion to Itself, for purposes beyond—and that, finally, the theme, great as it is, of the Personality of mortal life is most important with reference to the immortal, the Unknown, the Spiritual, the only permanently real, which, as the ocean waits for and receives the rivers, waits for us each and all.[132]

5. Thomas Davidson (1840-1900).

Thomas Davidson, called a modern Socrates by William James, and one of the twelve most learned men of the world at the time of his death,[133] advocated pluralistic idealism, a form of personalism. He was a masterful scholar and rigorous thinker, having been thoroughly trained in philosophy, the social sciences, and literature, as well as possessing unusual skill in using "all languages." His pluralism, although greatly influenced by Rosmini,[134] is strikingly similar to Howison's. In fact, Howison, who knew him per-

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132. Whitman, Art. (1868), 547.
133. Bakewell, Art. (1901), 440, and Moore, Art. (1925), v.
134. Davidson wrote, in a letter to Howison from Rome, "I go up to the Simplon Pass, or rather to Domo d'Ossola, a little place on the side of it, where I shall spend at least two months, studying the philosophy of Rosmini with the learned fathers there. . . . You could not do better than join me there. . . . I believe I have discovered the philosophy of the future, that of Rosmini. . . . Rosmini is <u>your</u> man above anything." Quoted in Buckham and Stratton, GHH, 94-95.

sonally as well as through his writings, said they agreed in their pluralism, and Charles M. Bakewell, a friend of both, classes them together as personal idealists.[135]

a. Davidson's General Thought and Life.

Davidson opposed both materialism and supernaturalism. He advocated the metaphysical reality of every person, and saved his uncompromising pluralism from chaos by postulating a divine community of eternal selves. He wrote: "The world consists of a multitude of sentient individuals or atoms, whose unity is their sentience."[136] His concern for the individual self is further evidenced by his statement, "The only thing of spiritual value is self-possession."[137] Again, he wrote that "the immanent purpose of evolution is the realization of free individuals, that is, moral personalities."[138] Those who knew Davidson and his ideas corroborate the view that he was a personalist in spirit and in thought. William Knight wrote:

Davidson's philosophy was both individualistic

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135. See Bakewell, Art. (1940), 623, and Howison, LOE, 420.
136. Davidson, Art. (1899), 30.
137. In a letter to Havelock Ellis. Quoted in Knight, MOTD, 42.
138. Davidson, HOE, v. This is precisely the thought of Howison and is somewhat akin to the view of Bowne. Davidson strenuously opposed all pantheism, or absolutism, including Hegelianism, and hence is contrary in thought to the view of personalism expressed by Calkins. These three thinkers will be discussed later.

sonality as well as through his writings, such they appeared in their journals, and Charles M. Sakowski, a friend of both, classes them together as professed idealists.[155]

a. Davidson's Concept Through Life.

Davidson opposed both materialism and supernaturalism. He advocated the metaphysical reality of every person, and saved his transcendentalism literally from chaos by constructing a divine community of eternal selves. He wrote: "The world consists of a multitude of personal selves, or atoms, whose unity is their relations."[156] Job concerns for the individual self is further evidenced by his statement, "The only basis of spiritual value is self-consciousness."[157] Again, he wrote that "the immanent purpose of evolution is the realization of Self-Individuality, that is, moral consciousness."[158] Those who knew Davidson are his taken corporeal; the view that he was a transcendent in spirit and in thought. William James wrote:

Davidson's philosophy was both individualistic

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155. See Sakowski, Art. (1940), 641, and Boisen, 149, 150.
156. Davidson, Art. (1904), 30.
157. In a Letter to Dewey (1904). Quoted in Fuller, 40.
158. Davidson, Art. V. While in general the thought of Davidson was in accordance with the view of Dewey, Davidson extraordinarily opposed all "muddles" or abstractions, including logicalities, and "once in a hundred" thought to the view of pragmatism as proposed by Dewey. Those show thinkers will be discussed later.

> and pluralistic. When experience is analyzed we find a unity within the plurality; and in that unity is found, and out of it may be deduced, a theism of which the evidence is clear and the outcome stable.[139]

Again, Knight wrote, in referring to the psychological, metaphysical, and ethical teaching of Davidson:

> Very early in life he saw that "man's chief end" (as his Scottish catechism put it) was the attainment of knowledge, insight, and freedom,—the realization of what is true, and beautiful, and good; but he also saw that this had to be conjoined with the realization of an equally supreme good or "chief end" by others, that is to say, by the community. It was this double or twin conviction, more than anything else, that dominated his whole life.[140]

Morris Cohen wrote in the same vein of Davidson's philosophy: "He regarded the individual man as a holy temple, and believed that nothing in the universe was holier."[141]

Davidson's life was as interesting and individualistic as his thought.[142] He was born October 25, 1840, in Aberdeenshire, Scotland, of humble parents who were sturdy peasants of deep piety. He went to school in his native town, and at the age of sixteen entered King's College, Aberdeen, on a four-year scholarship which he had won. He was fond of books from the first, and soon developed the careful habits of exact scholarship. After his student days he

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139. Knight, MOTD, 7.
140. Ibid., 7.
141. Morris R. Cohen, Art. (1907), 87.
142. See Charles M. Bakewell, Art. (1901), and also Art. (1930).

taught as rector of Old Aberdeen Grammar School for three years. From there, he went to London, then taught in Canada at the Collegiate Institute of London, Ontario, and finally came to the United States. He spent some time in Boston, but then made his way to St. Louis where he joined that distinguished St. Louis group of philosophers under the leadership of William T. Harris. It will be recalled that this early center of American philosophy had influenced, and had been influenced by, many personalists, viz., Harris, Alcott, Whitman, and Howison. Bakewell writes of Davidson's relationship to the St. Louis philosophers, "The influence of this group was profound and lasting, although Davidson could never find anything in Hegel."[143]

Davidson's relationship to the personalists did not cease when he left St. Louis for Boston. In fact, one can think they may have been strengthened, among other influences, by his relations with Borden Parker Bowne. William James wrote in a letter of reminiscences after the death of Davidson, that he had first seen Davidson in Boston in 1874.

> At that time I saw most of him at a little philosophical club which used to meet (often at his rooms in Temple Street) every fortnight. Other members were W. T. Harris, G. H. Howison, J. E. Cabot, C. C. Everett, B. P. Browne,[144] and sometimes G. H. Palmer.[145]

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143. Bakewell, Art. (1930), 96.
144. He means Borden Parker Bowne. See Moore, Art. (1925), ix-x.
145. James, Art. (1907), 111.

taught as rector of the Aberdeen Grammar School for seven years. From there, he went to London, then taught in Canada at the Collegiate Institute of London, Ontario, and finally came to the United States. He spent some time in Boston, but then made his way to St. Louis, where he joined Dora Williamina St. Louis group of philosophers under the leadership of William T. Harris. It will be remembered that this early member of American philosophy had influenced, and had been influenced by, many personalities, viz., Davies, Alcott, Emerson, and Dewey. Davidson, writing of Davidson's relationship to the St. Louis philosophers, "the influence of this group was profound and lasting, although Davidson never filed anything in blood."[145]

Davidson's relationship to the generalizing philosophers came when he left St. Louis for Boston. In fact, one can think they may have been acquainted. Among other influences, by his relation with Harris Person James. Harris James wrote in a letter of recommendation after the death of Davidson, that he had first met Davidson in Boston in 1879.

> At that time I was head of the Aberdeen Grammar School and Davidson was a student in the Latin School. Other members were: W. H. Burnham, G. S. Hall, H. H. Lowell, J. T. Duncan, G. G. Everett, E. C. Brown, and Annie Brown. [146]

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145. Schneider, op. cit. (1952), 32.
146. To Annie Davidson Brown Person. Jan 1900, MSS. (1900), 1-2.
147. Jones, op. cit. (1907), 311.

Davidson also associated with some of these men at the Concord Summer School, which met in Alcott's barn, and later in his own school at Farmington, Connecticut.

This eminent thinker has been called a wandering scholar for the simple reason that his mode of life was to travel and study six months out of every year. He lectured, wrote, and taught privately to earn his livelihood, but supremely enjoyed liberty and "the life of a free lance." In fact, he would have been invited to the chair of Greek philosophy at Harvard University had he not offended the Greek department by a criticism of its methods just as James was to advocate his cause.[146] Davidson might not have fitted into an academic mold, however, for he was distrustful of "mediaevalism" in universities and preferred to work with students who were concerned with knowledge and wisdom rather than those whose chief desire was academic credit. Always practical, he was particularly happy to teach the "bread-winners in the East Side of New York." He took an active interest in the London Fabian Society and founded the Fellowship of the New Life in London and then in New York. He was always an individualist, a "born dissenter" who "could not and would not fit into any niche."[147] How then can he be termed a personalist? The answer has been partially suggested. To

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146. James, Art. (1907), 111-112.
147. Bakewell, Art. (1930), 96.

answer it more fully, his philosophy will be further considered.

b. The Real.

Reality, for Davidson, is to be thought of as an ideal world of sentient individuals, interrelated through rationality, feeling, and action. His strong emphasis upon "feeling" was a result of both the influence of Rosmini and his reaction against the importance of reason in Hegelian absolutism. Individuality was lost in universalized thought; consequently, to maintain a rigorous pluralism, feeling was emphasized as the basic fact in experience. To avoid the charge of subjectivism to which this view might lead, Davidson suggested first, that individuals act upon each other through desire, and second, that a moral social ideal exists which gives direction and purpose to individual activity. That is to say, knowledge is not completely individual. If it were, it would be a "series of individual impressions, indistinguishable from hallucinations." Knowledge is, rather, built out of universal human experience. Each individual creates his own world in harmony with all other selves. Davidson expressed it, in part: "I am the sentient unity of a sensible world."[148] He went on to indicate that the many "I's" or

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148. Quoted by Bakewell, Art. (1901), 450.

answer it more fully, his philosophy will be further consideration.

4. The Moral.

Reality, for Dewey, is in the thought of an ideal world of moments in individuals, interpenetrated through continuity, conflict, mutation. His account commences upon "reality" was a result of both the influence of Hegelian and his preoccupation against the importance of process in traditional epistemology. Individuality was lost in universalized thought; continuously, he maintains a rigorous pluralism. Reality was conceived as the basic fact in experience. To avoid the charge of subjectivism, which this view might lead, Dewey suggested first, that individuals act upon each other through desire, and second, that a moral ideal exists which gives direction and purpose to individual activity. This is to say, knowledge is not completely individual. If it were, it would be a "series of individual perceptions, individualistic from beginning to end." Knowledge, rather, built out of universal human experience. Each individual creates his own world in harmony with all other selves. Dewey expressed it, in part: "I am the centre and sphere of a concrete world."[148] He went on to indicate that the idea "life" on

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148. Quoted by Lamont, op. cit. (1901), 483.

selves are individuated realities eternally formed in relation to the Supreme Individual, God. He says:

> You and I are eternal forms, whose inexhaustible taste with reference to each other is to penetrate each other through inexhaustible love and knowledge. . . . God is the loving, knowing interpretation of eternal forms . . . He is the ideality of which we are the reality . . . He is the 'law of being,' and in that law we live and move and have our being.[149]

In this pluralistic system, God and man are not placed over against each other; they are correlates. "There cannot be a man without a God; and man is as necessary to God as God is to man."[150] Both, or all personalities, are essential to each other in a pluralistic personal universe. Man is man "because he has in him that divine form." Hence he is free, but not in the usual sense of actual freedom. Man is potentially free, i.e., he is free so long as he actualizes the divine form in himself. He is free, then, only in so far as he frees himself. By so freeing himself man participates in a moral order, a world of eternal beings who have "their root and origin in one Eternal Being of infinite perfection" who is "at once their deepest form and necessarily, therefore, their goal."[151]

Man is also immortal. The process of achieving perfection is an everlasting one, for the goal cannot be

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149. Davidson, in a letter to Havelock Ellis, quoted in Knight, MOTD, 41.
150. Daley, Art. (1907), 78.
151. Davidson, Art. (1907), 207.

selves are individuated realities eternally turned in rela-

tion to the Supreme Individual, God. He says:

> You and I are eternal forces, whose individuali-
> ties basks with reference to each other is so
> perfectly each other's opposite, incomprehensible love
> and knowledge. . . . God is one Person, showing
> interpenetration of eternal forms . . . He is the
> ideality, of which we are the reality . . . He
> is the 'law of being,' and is also in us, we live
> and move and have our being.[140]

In this dialectic system, God and man are not joined over against each other; they are equivalent. "There cannot be a man without a God; and man is as necessary to God as God is to man."[141] Both, of all personalities, are equal to each other in a pluralistic personal universe. Man is man "because he has in him some divine form." Jesus he is free, but not in the usual sense of mental freedom. Man is potentially free, i.e., he is free as long as he realizes the divine form in himself. He is free, then, only in so far as he frees himself. By so freeing himself man participates in a moral order, a realm of eternal beings who have "their root and unity in one Eternal Being or Infinite personality" who is "as once simply imposed form and necessarily, therefore, their good."[142]

Man is also immortal. The Supreme of nothing-

ness is an overleaping one, for the good manifest in

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140. Davidson, in a letter to Davidson Ellis, quoted in Knight, NOTD, 41.
141. Daley, Art. (1907), 70.
142. Davidson, Ure. (1907), 307.

reached in time. In a letter to Morris R. Cohen, Davidson wrote:

> You must come to see that there is no world at all without you . . . you have existed from all eternity. You are not conscious in deep sleep; yet you are and feel, else you couldn't be waked. . . . 'Before Abraham was, I AM' said Jesus of Nazareth. It is a great satisfaction to be thoroughly convinced of one's immortality; and one may easily be so who thinks logically.[152]

That this was an abiding conviction with Davidson is attested by the fact that he wrote, in a letter to some of his young friends when he faced death in 1899, "Death is but an incident in an eternal career."[153]

c. Social Philosophy.

Davidson, as previously suggested, was preëminently practical. His speculative thinking, therefore, was for the primary purpose of elevating society to high levels of social experience. The individual which is sacred and eternal must be served by all existing institutions, rather than serving them. Davidson was a champion of democracy, as were the personalists Alcott and Whitman before him, for the simple reason that democracy expressed his pluralistic philosophy by placing authority in the individual, while at the same time recognizing that the highest values are achieved by social

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152. Quoted in Knight, MOTD, 143-144.
153. Davidson, EAWB, 57.

reached in time. In a letter to Marvin H. Cohen, Davidson wrote:

> You must come to see that there is no world at all without you . . . You have escaped from all obscurity. You are not conscious in a mirror; yet you are and feel, only you couldn't be sure. . . . 'Perhaps dreams are, I am' said Jesus of Nazareth. It is a great meditation to be thoroughly convinced of one's insignificance; and one may easily be so who cultivate intellectuality.[182]

That this was an abiding conviction with Davidson is evidenced by the fact that he wrote, in a letter to some of his young friends when he found dawn in 1900, "Death is but an incident in an eternal course."[183]

c. Social Philosophy.

Davidson, as previously anticipated, was condemnatory practical. His speculative thought, therefore, was for the primary purpose of elevating society to high levels of social consciousness. The individual union is sought and eternal peace be served by all cultivated thinking, rather than merely that. Davidson was a champion of democracy, as were the personalities Alcott and Emerson to some him, for the ethic common that democracy encourages his idealistic philosophy by finding authority in the individual, while at the same time recognizing that the highest values are achieved by social

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182. Quoted in Knight, Op. Cit., 144-145.
183. Davidson, Op. Cit., 87.

co-operation. Davidson wrote regarding this:

> Progress in social life is proportioned to the number of persons whose claim to be considered ends in themselves, and to share in all the fruits of civilization, is acknowledged and furthered by each member of society; progress in political life to the number whose claim is supported by the state, and the former progress is the condition of the latter. It follows that Democracy, in which the claims of all to the dignity and inheritance of humanity are sustained, is the perfect form of political life,—the ideal after which it must continually strive.[154]

One can readily believe that Davidson spent his life pleading for economic justice, political freedom, and equality of educational opportunity. His social philosophy began and ended with the supreme importance of every person. It was for this reason that he distrusted status quo educational institutions, opposed German imperialism, and was dissatisfied with Victorian England.[155] It was also due to his social concern for persons that he organized the Fellowship of the New Life in London and in New York, and lectured to the "bread-winners" in New York. Davidson advocated in one of his lectures to the Fellowship of the New Life the need of a sounder political economy based on the recognition of man's spiritual nature. He based his entire thought on two assumptions. First, human life does not consist of material possessions. Second, life consists of free spiritual activity,

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154. Davidson, Art. (1896), 460.
155. See Davidson, Art. (1897)[3].

co-operation. Davidson wrote regarding this:

> Progress in social life is proportioned to the number of persons among whom to be distributed ends in themselves, and is equal in all who further or exhibit it. In acknowledgment and furtherance by each member of society; progress in political life be the number when rights is supported by the events, and the tendency progress in the condition of the labour. It follows that democracy, in which the rights of all to the dignity and improvement of humanity are asserted, is the greatest form of political life,--the ideal after which is real co-ordinate active.[1]

One can readily believe that Davidson found his life planning for economic justice, political freedom, and equality of educational opportunity. His social philosophy began and ended with the supreme importance of every person. As we for this reason that he criticized Atlanta and educational institutions, opposed narrow isolation, and was disassociated with Vladovian England.[18] It was also due to his social concern for persons that he originated and followed of the Bee Life in London and in New York, and lectured on the "bread-winners" in New York. Davidson advocated in one of his lectures be one philosophy of life and the life has been of a concrete political economy based on the recognition of basic spiritual nature. He began his spiritual thought on two beginnings. First, human life and the material of material possession. Second, life consists of two spiritual activity,

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18. Davidson, op. cit. (1900), 200.
19. See Davidson, op. cit. (1897).

of which, in this world at least, material possession is an essential condition.[156] He went on to say that the remedy for both present and future evils lay in enlightening the public. The first step in doing this is the

> casting-aside of our present immoral and selfish political economy, our present views regarding the nature and uses of wealth, and the replacing of them by an economy which places in the foreground the moral aspects of every economic question, and considers wealth solely as a means for the advancement of man as man, in all virtues and perfections.[157]

As a world traveller, Davidson was familiar with the social conditions of many nations of the world, and was outspoken in denouncing desecration of personality, and in lauding the enthronement of man wherever either occurred. He caustically criticized the authoritarianism of the Holy Roman Empire under the control of the Popes and the attempts of Germany to emulate its pattern of autocratic power.[158] He welcomed the "democratization of England" while pointing out that the nation still needed

> a firm, impregnable conviction of the worth, independence, and eternity of the individual soul, with such a view of man's destiny as shall make the things of this material world assume their true position, certainly important enough, as mere means to the end of an immortal personality.[159]

When "plucky little Greece" was under the heel of "barbarous"

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156. Davidson, MAEQ, 1.
157. Ibid., 23.
158. Davidson, Art. (1897)[1].
159. Davidson, Art. (1896), 469.

of which, in this world as least, material possession is an essential condition.[146] So good on to say that the remedy for both present and future evils lay in multiplying the public. The first step in doing this is the

> establishment of our present imperfect and artificial economy, our present views regarding the nature and uses of wealth, and the regulating of them by an economy which shall have in the foreground the moral energy of every economic question, and consider money only as a means for the advancement of man as man. In all ethnous on. governments.[147]

As a world traveller, Davidson was familiar with the social conditions of many nations of the world, and was outspoken in denouncing degeneration of personality, and in laying the responsibility of man's worries always concerned. He consistently criticized the subjectivities of his body, human begins under the control of the brain and the schemes of Germany to develop its nations of aboriginal power.[148] He selected one "economistaction of "Ego-Ego" while pointing out that the nation still ignored

> a free, harmonious development of the single, independence, and responsibility of the individual man. With more a view of single destiny as which has the energy of individual work assume higher over personality, centrally harmonious enough, an more [illegible] for the end of an imperfect economistic.[149]

Then "plucky little Denmark" was under the head of "Denmark"

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146. Davidson, Mark. 1.
147. Ibid., 22.
148. Davidson, Art. (1909).
149. Davidson, Art. (1909), 4ff.

Turkey and "despotic" Russia, Davidson pleaded for the intervention of the United States of America. One can well imagine his position today in regard to the nation in which the teachings of Plato are forbidden by the Nazi,[160] for he wrote in 1897:

> We can give Greece our moral and material support. We can rouse the free spirit that animates our people and let it find expression through the press, through public resolutions, through motions in the national Senate and House of Representatives, and finally, in formal encouragement and protest expressed through the chief of the Executive and his foreign ministers. . . . If we follow this course, which is our simple duty to humanity, we shall find a warm response from the great popular heart of the elder continent, and rouse a healthy public opinion that will cow tyrants, paralyze bullies, and wipe out the ignominy of Europe ere she have to blush in the light of a new century.[161]

Finally, Davidson criticized the whole structure of "civilization" in the "present epoch" because it inhumanly uses man as a tool rather than as an end. In an article entitled "Aristocracy and Humanity," Davidson summed up his entire social philosophy by denouncing the aristocratic spirit of selfishness and barbarism and pleading for a new humanity. The task of "our epoch," he wrote, is to place the human world "upon the broad basis of simple humanity, whose apex

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160. Dr. Andre Michalopoulos, Greek minister of information, has stated: "Under the Germans it is forbidden to teach the philosophy of Plato in the land of his birth." Quoted in The Kansas City Star, November 2, 1942.
161. Davidson, Art. (1897)[2], 289.

Tarney and "domestic" insanity, Davidson decided for the intervention of the British standard of imagination. One can only imagine his positive body in regard to the nation in which the imaginings of Plato were considered by the Greek,100 for he wrote in 1909:

> We can give Greece our moral and material support. We can bring the Pan Greek spirit back into our people and let it flow upward through the press, through public assemblies, through politics in the national groups and houses of representatives, and finally, in formal encouragement and trade a recognized through the order of the Executive and the Foreign Ministers. . . . To the Hellenic life around, which is our ultimate guide to reality, we shall find a moral foreground from the great regular beats of the other continent, and raise a building public opinion that will grow gradually, harmonious, and wide out the legend of Greece are to blend in the light of a new culture.101

Similarly, Davidson criticized the Celtic chauvinism of "civilization" by the "greater world" because it innocently view man as a cool rather than as an ant. In an article entitled "Aristocracy and Democracy," Davidson argued in his entire social philosophy by dangling the Aristocratic ideals of intellectual and humanitarian culture in the background. The task of "our occult," he wrote, is to place the human world "upon the broad basis of simple humanity, where men

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100. Dr. Andre Kalokoukis, Greek minister of information, has stated: "Plato the Germans is in Germany to teach the philosophy of Plato in the land of his birth." Quoted in Ken Kennedy, "The Star," November 7, 1942.

101. Davidson, A.T. (1909), 288.

is moral worth."[162]

d. Philosophy of Education.

Education was the method by which Davidson hoped to attain the "chief good" for each member of the pluralistic universe, and thereby, the summum bonum for all. He "spent his life in the effort to uplift men by supplying a sound, aimful education";[163] he was convinced that it was through education that one attained moral freedom, social justice, and the higher values of spiritual life. He felt that society was "unspiritual," "ignorant," and "frivolous," and hence he attempted as did his close friends, Alcott, Harris, and Howison, to overcome these shortcomings with "missionary zeal." He was specific in his requirements for the content of education,[164] but it suffices to say here, that he believed every person ought to know the summit facts of human experience, possess "healthy, well-distributed affections," and possess a will that is loyal to such knowledge and affections.

Education ought to aim at producing free, self-directing persons who are "ready and able to act intelligently, nobly, and strongly in all the affairs of life."[165] It

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162. Davidson, Art. (1887), 165.
163. Bakewell, Art. (1701), 452-453.
164. See Davidson, Art. (1894), 575-581.
165. Ibid., 580.

in moral words."[123]

6. Philosophy of Education.

Education was also analyzed by which Davidson hoped to educate the "outer room" for much reading of the philosophic universe, and thought, the <u>amazing journey</u> too all. So "spent his life in the effort to realize man by educating a moral, mental education";[124] he was convinced that to the timorous education that are with and moral freedom, social journey, and the higher values of spiritual life. He felt that philosophy was "humanistic," "immanent," and "triviolous," and sought to attempted to did life alone friends, Alcott, Emerson, and Whitman, to overcome their misgivings with "matchless cool." He was reckless in his recommendation for the movement of education,[125] but in reflecting to say here, that he believed every person must be have humanistic tends of human experience, pursue "reality, self-distribution consciousness," and possess a will that is loyal to man therefore and attributes.

Education order to aim at reshaping, free, self-determining governing who are "ready and willing to act intelligently, modly, and sympathy to all the matters of life."[126] It

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123. Davidson, op. cit. (Jerry), 41.
124. Duveneck, op. cit. (Jerry), 42-43.
125. See Davidson, op. cit. (Jerry), 43-44.
126. Ibid., 45.

should enable one to realize in himself the "free humanity which has been the aim of the 'travail of the ages.'" When one reaches this ideal by training his intelligence, his affections, and his will, he "places himself in a normal relation to himself and the universe," and he finds "himself in the persistent attitude of love and worship which alone confers consecration and blessedness on life."[166]

Several things are involved in developing a personalistic system of education suitable to "eternal spirits." Davidson is quite specific here also. Such education involves first of all the recognition that the child being educated is "eternal," "superior to time, space, and causation, and, therefore, free." Second, the aim of education must be a "Weltanschauung." The teacher must impart the whole, and "the whole regarded as one, coherent universe-process of interacting spirits advancing to ever higher attainments." Third, one must learn that the universe is "knowable, lovable, modifiable."[167] Fourth, the national government ought to be a "central seat of learning," for "Education is surely as important as Agriculture." Fifth, education must be broad and deep for the masses; one must learn to earn both a livelihood and to attain civic culture. Finally, teachers

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166. See Davidson, Art. (1894), 581.
167. At this point Davidson is attacking naturalistic education that teaches men to feed their bodies, but starve their souls so that they "hanker after the husks that the swine eat."

must be better educated and possess a more unselfish interest in teaching.[168] It is Davidson's profound conviction that if those who educate the young were cognizant of the metaphysical worth of each individual personality and the relationship between them as "interacting spirits,"

> poverty, vice, and degradation would, in large measure, disappear, giving place to well-being, virtue, and nobility. There is no more patriotic work than this; for it is not amid the thunders of the battle-field, where men slay their fellowmen, that the noblest civic laurels are won, but in the quiet school-room, where devoted patriots, men and women, combine to slay misery, meanness, and corruption.[169]

Davidson thus adds much to the cumulative deposit of personalistic philosophy in the history of American thought. He held to the metaphysical reality of the individual and of God, was concerned to build a society that enthroned "spiritual" man, and advocated a personality-centered educational system as the instrument by which to achieve such a goal. He was not the churchman that Samuel Johnson and Jonathan Edwards were, yet he had a distinct philosophy of religion in which he held to the sacredness of the individual and the ideality of a personal God. He was broader in background than either Alcott or Whitman, yet at one with them in pleading for a person-centered civilization. He held, with both of them, to what has later been called an organic pluralism,

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168. These six factors and direct quotations regarding education are taken from Davidson, HOE, 254-276.
169. Davidson, HOE, 275-276.

although he was perhaps closer to Whitman in his fervor for democracy. Of the five men considered thus far, he was in many ways the most learned. His close relationship to the St. Louis Group, the Concord School of Philosophy, and the philosophical circles of Boston make him a strong connecting link between Alcott and Whitman on the one hand, and on the other, William Torrey Harris, the next thinker to be considered, George Holmes Howison, and Borden Parker Bowne.

6. William Torrey Harris (1835-1909).

William Torrey Harris contributed to the growth of personalism in America by opposing the developing naturalism of his day, by maintaining that self-activity is a presupposition of all experience, and by holding that Reality itself is cosmic self-activity. An extremely able thinker, Harris became a man of great influence in American philosophy and education. It has been said of his influence, however, that "hardly any American philosopher was more widely acclaimed in his own time; hardly any is so little read today."[170]

Harris was born on a farm near the village of North Killingly, Connecticut, in 1835. His education was not very thorough nor systematic. He was dissatisfied with the schools in Providence, Rhode Island, hence attended acade-

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170. Bates, Art. (1932), 330.

although he was perhaps closer to children in his fervor for democracy. Of the five men considered since Dr., he was in many ways the most learned. His close relationship to the St. Louis Group, the Concord School of Philosophy, and the philosophical circles of Harvard made him a strong connecting link between Alcott and Whitman on the one hand, and on the other, William Torrey Harris, the most learned to be considered, George Holmes Howison, and Josiah Royce Bowne.

6. William Torrey Harris (1835-1909).

William Torrey Harris concentrated in the growth of personalities in America by crystallizing the developing nationalism of his day, by unshackling the pre-activity in a consciousness of all consciousness, and by holding that Reality itself is complete self-activity. An extremely able student, Harris became a man of great influence in American politics and education. It has been said of his influence, however, that "hardly any American philosopher has been widely analyzed in his own time; hardly may he be little read today."[170]

Harris was born on a farm near the village of North Killingly, Connecticut, in 1835. His conversion was not very dramatic nor systematic. He was dismantled with the account in Providence, Rhode Island, being educated semi-

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170. Rubee, Art. (1909), 330.

mies at Woodstock, Connecticut, Worcester, Massachusetts, and Andover, Massachusetts, as well as two lesser ones. He entered Yale in 1854, but left dissatisfied after his junior year to teach in the public schools of St. Louis, Missouri. Great importance, however, may be attached to one event in his life at Yale; he heard Alcott lecture there in March of 1857 on Plato and Plotinus. This experience was "the turning point of his intellectual career," and he became "the most ardent" and "the ablest interpreter of Alcott's thought." In fact, he had Alcott come to St. Louis to "share views" with his new-found philosophical friends the next year.[171] Harris rose rapidly in St. Louis to become the city superintendent of the schools in 1868.

It was in St. Louis that Harris developed his philosophy. There he met Henry C. Brokmeyer, a believer in the idea of "self-determination as the ultimate principle of the universe,"[172] Thomas Davidson, who held to pluralistic idealism, Denton J. Snider, a philosophic "neutral," and later, George H. Howison, who became a vigorous exponent of person-

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171. See Shepard, PP, 466-467, 472, and 502. Shepard has also written: "Alcott . . . was a main influence in the intellectual awakening of William T. Harris . . . Alcott was partly responsible for the fact that by the year 1900 there was a philosophy dominating the American universities and colleges which he himself had been quite unable to understand." PP, 484.
172. Quoted from Brokmeyer's diary by Perry, Art. (1936), 30.

mies at Woodstock, Connecticut, Worcester, Massachusetts, and Andover, Massachusetts, as well as two longer terms. He entered Yale in 1852, but left dissatisfied after his junior year to teach in the public schools of St. Louis, Missouri. Great importance, however, may be attached to one event in his life at Yale: he heard Albert Lapham discuss in lecture 1057 on Plato and Aristotle. This experience was "the turning point of his intellectual career," and he became "too much student" and "too subtle interpreter of Aristotle's thought." In fact, he had almost come to St. Louis to "alter a view" with his non-Lutheran philosophical friends the next year.[172] Martin came reluctantly to St. Louis to become the only supervisor-teacher at the seminary in 1858.

It was in St. Louis that Martin developed his philosophy. There he met Henry C. Brokmeyer, a believer in the idea of "self-determination as the ultimate principle of the universe."[173] Thomas Davidson, who held to pluralistic idealism, Denton J. Snider, a philosophic "mystical," and Jabez Gorham A. Hanson, who became a vigorous exponent of German-

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172. See Shepard, "A," 403-407, 472, and 473. Shepard has also written "Martin . . . was a main influence in the intellectual awakening of William T. Harris . . . although his peculiar temperament for the time kept him from universalizing and so making his influence felt beyond his pupils." "B," 494.

173. Quoted from Brokmeyer's Journal, Art. (1898), 60.

al idealism.[173] Harris was the moving spirit of the group which founded the St. Louis Philosophical Society although Brokmeyer was its originator. The Society began with a systematic study of Hegel and shared his spirit. The influence of Harris is evidenced by the fact that he kept the "community stirred up over philosophy." The group he headed "practically inaugurated the philosophical movement in the United States."[174] In 1867 Harris founded the Journal of Speculative Philosophy, which was "the first philosophical periodical in the English language and is probably more significant in the annals of American philosophy than any other publication."[175] The Journal continued until 1893, when it was succeeded by the Philosophical Review.

Harris continued his work in St. Louis until 1880, when he became identified with the Concord School of Philosophy. Nine years later he was appointed United States Commissioner of Education, a position he held with distinction until 1906. Along with lecturing, writing, and administrative work, Harris edited Appleton's International Educational Series, Webster's New International Dictionary of the English Language, and was assistant editor of Johnson's New Universal Cyclopedia. He was a man of many pursuits, one

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173. See Perry, SLM, for an able treatment of the St. Louis School.
174. Evans, Art. (1936), 5.
175. Townsend, PIUS, 120.

al idealism.[172] Harris was the moving spirit of the group which founded the St. Louis Philosophical Society although Brokmeyer was its originator. The Society began with a systematic study of Hegel and shared his spirit. The influence of Harris is evidenced by the fact that the "growth-ly stirred up over philosophy." The group is hailed "practically inaugurated the philosophical movement in the United States."[173] In 1867 Harris founded the Journal of Speculative Philosophy, which was "the first philosophical periodical in the English language and is probably more significant in the annals of American philosophy than any other publication."[174] The Journal continued until 1893, when it was succeeded by the Philosophical Review.

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172. See Perry, 214, for an able presentation of the St. Louis school.
173. Evans, Art. (1883), 5.
174. Townsend, 1108, 1320.

whose "life and works are a precious inheritance to which the American people . . . can profitably appeal."[176]

a. Psychology.

Harris began his psychology with the idea that self-activity is the "great central fact to be kept in view in the study of the mind,"[177] a view that was also held by Jonathan Edwards. Self-activity is necessary in order to explain feeling and thinking. Further, imagination and fancy, memory and anticipation, and freedom and volition all depend on the self. "The self is the principle of the process of reaction against the environment and of the activity of reproduction and synthesis."[178] The mind-body problem resolves itself into a relationship between mechanical action and "vital" action. The latter "originates and guides" the former.[179] The question of freedom solves itself, for "self-activity is freedom."[180] Finally, the importance of the will is seen in the fact that it is a

> self-determining power, uniting itself with the intellect in the ascending series of attention, analysis, synthesis, reflection, and insight, [and] approaches at each step nearer and nearer to an adequate knowledge of itself.[181]

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176. Perry, Art. (1936), 48.
177. Harris, PFOE, 23.
178. Ibid., 205.
179. Ibid., 91.
180. Ibid., 118.
181. Ibid., 246-247.

where "life and society are a precious inheritance by which the American people . . . can profitably repent."[176]

c. Psychology.

Patrick Henry's psychology with the idea that self-activity is the "great central fact to be seen in view in the study of the mind,"[177] a view that was also held by Jonathan Edwards. Self-activity is necessary in order to explain feeling and thinking. Memory, imagination and fancy, memory and articulation, and reason and volition are dependent on the self. "The soul is the principle of the exercise of perception explained the environment and of the activity of reproduction and synthesis."[178] The mind-body problem resolves itself into a relationship between mechanical motion and "vital" motion. "The latter "originates and guides the former."[179] The question of freedom solves itself, for "self-activity is freedom."[180] Finally, the transcendence of the will is seen in the fact that it is a

> self-determining power, unlike itself with the tendency in the aboriginal energies of cognition, analysis, synthesis, reflection, and inclination, and approaches at each step nearer and nearer to an adequate knowledge of itself.[181]

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176. Ferry, Ann. (1938), 49.
177. Henrik, Pyon, 87.
178. Ibid., 90.
179. Ibid., 91.
180. Ibid., 112.
181. Ibid., 243-247.

b. Epistemology.

Harris suggested that philosophy must deal with "the forms of sense perception, of reflection, of speculative knowing, and the very forms which condition being, or existence itself."[182] One of the most important of these questions is that of knowledge. Here again the factor of self-activity is basic; it is "the most important conclusion reached in this higher kind of knowing."[183] Harris arrived at what seems to be his theory of knowledge in dealing with the "psychology of science and philosophy." He reached the conclusion that there are five intentions of the mind. First, there is sense perception, the rudimentary form of knowing. In this stage there is union of the pure ego and the sense-object. The second intention "contemplates the universals, classes or genera." Third, the mind utilizes a first principle to discover the unity of all universals. The fourth intention of the mind is scepticism. It breaks the connection between the mind and truth, and reveals the inadequacies of the third stage. The fifth step follows the dialectical movement, by refuting the sceptical fourth, to establish philosophy, or knowledge, on the firm basis that "consciousness presupposes an absolute ego or person." The fifth intention "sees that reason is absolute person, includ-

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182. Harris, SOP, 12.
183. Harris, PFOE, 243.

F. Epistemology.

Peirce suggested that philosophy must deal with "the form of some perception, of reflection, of abstractive thought, and the very form which constitution being, or existence itself."[125] One of the most important of these questions is that of knowledge. Here again the factor of activity is basic; it is "the most important consideration in this higher kind of knowing."[126] Peirce arrived at what seems to be his theory of knowledge in dealing with the "psychology of science and philosophy." He reached the conclusion that there are five inferences of the mind. First, there is sense perception, the rudimentary form of knowing. In this stage there is a union of the ego and the sense-object. The second intuition "comprehends the universals, classes or genera." Third, the mind utilizes a first reflexion to discover the unity of all universals. The fourth intention of the mind is scientific. It breaks the connection between the ego and truth, and reveals the inadequacies of the third stage. The fifth stage follows the dialectical movement, by reflecting the conditional thought, to establish philosophy, or knowledge, as the "ultimate result of "consciousness presupposes an absolute ego or person." The fifth intuition "sees that nature is nothing genuine, insofar

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125. Peirce, 300, 12.
126. Peirce, 2705, 2706.

ing subject and object."[184] Harris recognizes his indebtedness to Hegel by pointing out that this was Hegel's "Voyage of Discovery." One begins with empty being and ends "with ethical personality as the absolute."[185] His epistemology thus led to his metaphysics of the Absolute.

c. Metaphysics.

Harris defined philosophy as "not a science of things in general, but a science that investigates the presuppositions of experience, and discovers the nature of the first principle."[186] This first principle is "Self-Activity," often spoken of as "Absolute Reason," "God," the "Creator," an "absolutely universal ego." It is self-activity as consciousness and will that is necessary to explain causality, motion, change, space, time, and the existence of the physical world; it makes "the existence of the world possible."[187] Harris wrote:

> In causality there is absolute unity—self-cause being the source of both matter and form in the world. Self-activity is an a priori condition, not only of all changes, but also of time and space themselves.[188]

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184. Harris, PFOE, 397.
185. Ibid., 399-400.
186. Harris, SOP, 11.
187. Harris, Art. (1883), 310.
188. Ibid., 305. It follows that man is a self-active individual. Harris indicated how important he thought the subject to be by devoting two hundred and thirty-one pages to it in SOP.

d. Philosophy of Education.

Harris began his educational career when he was twenty-two years of age, in St. Louis, and spent the last seventeen years of his life, save the three he lived after retirement, as the United States Commissioner of Education. During these years he was especially related to the progressive educational ideas of Alcott and Davidson, and with Whitman and Howison put persons at the center of the educational process. He was not necessarily an "educational pioneer, but he was a great expositor of the best that was already known and thought in his field."[189] He defined education broadly enough to include the "four cardinal institutions of civilization—family, civil society, state, and church." He is specifically credited with having correlated the various studies into five of equal value, a step forward in the unification of all instruction, and also with being the first to make the kindergarten a part of the public school system of the United States. He inaugurated the latter into his system in St. Louis in 1873.[190] The eminent American educator, Nicholas Murray Butler, has written of Harris:

> For a long generation before 1904 the dominating force in American public education was William Torrey Harris. . . . On the platform of the National Education Association, before the National Council of Education and the Department of

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189. Bates, Art. (1932), 329.
190. See Munroe, HOE, 636 and 673. Also Cubberley, HOE, 426.

6. Philosophy of Education.

Harris began his educational career when he was twenty-two years of age, in St. Louis, and spent the last seventeen years of his life, save the three he lived after retirement, as the United States commissioner of education. During these years he was essentially polished on the progressive educational ideas of Alcott and Davidson, and with Bishop and Howison put pressure at the center of the educational process. He was not necessarily an "educational idealist", but he was a great organizer of the work that was already known and thought in his field.[119] He defined education broadly enough to include the "four essential institutions of civilization--family, civil society, church, and commonwealth." He is specifically credited with having correlated the various studies into five of equal value, a step forward in the unification of all knowledge, and also with being the first to make the kindergarten a part of the public school system of the United States. He introduced the latter into his system in St. Louis in 1873.[120] The eminent American educator, Nicholas Murray Butler, has written of Harris:

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119. Bates, art. (1874). 339.
120. See Barnes, 847, 848 and 874. Also Dunkley, 201, 202.

> Superintendence, before state and local meetings and teacher's institutes without number, for nearly forty years Dr. Harris poured forth, with pen as well as by voice, in forms that teachers could understand and apply, the results of his experience and of his sustained, his subtle and his exceptionally powerful thinking. . . . He was the one real, inspiring force in American public education with an influence and an authority that were truly nation-wide.[191]

Harris maintained that philosophy is basic for education; it alone "discovers Personality in the Absolute, and immortality and freedom in men," ideas which in turn "make possible our civilization."[192] The key to his theory of education was, therefore, the idea of self-activity, or the objectification of the self until it finally becomes related to the absolute self. The finite self is causative, creative, and self-conscious. It recognizes its own individuality, and goes on to recognize ideals, as brutes do not. Then by means of a combining and organizing power man constructs "for himself another set of conditions than those in which he finds himself."[193] Education is, consequently, the process by which one elevates himself from sense perception to "insight into the personal nature of the absolute."[194]

e. Aesthetics.

Man attains communion with the highest life through

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191. Quoted by Perry, SLM, 51.
192. Harris, Art. (PCU), 102.
193. Harris, PFOE, 307-308.
194. Ibid., 9.

> Nevertheless, before state and local governing and business institutions without number, for nearly forty years Dr. Morris poured forth, with pen as well as by voice, in fora that thousands could understand and apply, the results of his experience and of his studies, his subtle and his tremendously powerful criticism. . . . He was the one real, invaluable force in American public education with an influence and an authority that were truly nation-wide.[121]

Morris maintained that philosophy is basis for education; it alone "discovers personality in the individuo, and immortality and freedom in man," issues which in turn "make possible our civilization."[122] The key to his theory of education was, therefore, the idea of self-activity, or the objectification of the self until it finally becomes molded by the objective self. The finite self is conscious, creative, and self-conscious. In recognizing its own individuality, and goes on to recognize ideals, as Hughes do not, then by means of a conditior and overriding power man constructs "for himself another and of conditions than those in which he finds himself."[123] Education is, consequently, the process by which one develops himself from sense-perception to "insight into the personal nature of the universe."[124]

c. Analysis.

Man attains communion with the ultimate life through

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121. Quoted by Perry, 344, 2.
122. Morris, Art. (PE?), 126.
123. Morris, PEOA, 307-308.
124. Ibid., 9.

art, which "makes the invisible visible";[195] assumes reason to be ultimate, and reveals the "Personal Creator." "Matter becomes a work of art when made to manifest self-activity."[196] The lowest form of art is that which appeals merely to the senses; the highest is that which aspires to the "supersensuous." Sensuous elements are evidenced in regularity, symmetry, and harmony. Elements of the supersensuous are discovered as the art transcends time and space. The arts, therefore, ascend a scale as follows: architecture, sculpture, painting, music, and poetry. Poetry "unites in itself all the others";[197] it most perfectly transcends the sensuous, expresses self-activity, and reveals the absolute personality.

f. Philosophy of Religion.

Harris was essentially religious. "The philosophy of religion," he wrote, "must be acknowledged on all hands as the most important work of the human intellect."[198] Further, "the only way to bring more harmony between human actions and the teachings of religion is to associate religion with philosophy."[199] God, for Harris, is a revealed God, a con-

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195. Harris, SOP, 233.
196. Harris, PFOE, xxxiii.
197. Ibid., 373.
198. Harris, SOP, 239.
199. Harris, quoted by Schaub in Art. (1936), 56.

art, which "makes him [illegible] vitality";[195] becomes [illegible] to be [illegible], and reveals the "[illegible] [illegible]." "Mat-ter becomes a [illegible] of art when made to [illegible] self-activity."[196] The lowest form of art is that which [illegible] to the senses; the highest is that which [illegible] to the "[illegible]." Examples of [illegible] are architecture, sculpture, and music. Examples of the [illegible] discovered in the art [illegible] time and space. The [illegible], therefore, second a scale as follows: architecture, sculp-ture, painting, music, and poetry. Poetry "unites in itself all the others;[197] it most [illegible] [illegible] with [illegible], expresses self-activity, and reveals the absolute con-sciousness.

7. Philosophy of Religion.

Morris was [illegible] relations. "The philosophy of religion," he wrote, "must be acknowledged [illegible] as the most important [illegible] of the human intellect."[198] Further, "the only way to bring more harmony [illegible] human [illegible] and the teachings of religion is to [illegible] religion with philosophy."[199] God, the Father, is a revealed God, a co-

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195. Morris, [illegible], 223.
196. Morris, [illegible], [illegible].
197. Idem., 324.
198. Morris, [illegible], 238.
199. Morris, quoted by [illegible] in [illegible], [illegible].

scious, intelligent being.[200] "The divine Being is perfect in form, and its influence gives a tendency in the universe toward the survival of whatever reaches personality."[201] Men are created to participate in the self-activity of God, and they "have the possibility of infinitely growing into it by their own free activity."[202] It follows that nature reveals infinite goodness, and "man must have a divine destiny." Finally, "human consciousness is self-activity in the form of free and immortal personality."[203]

Throughout Harris' fruitful life in positions of educational leadership he exerted great influence for idealism which was essentially personalistic. Influenced by Alcott and enriched by friendships and an interplay of thought, among a host of others, with Davidson, Whitman, and Howison, Harris was a voice for personalism in the St. Louis Group, the Concord School, and, as the United States Commissioner of Education, the entire nation. His emphasis upon self-activity in all fields of philosophy enabled him to strengthen the central position of the self in psychology, epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of education, aesthetics, and philosophy of religion. As an educator he was especially concerned with directing individuals to mastery of the arts and

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200. Harris, SOP, 240.
201. Ibid., 170.
202. Ibid., 171.
203. Ibid., 166.

solves, intelligent being.[300] "The divine Being is perfect in form, and yet darkness gives a tendency in the universe toward the survival of whatever renders personality.[301] Man are crowded to participate in the self-activity of God, and deny "have the possibility of darkness preying into it by their own free nobility."[302] It follows that nature remains infinite goodness, and "man must have a divine destiny." Finally, "human consciousness is self-activity in the form of free and immortal personality."[303]

Thoroughly Spirit! Nothing jibe in conditions of economical leadership be centered great influence for idealism which was essentially personalistic. Influenced by Alcott and enclosed by friendships and an intensity of thought, among a host of others, with Emerson, Alcott, and Dewson, Harris was a voice for personalist in the St. Louis group, the Concord School, and, as the United Steam Navigations of Education, the active region. His methods upon activity in all fields of philosophy enabled him to strengthen the central position of the self in psychology, epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of education, aesthetics, and philosophy of religion. As an educator he was actually concerned with directing individuals to mastery of the arts and

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300. Harris, 801, 380.
301. Ibid., 170.
302. Ibid., 172.
303. Ibid., 174.

sciences and, beyond that, to "insight into the personal nature of the absolute."

7. Josiah Royce (1855-1916).

Josiah Royce made a contribution to personalism by maintaining that reality is an Absolute Person including the community of all the individuals and nature within its experience. This distinguished thinker, who has been called the "most brilliant American idealist," was closely related to many personalists of the United States. He counted Whitman among those "who glorify personal initiative,"[204] wrote for Harris' Journal of Speculative Philosophy and called Harris' Hegel's Logic "a scholarly exposition,"[205] exchanged views often with Howison, was the beloved teacher of Calkins, and wrote of Bowne: "I suppose that our agreements were rather on the increase toward the end of his work. I always prized him much."[206] Cell has indeed accurately written: "Royces System ist als personalistischer Absolutismus zu bezeichnen."[207] It is significant that as Howison, a personalist

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204. Royce, POL, 98.
205. Royce, SOMP, 479.
206. Quoted by Brightman, Art. (1922), 370.
207. Cell, Art. (1928), 385. Cunningham agrees with this interpretation of Royce. He has written: "The development of the idealistic argument speedily led to a personalistic emphasis. . . . Royce . . . tends to emphasize the integrity of the finite individual more explicitly than do his absolutistic British colleagues. . . ." Cunningham, IA, 302. See also Knudson, POP, 32-33, and McConnell, BPB, 132-133.

to be considered in some detail later, dedicated his chief book "to all who feel a deep concern for the dignity of the soul," so a group of eminent idealists dedicated Contemporary Idealism in America: "To the memory of Josiah Royce who proclaimed the dignity of the human spirit."[208]

Royce was born in 1855 in Grass Valley, a California mining town. His parents, English by birth, had crossed the continent during the "gold rush" days of 1849. Royce was brought up amid the hardship and uncertainty of a frontier community. His early schooling was at the hands of his mother, who organized and taught a small school. He went to San Francisco to grammar school, took preparatory instruction in Oakland, and matriculated at the then young University of California at Berkeley, where Howison later enjoyed a fruitful career. No formal philosophical instruction was given there in those early days, yet Royce received some philosophical stimulation from Joseph LeConte, the geologist, who was later a close friend and admirer of Howison. Royce spent the next year in Europe listening to Lotze, Wundt, and Windelband, as well as studying Kant, Schopenhauer and others. He was considerably influenced, as were the personalists Ward, Ladd, Howison, and Bowne, by Lotze. After his return to America, he received his Ph.D. in 1878 at Johns Hopkins University. There he was influenced chiefly by

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208. Barrett, CIIA, v.

to be considered to some detail later, dedicated his chief book "to all who feel a deep concern for the dignity of the soul," as a group of religious idealists dedicated Contemporary Ideaists in America: "to the memory of Josiah Royce who inculcated the dignity of the human spirit."[208]

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208. Barrett, Ch. v.

Charles Peirce. He then taught English at the University of California for four years. Under the influence of William James he came as a teacher to Harvard University in 1882. There he remained the rest of his life exerting a profound influence upon American philosophy, and especially upon a later personalist, Mary Whiton Calkins.[209] The personalistic elements in Royce's thinking are seen mainly in his metaphysics and his philosophy of religion, the two fields in which he was chiefly interested, and the areas of thought in which he did his most creative work.

a. Metaphysics.

It will be well to note, before stating Royce's idea of the absolute, nature, time, and selfhood, that he makes a sharp distinction between two types of human knowledge, the "descriptive" and the "appreciative." The former relates to knowledge of the physical world and the latter to knowledge of facts of experience for a Self. The human self becomes aware of itself by its relationship to other selves. Royce is continually concerned with this problem of the individual within a larger whole, a greater community, the absolute. For him this is basically a social universe, yet the individ-

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209. For succinct and scholarly statements of Royce's life and works see Perry, Art. (1935), 205-211, and Palmer, Art. (1932), 3-9.

Charles Peirce. He then taught English at the University of California for four years. Later the influence of William James led him to a teaching in Harvard University in 1900. There he remained the rest of his life, exercising a profound influence upon American philosophy, and especially upon a later generation, Harry Austin Gullins.[20] The personalistic elements in Royce's thinking are seen mainly in his metaphysics and his philosophy of religion, the fields in which he was chiefly interested, and the areas of thought in which he did his most creative work.

c. Metaphysics.

It will be well to note, before stating Royce's idea of the absolute, being, life, and activity, that he makes a sharp distinction between two types of human knowledge, the "descriptive" and the "experimentative." The former relates to knowledge of the physical world and the latter to knowledge of facts of experience for a self. The human self becomes aware of itself by its relationship to other selves. Logic is continuously concerned with this problem of the individual within a larger whole, a greater community, the absolute. For him this is basically a social universe, yet the individual

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20. For excellent and scholarly discussions of Royce's life and works see Perry, op. cit. (1935), 2b-2d, and Adams, op. cit. (1952), 3-6.

ual has reality. It has been said, because of Royce's idea of community, that his philosophy "must be called a social metaphysics of religion."[210] The world of description is never the whole truth; it must be "interpreted in terms of the World of Appreciation."

Royce's central metaphysical idea is that reality is Absolute Personality. In an essay on "The Implications of Self-Consciousness" he wrote, "the Infinite is unquestionably a Person, and this Person is as unquestionably the world-possessor."[211] Part of this possessed world is physical nature. For the Absolute, nature is merely phenomenal, yet it has meaning for finite selves in that it is used for the development of "human arts" and "the predictions of science." Nature is real for us "in precisely the sense in which our fellow-men are real," i.e., as an object of experience.[212] The problem of time is solved on the basis of selfhood; time is transcended by an "Eternal Consciousness." The self attempts complete expression in time, yet wins it finally only in its eternity of oneness with the Divine. The self, however, maintains its eternal individuality and freedom as a moral agent. "We have no other dwelling-place but the single unity of the divine consciousness."[213]

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210. Paul E. Johnson, in his unpublished dissertation, Josiah Royce's Philosophy of Religion, 146.
211. Royce, GE, 141.
212. Royce, WAI, II, 236.
213. Royce, WAI, I, 427.

well has truth. It has been said, because of Royce's idea of community, that his philosophy "must be called a social methodysism of religion."[210] The world of description is never the whole truth; it must be "interpreted in terms of the World of Appreciation."

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210. Paul E. Johnson, in "The Unpublished Manuscripts, Josiah Royce's Philosophy of Religion, 146.
211. Royce, UA, 141.
212. Royce, WAT, II, 420.
213. Royce, WAI, I, 420.

b. Philosophy of Religion.

Royce is concerned, in his philosophy of religion, with the "progressive realization of the Universal Community in and through the longings, the vicissitudes, the tragedies, the triumphs of this process of the temporal world."[214] Essential personalistic ideas in Royce's philosophy of religion are: God is a Person; man is a free moral agent living in a moral order; personalities struggle with evil; and man experiences immortality.

Despite Royce's absolutism he is a theist who views God as personal. To be sure God is all in all, and man becomes one with God, yet Royce argues for the individual identity of each personality. He is partially indebted to Howison for maintaining this position; he had come off second best at the hands of Howison in the discussion concerning the nature of God before the Philosophical Union of the University of California with Howison, LeConte, and Mezes. Howison had pointed out that Royce did not make enough allowance for individuality. Royce felt the weight of this pluralistic criticism and some years later, in his Gifford Lectures, emphasized individuality as he had not heretofore. The conclusion of the entire series of his lectures deals with the relationship of God and man. He wrote:

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214. Royce, POC, II, 387.

b. Philosophy of Religion.

Royce is concerned, in his philosophy of religion, with the "progressive realization of the universal Community in and through the journey, the vicissitudes, the beneficies, the dilemma of this province of the temporal world."[24] Essential personalistic ideas in Royce's philosophy of religion are: God is a Person; man is a free moral agent living in a moral order; personalities struggle with evil; and an overwhelmed immortality.

Despite Royce's admiration for is a theism who views God as personal. To do away God is fail in all, and man becomes one with God, yet Royce argues for the individual integrity of each personality. So his morality tendency to theism for maintaining this position be had once air moment best at the death of Josiah in the idealism corresponding the nature of God before the philosophical Union of the University of California with Jewison, Lecomte, and Lorenz. Jewison had pointed out, Royce did not make enough allowance for individuality. Royce felt the weight of this criticism and so a years later, in his Gifford Lectures, emphasized individuality as he had not heretofore. The consideration of the moral aspect of his theism deals with the relationship of God and man. He wrote:

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24. Royce, Op. Cit. 337.

> Despite God's absolute unity, we, as individuals, preserve and attain our unique lives and meanings, and are not lost in the very life that sustains us, and that needs us as its own expression.[215]

Closely related to this idea of individuality is that of freedom. The finite self exerts its own will; it creates its own purpose, its own "way of expressing God's will." It is compelled to be free for it is unique. Its purpose, or life plan, fills a place that cannot be filled by any other self. "Our theory of the Self assigns to it the character of the Free Individual. . . ."[216]

Agreeing with other personalists, Royce says the finite self faces the problem of evil, yet lives in a moral order. The self seeks to know the real. It contrasts itself with the absolute will and becomes conscious of the "Ought." It attempts to fulfil the absolute will. In this moral order it has its place, its task, effectiveness, freedom, and individual worth by virtue of its "unity with all Being, and with God."[217] The struggle with evil is solved by the Absolute Person transcending all the imperfections of the finite space-time world. In the temporal world there is evil; in the Eternal, there is triumph. "These glories are the treasures of the house of God."

A final question in Royce's philosophy of religion is

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215. Royce, WAI, II, 452.
216. See Royce, WAI, II, 293-294 and 336-337.
217. Royce, WAI, II, 375.

> Despite God's absolute grace, we, as individuals, preserve and should our unique lives and meanings, and are not lost in the very life that sustains us, and that seeks us in its own expression.[113]

Closely related to this idea of individuality is that of freedom. The finite self exerts its own will; it creates its own purpose, its own "<u>way of expressing God's will</u>." It is conceived to be free for it is unique. Its purpose, or life plan, fills a place that cannot be filled by any other self. "Our energy of knowledt results in the expression of the free individual. . . ."[114]

Agreeing with other personalists, Royce says the finite self faces the problem of evil. Yet living in a moral order. The self seeks to know the real. It contrasts itself with the absolute will and becomes conscious of the "ought." It attempts to fulfill the absolute will. In this moral order it has its place, its task, effectiveness, freedom, and individual worth by virtue of the "unity with all being, and with God."[115] The struggle with evil is solved by the Absolute during transcending all the imperfections of the finite human-like self. In the temporal world there is evil; in the Eternal, there is none. "Human factors are the treasures of the house of God."

A final question in Royce's philosophy of religion is

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[113]. Royce, Ibid, II, 422.
[114]. See Royce, Ibid, II, 323-330 and 341-344.
[115]. Royce, Ibid, II, 375.

that of immortality. He dealt with this idea specifically in his Ingersoll Lecture of 1899, arguing for it in the following way: (1) The world is a rational whole wherein the divine will is uniquely expressed. (2) Every aspect of the absolute is unique and gets individual expression. (3) The present life does not allow completeness. (4) Our life must receive significant expression. (5) We experience hints of real individuality in ourselves. (6) We, therefore, gain final conscious expression in an eternal conscious life.[218] Here, as elsewhere, Royce is consistently personalistic; eternal life is individual and conscious.[219]

The absolute idealism of Royce was less rigorous than the intellectualistic idealism of some of his German antecedents and British contemporaries, a fact which enabled him to make a momentous contribution to American personalism. His thought revealed the effects of the influence of Lotze, the personal-pluralistic criticism of Howison, and the "Individuality" as well as the "En-Masse" of Whitman. He continued his thought through Calkins, a more consciously personalistic thinker, and gladly recognized his "agreements" with Bowne, the "systematizer of personalism." Although pragmatism and new realism temporarily obscured his importance, he will be remembered as one of America's preëminent thinkers

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218. Royce, COI, 78-80.
219. Royce, COG, 326.

and as having made a permanent personalistic contribution to the developing philosophy of America.

8. Howison, Calkins, Bowne.

A recognition of the wealth of personalistic ideas throughout the entire history of American philosophy, as indicated by this survey, has prepared for a treatment of the chief representatives of the three distinctive types of personalism. It will be recalled that Johnson and Edwards expressed personalistic views in the early colonial period, that Whitman was the first one to publish an article entitled "Personalism" and was probably the first one to use the word in America, that Alcott was the first philosopher to call his thought personalism, and finally, that Davidson, Harris, and Royce were essentially personalistic. Although the word "personalism" was not widely used until relatively late in the development of American philosophy,[220] the vigor-

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220. The word "personalism" did not appear in Baldwin's Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology (1902), nor in the first edition of Webster's New International Dictionary of the English Language (1909). It appeared, however, in The Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics (1917), in the second edition of Webster's New International Dictionary of the English Language (1934), and in Runes' The Dictionary of Philosophy (1942). After the earlier use of the word by Whitman and Alcott, "personalism" was used by James (1902), Calkins (1907), and Bowne (1908). With the publication of the first book in English entitled Personalism (1908), by Bowne, the word came into general philosophical use. For further information regarding the use of "personalism" in Germany,

ous personalism of Howison, Calkins, and Bowne was possible only because it flowed from a vast reservoir of accumulated personalistic thought.

Howison, the pluralistic personalist, Calkins, the absolutistic personalist, and Bowne, the plural-monistic personalist, brought to conscious expression the full import of a rich native heritage. Theirs is a philosophy with an authentic American ring. It embodies not only the achievements of European and ancient thought into which they so thoroughly delved, but also sprang indigenously from the culture of a new continent. Its large dimensions and heroic proportions reveal it to have been a major productive force of the most worthful in American civilization. Personalism has, from the colonial period to the present, concerned itself empirically with the elemental problems of a growing nation and has held before every cultural advance the vistas of eternity.

France, and elsewhere, see Brightman, Art. (1922)[2], Art. (1927), and Art. (1943)[1]; Flewelling, Art. (1917) and Art. (1942); Knudson, POP, 17-21; and Murray, NED.

CHAPTER III.

PLURALISTIC PERSONALISM.

1. The Life and Influence of George Holmes Howison (1834-1916).

George Holmes Howison is the chief exponent of pluralistic personalism, the first type of personalism in the United States to be considered. He was born in Montgomery County, Maryland, of old Maryland and Virginia stock. He was always a lover of the East, and especially New England, yet he spent the most fruitful years of his successful teaching career at the University of California in Berkeley. There he inspired and stimulated young minds. His biographers, John Buckham and George Stratton remark: "He saw himself as a teacher of persons possessed of power to observe, to think, to enjoy beauty, to devote themselves to the great community of persons, of which the greatest of all is God."[1] He was an impressive personality, dignified in dress and manner. He showed a keen sense of discipline, humor always within the bounds of propriety, and above all, pugnacity in defense of truth. Hocking, who for a time was a member of Howison's department in California, said of him: "Howison comes as near to Elijah the prophet, and in some ways to old

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1. Buckham, John, and George Stratton, GHH, 15.

Simon Peter, as any human being I expect to meet in my time."[2] Without doubt he was at his best in the classroom. It is said that at times he would lose sight of his students or the occasion and would speak with the passion and eloquence of a poet. Yet he was quite human. An interesting story is told of his absent-mindedness:

> One day the home dinner waited for him a half-hour beyond the usual time; an hour. Nine o'clock and no George Howison. At ten Mrs. Howison began to be alarmed, and by eleven she was inquiring by telephone at all his favorite haunts. None of his friends, who in their turn grew alarmed, could give her a clue to his whereabouts. At one o'clock in the morning, in he sauntered, quite unconscious of the hour and of Mrs. Howison's anxiety. It appeared that he had crossed the Bay to San Francisco, had there met a friend, and the two had for all these hours been lost to the world in their discussion of high philosophy.[3]

He was slow in achieving prominence. As in the case of Thomas Hobbes, his formative period was of long duration. It was not until 1884, when he was fifty years of age, that he went reluctantly to his permanent position in philosophy at the University of California. The preceding years were not without value, however. When he was four years old his family had left its Maryland farm and moved to Ohio. The vicinity of Marietta offered excellent educational facilities, and while there, Howison attended Marietta and Harmar Academies, and Marietta College. His first taste of philosophy

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2. Buckham and Stratton, GHH, 13.
3. Ibid., 26.

came from the president of the college, Dr. Henry Smith, D.D.[4] After graduating, he studied in Lane Seminary in Cincinnati, Ohio, a Presbyterian school, but probably never served a full-time pastorate. Instead he became a teacher and principal of schools in Marietta, Chillicothe, Portsmouth, and Harmar in Ohio, and Salem in Massachusetts. It was in Salem that he met and married Lois Caswell, the lovely teacher of English who possessed a keen mind and a radiant personality. She was the "niece of President Caswell of Brown University; was related to the Angells of presidential fame, and had in her veins the blood of Miles Standish and Peregrine White, celebrated in stories of colonial New England."[5]

At the age of thirty, in the last year of the Civil War, Howison became a professor at Washington University in St. Louis. He was disappointed upon arrival, for, having expected to teach English literature, he was informed that an older man had been employed for that purpose, and that he was to assist in mathematics, and later in political economy. He used his time profitably, however, and wrote his first

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4. Dr. Smith was also Professor of Moral and Intellectual Philosophy. No specific descriptions of courses are given in the catalogue, but the work in the field of philosophy listed in the program for the senior year was: Intellectual Philosophy, Wayland's Moral Science and Whately's Logic. The author is indebted to Miss Lillian R. Spindler, registrar of Marietta College, for this information. Dr. Smith championed the Baconian method as over against German apriorism.
5. Buckham and Stratton, GHH, 44.

book, Analytic Geometry, which was acclaimed by authorities as a masterful piece of work. Along with this his interest in philosophy continued to grow, for he came under the influence of Harris, Brokmeyer, Snider, and others of the St. Louis school. He participated in the discussions of the Society and became its vice-president. The group was occupied with Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit when Howison first became affiliated with it; the Hegelian influence upon him was great even though he eventually championed pluralism, like the British Hegelian McTaggart. It was here, also, that Howison first came under the influence of Bronson Alcott and Emerson, both of whom lectured frequently to the St. Louis company. Howison, in turn, met them later when he taught in the East, and especially when he lectured at the Concord School of Philosophy which had been organized in Alcott's library.

Howison's lack of opportunity to teach in his fields of interest, along with his desire to go East, led him to resign from Washington University. This is how he came to teach at Massachusetts Institute of Technology from 1872 to 1878 as professor of logic and the philosophy of science.[6]

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6. At first, Howison taught Rudiments of Logic, Systematic Logic, and Philosophy of Science (which included twenty lectures on the theory of induction, fifteen lectures on the classification of the mathematical sciences, and ten lectures on the theory of calculus). The 1873-74 catalogue lists, for the first time, philosophy as one of the ten regular departments of the institution. Howison also

His excellent work there was widely acclaimed, yet another disappointment awaited him; he found it necessary to leave because of the institution's financial straits. As if to compensate for this experience, however, he had a delightful time the following year lecturing on ethics at Harvard Divinity School. From that position he went to Europe. He remained there for two years and enrolled as a student in the University of Berlin. Among the men under whom he studied were Du Bois-Raymond, Ebbinghaus, Paulsen, Gizycki, Lasson, Zeller, and Michelet, the pupil and friend of Hegel. From that enriching time of travel and study Howison returned to two unsettled years in America, the first being spent giving private instruction in Boston and the second lecturing on philosophy at the University of Michigan.[7]

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added that year to his course offerings: Critical History of Systems, Ethics, and Elements of Philosophy. The object of the philosophy department, which must have been written by Howison, was stated to be: "The specific object of the department is to furnish the basis for a sound general education, in such a study of philosophy as, gathering within its scope the solid products of the modern mind, will bring its idea into immediate connection with the Conduct of Life." P. 41 of the 1873-74 catalogue. Howison later gave various free lectures in series, such as: The System of John Stewart Mill, Modern Philosophy from Descartes to Hegel, Kant's Kritik der reinen Vernunft, and The Philosophy of Government. Howison also served as secretary of the faculty.

7. Howison is listed in the University of Michigan catalogue as Lecturer on Psychology, Logic, and Speculative Philosophy. He taught courses entitled Empirical Psychology, Speculative Philosophy, Formal Logic, and Real Logic. The year after he left John Dewey taught his psychology course.

It was during this latter year (1884) that Howison was invited to the Mills Chair of Philosophy at the University of California. The dispirited teacher was reluctant to accept the offer, however, for he was expecting a call from Johns Hopkins University, and presumably hoped to be called to Harvard. There was justification for the latter expectation, since Howison had been close to many of Harvard's leading men. J. Elliot Cabot wished him to be there, as did William James, even though he had committed himself to Royce. In a letter to Thomas Davidson, James wrote:

> When I see the disconsolate condition of poor Howison, looking for employment now, and when I recognize the extraordinary development of his intellect in the past four years, I feel almost guilty of having urged Royce's call hither. . . He /Howison/ gave the best philosophical lecture, in point of form and impressiveness, I think I ever heard, the other night at the Concord School.[8]

Howison finally decided to accept the offer from California. There he spent the last thirty-two years[9] of his life happy in the work he loved, teaching students. In a congenial atmosphere he built up a strong department and became a vital part of the university and community.[10] On one occasion he was largely responsible for determining who the new president

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8. Quoted by Buckham and Stratton in GHH, 70. James is referring to Howison's lectures on Hume and Kant given in August, 1883.
9. He became Professor Emeritus in 1909, after having taught for twenty-five years.
10. Bates, Art. (1932), 311.

of the university was to be. His pet interest was the Union, which he established to teach philosophy beyond the walls of the classroom. The policy of the Union was to discuss a specific book once a month during the year, and at the end of the year the author himself addressed the group. The public attended in large numbers. One of the most brilliant of the yearly meetings was the occasion when Royce, LeConte, Mezes, and Howison all took part in discussing "The Conception of God," the lectures appearing later in book form. The New York Times referred to the meeting as "the great debate" and "a battle of the giants," while the New York Tribune called the meeting "the most noteworthy philosophical discussion that for many a day had taken place in this country."[11] During these years in California Howison became more independent in his thinking and developed his pluralistic and idealistic form of personalism.

Not only did Howison bring to his new opportunity "a maturity of thought and experience which carried him rapidly forward,"[12] but he continued to study and discuss philosophy with the greatest philosophical minds of his day. His first trip to Europe had been rewarding; from California he returned thither twice more. At Oxford he came to know, among others, Caird, Rashdall, Schiller, Josephs, Carman,

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11. Quoted in Buckham and Stratton, GHH, 80.
12. Bates, op. cit., 311.

Fairbrother, Conybeare, Stout and Baldwin. It was partially the encouragement of Stout and Schiller that led him to publish his essays in the form of what was to become his most significant piece of work, The Limits of Evolution and Other Essays Illustrating the Metaphysical Theory of Personal Idealism (1901). He became a fast friend of James Ward, the pluralist, who had studied, as had Bowne, under Lotze. To the group of Howison's earlier German friends must now be added Vaihinger, of Halle, and Eucken, of Jena. It was with the latter "that Howison had perhaps the fullest and heartiest of his German friendships."[13] After reading The Limits of Evolution, Eucken expressed joyous approval, saying, "I, too, stand fully and without reserve on the platform of 'Personal Idealism.'"[14]

The influences that led Howison to personalism are three-fold. First, he developed his interest in philosophy while among the vigorous thinkers of the St. Louis School, all of whom were dominated by German idealism. At the St. Louis meetings he exchanged ideas with Harris, among others, and met Alcott, both of whom have been considered personalists in their essential philosophical views. Second, Howison's thorough scholarship enabled him to draw personalistic concepts from the mighty thinkers of the historic stream of

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13. Buckham and Stratton, GHH, 119.
14. Ibid., 120.

Patriotism, Jingoism, Stout and Selfish. In its essential nature, consciousness of Stout and Selfish Souls had this to establish unity in the form of what may be termed its essentiaiment alone of "are." The Lights of Evolution Shove Illuminating the Intellectual Sphere of Economic Theorizing (1001). In Germany a Jew, Friend of Karl Marx, the Socialist, who had studied, as has been said, under Lotze, the Prince of Kant's Critical Idealism, Eduard Bernstein, author Vaihinger, of Leipzig, and Stern, of Jena. It was also the Letter "that Engelsen had received the Ability and Insight of his German Fellow-Jew." Author of Making the Lights of Evolution, Author of Moral Idealism Economy, Author, Jew, Stern Fully and Clearly Showed on the Platform of Rational Idealism.[14]

The Illuminers that had Shown to Economists are Three-Fold. First, the Drives of the Economic Inventiveness Will Come the Vigorous Methods of the Ex. Idealistic Control, all of which were Engineered by Moral Idealism. As to the Lights Revealing in Economic Ethics, Author, Author, and not Alone, Both of Them Have been Considered Economists in Kant's Concrete Philosophical Views. Among Kant's Economic Economists Philosophical Views, Author connects from the Right Economy of the Philosophic Ethics of

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14. Buckle and Stern, Ibid., 120.
15. Ibid., 120.

philosophy. His own personalistic pluralism relative to Aristotle was, he said, an "attempt to carry out the individualistic tendencies in Aristotelianism to a conclusion consistently coherent."[15] While departing from Leibniz in some respects, he maintained that his own personalism "certainly does approach to the Leibnizian monodology more closely than to any other form of idealism that has preceded it."[16] Howison departed from Berkeley's "theocentric" idealism, but agreed with him in asserting that "nothing really exists but 'spirits and their ideas.'"[17] Howison accepted, from Kant, "the a priori character of all the connecting and inference-supporting elements in human consciousness," and also the removal of "the centre of the permanent order in Nature from the Divine mind to the human."[18] Further,

> Like Kant's, the present system finds the basis for its theory of knowledge in the native spontaneity of the human mind,—of all minds not divine; and again like Kant's, it provides for the 'transcendental' efficacy of this spontaneous intelligence, for the power to go beyond past experience and judge of the future in perpetuum with unreserved universality, by the hypothesis that Nature is a system of experiences, the 'matter' of which is sensation, while the 'form' or fixed order of it is determined by the elements—Space, Time, Cause, and so forth—

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15. Howison, LOE, xxvi.
16. Howison, LOE, xxiii. Howison rejects Leibniz's isolation of the monad in favor of a social consciousness, his idea of gradation, which involves a "system of caste," and the Leibnizian illusory character of extension and duration. LOE, xxiii-xxv.
17. Howison, LOE, xviii.
18. Howison, LOE, xix.

philosophy. His ten personalistic principles relating to Artificial Man, he said, are "attempts to group and see individuality from aspects in psychological terms by a phenomenologic consistently consonant."[15] While descending from Leibnitz in some respects, he maintained that man is a personalistic "monad" dual approach in the Leibnitzian monadology and closely then to our other form of idealism that has preceded it.[16] Bretton describes this ideology "transcendental idealist, but agreed with him in insisting that "Nature, reality exists only in spirits and their ideas."[17] Bretton concluded, from Kant, "the a priori characteristics of all the consciousness and interconnection-conditions in human experiences." and also the rejection of "the reality of the phenomenal order in favors from the Divine mind to the human."[18] Further,

> Like Kant's, the pragmatic Bretton finds the basis for his theory of knowledge in the creative spontaneity of the human mind,--of all minds but Divine; and again like Kant, it provides for the interconnection of these spontaneous intelligences, for the power to go beyond mere experience and judge of the future in terms with the reference universality. By the hypothesis that Nature is a system of sequences, the 'matter' of which is sensations, while the 'form' or formal order of it is constituted by the elements--space, time, change, and so forth--

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15. Bretton, op. cit.
16. Bretton, Ibid. Bretton relates Leibnitz's Monadism of his own work in terms of a social consciousness, his idea of "Personalism, which involves a "system of monads," and the Leibnitzian idiosyncrasy characteristic of reason and duration. Op. cit.
17. Bretton, Ibid. op. cit.
18. Bretton, Ibid. op. cit.

that the self-active consciousness supplies.[19] Finally, Howison built his personalism, in part, upon Hegelianism, for there he found "the strongest affirmations of personal reality and individual freedom."[20] Even though he dissented keenly from monism, Howison acknowledged his intellectual debt to Hegel, referring to him as one "to whom I owe many years of light and guidance, and who must always remain for me one of the world's great minds."[21] Howison made an original synthesis of the "new insights" of these philosophers in erecting his personalistic system, and sought, in terms of Aristotle, Leibniz, and Kant at least, "to continue the pluralistic aperçu, which undergoes a growing clarification in the thinking of these great minds, onward toward its proper fulfilment."[22] Finally, Howison must have been led to personalism, in part, by his philosophical friends and teachers of later years. He was closely associated with the aforementioned Harris and Alcott through the years, met with Davidson and Bowne, among others, when in Cambridge,[23] was keenly familiar with the thought of Royce,

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19. Howison, LOE, xix. Howison differs from Kant, however, by not restricting the application of a priori principles to the world of sense; he attempts to break down the barrier between the "practical" and "theoretical" consciousness; he differs with Kant on the question of the origin of the "contents" in experience. See LOE, xix-xxii.
20. Howison, LOE, xxviii.
21. Howison, LOE, xxvi-xxvii.
22. Howison, LOE, xxvi.
23. See reference by William James,

knew the Oxford personalists (although he maintains independence of thought from them), was a fast friend of James Ward, and among other German philosophers, was a close friend of Eucken's, who stood on the "platform of 'Personal Idealism.'" It thus appears that Howison's personalism can be traced to his original synthesis of the rich deposit of thought obtained at St. Louis, from his thorough knowledge of philosophical literature, and from his lasting friendships with thinkers who advocated personalism or ideas in harmony with it.

Howison's influence as a philosopher was significant, yet he did not establish a school of thought; he never gathered a professional following. His greatest excellence was his power as a teacher.[24] The students under his scholarly guidance who did not become philosophers "found their lives lastingly impressed." When Franklin K. Lane, one of his students, became a member of President Wilson's Cabinet in 1913, he wrote in response to a letter from Howison: "No letter that I have ever received has given me more real pleasure than yours, and no man has been more of an inspiration than you."[25] Those students of Howison who devoted themselves fully to philosophy, Mezes, McGilvary, Rieber,

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24. It was remarked in The University Chronicle soon after his death: "The University of California has lost its greatest teacher." Quoted in Ferrier, ODUC, 468n.
25. Quoted in Lane and Wall, LFL, 2.

Stuart, Henderson, Lovejoy, and Bakewell,[26] came to assume leading places in American philosophy even though they did not become his disciples. This lack of a following did not please Howison, so confident was he of the truth of his own view. He is said to have replied to congratulations upon his success as a teacher for having so many distinguished students: "Yes, but not one of them teaches the truth."[27] Howison's influence, however, was felt by these men, and is seen in others. The thought of Arthur Kenyon Rogers and Joseph A. Leighton can be traced, at least in part, to him. James Ward paid him high tribute when he wrote in reference to The Limits of Evolution: "It was your book that emboldened me to try to work out pluralism as fully as I could, & to start from the Many & not from the One."[28] Joseph LeConte, a distinguished colleague and friend of Howison, wrote in recognition of his indebtedness to him: "I never knew a more acute thinker. . .; I never knew anyone who had so thoroughly in mind the whole literature of philosophy; I never knew anyone who could compare with him as a dialectician."[29]

Howison did not write a great deal. This is probably due to his great popularity as a speaker, his vigor as a teacher, and to the influence of the nine years that he had

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26. Buckham and Stratton, GHH, 11.
27. Quoted in Buckham and Stratton, GHH, 13.
28. Buckham and Stratton, GHH, 116-117.
29. LeConte, AJL, 261.

spent in "rather desultory secondary school teaching." What he did publish was weighty. He was a contributor to the Journal of Speculative Philosophy as well as a close friend of its founder, Harris. He was a member of the editorial board of the Psychological Review when it began its career, and also of that of the Kantstudien, in Germany, and of the Hibbert Journal, in England.

Howison was slow to arrive at his full stature, yet his ability and sincerity gave him an important place in American philosophy. He was honored with LL.D. degrees by Marietta College in 1887, the University of Michigan in 1909, and the University of California in 1914.[30] No one can read him today without catching his moral earnestness, his breadth of vision, his eager concern for truth. His mature thought was that reality is a system of infinite[31] persons, that the individual has everlasting reality in the "Eternal Republic," and that this pluralistic universe is bound by reason into

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30. The registrar of Marietta College and the assistant to the President of the University of Michigan are unable to find the exact citation under which Howison was granted the honorary degree from their respective institutions. In those "more informal days" the records were kept, but "without any supporting detail." The registrar of the University of California, however, has supplied the information that he was granted the honorary Doctor of Laws degree from that institution with the citation: "A masterful teacher gifted to establish the ideal as the veritable real, and make it a saving power in the lives of men."
31. By infinite, Howison means distinct, eternal, self-existent, self-active, or free. In fact, all these terms are interchangeable to him. See LOE, 422.

harmonic union.

2. The Significance of Mind.

Howison called his metaphysical system "personal idealism," thus distinguishing it from typical monistic idealism. He pointed out that historically idealism had been just as monistic as materialism and that Leibniz had been the only thinker from Plato "to the present 1901 " who had "distinctly and systematically" broken from the monistic tradition. By personal idealism, Howison meant an idealistic system that, while thoroughly personal, was pluralistic. This pluralism was not intended in the "bad sense," i.e., it was not anarchic. The public and universal character of every mind was asserted at the same time with its individuality. All minds, according to this view, are held together by reason. While retaining the idealistic emphasis on mind, Howison's personal idealism laid far more stress on the individual separateness and personality of mind than had any previous thinker other than Leibniz. Whenever the word "mind" is used, then, in reference to Howison's thought, it is to be understood as equivalent to self, or personality, for each mind possesses "personal initiative, real self-direction."

In the process of knowing, the human mind functions spontaneously. It brings to the act of experience its own

harmonic union.

6. The Magnificence of Man.

Bertram Gulley has aptly labeled Quinn's "personal idealism," then distinguishing it from Berkeley's immaterialistic idealism. He noticed that this philosophically idealistic bent was manifest in aesthetics and that Berkeley had been the only thinker from Plato "to the present." Lord " was not "idealistic and spiritualistic" because that was antithetic tendition. By natural dis-like, Berkeley chose an idealistic system that, while subjectively unique, was idealistic. His attitude was not intended to be "bad news," i.e., it was not hedonistic. For outside the universal idealistic or every mind was connected at the same time with intelligibility. All minds, according to Berkeley, are united together by reason. While rejecting the Platonic exaltation of the idealistic personal ideal in lead for the supremacy of the individual imaginations and personal ideas, Berkeley had very serious criticism from Plato. Therefore the great "stand" is made, then, in reference to Berkeley's idealism, it is to be understood as a universal in mind, for everything, for each and everyone "personal idealistic, and spiritualistic."

In the essence of this, the human mind "realizes" spontaneously. It origins in the mind of a rational ele-

self-activity; it alone makes the perception of objects possible. Experience is not constituted out of sensations or impressions; rather, self-active consciousness organizes and forms them into intelligible experience. Sensation is not "an unfathomable datum" nor is it produced "by some foreign agent acting as an efficient cause;"[32] it is constructed by the self. Howison has been charged with irrationalism at this point, for how does he account for a uniform body of knowledge?[33] He seemingly overlooks interaction, and rejects the preëstablished harmony of Leibniz. His doctrine of "Spontaneous Harmony" or "spontaneous objective cognition" would indeed seem to make uniformity of knowledge a pure coincidence. To remedy this he calls in "a world of efficient-causal communication between individuals other than God"[34] based on the space-time aspect of self-consciousness. In the last analysis, however, he appeals to a purely ideal "social consciousness" and a "communal system of experience," rather than to efficient-causal communication. This would appear to be more easily accomplished on the basis of absolutism, which Howison thoroughly rejects, than on his own system of pluralism, but he is able to appeal to "social

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32. Howison, LOE, xxi.
33. See Borden Bowne Kessler's unpublished Boston University dissertation, PMVP, 33-35.
34. Howison, LOE, xxiii. This communication between selves is interaction, yet Howison denies the idea of interaction. He writes: "No mind can have an efficient relation to another mind." LOE, 74.

consciousness" by employing the doctrine of final cause as "the sole causal relation between minds."[35] The communal system is an ideal for it is the self-awareness of each mind in its correlation with the total system of other minds that is constitutive of sensible objects and the human intelligence that perceives them.[36] Each mind, or self, has an "inner initiative," or "native contemplation of the same Ideal." The world of minds becomes the final cause, the Ens realissimum, the foundation of knowledge.

The metaphysical function of mind is to be "the measure of all things." It makes self-awareness possible in the cognition of a community of eternal infinite selves, and thereby becomes basic for existence, or experience. All existence is to be thought of in terms of mind, or speaking more specifically, "the assemblage of individual minds"[37] is the cause or ground of all that exists. This assemblage is an ideal; minds are related to their own acts and life, or toward the phenomenal world by efficient causation, but they are related to each other only on the basis of final causation, or ideality. Howison wrote: "All existence is either (1) the existence of minds, or (2) the existence of the items and order of their experience. . ."[38] Mind is the

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35. Howison, LOE, 74.
36. See Howison, Art. (1884), 6-7.
37. Howison, Art. (1905), 179.
38. Howison, LOE, xii.

consciousness" by describing the doctrine of "final causes" as "the sole causal relation between ends."[46] The concept quotes is an ideal for it is the self-consciousness of each other in the consciousness with the total system of ends that is constitutive of concrete objects and the human faculties that perceive them.[47] Such also, or only, begins "human initiative," or "positive consciousness of the moral ideal." The moral of ethics becomes the final cause, the *telos* *teleologia*, the fulfillment of consciousness.

The methodological formula of Hegel is to "take cognition of all things." It takes self-consciousness consists in the condition of a consciousness of eternal intuitive reason, and thereby becomes basis for existence, or expression. All relations is to be thought of together of which, or consciousness are mutually, "the *consciousness of individual* *reason*[48] is the-cause or ground of all that exists. Their consciousness is ideal; ends are related as truth but more and life, as based and dominant world by efficient consciousness, but they are related to each other only on the basis of final causation, or identity. Hegelian system: "All existence is either (1) the existence of *ideas*; or (2) the existence of *the* *idea* and other of *finite* *consciousness*. . . ."[49] That is the

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46. Hegelian, Log., 41.
47. See Hegelian, Log. (1968), 147.
48. Hegelian, Log. (1968), 179.
49. Hegelian, Log., 41.

whole in contrast to the part, the subject in opposition to the object, and reality as distinct from appearance; but the part, the object, the appearance exist only in and for the mind, the subject, the reality.[39]

It follows from such a view that physical nature is dependent upon and an integral part of mind. In fact, it is the sum of organized sensory experiences of the total community of minds, and as such is an ideal. The content of the experience of nature is not given, as it is for Kant; rather, sensation is constructed out of the resources of each individual mind; it is "a product of the individual's efficient causality." The form or fixed order of nature "is determined by the elements—Space, Time, Cause, and so forth—that the self-active consciousness supplies."[40] Thus nature, as a passive effect, is dependent for its existence upon its constitutive principle, the mutual recognition of all minds.

Time and space, the most universal aspects of Nature, are therefore a priori conditions of all "sensuous" consciousness. Sensuous experience does not bring them into existence for such experience presupposes them; they are not produced by evolution for they are the presupposition of any evolving process. Evolution relates to the phenomenal world

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39. See Howison, Art. (1905), 178-182. Minds are "necessarily federal." The "whole" is a pluralistic harmony rather than a monistic relationship between the whole and its parts.
40. Howison, LOE, xix.

in which events or items follow each other successively, whereas time and space are the media through which seriality is perceived or thought. Time and space, consequently, "owe their entire existence to the essential correlation and co-existence of minds."[41]

God, too, is to be conceived of in relation to mind. He is the Divine "Type," the "perfect self-fulfilment in eternity," the "Unchangeable Ideal," the "central member" of the divine society of spirits. He is the bond of union in the community of minds, and reigns in it by reason, by "final causation,--that is, simply by being the impersonated Ideal of every mind."[42] The significance of mind in Howison's system is clearly evident from such an exposition; a society of minds, human and Divine, constitutes all of reality.

3. Nature.

It is plain that, in Howison's view of Nature, everything phenomenal is dependent upon the "assemblage of individual minds." Personal individual and social intelligence is the cause of everything that exists outside its own noumenal reality. Selves, then, are logically prior to time and space, two concepts that need more attention than they were given in the discussion of mind. Selves are also prior to

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41. Howison, LOE, xiii.
42. Ibid., xiv.

and directive in the process of evolution. Let us, then, turn to these basic ideas in order to understand Howison's philosophy more fully.

First, consider physical nature. Is it the result of an unknown force, or cause, as held by Spencer? Is it ultimate in its own right as Democritus and all materialists since him have held, so that it is the cause of mind or personality? Is nature the activity of a divine Being, as held by most idealists? Let us look at Howison's answer to such questions. His mature thought is: (1) Nature, in essence, is the sum of the organized experiences of minds. The "matter" of the experiences is sensation, while the fixed order of the experiences is determined by space, time, cause, etc. that are supplied by the self-active consciousness.[43] (2) It follows that nature is not the creation of God, nor his activity; it is created corporately by a society of minds, other than God. Its origin lies in the self-definition of each individual. "We conclude to the dependence of Nature upon <u>us</u>,...instead of our derivative dependence upon Nature."[44] (3) This means that knowledge of an order of nature

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43. Howison, LOE, xii-xiii, and xix. His view resembles McTaggart's. Calkins calls attention to the fact that Howison and McTaggart are similar in teaching that ultimate reality is the complete community of selves. See PPP (1st. ed.), 378.
44. Howison, LOE, 306. Howison means that the total society of minds creates the tiger and the apple tree, the dive-bomber and radium, and he thereby represents extreme mentalism, for in his doctrine of "corporate" creativity he

is conditioned by knowledge of transcendent realities, viz., awareness of one's own person and all the persons of the total universe.[45] (4) Nature is not properly a cause; it is only a transmissive effect or aggregate of such effects.

> Throughout Nature, as distinguished from idealizing mind, there reigns, in fine, no causation but transmission. As every phenomenal cause is only a transmissive and therefore passive agent, so Nature itself, in its aggregate, is only a passive transmitter. But because of its origin in the Final Causation of intelligence, its whole must conform to the ideal that expresses the essential form of intelligent being, and all its parts must follow each other in a steadfast logical ascent toward that ideal as their goal.[46]

(5) Nature is a result of both efficient and final causation, although, as indicated, the latter is the more important. Howison abandons the Kantian idea that the content of experience is given. Nature is produced wholly from the resources of the individual mind[47] in terms of efficient causation; it is produced corporately by reference beyond the individual to the whole world of minds in terms of final causation. "The mutual recognition of all minds...becomes...the constitutive principle in the world of Nature."[48] The final cause, which will be seen later to be the only causation in the

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lacks even a Berkeleyan God to experience the object when the finite mind is not present to do so.

45. Howison, Art. (1884), 4-5.
46. Howison, LOE, 39.
47. Howison's confusion is evidenced here, for is sensation a product of my will? Obviously not, but that is his idea. How can it be the product of a society of minds?
48. Howison, LOE, xxii.

is conditioned by knowledge of transcendent realities, viz., awareness of God's own person and all the purposes of the total universe.[46] (4) Nature is not precisely a course; it is only a transmissive effect or aggregate of such effects.

> Throughout Nature, as distinguished from Ideal-Living mind, there reigns, in fine, no connection but transmission. As every phenomenal cause is only a transmissive and therefore negative agent, so Nature itself, in its aggregate, is only a passive transmitter. But because of its origin in the final causation of intelligence, the whole must conform to the ideal that surrounds the essential form of intelligent being, and all its parts must fall each other in a closed, integral and ascent toward that ideal as their goal.[47]

(5) Nature is a result of both artificial and final causation, although, as indicated, the latter is the more important. Davison observes the American idea that the content of experience is given. Nature is produced wholly from the standpoint of the individual mind.[48] In terms of artificial causation, it is produced externally by reference beyond the individual to the whole world of minds in terms of final causation. "The moral recognition of all minds...becomes...the constructive principle in the world of Nature."[49] The final causation will be seen later to be the only connection in the

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[46] Leaving aside a discussion that is irrelevant to the objectives of the finite mind is not present in its so.
[47] Davison, ibid. (1884), 4-5.
[48] Davison, ibid., 40.
[49] Davison's conclusion is evidenced here, for he assumes a product of my will. Obviously not, but that is his idea. How can it be the product of a society or mind?
[50] Davison, ibid., 44.

moral world, according to the view held by Howison, is here seen to be the chief cause in the world of Nature. (6) Nature is the scene of ceaseless conflict between the actual and the ideal, for the natural is partial and fragmentary. As a product of man's efficient causation, nature is the self-activity of the self striving for the ideal, not the ideal itself. The conflict is between nature in its present form and the ideal form of spirit. It follows that Nature is not sin or guilt in itself, as existent, it merely carries the "risk" of sin by admitting the negative principle of defect into its being.[49]

Stated succinctly, Howison's view is that nature is the experience of all minds; it is created corporately by all minds rather than by God; nature is known only because the mind first knows itself and the society of persons; it is an effect rather than a cause; and finally, it is the scene of endless conflict for it contains defect and can inhibit the self from attaining the perfection of the ideal type. This is not the place for criticism, yet one is forced to ask, how can the fragmentary phenomenal world be held together by persons, who, though public and social, are yet distinct experiencing individuals? This view has the same defects as Berkeley's mentalism.[50] Howison points out

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49. See Howison, LOE, 364, 366, 367.
50. Among these defects are Berkeley's idea that universals are not real for particular minds, God is not clearly

moral world, according to the view held by Hobbes, is been
more to the edge of chaos in the world of Nature. (40) Be-
cause is the cause of unconscious conflict between the actual
and the ideal, for the material is partial and fragmentary.
as a product of man's efficient organization, nature is the
self-activity of the self striving for the good, not the
ideal itself. The conflict is between nature in its present
form and the ideal form of spirit. It follows that Nature is
not sin or guilt in itself, as evident, it merely contains
the "sins" of sin by exhibiting the negative principle of de-
fect into the being.(41)

Stated concisely, Hegelian's view in that nature is
the consciousness of all minds: it is created competently by
all minds rather than by God; nature is known only because
one mind first knows itself and the contrary of personal is
is significant rather than a cause; and finally, it is the
cause of conflict, conflict for it contains defect and can in-
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held together by persons, who, though mortal and sinful, are
yet distinct organizations individually. This view has the
same defects as Leibnitz's monadism. (42) Hegelian states out

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40. See Hegelian, 107, 108, 109, 387.
41. Hence these defects are contingent since that universals are not real for particular minds, but is not clearly

that his theory is not to be confounded with Berkeley's. It is different, to be sure, in its socio-centric nature as contrasted to Berkeley's theocentric or theological idealism. But there the difference ends, and in favor of Berkeley, for he called in one mind to hold the physical world together in the absence of the individual's consciousness of it, whereas Howison has no one principle of rationality other than a federal republic of experience. Howison faces this question, and solves it in the following way. The incoherent and fragmentary becomes all-coherent in the unity of its inevitable reality as a thinking self. The self declares the isolation and fragmentariness to be only apparent, and

> so places the phenomena in a real system that takes it [sic] out of the category of illusion by giving it a continual and endlessly ascending approximation to unqualified reality.[51]

This is a lame effort to save the day, and actually sacrifices idealism by implying the reality of phenomena.

What does Howison have to say of time and space? Again, as with nature, they are dependent upon the society of minds. They are not the individuations of the pluralistic universe, for the "associative assemblage" of individuals is not placed and dated in the fleeting world of phenomena. It is only in terms of the phenomenal world that the two

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related to finite persons, and knowledge is impossible on the basis of epistemological monism.

51. Howison, COG, 103.

sense-forms are necessary. As suggested when dealing with the problem of the significance of the mind, time and space condition all "sensuous" consciousness, but they are not brought into existence by such consciousness. Rather, they are presupposed, and owe their existence to the total assemblage of minds.

It follows that time and space are not capable of production by the process of evolution. Rather, evolution presupposes them, for phenomenal change is thought of in terms of succession in time and movement in space. Here Howison criticizes Spencer with the thought of Kant, that time and space cannot be generalized from experience since they are already operating in the experience from which the generalization is made. Time, especially, is presupposed even in "figuring to ourselves the process of evolution."

It is interesting to note Howison's distinction between time and space on the basis of objective and subjective principles. Time cannot be made out of space, and space cannot be made out of time for each is completely distinct from the other. Space coordinates the public experiences of the individual, i.e., it is the a priori principle by which the individual conscious self "comes into actual sensuous commerce with other selves of that species, or, in short, shares with them in a real located and physical world."[52]

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52. Howison, LOE, xxxix.

mena-forms are necessary. An suggestion was dealing with the problem of the significance of the mind, time and space condition all "phenomena" consciousness, but they are not brought into existence by such conditionness. Indeed, they are presupposed, and are itself existence by the total mind-stage of mind.

It follows that time and space are not capable of generation by the process of evolution. Rather, evolution presupposes them, for phenomenal change is thought of in terms of succession in time and movement in space. Pure Reason mediates necessity with the element of time, that time and space cannot be generated from experience since they are already operating in the experiences from which the generalization is made. Thus, potentially, it presupposes even in "trying to narrative the process of evolution."

It is interesting to note Santayana distinction between time and space on the basis of potential and subjective principles. Time cannot be cause out of space, and space cannot be made out of time for each is completely distinct from the other. Space coordinates the public experiences of the individual, i.e., it is the a priori principle by which the individual consciousness self "comes into mental association with other selves of time and notes, or, in short, shares with them in a real <u>local</u> and <u>material</u> world, and

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[1]. Santayana, op. cit.

This is the objective aspect of public experience. Time, on the other hand, coordinates the private experiences of the self. It is because of this peculiar function of each that space and time are not only the necessary sense-forms, but the only ones. By means of them the society of minds distinguishes between the privacy of each and the public life, which is common to all, between individuality and social communication.

> Indeed, as from this attained point of view we can now clearly see, the real ground of the difference between Time and Space, and hence between subjective perception and the objective existence of physical things, is in the fact that a mind, in being such,—in its very act of self-definition,—correlates itself with a society of minds, and so, to fulfill its nature, in so far as this includes a world of experiences, must form its experience socially as well as privately and hence will put forth a condition of sensuous communication, as well as a condition of inner sensation. Thus the dualization of the sense-world into inner and outer, psychic and physical, subjective and objective, rests at last on the intrinsically social nature of conscious being; rests on the twofold structure, logically dichotomous, of the self-defining act; and we get the explanation, from the nature of intelligence as such, why the Sense-Forms are necessarily two, and only two.[53]

Howison thus escapes the sensationalism of Hume and Spencer, the objectivity of space and time as held by the physical scientists from the beginning of the sixteenth century to Einstein's recent theory of relativity, and the idea of

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53. Howison, Art. (1906), 187.

while in the objectivity of work of analytic geometry, time, on the other hand, coordinates the relative co-ordination of the self. It is because of this therefore that motion of each kind and time are not only the necessary conditions, but the only ones. By means of them the contents of which differ quite between the privacy of each and the public life, which is common to all, between individuality and social construction.

> Instead, we from this standpoint point of view we can now clearly see, the area of conflict of the difference between time and space, and hence between subjective perception and the objective fact that a mind. In today work,--in the very work of self-fertilization,--connotation dawns with a reality of time, and so, to quote the poetry, in an "ever-in-lengthen a world of consciousness, that ever, the consciousness actually as well as relatively and hence only that form a condition of economic determination, as well as a condition of inner stimulation. Thus the dialectics of the inner-world time human and outer, revolve and dissolve, subjective and objective, finally at last on the interpretability model method of conscious behavior on the social structure. Instead, dissonance, or the relationship only and so not the efficiency, from the nature of intelligence as also, and the inner-outer can necessarily be, and only be.[1]

Hence time represents the relationship of mind and process, the objectivity of mind also as held by the intellect activities from the position of the physical activity in dynamic power energy of reality, and the idea of

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[1]. Hegelian, Ibid. (1908), 107.

space and time as abstract concepts. He also avoids the reality of time as held by Bergson and the space-time continuum of Alexander and Whitehead, yet he gets into the same difficulty as did Kant. His difficulty is in postulating a dichotomy of experience, one public the other private, for space and time are both private experiences and also public or universal conditions of all experience. To deal with space as one form and time as another is to deal with each abstractly. Could one not hold to a space-time continuum on a personalistic basis as well as on a realistic one? That is, all thought or activity is on the basis of a space-time continuum, but a space-time continuum is meaningless except in terms of conscious personality. In that event, however, it would be necessary to revise Howison's pluralism to the extent that nature is not the product of all selves, but the activity of One, although it is experienced objectively by all. Howison argues for the objectivity of space and the subjectivity of time. Can not each be objective for the "assemblage" of minds and subjective for the experient?

One of Howison's chief concerns in regard to nature was the limits of evolution, for he was a constant critic of not only absolutism in all forms, but also the naturalistic philosophies of the nineteenth century. Howison gave a lecture entitled "The Limits of Evolution" at Stanford University, October, 1895. It was printed in the New World, June, 1896, and later appeared as the first chapter in his book of

space and time as absolute concepts. He also avoids the reality of time assigned by Bergson and the space-time continuum of Alexander and Whitehead, yet he spoke upon the same difficulty as did Kant. His difficulty is in identifying a discovery of experience, one results the other primitive, for space and time are both private experiences and also public or universal conditions of all experience. To deal with space as one form and time as another is to deal with each abstractly. Could one not hold to a space-time continuum as a phenomenalistic basis as well as on a realistic one? Thus is, all things or reality is on the basis of a space-time continuum, but a space-time consciousness is manifestes under the forms of objective consciousness. In this sense, however, it would be necessary to revise Santayana's phrasing to the effect that "nature is not the product of all nature, but the activity of one, although it is accompanied objectively by all. Perhaps a form for the objectivity of space and the subjectivity of time. Can not these be subsumed into the "sensations" of which our "intuitions for the objectively

One of Dewey's chief arguments in regard to Kant was the limits of evolution, for he was a consistent critic of not only adaptation to all forms, but also of the "pulsations of the unknowable energy." Dewey gave a less-type outline "the limits of evolution" in Studies in Logical Theory, Chicago, 1903. It was printed in the New World, June, 1903, and Dewey commented on the Kantian chapter in his book of

the same title. Just what are the proposed limits of evolution? In the celebrated debate previously referred to between LeConte, Royce, Mezes, and Howison, LeConte pointed out that evolution was to be understood in terms of its end.[54] Howison heartily accepted this, but went on to add that evolution is limited to the phenomenal realm.

How does Howison defend this view? He points out as the first limitation of evolution that there is a chasm between the phenomenal and the noumenal which evolution cannot cross. The agnostic and naturalistic evolutionary thinkers who cannot account for real persons, individual moral responsibility, or a personal God, do not sense this as do the technical scientists. The problem of evolution is not one for sciences, which are limited to specific fields of investigation, but rather a problem for philosophy. Science, then, cannot cross the chasm between the phenomenal and the noumenal. A second limitation of evolution is the break in the physical world between the inorganic and the organic. Agnosticism appeals to the Unknowable in accounting for this; Howison appeals to an "Unseen Power" that is a changeless noumenal principle. Third, evolution is limited by the break between physiological and logical genesis. The mind does not originate out of non-mind. The fourth limit is that evolution can reach the unknowable but not explanation; only

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54. LeConte, Art. (1902), 74.

philosophy can reach the latter. Fifth, evolution is limited in crossing from "nature in general to human nature viewed as essentially reason." Human reason, instead of being a result of evolution, is required by it, hence the phenomenal world with its evolutional law is strictly ideal in character. The proof of this is seen in several ways: (1) Time and space are merely media through which evolution is perceived and thought. (2) Change and progression are dynamic in terms of increasing fullness and richness of life. Lifted to cosmic proportions progression transcends the special sciences. (3) Causation as a "nexus" between phenomena issues from the mind itself. (4) Logical unity results from the intrinsic coherence of self-consciousness. (5) Final causation is the only genuine cause; it results from intelligence whereas phenomenal cause is merely a passive agent. Phenomena are, thus, ideal. In view of these limitations, "Man the spirit, man the real mind, is not the offspring of Nature, but rather Nature is in a great sense the offspring of this true Human Nature."[55] It follows that idealizing thought is the only thing that can overspan all the breaks which evolution must pass to become a cosmic principle. Evolution is seen, in its true light, to be limited to the realm of phenomena.

What, then, is Howison's philosophy of Nature? It is

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55. Howison, LOE, 48.

simply that the phenomenal world is created, not by God, nor by efficient causation, but by the final causation of a society of minds experiencing themselves and each other in questing for the "Eternal Ideal." Space and time, force and energy, motion and matter, and all similar concepts pertaining to the physical world are subservient to mind, deriving what phenomenal reality they have from the pluralistic society of minds. Evolution, too, finds its source in man, "the coöperating Cause and Lord of that world where evolution has its course."[56] Man is sovereign of the whole realm of nature. And where is God in the process? He is the "Ideal," perfection, the "inspirer of an endless progress in moral freedom." Before considering Howison's idea of God, however, let us see what he means by an "Eternal Republic" of minds.

4. The "Eternal Republic."

Howison's central idea of an "Eternal Republic" of infinite persons involves several important concepts, viz., reason, moral aims, freedom, and immortality. It is reason that relates all persons to each other. On such a basis each is morally obligated to the others. Morality is possible only on the basis of freedom. "Any doctrine incompatible

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56. Howison, LOE, 55. See, also, McTaggart, who denies the existence of God (and consequently divine creativity) while holding that "the harmonious system of selves is the fundamental fact of the universe." SDOR, 248. McTaggart lauds Howison for having "brilliantly expounded and defended" the conception of a non-creative God. SDOR, 221.

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with the freedom of the individual," write Howison's biographers, "was for him intellectually intolerable."[57] And finally, the society of persons is eternal, each member experiencing immortality.

A self cannot be except as a member of a reciprocal society; each self exists only as it is grounded in a social universe. How that society is held together according to Howison has been previously mentioned, i.e., by reason. It was seen in the discussion of mind that Howison's position raises many questions, so here let us examine reason further. Its importance to Howison is seen in his statement, that by means of it "we have a noumenal Reality that is properly to be described as the eternal Federal Republic of Spirits."[58] The ultimate reality is a society of persons; persons are united by reason as an ideal. This new concept of reason is used by Howison to attack the agnostic denial of knowledge, the method of natural science by which reason gives mastery of the sense-world, and pantheistic idealism's "undue arrest of reason." Reason is not only a tool or method; it is not merely natural; "it is also spiritual; it is itself, when come to itself, the true divine revelation."[59]

This leads to a consideration of Howison's conception of the relation of reason to religion, for "essential reason"

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57. Buckham and Stratton, GHH, 24.
58. Howison, Art. (1905), 179.
59. Howison, LOE, 225.

is directed to religion. Religion, he suggests, has used several invalid methods to arrive at truth, the most abusive being authority. He therefore takes up the cudgel of reason as a method to supplant it, pointing out that the method of authority is invalid for several reasons. First, it is "logically unreal," i.e., it rebukes reason and therefore contradicts the mind of God. God is a spirit, and is to be known in spirit, not in terms of external evidence received by the senses. Second, the method of authority is invalid for it is unintelligible. The Romanist places his authority in the church; the orthodox Protestant lodges his in scripture, both appealing to the "miraculous communication of the Divine Will." This rests upon a "stupendous Declaration" to some select few, but in as much as testimony, ear-witness, and declaration tend to be untrustworthy over the years, the reasoning mind comes not to God but to vacancy. God is supersensible, and he therefore does not present himself directly to man's senses, as is implied in the doctrine of authority. Further, the principle of authority contradicts the spirit of Christ. His central ideas were that God is boundless in His love and that all souls are related to Him as an ideal society of minds in which each individual possesses moral freedom and is "guided by the contemplation of its perfect fulfilment in the Supreme Soul."[60] Religion,

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60. Howison, LOE, 251.

under the Christ, changes from a worship of an unapproachable authoritarian Sovereign to a "joyful communion" with a Guide and Friend. Such a Supreme Person is the God of the living, not the authoritarian God of the dead. He is an "active member in a society where all alike strive to recognize the infinite worth, the boundless possibilities, of all the others."[61] Along with such a noble idea of God, Jesus pointed out that the soul is immortal and free. All three doctrines, i.e., the idea of God, immortality, and freedom, are opposed to the method of authority. Reason alone, then, is the only real method of determining religious belief and practice. Even those who discredit reason, in their final appeal, utilize reason to maintain their position. There is at the basis of authority the implied power of the human mind to judge spiritual things. Reason has been employed by the Christian Apologists of the Roman tradition, so too by contemporary liberals of Protestantism. In describing personal experience on the adaptation of Christianity to rational programs, the latter appeals not only to the reasoning process, but also to the rational nature of personality.

The conclusive argument for the view that reason is essentially religious and that religion is essentially rational lies in the scientific method of induction itself. The logic of science erects its laws on the basis of care-

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61. Howison, LOE, 255.

fully ascertained particular facts. Using the same method, one arrives at the conclusion, says Howison, that existence at its core is the existence of conscious minds or spirits, and that material things are purely phenomenal, as held by Berkeley and Kant. The method of induction leads one, therefore, "to a rational nature everywhere present and regulative." The rational nature, then, in turn leads to "the reality of a universal rational society." Evolution itself bears this out for it is nothing more than the increasing reasonableness of things; those things which survive are more reasonable than those things or forms of life which perish. Howison concludes:

> Human reason is not a circumscribed power, confined to judgments within the world of sensible experience alone, but is as wide in its scope as all possible reality, and in fact has for its supreme and most appropriate object the world of the spirit, the society of all spirits, and God as central therein.[62]

It is reason, then, that not only holds the "eternal republic" together as an ideal bond of union, but is also the method whereby each individual within the "city of God" defines himself, knows God and all other minds, and aims to achieve "the perfection and bliss of all."[63]

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62. Howison, LOE, 267.
63. This paragraph illustrates several things. First, Howison draws heavily from Hegel and Kant—from Hegel the idea: "Was vernünftig ist, das ist wirklich, und was wirklich ist, das ist vernünftig," and from Kant the idea that the practical reason is more significant than speculative reason, which is limited to sensible experience

Only ancestrally particular facts, then, can ever result, one arrives at the conclusion, only Dwelling, that existence as life owes its existence to particular minds as objects, and that material things are really phenomenal, as held by Berkeley and Kant. The method of induction leads one, therefore, "to a rational genius everywhere present and everlasting." The material nature, then, in turn leads to "the reality of a universal rational society." Evolution itself bears this out for it is nothing more than the increasing responsiveness of things; those things which survive are more responsible than those things or forms of life which perish.

Dewing concludes:

> Human reason is not a disembodied power, confined to phenomena within the world of sensible experience alone, but is as wide in its scope as all possible reality, and in fact has its purpose and most appropriate object the realm of the spirit, the society of all spirits, and God as central Spirit.

It is reason, then, that not only unite the "eternal cosmos" together as an ideal unity of union, but is also the material whereby each individual within the "city of God" dwells himself, knows God and all other minds, and aims to achieve "the perfection and unity of all."

[illegible]. Dewing, op. cit.

[illegible]. This paragraph illustrates several points. First, Dewing draws heavily from Hegel and Kant--from Hegel the idea: "Man verwirklicht sich, das ist absolutes, und was absolut ist, das ist verwirklicht," and from Kant the idea that the practical reason is more significant than a speculative reason, which is limited to sensible experience

Morality has an important place in Howison's idea of the "eternal republic." In fact, Buckham and Stratton point out that "the pivot of all Howison's later thinking, at least was the moral responsibility of the human person."[64] That idea is what disturbed Howison when he thought of absolute idealism. How, he argued, could one talk of a moral order, when there is only one mind, one person? It is also sheer nonsense, he thought, to talk of a moral order on the basis of typical theism based on efficient causation. Immortality operates on the basis of an ideal. A moral choice is not made on the basis of coercion. One is moral only in terms of an ideal, the final cause. Morality presupposes a world of minds as a Kantian realm of ends. To refuse the claims of morality, then, is not only an act of irrationality, but also a denial of the mind's own existence. Morality becomes the first principle of knowledge, and is "itself an act of knowledge not simply a sentiment of obligation."[65]

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alone. Also to be noted is the fact that a rationalistic definition of religion is implied (see Brightman, POR, 192 and 192n). Finally, the achievement of "the perfection and bliss of all" is obviously a self-realization theory of value that leads to a personalistic and perfectionistic view of morality that has, in this form at least, found expression in such diverse thinkers as Hegel, T. H. Green, B. Bosanquet, F. H. Bradley, James Seth, Friedrich Paulsen, Borden Parker Bowne, W. M. Urban, John Dewey, Edgar S. Brightman, and William E. Hocking. See especially Brightman, ML, 287n, 294-295, and Titus, EFT, 87-88.

64. Buckham and Stratton, GHH, 24.
65. Howison, LOE, xxxvii.

Morality has an "overwhelming claim to impartial [illegible] of the "moral problem." In fact, Sidgwick and Bradley [illegible] that there "the praise of all moral [illegible] labor [illegible], as [illegible] the moral responsibility of the human person."[illegible] Such [illegible] distinguished thinkers have the strength of [illegible] [illegible]. They, be argued, merely use [illegible] of a moral order, [illegible] there is only one ethic, our present. It is [illegible] [illegible], to talk of a moral order in the [illegible] [illegible] theses based on artificial construction. Immorality [illegible] on the basis of an ideal. A moral ideal is not [illegible] on the basis of operation. One is moral only in terms [illegible] an ideal, the final end. Morality presupposes a [illegible] [illegible] as a [illegible] basis of [illegible]. To reduce the [illegible] of morality, then, is not only to [illegible] of [illegible], but also a denial of the [illegible] [illegible]. Morality becomes the first principle of knowledge, and by "theory" we not [illegible] [illegible] a [illegible] of [illegible]."[illegible]

[illegible]

Howison points out the difference between his original view of God acting as the moral goal and all other historic systems that have based themselves on creationism. He distinguished four groups, (1) post-exilic Hebraism, and those systems influenced by it, as a dualism between Creator and creature, (2) the theories of those who hold to a monistic creator and lead to pantheism, (3) the systems of those who make matter the producing source of every form of consciousness, and (4) the views of those who "repudiate the search into causes as baseless and futile," i.e., the positivists. Howison dispenses with the third and fourth views for they make no pretense of providing for freedom, and lead only to an egoistic, trivial hedonism as a system of morality. The second group of thinkers, represented by Hegel, T. H. Green, Royce, and Calkins, are dispensed with almost as summarily, for the self-determination of the individual is cancelled; he is merely part of the larger Whole, or Absolute. This leaves only the dualism of the first group, but here, suggests Howison, one is little better off than under monism. The creature must register the will of the Creator and is without freedom. So also, N. Hartmann argues against theism.

Howison reveals insight here in terms of the total goal of the "eternal republic;" but one could charge him with the same moral determinism which he alleges against creationism. How, one might ask him, can one be morally free if he

Hewison points out that difference between his optimistic view of the novel - with a good world and all other minor evils arising from groups, (1) good-evil dichotomies, and those systems fabricated by men, such as the conflict between Creation and creature, (2) the elements of those who hold to a mechanistic conscience and lead to penalties, (3) the systems of those who make matter the productive source of every form of consciousness, and (4) the views of those who "regard the universe into nature as beyond good and evil," i.e., the pantheists. Hewison disposes with the third and fourth views for they make no provision of providing for freedom, and lead only to an equality, crystal brooding in a system of mechanistic. The second group of attitudes, represented by Royce, G. Green, Hegel, and Dewey, are disposed with almost as summarily, for the self-determination of the individual is concerned; he is merely part of the larger whole, or Absolute. This leaves only the question of the three goods, and here, concludes Hewison, one is left to either of three conclusions. The evolutionary progress can will of the Creator and is without freedom. Or else, i.e., Hartmann argues, neither choice.

Hewison finally insists on an issue of the total good of the "eternal possible;" but one could accept life as the more moral determinate action in filling existence optimistic. Here, one should ask life, can one be morally justified in

is automatically, upon his first cognition or self-awareness, a part of the republic moving in the direction of perfection? One is conditioned in advance of his self-awareness to move toward the ideal. God's final causation becomes efficient. Howison's system would seem much more deterministic than the mediating position of Bowne's in which one can make a choice whether or not he wants to cooperate with the Divine will and achieve the Kingdom of Ends. Beginning with Howison's final cause, however, one must follow him logically to a moral order in which each individual reciprocally relates himself to all others in terms of the perfect Ideal. God, as the ideal, draws all members of the republic to a moral end. In this eternal pluralism of causal minds each possesses moral autonomy.

This system of Howison's adjusts itself to the primary conditions of the moral life in the following ways: (1) His system maintains that not a single individual is determined by any efficient causation. (2) The Kantian gap between morality and intelligence is closed, for self-active consciousness is objective by virtue of its social and federal character. (3) Only on this basis of organic pluralism is one certain of individual immortality as everlasting personal continuance. (4) There is hope of real and lasting improvement of the present world by moral endeavor in that Howison's system maintains an indivisible union of the eternal and the temporal worlds. (5) One can solve the problem

in misunderstanding, upon his views on religion or self-government, a point of the republic having in the direction of positivism. One is convinced in advance of his anti-Christ to move toward the ideal. Grote's final conclusion because artificial. Comte's system would seem much more deterministic than the antiquated position of Aurelius in which one can only a bonded whether or not he needs to cooperate with the Divine will and achieve the Kingdom of God. Religion also determines final course, however, one must follow his logically to a moral order in which and individual psychologically relates himself to all others in terms of the positive ideal. Yet, as the ideal, comes all models of concepts is to a moral end. In this concept alternative of moral right each concerns moral citizenship.

This system of Comte's citizen tends to the primary conditions of the moral life in the following ways: (1) his system maintains that not a single individual is determined by any self-etc. consciousness. (2) The Kantian gap between morality and inclinations is closed, for self-active consciousness is objective by virtue of its moral and functional characteristic. (3) Only on this basis of organic physicism is the conflict of individual in outlining as evolutionary personal continuance. (4) Thus, in spite of moral and intellectual improvement of the growth would by man's endeavor in than Aurelius system relations an individual union of the cosmical and the personal world. (5) One can solve the problem

of evil without placing its responsibility before God. The minds other than the perfect Ideal cause evil, and it can therefore be "cured" "through the immanence of each being's eternal principle of good and the presence to it of the divine Friend and Savior." (6) Organic pluralism validates belief in God as the absolutely perfect Person who transcends all others and is immanent in none except as an ideal before each mind. Such a God is concerned with the spiritual success of every person, and hence each member of the republic turns to the Absolute Conscience in every moral disaster for renewal of moral courage and strength. This is the function of prayer.[66] A moral order is assured on the basis of each member of the republic striving for the perfection of the ideal Type.

The question of freedom holds a prominent place in Howison's eternal republic, and as such, is Howison's answer to the above-suggested "determinism" argument. Having established the moral life, freedom is demanded. Persons "think their own thoughts, originate their own decisions," and choose their own ideals. Moreover, freedom is grounded in the very nature of the self. Selves have a mutual influence upon each other, even though there is no interpenetration among them any more than there is immanence of God in any of

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66. Howison, as reproduced in Buckham and Stratton, GHH, 147-151.

them. Both interpenetration and immanence would be violations of personality. Each self is completely autonomous, hence completely free in its actions relative to other human minds, to God, and to the natural world.

Howison's attempt to harmonize determinism and freedom parallels his solutions to other problems, i.e., in terms of the definite rational nature of each self, and the final causality of God. By freedom he does not mean caprice or chance, rather "action spontaneously flowing from the definite guiding intelligence of the agent himself."[67] The natural world, in terms of God, is subject to his mind and will. If that is true for God, argues Howison in taking the thought of typical theists, it is also true for all persons. If every self is coexistent in eternity with God, then men are logically prior to nature as its source rather than its outcome, in the same ideal manner in which God is. It is not God alone who conditions nature, but the entire society of free minds. In fact, God conditions nature only remotely as the ruling ideal, whereas human minds condition it "directly and productively" in reference to the Ideal. Man is exalted over the natural world as an eternally self-directing activity. He is, therefore, not a creature, as held in "elder" theology, but infinite and free in his own right.

Such a view of man conflicts with the usual creative

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67. Howison, LOE, 320.

tions. Such interpretation and treatment would be vitiations of personality. Each self is completely autonomous, being completely free in its actions relative to other human beings, to God, and to the natural world.

Sorokin's attempt to reconcile determinism and freedom parallels his solutions to other problems, i.e., in terms of the definite rational nature of conditioning, and the final causality of God. By freedom he does not mean caprice or chance, rather "action spontaneously flowing from the definite qualitative individuality of the present bearer." The material world, in terms of God, is subject to his will and will. If this is true for God, surely freedom in human has through of typical creature. It is also true for all persons. If every self is constituted in eternity with God, then man is logically prior to nature as its source rather than its outcome, in the same ideal manner in which God is. It is not God alone who constitutes nature, but also unique society of free minds. In fact, God constitutes nature only mediately as the ruling ideal, whereas human minds constitute it "directly and productively" in relation to the ideal. Man is exalted over the natural world as an eternally self-directing entity. It is, therefore, not a monistic, nor a dualistic "idealistic" theology, but instead and true to his own origin.

Such a view of man reconciles with the ideal creative

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[1]. Sorokin, LOV, 380.

office of God. The ultimate solution to the question of freedom, then, demands that one find a substitute for the older idea of creation as efficient causation. If that cannot be done, one must "in all honesty and good logic" "travel penitently back to a Calvinism, a Scotism, an Augustinianism."[68] Inasmuch as a being efficiently caused cannot be free, God must be a final cause of all free activity.

> Final cause, then, or the Ideality at the logical heart of conscious life,—to that we are to look for release from the perplexity about the determinism in Divine supremacy and the self-determinism in human or other non-divine freedom.[69]

Howison anticipates the charge that his uncompromising pluralism becomes atheism in making every person his own creator, or polytheism in making every person a God. He answers the first charge by pointing out that every self needs God as its ideal, a view compatible with freedom, and eliminates the second by maintaining that every self posits itself as not God in that it possesses defect.

> Thus every soul, though indeed, in the unifying <u>whole</u> of its nature, of the divine <u>kind</u>, and of inextinguishable free-infinity, nevertheless carries in its being an aspect of negation to its divine nature, and simply by the operation of its self-thought idea must realize its eternal freedom <u>in</u> a way that differs from God's way in kind.[70]

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68. Howison rarely sees a mediating view; here it is either complete freedom or predestination.
69. Howison, LOE, 348.
70. Ibid., 363.

office of God. The ultimate solution to the question of freedom, then, becomes that one sees a substitute for the older idea of creation as efficient causation. If this can not be done, one must "in all honesty and good logic" "travel unmistakably back to a Deityless, a Godless, an Anthropomorphism."[68] Dewey as a being officially concerned neither Jew, God nor a final cause of all free activity.

> Final cause, then, or the Ideality at the logical heart of conscious life,--to that we are to look for reunion from the personality about the determinism in Divine omnipotency and the self-determinism in human or other non-divine freedom.[69]

Dewey anticipates the charge that his unconvincing pluralism becomes evident in making every person his own god, or polytheism in making every person a God. In answer he first starts by pointing out that every body meets not as the ideal, a view compatible with freedom, and otherwise surround by multiplicity. Each, every self posits itself as not too in that its possession defect.

> From every point, through thought, in the multiple whole of its nature, of the divine ideal, and of the kingdom's free-individuality, powerful time matrices in the making an appeal of devotion to the divine desire, and slowly by the operation of the self-caught time-sense realize the abundant Pluralism in a way that differs from God's way in time.[70]

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68. Dewey really sees a modicum of truth here in an oblique manner therefore or transformation.
69. Dewey, 1916, 356.
70. Ibid., 1903.

The free system is not, then, polytheistic any more than it is atheistic. All except God provide in their own being the "liability" of sin. And further, one experiences freedom in the act of wrong-doing. The ideal of freedom becomes two-fold, eternal apprehension of the Ideal in God and recognition of one's ideal self as thoroughly individuated from God. In short, for Howison, freedom means self-direction toward the Ideal, and power on the part of infinite beings in the sense world to bring their "temporal life" into conformity with the Ideal.

The pursuit of the ideal is an eternal process, i.e., human selves, as coeternal with God achieve immortality. Howison is not concerned with the various forms of impersonal immortality, viz., the doctrine that the indestructibility of matter assures one of immortality on scientific assumptions, or that one is biologically immortal through his offspring, or sociologically immortal through influence, or that he achieves metaphysical immortality by returning to the "mother sea of mind" or the "World Soul" of Plotinus, Emerson, and Royce. It is personal, self-conscious individual immortality based on an idealistic doctrine of an "eternal Pluralism" that Howison champions. Here he is closer to Bowne than he is to Calkins.

Consider how Howison arrives at such a view. He first disposes of the objection of "cerebral materialism" by an appeal to a more rational philosophy than the empiricist

The free system is evil, then, polycentricity any more than it is absolutism. All excess and provide an limit own being the "liability" of sin. And further, one experiences freedom in the act of wrong-doing. The idea of freedom becomes ambiguous, external appreciation of the idea in God and recognition of ones ideal self as the supply indistinguished from an object, for decision, freedom means self-direction toward the Ideal, and power on the part of finitude belongs in the sense world to mean that "temporal life" into conformity with the Ideal.

The morality of the ideal is an ideal process, "a human solved, as conformed with God achieve immorality. Person is not concerned with the various form of immoral immorality, sin. The question that the independently of action morality one of immorality on scientific assumptions, or that one is biologically immoral choose his affairs, or sociologically immoral choose religious, or that he achieve methodical immorality by returning to the "person and of mind" or the "human soul" of finitude, nature, and history. It is personal, self-conscious individual immorality based on an idealistic doctrine of an "ideal Ideal" that Davies describes. Here he is clear, as Green when he is in unities.

Describes the Davies writers at such a view. It turns discuss a, the solipsistic or "personal materialism" by an appeal to a more rational idealism by then the empirical

tradition and to a more thorough interpretation of modern psychology than James, whom he criticizes, has made. Philosophically, brain-function materialism rests upon the idea that (1) the brain is the creation of some assumed "Mind behind the scenes," (2) the creation of "many minds behind the scenes," or (3) self-existent as an "unintelligible mystery in being." All these he denounces as unintelligible. Psychologically, the problem of parallelism arises. Is the mind a concomitant variation of the brain? If so the brain is not logically prior to the mind, nor vice versa, hence parallelism is inadequate. Interactionism is more coherent with all of experience. But on what causal basis can there be interaction? Only by connecting the two streams of joint effects to a "primordial and actively conscious self as their real cause."[71] That is, Howison's solution rests upon an *a priori* self-active consciousness. He agrees with Kant that for anything to be perceived or experienced at all, it must be brought by the mind to the act of experience. The roots of all knowledge and experience are part of the spontaneity of the personality.

In proving this, Howison declares that time and space and force and cause, as well as all sensory experiences,[72] are *a priori* or spontaneous forms of consciousness. Human

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71. Howison, LOE, 296.
72. He does not mean, however, that time, space, force, and cause are sensory; they are *a priori* conditions of sense experience as well as *a priori* forms of consciousness.

tradition and to a more convincing interpretation of modern psychology than Ormond, who he criticizes, has done. Idealism-materialism, brain-function materialism rests upon the idea that (1) the brain is the creation of some external "spirit-plane the answer," (2) the creation of "some mind behind the cosmos," or (3) self-existent as an "ultimate-reality-substance-being." All these be dangerous as metaphysics. Psychologically, the problem of parallelism arises. In the mind a corresponding variation of the brain. It so the brain is not logically prior to the mind, nor vice versa, hence parallelism is inadequate. Interactionism is more coherent with all of experience. But on what ground brain can ever be interacting? Only by connecting the two streams of joint effects to a "pulsating and activity connections with a their real source."[7] That is, Morrison's solution rests upon a [illegible] self-active consciousness. He agrees with Kant that for anything to be perceived or apprehended as all, it must be brought by the mind in the act of apperception. The roots of all knowledge and experience are part of the apperceptive of the personality.

In growing sick, Morrison decides that time and space are forms and only in all subjectively experiences,[8] are a priori or preconscious [illegible] of consciousness. Space

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[7] Morrison, Op. cit.

[8] He does not mean, however, that time, space, forms, and [illegible] are memory; they are a priori conditions of sense experiences as well as a priori forms of consciousness.

selves are not dependent upon nature, rather nature is dependent upon them. Death, then, becomes simply a "point of transition" from one form of experience to another in the eternal life of the individual. The eternal republic of minds is

> the world of primary causes, and every member of it, secure above the vicissitudes of Time and Space and Force, is possessed of a supertemporal or eternal reality, and is therefore not liable to any lethal influence from any other source. Itself a primary cause, it can neither destroy another primary cause nor be destroyed by any.[73]

Howison does not stop here. One does not continue to live merely in a world of sense-perception. The self not only conditions nature, but also the entire spontaneous mental life including all its guiding ideals of truth, beauty, and good, which in turn are constituent parts of its being. The self, then, posits ideals spontaneously in its recognition of the society of minds as it becomes conscious of itself. Persons transcend the world of sense-perception in their immortality, and also continue to increase value. The ideals posited will "reign everlastingly" for the self and the total society of selves.

Howison's eternal republic is seen to be a society of self-conscious individuals who are both infinite and coeter-

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73. Howison, LOE, 307-308. A primary cause is "self-causative life," "spontaneous cognition;" it is not primary in the sense of efficient causation.

survive, not consistent with nature, which endows it depen-
dent upon them. Truth, then, becomes only a "point of
convergence" from one form of experience to another in the
internal life of the individual. The external reality of
objects is

> the world of primary qualities, and even, perhaps
> of it, assumes above the vicissitudes of time
> and space that force, in consequence of a subse-
> quent or external reality, one is absolutely
> unintelligible by any logical inference from any
> other source. Itself a primary datum, it was
> neither analyzer nor other primary sensations can be
> discovered by any.[72]

Hartmann does not also here. One does not conclude so, like
Berkeley in a world of mere perceptions. One will say only
sensations remain, but also the entire consciousness, moral
life included, all the guiding ideals of human, social, and
moral, as they are constituent parts of its being. The
self, then, is a form necessary in the recognition
of the content as which on it depends consciousness of life.
Persons brought up in worlds of sense-perception in their sen-
suality, and also conclude to their true value. The idea
position will "begin morbidly" for the self and also in-
the reality of nature.

Hartmann external reality is seen to be a content of
self-consciousness (Selbstbewusstsein) and both intuitive and sym-

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72. Hartmann, Ibid. 307-311. A reality based in "self-nature-
ative life," "consciousness constituting," it is not without
in the basis of efficient communication.

nal with God. Their infinity means their self-activity, distinctness, self-existence, freedom. The entire pluralistic system is held together in complete harmony by reason, that is, by reason as an ideal. Each individual, moreover, possesses moral integrity and freedom to pursue moral aims. Finally, the entire republic is eternal inasmuch as each person is immortal. In arriving at these conclusions, Howison depends upon his idea that selves are logically prior to nature and all of supratemporal experience. The total society of selves is corporately the source of nature and ideals in terms of the final cause, God. It will be well, then, to consider more closely Howison's idea of God.

5. The Idea of God.

Howison views God as an infinite, self-existent, self-active being who "is the way of absolute perfection."[74] This perfection is unique among all the minds, or persons of the universe, for all other minds include defect. God alone is the "ideal Type," the central member of the total society of persons, the Aristotelian final cause making possible the existence of all other persons. As such he is the "Perfect Guide and Friend."

God is not a creator, however. As a final cause (and

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74. Howison, LOE, 423.

in Howison's system efficient cause always gives way to final cause), God can not create another self-active intelligence; he is the goal of every self, the ideal. Each human self defines itself in terms of the entire system of selves, but more particularly in terms of the ideal of itself, or God. The Supreme Self becomes an impersonated ideal of all the selves in the entire system. There is thus a logical origin of each self in terms of God, but not a newly created self by the will of God. What the origin of the entire system is Howison does not say, other than to maintain the view that every self in his pluralistic system is eternal and infinite. It is therefore invalid to speak of creation of selves in terms of space or time; spontaneous cognition is self-causative life. One cognizes himself only in terms of the total society of selves for whom the ideal is God, hence creation is logical relationship to an ideal, God.

This view of God as merely one in a pluralistic system, and all selves being infinite, is in opposition to both the pluralistic monism of Bowne and the Absolutistic view of Miss Calkins. Bowne maintains that finite selves are created by God; Miss Calkins holds that finite selves are part of the Absolute. Howison points out that neither of these positions is ideal enough. In the celebrated debate between Royce, Mezes, LeConte, and Howison at the Philosophical Union in Berkeley, Howison attacked the Absolutistic view in challenging Royce, Miss Calkins' teacher. Howison argued that

In Spectacle Anybodycritical means always giving way to that
organ, God can not create certain anti-moral beings because
God is the real of every moral, non-moral. Much less can God
create ideals in terms of the religious system of values, but
were particularly in terms of the idea of idealy, or God.
The Supreme will become an abstract-moral ideal of all the
values in the moral system. There is thus a logical delight
of each self in terms of God, but not a moral concerned self
by the will of God. Since the origin of the moral system is
anything do a man say, where from do maintain the value that
every self in the idealistic system is unusual and infinite.
It is therefore invalid to speak of creation of values in
terms of regard as also systematic organization in self-mora-
tive life. One co-ordinate himself only in terms of the social
society of values for more the ideal is God, moral creation
is logical responsibility on the ideal, God.

This view of God as merely one is a phenomenologic ope-
ra, and all values being infinite, it is opposition to both
the pluralistic system of Jesus and the absolutistic view of
Mary Daktina. Some moral-the time finite values are cre-
ated by God; then Dakina holds that finite values are part
of the absolute. Jesus points out that society of human
relations is ideal enough. In this epistemological debate between
Jesus, Mary, Dakina, and Jesus on the philosophical Lotus
in society, Hoyman attempted the absolutic view in mora-
lism form, this dialect beauty. Hoyman argued that

Absolute idealism leads not to theism or monotheism, but to universal theism or to the pantheism of the Orient.[75] In both a system where God is absolute and where God creates other persons, man is indeed finite; man, for Howison, is infinite, even as God. Not only do both the above systems lessen the dignity of man, but further, says Howison, the absolutistic position denies freedom and immortality, and destroys the moral order.

In determining the actual existence of God, Howison holds that he emphatically rejects the "thrice-buried Ontological Proof." He seems to use precisely that argument, however, if not from the point of view of an individual, then on a pluralistic basis of all selves corporately postulating Him, for Howison maintains that every mind in the universe defines itself ultimately only in terms of God. Because many minds exist, God necessarily exists. This cannot be the cosmological argument, for in Howison's system there is no efficient cause of a cosmos. The existence of any mind or self, says Howison, carries with it all that the self "synthetically involves," and the individual self involves God. This is stretching the point, yet Howison sharply denies McTaggart's criticism that he assumes the ideal Type as a possible being. The denial is not convincing. One does not seem justified in saying that a mind defines itself

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75. See Howison, COG, 89-100.

Absolute idealism leads not to theism or monotheism, but to pantheism: relative to the pantheism of the Gnosis.[70] In both a system above and by absolute and where God operates other persons, man is indeed finite; man, God-Person, is infinite, even as God. But only do both the above systems lessen the dignity of man, but therefore, says Dawson, the absolutistic position leads freedom and immortality, and destroys the moral order.

In determining the central evidence of God, Dawson holds that he meaningfully replaces the "Kant-Berkeley-Hegelian proof." He seems to have previously shown evidence, if not from the point of view of an individual, from a transcendentalist basis or all active corporately constituting Him. The Dawson situation that every mind in the universe defines itself relatively only in terms of God, changes many minds model, and meaningfully makes. This dangers to the cosmological argument, for in Dawson's system there is no self-existent-cause of a nexus. The existence of any mind or self, says Dawson, carries with it all that the self "symbolically involves," and the individual self involves God. This is extending the point, yet Dawson absolutely denies "logically" existence that by assuming the local type as a possible being. The denial is not conclusive, and does not seem justified in saying that a mind defines itself

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70. See Dawson, op. cit., 87-100.

as actually existing on the basis of an ideal Type, which therefore ipso facto exists also. "If he is real," writes Howison, of individual persons, "then God is real; if God is not real, then neither can he be real."[76] This argument does not even prove the existence of the idea of God, for belief in God is not an immediate inference from belief in self. All individuals do not have an idea of God. Howison is satisfied, however, that it proves the existence of God.

An interesting concomitant of the idea that God is a final cause rather than an efficient one is that God is thereby relieved of all responsibility for evil. God is the creator or author of nothing in terms of efficient cause; how then can he be the author of evil? This view is not to be misconstrued as making God finite, for it must be remembered that all persons are infinite in Howison's system. In regard to evil, Howison writes with insight:

> To present God as the responsible cause of the enormity of suffering simply in natural existence . . . and, at the same time, to present Him as the rightful object of our adoring devotion because He is the perfect impersonation of Justice and of Love, should by this time be seen to involve a hopeless contradiction. . . .[77]

True, it is not eternal love or goodness that "scorches and suffocates," that by means of a volcanic eruption engulfs "a whole civil community in indiscriminate annihilation."

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76. Howison, LOE, 355.
77. Howison, Art. (1902), 117.

ra morality centering on the basis of an moral type, which

Bonhoeffer terms *ethics* exists also. "If God is good," writes

Bryson, of individual persons, "then God is good; if God is

not good, then neither can he be good."[76] This argument does

not even prove the existence of the idea of God, for instead

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Bonhoeffer's belief of evil responsibility for evil. God is the

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then can he be the author of evil? This view is not to be

misconstrued to making God finite, for it would be distinctive

that all purposes are finite in Bonhoeffer's system. Bonhoeffer

to evil, Bryson writes with insight:

> To accept God as the Responsible Cause of the
> morality of rejecting alacity in natural exist-
> ence . . . does, as the same time, be immoral.
> Also as the rightful object of our endeavor de-
> vaking because he is the cause particular manifestation
> of Jesus and of love, sunrise by this step be-
> cause to involve a deplorable confusion. . . .[77]

Here, he cannot reconcile love or goodness that "accepts and

sanctions," that by means of a valuable evaluation implies

"a whole civil community in the Christianitate Sanctitatis."

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76. Bryson, op. cit.
77. Bryson, Ibid. (1962), 117.

Thinkers have dealt with the contradiction over the years, arriving at such views as Zoroastrian dualism, the idea that evil is a just judgment, the view that evil is good in disguise, and the idea that evil is not eliminated because God is finite. Howison is aware of these views, although not of the latter concept in its most recent expression. He emphatically rejects them, pointing out that all such views either beg the question "by denying that there is any evil" or else attempt to make God finite in a world in which all selves are infinite. There is nothing particularly striking in this idea of Howison's, but he is original in being so completely pluralistic that he avoids creationism and efficient causality, thereby making God purely an ideal who is not responsible for any of the evil of the world. The real source of the problem of evil, to Howison, "is the traditional form of our theism, and its burden comes from attributing to God the authorship of Nature. . . ."[78] The solution to the whole problem of evil, then, is simply a "new idealism," a philosophy in which nature and all its evils are derived from minds to be sure, but minds other than God. Inasmuch as God stands in a final-causal relation to all other minds he is exonerated. This is really no solution. It merely saves God by shifting the responsibility from the central Person in the "Republic" to the entire "Republic" exclusive of the perfect Ideal.

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78. Howison, Art. (1902), 115.

One is forced again, in dealing with the component aspects of Howison's idea of God, as he is in discussing any of Howison's thought, back to the concept of final cause. One is certain that God exists, for there must be an ideal by which each individual person defines itself. God is good, for the ideal must be perfect, and for the same reason, He is not the author of evil. Howison is concerned with making a strong case for theism, but so restricting is his narrow concept of final cause that he never arrives at a theism of the breadth and depth of that expounded by either Calkins or Bowne. He suggests that the views they represent are not ideal enough. Rather, one is tempted to conclude that his God is but a primus inter pares,[79] or less, for if God does not share in the creation of anything, as final cause, He is not of the same order of persons with man even though He may be their Ideal in other respects.

6. Howison's Place and Influence in American Philosophy.

Howison, a significant American thinker, was one of a company of men in his day who made philosophy an important part of the newly evolving American culture. He was a masterful teacher, and will continue to be recognized for his

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79. See Wahl, PPEA, 226.

One is forced again, in dealing with the component aspects of Bowne's idea of God, as he is in discussing any of Bowne's thought, back to the concept of final cause. One is certain that God exists, for there must be an ideal by which each individual person defines itself. God is good, for the ideal must be perfect, and for the same reason, He is not the author of evil. Bowne is concerned with making a strong case for theism, but he realizes his narrow concept of final cause that he never arrives at a theism of the breadth and depth of that expounded by philosophers of Royce. He suggests that the views they propose are not ideal enough. Rather, one is tempted to conclude that his God is but a prime inter pares,[78] or less, for if God does not share in the creation of anything, an final cause, He is not of the same order of persons with man even though He may be their ideal in other respects.

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78. Sam Weil. Ibid. p.9.

original form of personalism. Before dealing with these specific factors in his influence, however, consider the recognition given him in recent philosophical literature.

Howison is not referred to very frequently in the philosophical journals, but he is given considerable attention in some of the important books. Two excellent articles, however, have appeared. John W. Buckham published "The Contributions of Professor Howison to Christian Thought" in The Harvard Theological Review in 1916, and Charles M. Bakewell gave a scholarly treatment to "The Personal Idealism of George Holmes Howison" in The Philosophical Review in 1940.[80] The chief book dealing with the life and thought of Howison is George Holmes Howison by Buckham and Stratton.[81] Reference is made to Howison in several standard textbooks: Mary Whiton Calkins devotes considerable discussion to him in her book, Persistent Problems of Philosophy.[82] G. Watts Cunningham devotes a chapter to him in The Idealistic Argument in Recent British and American Philosophy.[83] George Stuart Fullerton speaks of his "eloquence and feeling" in An Introduction to Philosophy.[84] Gamertsfelder and Evans refer to

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80. These articles, and the books mentioned that follow, appear in the bibliography.
81. Professor emeritus, Charles Henry Rieber, in a letter dated January 10, 1943, calls this "an outstanding book."
82. See PPP (1st ed.), 378, 407, 412-416, 422n, and 558. She favors his personalism, but rejects his pluralism.
83. See 302-314.
84. See 205.

him in Fundamentals of Philosophy.[85] His system is referred to by David R. Major in An Introduction to Philosophy,[86] by G. T. W. Patrick in Introduction to Philosophy,[87] by Arthur Kenyon Rogers in his English and American Philosophy Since 1800,[88] and by Frank Thilly in A History of Philosophy.[89] Howison's system is considered, or alluded to, in several other important books. They are: William Ernest Hocking's Types of Philosophy,[90] Albert C. Knudson's Philosophy of Personalism,[91] Joseph Alexander Leighton's Man and The Cosmos,[92] Douglas Clyde Macintosh's The Problem of Knowledge,[93] Ralph Barton Perry's Present Philosophical Tendencies,[94] and S. Radhakrishnan's The Reign of Religion in Contemporary Philosophy.[95] Howison is also recognized in several notable books on religion. Rannie Belle Baker critically evaluates "Howison's Theory" at some length in The Concept of a Limited God.[96] Edgar S. Brightman mentions him in A Philosophy of

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85. See 237 and 430.
86. See 262-263, 270n, and 329.
87. Patrick puts Howison's Limits of Evolution in a list of books which he says "should be carefully read by every student in philosophy. Their wholesomeness and their ethical Idealism insure their lasting value." ITP, 222.
88. See 303.
89. See 562.
90. See the first edition, 42 and 246.
91. Howison's view of God is treated critically by Knudson. See POP, 53-61, and also 19-20, 75, and 83n.
92. See 186 and 197.
93. See 189 and 190.
94. See 306.
95. For this critical discussion of Howison's system, see 384-392.
96. See 87-97.

Religion,[97] as does William Ernest Hocking in The Meaning of God in Human Experience.[98] A. Seth Pringle-Pattison treats Howison's views in The Idea of God.[99] Finally, reference is made to Howison by William Kelley Wright in A Student's Philosophy of Religion.[100]

The first thing to be said of Howison's place and influence in American philosophy is that he was a distinguished thinker, who, with his contemporaries, made a profound philosophical imprint upon American culture. During the transitional nineteenth century, America was expanding, growing, and arriving at her full stature. Howison, along with his friends and fellow philosophers, Alcott, Emerson, Brokmeyer, Snider, Harris, Davidson, Palmer, James, Bowne, and Royce, helped to mold America politically, religiously, educationally and socially. He was an important member of the St. Louis Group, which was, for a time, the leading philosophical voice of the nation. His was a forceful influence in the East, especially at Massachusetts Institute of Technology and at the Concord School of Philosophy. During his later years, spent at the University of California, he made a lasting philosophical contribution to the West. Hocking, who

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97. See 300n.
98. See 290 and 503.
99. See 315-321, 386, and 412n.
100. See 337. For a somewhat more complete (although not as recent) list of references to Howison in philosophical publications, see Buckham and Stratton, GHH, 389-390.

Salvation,[97] as does William Ernest Hocking in *The Meaning of God in Human Experience*.[98] A. Boris Pfeiffer-Belli treats Santayana's views in *The Idea of God*.[99] Finally, reference is made to Dewey by William Ralfey Salzer in *A Pragmatic Philosophy of Religion*.[100]

The first thing to be sure of Santayana's place and influence in American philosophy is that he was a distinguished thinker, who, with his contemporaries, made a profound philosophical impact upon American culture. During the transitional nineteenth century, Emerson was expounding, preaching, and serving as his full self. Adams, along with his friends and fellow philosophers, Alcott, Ripley, Brownson, James, Peirce, Dewey, Royce, Santayana, Dewey, Palmer, James, Royce, and Lovejoy, helped to mold American philosophy, religious, transcendentality and poetry. He was an important member of the St. Louis Group, which was, for a time, the leading philosophical voice of America. He was a forerunner of Lovejoy in the West, especially as Bernardete, Inventor of Cosmology and at the Johns Hopkins School of Philosophy. During his latter years, spent at the University of California, he made a tremendous philosophical contribution to the West. Santayana, who

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97. See [illegible].
98. See [illegible] and [illegible].
99. See [illegible], [illegible], [illegible].
100. See [illegible]. [illegible] *Pragmatic Philosophy of Religion* (Philadelphia: Dorrance [illegible] Inc. Publishers, 1966, Pitman and Sherman, [illegible], [illegible]-[illegible].

knew him well, wrote that Howison "took his philosophy like a religion,"[101] and Montague adds:

> He preached it with fiery and unflagging earnestness, and so great was the force of his personality that people all over the Pacific Coast began and have continued to study the philosophy of German Idealism. The spirit at Berkeley was very different from that at Harvard. Under Howison, philosophy was not a fencing-match in which friendly gentlemen exchanged playful thrusts and courteously applauded their adversaries. It was a grim thing of life and death for the soul, a veritable religion in which either you were orthodox (Howisonian), or you were damned.[102]

J. Elliot Cabot, to whose lectures Howison had listened at Harvard, concurs regarding Howison's influence, for he wrote in 1897:

> I think often of your activity & influence there on the other side of the continent as a very important factor in its history—not at all calculable but certain to be far-reaching & in the highest matters as time goes on.[103]

Cunningham, too, says that Howison "exerted a marked influence on the cultural development of the Pacific Coast during the years (1884-1909) of his professorship at the University of California."[104] So forceful was Howison's leadership that James Ward wished him to come to Cambridge, England, saying: "No one from your side of the water would be so welcome."[105] Indeed, during the last half of the transitional nineteenth

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101. In a letter to the author dated January 12, 1943.
102. Montague, Art. (1930), 141.
103. Quoted by Buckham and Stratton, GHH, 101.
104. Cunningham, IA, 302.
105. Quoted by Buckham and Stratton, GHH, 116.

know him well, wrote that Dawson "combined philosophy, life, a religion."[101] and Montague wrote:

> He commended it with tears and quivering earnestness, and so gave the force of his personality to that people all over the Pacific Coast. Young men have mentioned to whom the history of Dawson Island, the nature of Kendall's ministry, are different from what it would have been. Under Dawson's chivalrous care was not a female in Valparaiso exposed to danger. Dawson's advice was usually sought and followed by the most dissolute and desperate characters. He was a strong, virile man of life and death for the good, a very real protector in moral action and a strong orthodox (Wesleyan), but was more dammed.[102]

6. Milton Dobbs, in whose lectures Dawson had listened at Corvaro, commenced regarding Dawson's influence, for the area in 1897:

> I think often of your activity & influence upon me in shaping some of the conditions on a very important fences in the history--not as mere valuable but as being in the Pre-requisite & in the element matters as also some on.[103]

Dwelling here, you, says that Dawson "exerted a marked influence on the educational development of the Pacific Coast during the years (1894-1900) of his presidency of the University of California."[104] Mr Cooper, who Dawson's secretary, said "Dawson wished his to come to Washington, England, saying he was from your side of the ship, being sorry to return." Indeed, during the last half of the transitional period

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101. In a letter to the author dated January 13, 1964.
102. Montague, op. cit. (1930), 141.
103. Quoted by Dobbs in a letter, 1898, 10.
104. Schaffner, 34, 50.
105. Quoted by Johnson and Stevens, 1924, 110.

century, Howison helped to establish philosophy prominently in the newly developed America. He hoped that philosophy would prepare "the superstructure of a national life at once genuine and devoted."[106]

Second, as already stated, Howison will be remembered as a great teacher. This is his weakness as well as his strength, however, for he did little important writing. He wrote only one philosophical book of significance, The Limits of Evolution. Even that was not a complete exposition of his system; it was a reworking of previously published essays. As a writer, he lacked the warmth and strength which were apparent in his lecturing and speaking; nor did he always write clearly. This lack of clarity and systematic exposition may account, in part, for his lack of a philosophical following. Be that as it may, his prominence as a teacher was recognized even in England. In a letter from Oxford to a "young and intimate friend," Howison wrote:

> Dr. Stout . . . has been very attentive to me, and says he likes the Univ. of Cal. philosophers, from Royce on (he has seen Bakewell, and read McGilvary), because they really seem to have some convictions, and feel as if they ought to get others to share them.[107]

As previously mentioned, Howison numbered among his students Mezes, Rieber, Stuart, McGilvary, Bakewell, Henderson, and Lovejoy. Through these men, as well as through his many

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106. Howison, Art. (1934), 379.
107. Quoted by Buckham and Stratton, GHH, 115.

century. Dawson helped to outlaw patronage appointments in the newly developed Province. He hoped that railways would provide "the superstructure of a national life as enduring and complete."[106]

Second, as liberal student, Dawson will be remembered as a great teacher. This is his reputation as well as his strength. However, for his little important writing, he wrote only one philosophical book of significance, The Science of Evolution. From that was his complete rejection of Hegelian speculation; it was a rejection of developmental philosophy. As a critic, he looked him matters and attempted making good a course in his lecturing and controlling; now did he always write clearly. With less originality and practicality expectation may account, in part, for his loss of a philosophical following. In that as it may, his reminiscence as a teacher was recognized even in England. In a letter from Oxford to a "young and intimate friend," Dawson wrote:

> Mr. Stout . . . has been very attentive to me, and says he likes the Daily. At Oxf. philosophers, Cross lovers on (in) has been Hegelian, and treat Reality, because the Reality seems to have some complications, and I'm sure he ought to get others to place sign.[107]

A provincial academic, Dawson nonetheless made students aware, Weber, Ozanne, Coldwell, Henderson, and Dwight. Through them he, as well as Grover, had many

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106. Dawson, ANE, (1924), 180.
107. quoted by Dawson and Sandison, DM, 116.

lecture and speaking engagements, "he exercised a wide influence on American philosophy."[108]

Finally, Howison will continue as an influence in American philosophy because of his pluralistic form of personalism. He was in the center of many philosophical crosscurrents, from which he evolved, in part, his system. He drew the best from German idealism in his early days at St. Louis and in his later study abroad. He knew the historic literature of his field, the significant British philosophy, and he was thoroughly steeped in his own genteel heritage. Against this background, and through his sympathetic exchange of ideas with such men as Alcott and Davidson, Harris and Royce, he worked out his system of thought. Philosophy was for him a way of life. He attempted, therefore, to vitalize the genteel tradition by developing a pluralistic personalism that was more concrete and more inclusive of the many factors of experience. His personalism "was in refreshing contrast to the anthropophagous absolute of Royce and Bradley. . . ."[109] It was a forerunner of the pluralism of James. In one way at least, his system was a logical synthesis between the semi-pantheism of Calkins and the alleged "monarchotheism" of Bowne.[110] His was a pioneering philosophy, a distinct

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108. Bates, Art. (1932), 311. See also Buckham and Stratton, GHH, 11.
109. Montague, Art. (1930), 141.
110. Hocking credits Howison with checking Absolutism, and puts him in the company of Hegel and James for saying

personalistic pluralism that will continue to stand out prominently in American philosophy.

7. Summary.

Howison, a vigorous spirit with a well-trained mind, is the chief representative of pluralistic personalism in American philosophy. He developed his particular system through an original synthesis of the ideas of Aristotle, Leibniz, Berkeley, Kant, and Hegel, through an interchange of thought with such distinguished contemporaries as Alcott, Davidson, Harris, James, Palmer, Bowne and Royce, and through his deep concern that every person be recognized as an integral part of the eternal society of persons.

His personalism is a definition of reality as a universal society of persons, who, although held together by reason, are completely individual and eternal. Mind, on this basis, functions spontaneously to make perception possible. Nature is dependent upon the "assemblage of individual minds," and is created, not by God, but by the final causation of a society of minds experiencing themselves and each other. In the "eternal republic," the individual person achieves moral

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the world is a place where the spirit can never be naturalized. See MGHE, 290, 503. Radhakrishnan includes him in the distinguished company of James Bergson, Ward, Schiller, Balfour, Eucken, and Rashdall for opposing Absolutism. See ROR, 46-47.

personalistic idealism that will contribute to obtain one consistency in Western philosophy.

7. Summary.

Bowne, a vigorous analyst with a well-grounded idea, is the chief representative of idealistic personalism in American philosophy. He developed his particular system through an original synthesis of the ideas of Berkeley, Leibnitz, Lotze, Kant, and Hegel, through an interpretation of Lotze with such distinguished contemporaries as Ulrici, Fechner, Harms, Ulrici, Lotze, and Lotze, and through his own concern that every person be recognized as an independent core of the universal society of persons.

His contribution is a definition of reality as a universal society of persons, and, although hold to Berkeley's idealism, he characterized individual as dynamic, not, as Berkeley thought, Christian personalistically in such presupposition possible. Bowne is distinguished from "personalism" of individual minds, for he conceived, not by God, but by the final connection of a society of minds experiencing themselves and each other. In the "absolute possible," the individual person indicates moral

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The world is a place where the ideals can never be realized. See [illegible], 1900, Chap. Idealistic Idealism in relation to the distinctional concept of Bowne Bowne, Time, Infinite, and Finite, Bowne, and Reason-it for choosing Absolutism. See 201, 40-42.

goals in terms of the ideal, God, experiences free choice, and attains immortality. God is the "ideal Type," "the way of absolute perfection." He is not a creator, but a final cause, the goal of every self.

Howison's life and work may be appraised in the light of his forceful personality and his philosophical position. His life spanned an important period in the development of American culture. With clarity of purpose, vigorous scholarship, and deep religious faith, he made a permanent contribution to that developing culture, and to the progress of thought. (1) He helped to give philosophy an important role in American life. (2) He was a superlative teacher who, although he did not develop a following, stimulated students to become more noble persons in all walks of life. He so aroused the interest of some of his students that they became philosophers themselves, and have assumed responsible positions in American education. (3) He turned from traditional idealism to become the champion of a more vigorous and concrete personal idealism. It is to him that future philosophers will turn for the ablest American expression of pluralistic personalism.

goals in terms of God, God, experience from origin, and obtain immortality. God is the "first cause," the way of absolute perfection. He is not a creation, but a final cause, the goal of every soul.

Brownson's life and work may be appreciated in the light of his forceful personality and his philosophical position. His life spanned an important period in the development of American culture. With clarity of purpose, vigorous scholarship, and deep religious faith, he made a permanent contribution to that developing culture, and to the progress of thought. (1) He helped to give philosophy an important role in American life. (2) He was a speculative thinker who, although he did not develop a following, stimulated students to become more critic and to think in all walks of life. He so aroused the interest of some of his students that they became philosophers themselves, and have exercised considerable positions in American thought. (3) He turned from traditional theism to deism, the character of a more vigorous and concrete personal theism. It is to him that future philosophers will turn for the richest American conversation of religious philosophy.

CHAPTER IV

ABSOLUTISTIC PERSONALISM

Mary Whiton Calkins, a student and disciple of Royce, is an exponent of the second distinctive type of personalism in America, viz., absolutistic personalism.[1] Her central idea is that the Absolute Self shares, but transcends temporal consciousness, and experiences what every finite self experiences. The finite self, on the other hand, is an expression, an integral part of the Absolute Self, not a separate and distinct eternal infinite entity as in Howison's system. The "Great society of mutually interrelated selves" is held together, not by desire or sentience, as for Davidson, nor by reason as for Howison, but by rationality within the conscious personality of the Absolute itself. By personality, Calkins means "spirit," "soul," "self," "person," "I."[2]

The distinctiveness of Miss Calkins' absolutistic view in American personalism may be seen in her own reference to personalistic thinkers. In pointing out those who hold that "consciousness is not mere idea or series of ideas," but "the unique subject of ideas," she refers to Descartes, Locke, Berkeley, Leibniz, Kant, Fichte, Hegel, Schopenhauer, Lotze,

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1. Knudson calls her the "most conspicuous representative" of this form of personalism. See POP, 33. It must be recognized that although Calkins did not attain the superior greatness of Royce, she was more consciously personalistic. See pages 80, 142, 268, and 269 of this study.
2. Calkins, PPP (1st. ed.), 75n.

Renouvier, Howison, Ward, Royce, "and a great company of philosophers."[3] The only Americans in the list are Howison and Royce, both personalists, but diametrically opposed in terms of pluralism versus absolutism. Calkins does not suggest the possibility of a mediating position such as held by Bowne and others, hence one can conclude that she herself views her monistic personalism as distinctive in contrast to Howison's pluralistic personalism.[4]

1. The Life and Influence of Mary Whiton Calkins (1863-1930).

The dynamic personality of Mary Whiton Calkins enabled her to become a beloved teacher, a venerated colleague, and a distinctive leader in both American philosophy and psychology. Although she spent her academic career at Wellesley College, she "exercised an influence far beyond its walls."[5]

She was born in Hartford, Connecticut, March 30, 1863, the daughter of Wolcott Calkins and Charlotte Whiton Calkins.[6] Her family background on her father's side was of Welsh stock

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3. Calkins, PPP (1st ed.), 407.
4. Calkins' treatment of "Personal Idealism" in her book, Persistent Problems of Philosophy, is, in fact, divided into only two parts, pluralistic personal idealism and monistic personal idealism. See pp. 406-455. Her chief references are to Howison and Royce.
5. Brightman, Art. (1931), 35.
6. For a discussion of the salient features of Miss Calkins' life see her brother's article, which was read at a memorial service for her in the Wellesley College Chapel some six weeks after her death: Raymond Calkins, Art. (1931), 1-19.

Renouvier, Boutroux, Bergson, Royce, "and a great company of philosophers."[3] The only documents in the life are Dewlaw and Royce, both personalists, one diametrically opposed in terms of idealistic versus absolutism. Collins does not suggest the possibility of a mediating position such as held by James and others; hence one can conclude that she regards her monistic personalism as distinctive in contrast to Bowne's pluralistic personalism.[4]

1. The life and influence of Mary Whiton Calkins (1863-1930).

The dynamic personality of Mary Whiton Calkins enabled her to become a beloved teacher, a respected colleague, and a distinctive leader in both American philosophy and psychology. Although she never her monistic outlook or Christian faith, she appreciated an influence far beyond the walls.[5]

She was born to Benjamin, Congregational, March 30, 1863, the daughter of Julius Calkins and Charlotte Whiton Calkins.[6] Her family background on her father's side was of Welsh stock

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3. Calkins, PPP (1st ed.), 400.
4. Calkins' treatment of "Personal Idealism" in her book, Persistent Problems of Philosophy, is, in fact, devoted into only two parts, pluralistic personal idealism and monistic personal idealism. See pp. 438-450. Her chief references are to Lotze, and Royce.
5. Leighton, APA (1931), 38.
6. For a dissertation of the outline features of Miss Calkins' life see her Psychologies monists, which was read as a memorial service for her in the Wellesley College Chapel some six weeks after her death. Personal Idealism, 1st. (1931), 3-10.

that migrated to America in 1638, and on her mother's side was of Mayflower descent, John and Priscilla Alden and Richard Warren being numbered among her ancestors. Her father was a teacher and then a clergyman who had taught at Worcester Academy, Worcester, Massachusetts, was graduated from Union Theological Seminary, and had studied and travelled in Europe.[7] He remained in Hartford only two years, then served the Calvary Presbyterian Church in Philadelphia until 1867, when he went to Buffalo, New York, as minister of the North Presbyterian Church. Miss Calkins spent her childhood in Buffalo. There she went to the public schools and studied German privately under a Frau Veldt. When her parents moved to Newton, Massachusetts in 1880, she entered the Newton High School and "at once showed unusual intellectual ability."[8]

She received her advanced academic training at Smith College, Radcliffe College, Clark University, Harvard University, and also travelled in Europe. In 1882 she entered Smith College, where she studied chiefly Greek and philosophy. She graduated with the class of 1885, after being out a year because of sickness in the family. She spent a year at home following her graduation, reading widely, and developing strong social interests that later came to be a

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7. For more information about him see Thomas Cole Richards, Art. (1929), 422.
8. R. Calkins, Art. (1931), 3.

that migrated to Georgia in 1874, and on her mother's side was of Dutchman descent. Jean was Philadelphia Album and Blanche Darren being wondered about her accomplishment. Her father was a teacher and then a clergyman who had taught at Worcester Academy, Worcester, Massachusetts, was graduated from Union Theological Seminary, and had studied and travelled in Europe. He remained in Georgia only two years, then moved the Delaware Presbyterian Church in Philadelphia (April 1887), when he went to Buffalo, New York, as minister of the North Presbyterian Church. Miss Dallas spent her childhood in Buffalo. There she was to see public speaking and studied Darwin seriously during Yale. Then her parents moved to Boston, Massachusetts in 1890, she entered the Boston High School and "at once showed unusual intellectual ability."

She received her advanced academic training at Smith College, Radcliffe College, Cornell University, Harvard University, and also travelled in Europe. In 1896 she entered Smith College, where she studied mainly Greek and philosophy. She graduated with the class of 1899, after being out a year because of sickness in her family. She spent a year at home following her graduation, reading widely, and developing among social interests that later came to be a

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7. For more information about Miss Jane Thomas Todd Clements, art. (1920), 492.
8. L. Dallas, art. (1920), 4.

vigorous social philosophy. She travelled the next year with her family in Europe. Besides her general travel and study, she made a special trip with Miss Abby Leach, an instructor of Vassar College, to Greece, where she broadened her knowledge of the Greek Classics and learned to read modern Greek.[9] After returning to America, Miss Calkins became tutor in Greek at Wellesley College, a position she held for two years. She served another year as instructor in Greek, and then became instructor in psychology in 1890. Four years later she was made associate professor of psychology, and in 1896 became associate professor of psychology and philosophy. For the first time she was able to teach in the field of her major interest, philosophy. She was made a full professor of philosophy and psychology in 1898, and held that position until 1929, when she became research professor of philosophy and psychology.

Before teaching in the fields of psychology and philosophy, however, Miss Calkins studied further at Clark University [10] and Harvard. In the meantime she had received

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9. How like Thomas Davidson, who read both ancient and modern Greek, spoke modern Greek fluently, and who was, through wide travel there, familiar with the total life of modern Greece. Throughout her teaching career, Calkins regretted, as had Davidson, the fact that students were so uncultured as to pay little attention to reading the original Greek.
10. The vigorous, pioneering personality of Miss Calkins is illustrated in a letter dated November 30, 1942, from Mrs. Lydia C. Colby, recorder of Clark University, who wrote in answer to my request for a transcript of

vigorous social philosophy. She travelled the next year with her family to Europe. Besides her general travel and study, she made a special trip with Miss Abby Leeson, an instructor of Vassar College, to Greece, where she increased her knowledge of the Greek Dramas and learned to read modern Greek.[9] After returning to America, Miss Calkins became tutor in Greek at Wellesley College, a position she held for two years. She served another year as instructor in Greek, and then became instructor in psychology in 1890. Four years later she was made associate professor of psychology, and in 1895 became associate professor of psychology and philosophy. For the first time she was able to teach in the field of her major interest, philosophy. She was made a full professor of philosophy and psychology in 1903, and held that position until 1922, when she became research professor of philosophy and psychology.

Before focusing in the fields of psychology and philosophy, however, Miss Calkins had taught as Clark University[10] and Harvard. In the summers she had journeyed

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9. Now like Thomas Davidson, she read both ancient and modern Greek, spoke modern Greek fluently, and she was through with travel there, "realizing with the total life of modern Greece." Throughout her teaching career, Calkins reported, as had Davidson, her feet that she should seek an teaching at Vassar on to pay little attention to teaching the original Greek.

10. The vigorous, pioneering personality of Miss Calkins is illustrated in a lively metal Hopkins, 1894, from Mrs. Lydia G. Duffy, Regents of Clark University, who wrote in answer to my request for a transcript of

her master of arts degree from Smith College in 1888. At Clark University her psychology was studied under Professor Edmund C. Sanford. At Harvard University she specialized in philosophy, and studied under the illustrious professors, Royce, Munsterberg, and James. She was most deeply influenced by Josiah Royce, whose general philosophical views she later championed herself.[11]

Returning to Wellesley in 1891, after this preparation for her new work, Miss Calkins established a psychological laboratory that "was one of the first eleven laboratories to be founded in the United States, and the first to be founded in any college for women."[12]

Even though Miss Calkins taught psychology, wrote two textbooks on the subject, An Introduction to Psychology (1901) and A First Book in Psychology (1909), and was elected

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Calkins' work there: "During the first few years of the University, women were not supposed to be admitted to its sacred confines, so that those who were brave enough to enter its doors had no official standing, and apparently no records were kept of their work."

11. These three professors declared Miss Calkins to be one of their most brilliant pupils. She took the oral examination for the Ph.D. degree in 1895, and passed it with distinction. William James said that it ranked above any he had previously heard. She was refused the degree, however, simply because Harvard University did not award degrees to women. Later, Harvard repented and offered her the degree, but she declined the belated offer. Radcliffe College still later offered her the doctor's degree, but she declined because her work had been done at Harvard rather than at Radcliffe. See Raymond Calkins, Art. (1931), 9-10.
12. R. Calkins, Art. (1931), 10.

her master of arts degree from Smith College in 1890. At Clark University her psychology was studied under Professor Edmund C. Sanford. At Harvard University she specialized in philosophy, and studied under the illustrious professors, Royce, Münsterberg, and James. She was most deeply influenced by Josiah Royce, whose general philosophical views she later characterized herself.[11]

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Even though Miss Calkins taught psychology, wrote two textbooks on the subject, An Introduction to Psychology (1903) and A First Book in Psychology (1909), and was elected

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Calkins' work there: "During the first few years of the University, women were not supposed to be admitted to the sacred conclave, so that those who were brave enough to enter its doors had no official standing, and experimentally no records were kept of their work."

11. These three professors declared Miss Calkins to be one of their most brilliant pupils. She took the oral examination for the Ph.D. degree in 1895, and passed it with distinction. Miss Calkins said that she received more than any other previously heard. She was refused the degree, however, simply because Harvard University did not award degrees to women. Later, Harvard reversed and offered her the degree, but she declined, she believed offer. Radcliffe College still later offered her the doctor's degree, but she declined because her work had been done at Harvard rather than at Radcliffe. See Beyond Calkins, op. cit. (1931), 9-10.

12. E. Calkins, op. cit. (1931), 10.

president of the American Psychological Association, her primary interest was in philosophy. Professor Thomas Hayes Procter, one of her colleagues, has suggested that it was "through philosophy she fought her way to a real integration of life.... Her largeness of soul was essentially philosophic."[13] Another colleague, Miss Mary S. Case, has written of her philosophy that her course in modern philosophy "became one of the outstanding features in the academic life of the College."[14]

During these forty-three years at Wellesley, Miss Calkins was revered as a teacher and admired as a colleague. She was unwaveringly loyal, kind, and considerate. Professor Procter has remarked in conversation that one of the worthiest of her characteristics was her ability to work long hours day after day, doing much of her writing and studying on the bus between her home in Newton and the College in Wellesley. An incident that took place at an informal departmental party well illustrates this ability for work and also her concern for the students:

> An appreciative and humorously inclined graduate student presented Miss Calkins with a sign which read: "Professor Calkins. Office hours daily from 7 a. m. to 10 p. m., and at other times by appointment."[15]

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13. Procter, Art. (1931), 31.
14. Quoted by R. Calkins, Art. (1931), 10-11.
15. Helen Cook Vincent, Art. (1931), 22.

travelled of the American technological mecca in 1931, her primary interest was in philosophy. Protestant Thomas Hayes Procter, one of her colleagues, has suggested that it was "strong philosophy she lacked but may be a good indication of life.... Her interpretation of Kant was notentially philosophic."[13] Another colleague, Miss Mary G. Chase, has written of her philosophy that her courses in modern philosophy "became one of the outstanding features in the academic life of the College."[14]

During these forty-three years at Mount Holyoke, Miss Salvine was revered as a teacher and admired as a colleague. She was unusually long, lithe, and comfortable. Professor Procter has recalled in conversation that one of the women-ent of her conversations was her ability to work long hours day after day, doing more of her writing and studying on the bus between her home in Hadley and the College in Holyoke. An incident such took place on an informal departmental party with fifteen-year-old Kathy for very and also her concern for the students:

> An expressively and amusingly localized grandmaternal character appeared from the Dunbar with a plaque on which: "Professor Salvine. Office hours daily from 9 a. m. to 10 p. m., only at other times by appointment."[15]

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13. Procter, Rev. (1931), 23.
14. Quoted by A. Quick, Rev. (1943), 10-11.
15. Helen Cook Vinson, Ms. (1931), 22.

A student has further said of her: she "was the most perfectly integrated personality I have known."[16] A colleague wrote: "She inspired us with her sense of the thrilling importance of the work of the scholar and teacher."[17] And during all these years of writing, lecturing, and teaching as a scholar and teacher, "her most passionate interest" was "that personalism should prevail both in psychology and in philosophy."[18]

It was suggested at the outset that the influence of Miss Calkins went far beyond the walls of Wellesley. Several pertinent facts about her life corroborate this. She was elected to the presidency of the American Psychological Association in 1905, the American Philosophical Association in 1918, and in 1928 was made an honorary member of the British Psychological Association.[19] She was honored with the degree of Doctor of Letters by Columbia University in 1909,[20] and

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16. Quoted by Vincent, Art. (1931), 24.
17. Procter, Art. (1931), 29.
18. R. Calkins, Art. (1931), 11.
19. She was the first woman to be the president of the American Psychological Association, the only woman until 1941 to be president of the American Philosophical Association, and the British Psychological Association "had never before conferred such an honor upon any woman." See R. Calkins, Art. (1931), 12. Only two other thinkers ever held the presidency of both American Associations, William James and Munsterberg.
20. Miss Calkins was the first woman to receive an honorary degree from Columbia. In conferring the degree, President Nicholas Murray Butler used the phrase: "Professor of Philosophy and Psychology in Wellesley College; an acute and clear-minded student of the problems of mental life." From a letter by Philip M. Hayden, secretary of

A student has written said of her: she "was the most poetically inspirated personality I have known."[16] A colleague wrote: "She inspired us with her sense of the thrilling importance of the work of the science and therapy."[17] And during all these years of writing, lecturing, and teaching as a scholar and teacher, "her more passionate interest" was "that psychiatrists should prevail both in psychology and in philosophy."[18]

It was suggested at the outset that the influence of Mary Calkins went far beyond the walls of Wellesley. Several persisting facts about her life corroborate this. She was elected to the presidency of the American Psychological Association in 1905, the American Philosophical Association in 1918, and in 1920 was made an honorary member of the British Psychological Association.[19] She was honored with the degree of Doctor of Letters by Columbia University in 1909,[20] and

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16. Quoted by Blanchard, op. cit. (1931), 64.
17. Frances, loc. cit. (1931), 23.
18. M. Calkins, Ms. (1931), 11.
19. She was the first woman to be the president of an American Psychological Association, the only woman until 1934 to be president of the American Philosophical Association, and the British Psychological Association "has never before conferred such an honor upon any woman." See M. Calkins, op. cit. (1931), 34. Only two other Wellesley women held the presidency of both American Associations, Alice James and Jessica Tuttle.
20. Mary Calkins was the first woman to receive an honorary degree from Columbia. In presenting the degree, President Nicholas Murray Butler praised her "scholarship and philosophy and Psychology in Wellesley College, an acute and clear-minded student of the problems of mental life." From a letter by Phillip A. Boyden, secretary of

with the degree of Doctor of Laws by Smith College in 1910.[21] She was invited to many places to lecture. During the first semester of 1916 she lectured on the Mills Foundation at the University of California, giving a graduate seminar and a lecture course on the Fundamental Problems of Philosophy that was open to students and the public.[22] She also lectured at the University of London, in 1927, on the subject "Conceptions of Meaning and Value,"[23] and at Harvard Summer School of Theology in 1910 on the subject of Prayer. It has been well stated that Miss Calkins "was the first woman in the entire history of philosophy to achieve distinction."[24]

The source of the leadership and influence of Miss Calkins lies in her life itself. She "lived her own beautiful philosophy." Her students say "she taught us how to

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Columbia University, dated December 10, 1942.

21. In October, 1910, at the inauguration of President Burton at Smith College, Miss Calkins was given the degree of Doctor of Laws with the following citation: "Mary Whiton Calkins—Bachelor and master of arts of Smith College, doctor of letters of Columbia University, professor of philosophy and psychology at Wellesley College; learned and eloquent, clear and profound, her many and important contributions to philosophy and to psychology have won the recognition of scholars and institutions at home as well as abroad and secured for her a unique place among the students of those subjects in our time." Quoted in a letter from Miss Joy Secor, registrar of Smith College, November 30, 1942.
22. R. Calkins, Art. (1931), 12. Also the Smith Alumnae Quarterly. It will be recalled that it was the Mills Chair of Philosophy at the University of California that Howison accepted when he first went there to teach philosophy.
23. R. Calkins, Art. (1931), 12.
24. Brightman, Art. (1931), 35.

live."[25] Deeply religious, she integrated her philosophy and religion into a constructive pattern for life, supported the church, gave liberally to many causes, and believed sincerely in prayer and immortality. Professor Brightman has characterized her superlative traits of mind as: (1) clarity of thought and expression, (2) demand for proof, (3) a fundamental fairness, (4) a keen sense of social justice, (5) animation "both by a high sense of duty and by a human kindness and loyalty mellowed by humor," and (6) religious faith.[26] Indeed, when one views the richness and range of her life, one can conclude with Professor Procter that such a life "cannot be lost," and that "she who sought truth, willed the good, and loved the Great Community may still continue to unfold the possibilities of her soul in the activity of creation."[27]

2. The Absolute Self.

Miss Calkins' central philosophical idea is that the Absolute constitutes the whole of reality. She agreed with Howison, and other personalists, that "the universe is completely mental in nature, and that every mental existent is either a self, or else a part, aspect, phase, or process of

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25. Vincent, Art. (1931), 24.
26. Brightman, Art. (1931), 38-42.
27. Procter, Art. (1931), 33.

life.[35] Deeply religious, he interpreted God (astronomy and religion) into a comprehensive pattern for life, supported the church, gave liberally to many causes, and believed strongly in prayer and immortality. Professor Smithdeem has characterized her apologetic traits of mind as: (1) clarity of thought and expression, (2) reason for proof, (3) a fundamental fairness, (4) a keen sense of social justice, (5) achievement "born of a high sense of duty and by a broken kindness and lovely smiling by humor," and (6) religious faith.[36] Indeed, when one views the kindness and range of her life, one can conclude with professor Hopper that such a life "cannot be lost," and that "she who sought truth, willed the good, and loved the great Governing Mind shall contribute to mankind the possibilities of her soul in the activity of generation."[37]

D. The Apologia Self.

Miss Gilchrist's general philosophical line is that the Christian conception has stood the test of reality. She argued with Spencer, and other materialists, that "the universe is composed entirely of matter, and that every mental existence is either a self, or also - part, manner, shape, or process of

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35. Vinnedge, op. cit. (1947), 34.
36. Smithdeem, op. cit. (1951), 50-52.
37. Hopper, op. cit. (1911), 50.

a self,"[28] yet she differed from him and many other personalists by maintaining that all selves are part of the Absolute Self. She agrees in this point of view with Hegel and Royce, saying in fact that "the idealistic critic may . . . never reject Hegel's proof that ultimate reality is an Absolute Self."[29] Personality is, thus, ultimate, but all existence must cohere in one Absolute unity, an absolute self. Even though finite selves experience themselves as individual unities, they are merely parts of the greater whole. Calkins has pointed out that

> Personal absolutism is the doctrine that all existent realities are selves of one sort or another; that these selves are not wholly independent beings but rather members of an all-including conscious being in somewhat the fashion in which a student self, a business self, and a domestic self may be said to be parts of me; and finally that this all-including self is no mere aggregate or society of persons but a unique individual which perceives, thinks, feels, and wills as an individual. It follows that every last fact in the universe is ultimately a fact of the absolute self's experiencing.[30]

The absolute self is, thus, a complete self that is supra-temporal, supra-spatial, and conscious of the experience of finite selves as parts of its own experience.

Calkins arrives at several conclusions regarding the nature of the absolute self. First, regarding consciousness:

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28. Brightman, Art. (1931), 46.
29. Calkins, Art. (1903)[1], 24.
30. Calkins, PPP (5th ed.), 449.

a self,[29] yet was written from his and many other persons' pleasure or maintenance that all selves are part of the Absolute Self. She argues in this point of view with Hegel and others, saying in fact that "the idealistic critic may . . . never reject Hegel's proof that ultimate reality is an Absolute Self."[30] Consequently, then, finite, illusory, but all existence must subsist in one absolute unity, an absolute self. Even though finite selves transcend themselves as individual wholes, they are merely parts of the greater whole. Haldane has pointed out that

> Personal absolutism is the doctrine that all relevant reality is a selves of one sort or another; that these selves are not wholly independent beings but rather members of an all-inclusive cosmic unity; in connection the transition in which a finished self is a business self, and a citizen self may be seen to be parts of one; and finally that this all-including self is no mere aggregate or society of persons but a unique individual which persists, thinks, feels, and acts as an individual. It follows that every fact that is the universe is ultimately a fact of the absolute self's experiences.[31]

The absolute self is, then, a reality self that is supra-personal, supra-material, and synonymous of the experiences of finite selves as parts of its own consciousness.

Haldane argues at several occasions regarding the nature of the absolute self. There, regarding consciousness

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29. Brightman, Op. cit. (1940), 40.
30. Haldane, Op. cit. (1929), 40.
31. Haldane, Op. cit. (2nd ed.), 140.

(1) The absolute self has all varieties of elemental sense experience inasmuch as he is conscious of all that is experienced by human selves. (2) The absolute not only perceives, he also thinks, not in the slow syllogistic method of gaining truth by degrees, but by "thought-intuition." "He unites the directness of human perception with more than the completeness of human thought," and hence "his must indeed be the only really necessary and complete consciousness."[31] (3) The absolute is effectively conscious, that is, he entertains an emotional consciousness toward each finite self.[32] (4) The absolute self affirms, i.e., he actively experiences will.[33] Second, regarding the nature of the absolute self, he not only knows, feels, and wills, he is also conscious of himself as good. The absolute cannot be both good and bad, and inasmuch as badness is only "partialness" according to Calkins, he is good. "The fully personalistic absolutist seems constrained to attribute goodness to the Absolute Self."[34] Calkins' conclusion, regarding consciousness of the absolute, is that "the absolute self has all the elemental experiences . . . of human selves; that he is conscious of himself as actively related to finite selves, included within himself; that his experience is utterly

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31. Calkins, PPP (1st ed.), 427.
32. It will be recalled that Davidson held his pluralistic system together largely on the basis of sentience.
33. Calkins, PPP (5th ed.), 461.
34. Ibid., 434.

(1) the absolute self has all variation of elements some experience finiteness as its connotations of all that is experienced by human selves. (2) the absolute not only preserves the also finites, but is the also syllogistic method of qualifying truth by degrees, but by "blending-substitution." Ten-nities the differences of human perception with more than somelatenessy of human thought," and among "life must indeed be the only reality necessary and absolute coordinateness."[31] (3) the absolute is effectively concrete, that is, the experience an emotional consciousness beyond such finite self.[32] (4) the absolute self effects, i. e., the relationship consciousness self.[33] Beyond, regarding the meaning of the absolute self, he not only knows, feels, and wills, he is also connotation of himself as good. The absolute changes be from good and bad, and knowing as because is only "sensitiness" according to duties, he is good. "The truly personalistic absolutist never concentrates or attributes goodness to the absolute self."[34] Ultimat morality, regarding consequence of the absolute, is that "the absolute self has all the elemental experiences . . . of human selves; that he is consciousness of himself as relatively related to finite selves, intuited within himself; that his experiences is infinity

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31. Calkins, PPP (1st ed.), 494.
32. It will be recalling that Davidson said his "sense of infinity arises together through as the basis of consciousness."
33. Calkins, PPP (1st ed.), 401.
34. Ibid., 494.

complete."[35]

3. The Finite Self as an Expression of the Absolute Self.

The Absolute Self individualizes itself into distinct conscious finite selves that represent different purposes, emotions, or thoughts of its own being. Finite selves are partial and fragmentary; they express various aspects of absolute experience. Calkins insists that human individuality is not lost on this basis, as her pluralistic opponents maintain. She wrote:

> You and I, so far from being swallowed up in the absolute self, so far from being lost or engulfed in the ultimate I, find the guarantee of our individual reality precisely herein that we are essential and unique expressions of this absolute self.[36]

The essential factor, for both psychology and philosophy, then, is the experiencing self.[37]

Calkins arrives at awareness of a self by introspective experience. She agrees with Kant and Berkeley in

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35. Calkins, PPP (1st ed.), 434.
36. Ibid., 439.
37. See Calkins' unpublished lecture entitled "An Essential Factor of a Radical Empiricism" written some time after 1927. In another unpublished manuscript entitled "The Self-Psychology of Psychoanalysts," Calkins said that her purpose in writing it was "to show that the psychological doctrine of the psychoanalysts is essentially personalistic psychoanalysis." P. 1. The present writer is indebted to Professor Thomas Hayes Procter of Wellesley College for allowing him to examine all of Miss Calkins' unpublished manuscripts.

associate. [illegible]

2. The finite self as an expression of the absolute self.

The absolute self individualizes itself into distinct consciousness finite selves each processing different experiences, sensations, or thoughts of its own being. Finite selves are partial and fragmentary; they experience various aspects of absolute experiences. Galkins insists that human individuality is not lost on this basis, as her philosophia oriental contends. She writes:

> You and I, so far from being swallowed up in an absolute self, so far from being lost or annulled in the infinite I, find the guarantee of our individual reality precisely herein that we are essential and unique expressions of this absolute-self.[36]

Her essential factor, for both psychology and philosophy, then, is the experiencing self.[37]

Galkins argues at another of a self by introspective procedures. She agrees with James and Jerusalem in

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36. Galkins, PP (list 1.), 454.
37. Ibid., 459.
38. See Galkins' monthlibner lectures entitled "An Examined Theory of a Unified Subjectivism" written some time after 1908. In another unpublished manuscript entitled "The Self-Psychology of Psychoanalysis," Galkins said that her purpose in writing it was "to show that the psychological description of the psychoanalysis is essentially [illegible] psychologia." [illegible] The process [illegible] writer is indebted to Professor Tidwell for pointing out of Galkins's position for allowing him to examine all of the Galkins' unpublished manuscripts.

asserting that all knowledge is the function of a knower,[38] and that idealism must be based "on the one unchallengeable assertion: what I directly know, and all that I directly know, is a self (myself) experiencing."[39] One knows the absolute through the same process of relationship between knower and known. "I directly know myself; I directly know the absolute since I am identically the same as part of him."[40] In a challenge to the realists who bow to the authority of the physical scientists whose "hypothesized realities . . . are one and all reducible to the negligible unknown or else to a complex of sensible quality and relation," Calkins says:

> Do not talk about vortex-ring, and electron, and ether, and energy, until you have first discussed the terms to which these reduce; the sensible qualities and complexes—extensity, resistence, motion—and the relations—cause, multiplicity, oneness, and the rest. You can give no unchallenged account of these qualities and relations, except as distinct ways of experiencing, that is, of being conscious.[41]

Calkins enumerates the characteristics of the self in her article, "The Case of the Self against the Soul." (1) The

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38. See Calkins, Art. (1925), 22, and Art. (1908), 280.
39. Calkins, Art. (1929), xl. See also her unpublished "Radical Empiricism in Philosophy," especially the conclusion, 48.
40. Calkins, PPP (5th ed.), 472.
41. Calkins, Art. (1911), 458. Calkins is criticizing science as a philosophy, not as a method, or body of knowledge. In fact, she points out elsewhere that science favors "an upgrowth of personalistic doctrine." Art. (1919)[2], 146.

assertion that all knowledge is the function of a course, so and that identity does be meant "on the one unchangeable assertion: what I directly know, and all that I directly know, is a self (myself) experiencing." One knows the absolute through the same process of relationship between knower and known. "I directly know myself; I directly know the absolute since I am identically the same as part of him." In a challenge to the realists who deny to the existence of the physical sciences whose "hypothetical realities . . . are one and all reducible to the simplicity unknown or else to a complex of sensible quality and relation." Gentile says:

> Do not talk about terms--the, and identation, and stars, and waves, until you have first discovered the terms to which these refers; the sensible qualities and say/ness--extensity, resistance, motion--and the relations--space, multiplicity, causes, and the rest. You can give the universal measured account of these qualities and relations, except on distinct ways of consciousness, that is, of being conscious.[31]

Gentile concretes the transcendentalism of the self in one statement, "The Ego or the self negates the Non-I." (1) The

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31. See Gentile, Art. (1928), 32, and Art. (1930), 80.
32. Gentile, Arts. (1920), 23. See also the unpublished "Ultimate Contribution in Philosophy," concerning the nonrelation, 48.
40. Gentile, Art (4th ed.), 472.
41. Gentile, Art. (1923), 45. Gentile is antithetical/ontions as a rationalist, but in a method, or body of knowledge. In fact, who notice out elsewhere that science lapses "an nonsense of personalistic doctrine." Art. (1919), 145.

self persists. (2) The self also changes. (3) Every self is unique, individual. "There is only one of me." (4) Every self is complex, "a unity of present with past, . . . with future, . . . self and a totality, also, of many different experiences." Finally, (5) every self is related to the world in which it is placed. All of these characteristics are immediately experienced, hence the self is not merely inferred; it is observed.[42] This finite self, as known through experience, is ultimate, "a self who is conscious, a perceiving, thinking, feeling, or willing self."[43]

One must also consider Calkins' idea of the freedom of finite selves inasmuch as this question seems to be a crucial issue between the personalistic pluralist and the personalistic absolutist points of view. The pluralist charges the monist with failure to harmonize the claims of human freedom of choice with the idea of an absolute self.[44] Calkins has recognized this charge, yet defends freedom within her system on the basis of two considerations: "First that we are often conscious of freedom, . . . second, the alleged implication of freedom in moral consciousness."[45] The first argument is psychological. Every normal self believes it is

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42. Calkins, Art. (1917), 279-280. See also James Bissett Pratt's use of these characteristics in Matter and Spirit, 177-178.
43. Calkins, Art. (1919), 128.
44. Howison, for instance, maintains that on the basis of monism individual "freedom would be swamped." LOE, 411.
45. Calkins, PPP (1st ed.), 449.

self consists. (2) The self also changes. (3) Every self is unique, individual. "There is only one of me." (4) Every self is complex, "a unity of present with past, . . . with future, . . . self and a society, also, of many different personalities." Finally, (5) every self is related to the world in which it is placed. All of these characteristics are immediately experienced, hence the self is not merely inferred: it is observed.[42] "Data finding self, as known through experience, is ultimate, "a self who is conscious, a personality, thinking, feeling, or willing self."[43]

One must also consider Dewey's idea of the freedom of finite selves inasmuch as this question seems to be a crucial issue between the personalistic idealist and the personalistic subjectivist points of view. The idealist assigns the world wide reality to interpret the claims of human freedom of choice and the idea of an absolute self.[44] Dewey has recognized this charge, yet defends freedom within the system on the basis of two considerations: "First that we are often conscious of freedom, . . . second, the alleged impossibility of freedom is mental construction."[45] The first argument is psychological. Every normal self believes it is

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42. Dewey, Art. (1879), 270-271. (Ed. note James Ward's Freedom was of these characteristics in Mind and Society, 1876-79.
43. Dewey, Art. (1910), 124.
44. Joyce, Cor Ignotum, maintains that on the basis of moral intuition "reason will be swamped." 102, 40.
45. Dewey, Art (Loc cit.), 124.

free. This is not a conclusive argument, however. It is similar to the one used by Spinoza that a falling stone coming to consciousness while in motion would attribute freedom to itself. The second argument is Kantian and Jamesian; one experiences the categorical imperative. The experiences of self-respect or regret imply that one has moral freedom, for they indicate that one may espouse either good or evil. This argument is not conclusive, as Calkins admits, hence one must return to the nature of the absolute self in defining the freedom of the finite selves. The human self is eternally the "expression of the will of the absolute self."[46] The absolute is unutterably richer in experience than the finite self. Nevertheless, the finite self is "the self of the moment," the self of the now, and as such, is different from the absolute self. "In so far as a human self is a now-self, it is different from the Absolute; and in the degree in which it differs from the Absolute there may be room for freedom."[47] The "momentary self" may thus determine its "own next moment." Such freedom is superficial from a standpoint other than the monistic position, yet it is consistent for the monist. The finite self is part of the Absolute; its freedom is only the freedom of the moment. This is a cautious conclusion that neither affirms nor denies freedom,

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46. Calkins, PPP (1st ed.), 451.
47. Ibid., 451.

free. This is not a convincing argument, however. It is obvious to him as stated by Sartre that a "falling about nothingness while a society would alienate freedom to itself." The second argument is Kantian and dualistic: one experiences the metaphysical imperative. The experience of self-respect or a sense of duty and law control freedom, for they indicate that one may assume either good or evil. This argument is not conclusive, as Sartre notes, because one must resort to the matter of the objective self in defining the freedom of the finite selves. The human self is obviously the "expression of the will of the absolute self." The notion is unintelligible either in regard one than the finite self. Nevertheless, the finite self is "the self of the moment," the self of the now, then as such, is different from the absolute self. "In so far as a human self is a non-self, it is differed from the Absolute; and in one degree in which it differs from the absolute there may be room for freedom."[47] The "nonexisting self" may thus determine the "ever most moment." Such freedom is substantial from a metaphysical other than the moralistic position, yet it is consistent for the moralist. The finite self is more of the Absolute; the freedom is only the freedom of the moment. This is a conclusion concerning that nothing affirmed and denies freedom.

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46. Sartre, Op. cit. (Jan ed.), 481.
47. Ibid., 481.

but rather "opens the way for the consideration of those facts of the moral life on which the doctrine of freedom is based."[48]

The finite self, while a part of the absolute, is unique and individual. It is persistent and complex, active and assertive, particularizing and social, and is capable of perceiving, thinking, feeling, and willing.[49] It is free to make moral choices, but metaphysically free only within the structure of an absolutistic monism. All freedom, to be sure, is within limits.

4. Philosophy of Nature.

The physical universe is to be understood as the experiencing and willing of the cosmic person in the same manner in which every finite self is part of the experience of the absolute. The total universe is completely mental, or personalistic. For subscribing to this view, Calkins has often been included in the group of panpsychists such as Paulsen, Fechner, and James Ward.[50] This interpretation of Calkins is based upon her presidential address to the American Philosophical Association at Harvard University, December

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48. Calkins, PPP (1st ed.), 452.
49. For a complete account of each of these detailed aspects of the self, see Calkins, FBIP.
50. See especially Gamertsfelder and Evans, FOP, 476, and Joseph A. Leighton, MATC, 248-249.

but rather "some sin may (do) the consideration of those facts of the moral life on which the doctrine of freedom is based."[59]

The finite self, while a part of the absolute, is unique and individual. It is rational and complex, active and passive, participating and social, and is capable of perceiving, thinking, feeling, and willing.[60] It is free to make moral choices, but autonomously free only within the structure of an absolutistic monism. All freedom, to be sure, is within limits.

c. Philosophy of Nature.

The ultimate universe is to be understood as the co-ordinator and unifier of the cosmic process in the same manner in which every finite self is part of the experience of the absolute. The total universe is completely mental, or personalistic. For supporting an this view, Dorkins has often been included in the group of contemporary analysts Pfleiderer, Troltsch, and Jesse Hope.[61] This interpretation of Dorkins is based upon his presidential address to the American Philosophical Association on Harvard University, December

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59. Dorkins, Pre Ilet ed.), 456.
60. For a complete account of each of these logical aspects of the self, see Dorkins, Op. Cit.
61. See especially Comparative Ind Ayers, 170, 176, and Joseph A. Leighton, MIND, 164-180.

27, 1918, in which she discussed "The Personalistic Conception of Nature." She attempted to "trace the metamorphosis of vitalism into personalism and to show that this psychological vitalism antagonizes no justified claim of mechanism,"[51] and also to establish "the fully personalistic conception of the universe as consisting in innumerable selves, or persons of different levels and degrees, more or less closely related to each other."[52] Calkins is not reverting to animism or phenomenalism; she is simply attempting to point out that there are different levels of personality, from the minimal to the maximal, i.e., from the non-human (the selves of inorganic nature, the one-sidedly communicative, and the intercommunicative of the higher vertebrates) through the human to the absolute, which is the complete, the supreme self. She argues that she has the support of science in this view, especially in the newer dynamic theories of physics and the elimination of biological vitalism in favor of psychological vitalism. Although Calkins never designates herself a panpsychist, her non-communicative selves are surely monads. She is chiefly interested, however, in pleading for a recognition of the claims of personalism as soon as scientists and metaphysicians can be persuaded that it involves "neither animism, phenomenalism, nor crass in-

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51. Calkins, Art. (1919), 115.
52. Ibid., 122.

"[illegible]", in which she discussed "the Theosophical Conception of Science." She attempted to "bring the sciences of vitalism into harmony and to show that the psychologist vitalist undergoes no justified claim of modern-ism,"[1] and aim to establish "the truly personalistic nature of the universe as consisting in innumerable selves, or persons of different levels and degrees, more or less closely related to each other."[2] Gallie is not arguing to animism or phenomenalism; she is simply attempting to point out that there are different levels of personality, from the animal to the material, i.e., from the non-human (the selves of inorganic nature, the mineralogy communities), and the intercommunicative of the higher vertebrates) through the human to the sub-human, which is the complete the supreme self. She argues that she has the support of science in this view, especially in the power dynamic theory of physics and the alternation of biological vitalism in favor of psychological vitalism. Although Gallie never denies material a monopolist, her non-materialistic selves are merely superior. She is clearly interested, however, in pleading for a recognition of the claims of personalism as soon as science and mere theorists can be persuaded that it involves "neither animism, phenomenalism, nor crass in-

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[1]. Gallie, op. cit. (1919), 114.

[2]. Ibid., 118.

determinism."[53]

5. The Great Society of Selves.

It has been pointed out that the idea of an absolute self does not vitiate, for Calkins, the individuality of the human self. Another aspect of the relationship between the absolute and the finite selves that is of capital importance in the absolutistic personalistic system is that the total society of selves is mutually interrelated. Calkins indicates her faith in the idea that this is a social universe, in language similar to that used by her teacher Royce. She speaks of "loyalty to the universal community of selves,"[54] "the great universe of selves,"[55] "the totality of conscious beings,"[56] "community of experience,"[57] and "the Great Society."[58] In contrasting her position with that of the pluralist, she has written: "The personal absolutist's universe is richer, not poorer, than that of the pluralistic personalist. He, too, conceives the world as a Great Society of mutually interrelated selves, human and extra-human."[59]

The social universe of selves is thus held together

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53. Calkins, Art. (1919), 146.
54. Calkins, GMAG, 51, and Art. (1916), 293.
55. GMAG, 49.
56. Ibid., 49.
57. FBIP, 179.
58. GMAG, 50, and 59.
59. PPP (5th ed.), 467.

determinism."[45]

5. The Great Society of Selves.

It has been pointed out that the idea of an absolute self does not vitiate, for Dewey, the individuality of the human self. Another aspect of the relationship between the absolute and the finite selves that is of marked importance is the absolutistic personalistic system in that the total society of selves is mutually interrelated. Dewey insisted over and again in the idea that this is a social universe. In language similar to that used by Josiah Royce. He speaks of "loyalty to the universal community of selves." "the great universe of selves,"[46] "the totality of associated beings,"[47] "community of experiences,"[48] and "the great Society."[49] In contrasting his position with that of the pluralist, he has stated: "The personal absolutistic solution is right, not pluralistic, than that of the pluralistic personalist. He, too, describes the world as a Great Society of mutually interrelated selves, human and super-human."[50]

The social universe of selves is thus both logically

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[45]. Dewey, Art. (1891), 124.
[46]. Dewey, Ethics, 11, Ann Arb. (1918), 295.
[47]. Ibid., 49.
[48]. Ibid., 49.
[49]. Ibid., 179.
[50]. Ibid., 140, and 80.
[51]. Ibid (Ibid ed.), 497.

by the consciousness of the Absolute. Everything in the universe is either a self or part of a self, and all selves are part of the absolute self. The human self is aware of other selves only indirectly; it is aware of the absolute directly. The human self shares with his fellows who are distinct from him whereas the absolute shares his experience with those who are "included within him." Each human self has its own "individual point of view," yet each is "organically related to the rest and aware of them not merely as single individuals but as a related society."[60]

Loyalty to the "Great Society" is both psychologically possible and metaphysically tenable, suggests Calkins. She illustrates the first conclusion in several ways. First, social groups are personified and individuated, as in the business world. Second, national groups are personified so that "a man's country is . . . felt and treated as if a self."[61] Third, one is loyal to the Christian church. One speaks of the "communion of saints," or calls the church the "Beloved Community," as did Royce. While these facts are common to human experience, devotion to a community of selves that is truly universal is much more. The dialectic of loyalty, however, is such that "loyalty tends constantly to overflow its boundaries so that its object is progressively

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60. Calkins, PPP (5th ed.), 473-474.
61. GMAG, 53.

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Loyalty to the "Great Society" is both psychological-ly possible and ethically feasible, progress being. She illustrates the first-conclusion in several ways. First, social groups are personified and individuated, as in the business world. Second, religious groups are personified so that "a church's history is . . . into and treated as if a self."[61] Third, one is loyal to the Christian church, the nation of the "communion of saints," or calls the church the "Beloved Community," as did Royce. Still other funds are created by human organization, devotion to a community of solves that is truly universal in much more. The ideals of loy-alty, however, is such that "Loyalty tends constantly to overflow the boundaries so that its object is progressively

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[60]. Perkins, op. cit. (see ch.1), 479-480.
[61]. Ibid., 63.

widened."[62] The individual, then, relates himself to an ever-enlarging society. This psychological argument that one can have an object of loyalty "unbuilt by human hands," is only one of Calkins' answers to her critics. Her second contention, which does not necessarily prove an absolute self, is that the individual can be loyal to the greater community and also remain true to himself. Calkins points out that "individuality means not separateness, but uniqueness."[63] Every individual self is inextricably bound up with other persons, and each self discovers richness and enlargement only as he relates himself to social ends.[64] When loyal to the community, the individual "is loyal to himself, but to himself as related member, not to himself in isolation from the Great Society."[65] The individual maintains his own identity within the universal society, but because he is organically and vitally related to it as part to whole, he realizes his fullest completeness only in his "entire loyalty to it."

6. Social Philosophy.

If one believes in a metaphysical society of interre-

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62. Calkins, GMAG, 55.
63. Ibid., 64.
64. Calkins serves as an excellent check upon those who hold to a superficial individualism that leads to metaphysical as well as social anarchy. It was Howison's recognition of this truth that made him endeavor to hold his pluralism together by reason rather than allowing it to degenerate into an incoherent universe of anarchic selves.
65. Calkins, GMAG, 66.

lated selves, each of whom possess sacred uniqueness, one must consistently hold to a vigorous social philosophy. Calkins did this. In every area of thought or of human relationship, she championed social justice. She counselled her Wellesley colleagues and students, in a controversy over freedom of speech, in the stirring words: "A college community should be aflame with social and political interest."[66] She addressed herself to clergymen, in the controversy over an individual or social gospel: "I believe . . . that the message of the minister is both individual and social."[67] Regarding a strike on the Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad "which delayed the traffic of a continent, and involved an incalculable loss," she pleaded as early as 1888 for a reform which would "remove the very principle of the discord between capital and labor."[68] Of great importance is the fact that Calkins not only held to a progressive social philosophy, she also lived it. She supported the Consumers' League, was a member of the Fellowship of Reconciliation, a member of the Civil Liberties Union, often voted the Socialist ticket, was an "uncompromising pacifist," and was "radical in her views of present economic, industrial, and international relations." She took the words of Jesus

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66. Calkins, Art. (1918).
67. An unpublished manuscript entitled "The Minister's Message: Individual or Social," for which there is no date, 2.
68. Calkins, STP, 4.

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what nonsensically held to a vigorous social philosophy.
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lationship, she disconcerted social practice. She counselled
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and international relations." She took the words of Jesus

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66. Dahlina, Art. (1919).
67. An unpublished manuscript entitled "The Ultimately Dis-
tinct: Individual or Social," for which there is no date,
p.
68. Dahlina, ATT, 4.

seriously, "and witnessed for what she believed."[69]

Two specific problems dealt with by Calkins, that further illustrate her social philosophy, are the problem of an economic system based on individual profits and the question of war. She wrote a booklet in 1888, regarding the first, entitled Sharing the Profits. It was an exposition of a method designed to meet the crucial problem of the economic and ethical needs of labor, while at the same time satisfying the demands of capital. Profit-sharing was therefore advocated as a middle ground among labor reforms. Calkins maintained that profit-sharing is ethically sound inasmuch as material values belong to their producers, and laborers are part producers of wealth. It is economically sound for it would both increase and regulate production. Calkins illustrated the strength of her argument with actual experiments in industry, and said: "We must concede that at least the possibility of the economic value . . . is proved by the experience of firms which have tested the theory."[70] She further pointed out that profit-sharing is associated with such industrial reforms as (1) savings accounts for workmen, (2) industrial education, (3) improved homes for working people, and (4) distributive co-operation. Finally, although she was cognizant of objections to profit-sharing, she con-

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69. Raymond Calkins, Art. (1931), 16-17.
70. Calkins, STP, 20.

serious[69] and witnessed for what one believed.[70]

Two specific problems dealt with by Daikins, that further illustrate her social philosophy, are the problem of an economic system based on individual profits and the question of war. She wrote a booklet in 1922, regarding the first, entitled Sharing the Profits. It was an exposition of a method designed to meet the crucial problem of the economic and ethical needs of labor, while at the same time satisfying the demands of capital. Profit-sharing was therefore advocated as a middle ground among labor reforms. Daikins maintained that profit-sharing is ethically sound because material values belong to their producers, and i-bonds are just producers of wealth. It is economically sound for it would both increase and regulate production. Daikins illustrated the strength of her argument with several experiments in industry, and said: "We must conclude that at least the possibility of the economic value . . . is proved by the experience of firms which have tested the theory."[71] She further pointed out that profit-sharing is associated with other industrial reforms as (1) having accounts for workers, (2) industrial education, (3) improved homes for working people, and (4) distributive co-operation. Finally, although she was cognizant of objections to profit-sharing, she con-

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69. Beyond Daikins, op. cit. (1921), 15-17.
70. Daikins, op. cit., 20.

cluded: "Theory and experiment alike meet the objections to profit-sharing. By deductive and inductive reasoning its position is strengthened."[71] Calkins was not misled into the belief that this was a "panacea for industrial ills." It was to her simply an "introduction" to more fundamental reforms that were necessary, such as transformation of man's mental and moral character. It was, however, a step in the elimination of industrial evils by "rewarding care, fidelity, and energy with a part of what they have helped to produce."[72]

The second specific problem that illustrates Calkins' social philosophy is her view of war. In a trenchant article written during the First World War, she advocated "Militant Pacifism," maintaining that "war is not the inevitable result of unmodifiable instinct."[73] It is the result of "human greed and sloth and cruelty." War will be eliminated when "the fighting instinct of a virile people may be under the control of its social instincts . . . when these social instincts dominate pugnacity,"[74] and when one sacrifices for the "universal community of sentient beings." How keenly Calkins spoke to her day when the Second World War was in its formative stages! In an unpublished manuscript entitled

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71. Calkins, STP, 58.
72. Ibid., 13.
73. Calkins, Art. (1917), 75.
74. Ibid., 78-79.

clusion: "Theory and experiment alike show the objectives to profit-making. By deductive and inductive reasoning the position is strengthened."[71] Galtung was not misled into the belief that this was a "process for humanitarian aims." It was to her simply an "introduction" to more fundamental reforms that were necessary, such as transformation of mental and moral character. It was, however, a step in the elimination of inherited evils by "removing some, [illegible], and supply with a part of what they have helped to produce."[72]

The second moralistic problem that illustrates Galtung's social philosophy is her view of war. In a frequent article written during the First World War, she advocated "military training," maintaining that "war is not the inevitable result of immutable instincts."[73] It is the result of "human greed and pride and morality." War will be eliminated when "the digestive functions of a virile people may be under the control of the social instincts . . . when these social instincts become dominant morality,"[74] and when one substitutes for the "universal community of evil-doing beings." Now humanity faithing again to her day when the Second World War was in the formative stage! In an unpublished manuscript entitled

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71. Galtung, ETP, 89.
72. Ibid., 13.
73. Galtung, Ann. (1917), 98.
74. Ibid., 98-99.

"The Fighting Instinct," written between 1926 and her death in 1930, she made a ringing plea for a spiritual war on war, saying: "For this great spiritual warfare the time is over ripe."[75] There was no place for war in her "Great Society."

7. Ethics.

Miss Calkins made a contribution to the field of ethics in her book The Good Man and The Good (1918).[76] A consideration of the book logically follows a treatment of her social philosophy, for although she began her ethical system with the experience of a moral person, she devoted at least half of the book to man as a social being, and found man's greatest passion to be loyalty to the universal community of selves, the kingdom of God.

Consider the chief points in Calkins' ethical system. (1) The good man is one who acknowledges obligation. (2) The good man is one who wills the good. (3) The good is to be identified with the "all-including community." (4) Loyalty to the universal community is compatible with true individuation. (5) The good is not pleasure, as held by the hedonist, although pleasure, or Kantian happiness, is part of it.

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75. See "The Fighting Instinct," 74. Underlining not in the original.
76. See also the paper she read at the Sixth International Congress of Philosophy entitled "The Basis of Objective Judgments in a Subjective Ethics." Art. (1927), 408-414.

"The Flaming Tradition," written between 1932 and her death in 1950, she made a plaintive plea for a metaphysical war on pacifism: "For this great spiritual warfare *she* *then is over-time*."[75] There was no place for war in her "Peace Society."

V. Ethics.

Miss Dalrymple made a contribution to the field of ethics in her book *The Good Man and the Good* (1918).[76] A coherentist or the book logically follows a treatment of her social philosophy. For *Liegeman* she bases her ethical system with the organism of a social process, she developed at least part of the book to mean as a social being, and formed moral principles to be loyalty to the universal movements of living, the kingdom of God.

Consider the ethical points in Dalrymple's ethical system. (1) The good man is one who recognizes obligation. (2) The good man is one who wills the good. (3) The good is to be identified with the "fulfilmentation elements." (4) Loyalty to the universal community is compatible with true individualism. (5) The good is not dynamic, as claim by the theologian, although pleasure, or feeling magnitude, is part of it.

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75. See "The Flaming Tradition," 76. Underlining not in the original.

76. See also the paper she read at the "Fifth International Congress of Philosophy meeting" "The Basis of Objective Judgments in a Subjective Sphere." Arc. (1927), 409-414.

The good is "the fullest expression of every capacity, the freest exercise of every activity of the whole universe of selves."[77] (6) The virtuous man controls his instinctive tendencies. He is thrifty, brave, prudent, and thoughtful. (7) The good man is socially virtuous. He is truthful, just, and generous. Finally, (8) the good man is a "lover of God."

Calkins' idea of aesthetics is that the beautiful is ideal, valued, and unified, as is the good. "The beautiful object, like the good, involves a subordination of part to whole, a harmoniousness, a unification of detail."[78] The beautiful object, in contrast to the good object, however, is impersonal, an isolated object, and an object of emotion.

> One is engulfed, immersed, in the aesthetic delight, one works and battles for one's moral purpose. The lover of beauty opens his eyes to see and spreads wide his arms to receive, the lover of goodness bares his arm to toil or to strike, and strains his muscles to press forward.[79]

While morality is similar to beauty in some ways, it is different chiefly in that it finds its culmination in religion. The moral man finds his greatest self-expression in relating himself to the great community of selves. He becomes transformed as he participates in the moral development of the universe.

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77. Calkins, GMAG, 79.
78. Ibid., 165-166.
79. Ibid., 167.

The good is "the fullest expression of every capacity, the freest exercise of every activity of the whole universe of values."[77] (6) He virtuous man nourishes his imaginative tendencies. He is sensitive, brave, generous, and temperate. (7) The good man is morally virtuous. He is truthful, just, and generous. Finally, (8) the good man is a "lover of life."

Dalkins' idea of ecstatic is that the beautiful is lofty, valuable, and unified, as is the good. "The beautiful object, like the good, involves a subordination of parts to whole, a harmoniousness, a unification of parts."[78] The beautiful object, is compared to the good object, however, is impersonal, an isolated object, and an object of contemplation.

> One is qualified, instead, in the aesthetic delight, one series and beholds for quite neutral purposes. The lover of country opens his eyes to see and spreads wide his ears to receive, the lover of goodness hopes his eyes to fall on to stride, and attains his motives to press forward.[79]

Dalkins' morality is similar to Dewey in some ways. It is different only in that it finds the culmination in religion. The moral man finds his greatest self-expression in relating himself to the great community of saints. He becomes conscious as he participates in the moral development of the universe.

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77. Dalkins, OMAD, 79.
78. Ibid., 105-106.
79. Ibid., 107.

8. Philosophy of Religion.

Calkins was essentially a religious spirit. It has been written that religion was the "motive and mainspring of her life."[80] One of her students has said that "Her philosophy, ethics, religion, psychology, and daily life were harmonious;"[81] another, "As her philosophy was positively theistic, so her living was essentially religious."[82] Brightman, too, has suggested that one of the outstanding traits of Miss Calkins' personality was her religious faith. He wrote, regarding her ideas of religion:

> Her empirical study of religion and her philosophy alike prepared her for a sympathetic attitude toward the teaching of Jesus that God is father of men and that the universal society is to be viewed as the family or kingdom of God.[83]

Miss Calkins wrote widely on such religious subjects as prayer, the church, the social gospel, and immortality, although not in any organized manner. She had planned upon retirement to write a book that would express her integration of philosophy and religion,[84] but ill health and death made this impossible. A consideration of some of her ideas here will reveal the essentials of her philosophy of religion. Let us, then, state her ideas of God, prayer, the problem of

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80. R. Calkins, Art. (1931), 24.
81. Quoted by Vincent, Art. (1931), 24.
82. Vincent, Art. (1931), 26.
83. Brightman, Art. (1931), 42.
84. Procter, Art. (1931), 32.

d. Fulfillment of Religion.

Dalkins was essentially a religious spirit. It has been written that religion was the "motive and mainspring of her life."[90] One of her students has said that "her philosophy, education, religion, personality, and daily life were harmonious;"[91] another, "As her philosophy was positively theistic, so her living was essentially religious."[92] Brightman, too, has suggested that one of the outstanding traits of Miss Dalkins' personality was her religious faith. In regards her ideas of religion:

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Let us, then, begin by ideas of God, prayer, the problem of

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90. R. Dalkins, Art. (1931), 94.
91. Quoted by Vinnedt, Art. (1931), 94.
92. Vinnedt, Art. (1931), 94.
93. Brightman, Art. (1931), 94.
94. Proctor, Art. (1931), 94.

evil, and immortality.

Calkins views God as a cosmic Person. She agreed on a "Platform of Personalistic Idealism" with Professor Brightman on May 25, 1929, affirming that "the physical universe may be regarded as the direct experiencing and willing of one cosmic person." Such a "cosmic person" includes "both the God of theism and the Absolute Person." God is, thus, an Absolute Person who constitutes all existence, including the various finite selves and physical nature, and also the various experiences of the absolute self. The object of one's religious experience is "a self, or selves, greater than himself or than any other human self."[85] God is a "personal object,"[86] the "Greater Self who includes yet transcends" human beings, but who "in one form or in another . . . must belong to the world of selves."[87] To such a God, the "Father of all," one must be utterly loyal. This Calkins believed and lived. It has been written that "Her life was dignified because surrendered in absolute devotion to God."[88]

Prayer is important in Calkins' philosophy of religion. It will be recalled that reference was made to her lecture on prayer at the Harvard Summer School of Theology in 1910. "So unusual and so gripping was her presentation

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85. Calkins, GMAG, 171.
86. Ibid., 169.
87. Ibid., 173.
88. Procter, Art. (1931), 32.

evil, and immortality.

Daniels views God as a cosmic Person. She argued on a "platform of pragmatistic idealism" with Presbyterian Bryan-man on May 26, 1922, affirming that "the physical universe may be regarded as the direct expression and willing of one cosmic person." Such a "cosmic person" transcends "both the God of Christian and the Christian person." God is, then, an absolute person who constitutes all existence, including the various finite selves and physical nature, and also the various experiences of the absolute self. The object of God's relations experiences is "a unit, or entire, greater than himself or than any other human unit."[26] God is a "personal object,"[27] the "Personal Self who includes yet transcends" human beings, but who "is one face or in another . . . that belongs to the world of selves."[28] To such a God, the "Father of all," one ought to be utterly loyal. This thinking believed and lived. It has been written that "Her life was dignified because surrounded in absolute devotion to God."[29]

Prayer is important in Daniels' philosophy of religion. It will be recalled that preference was made to her lecture on prayer at the Southern Baptist School of Theology in 1910. "So unusual was to criticize was her presentation

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26. Daniels, Amos, 37.
27. Ibid., 326.
28. Ibid., 372.
29. Proctor, A.T., (Lexii), 24.

of the subject of prayer," wrote Raymond Calkins of the occasion, "that her hearers crowded around her at its close for further questioning."[89] Calkins pointed out on that occasion that prayer does not presuppose "a metaphysical idea of God as personal being,"[90] although it is the "address of spirit to spirit," "a personal attitude by which the divine self is conceived to be affected in essentially the way in which one person is affected by another."[91] The answer to prayer is God's awareness that the human self is turning to him. Prayer is social as well as private; it is more than the relation of the single worshiper to God. In fact, public worship is corporate prayer; "consciousness of other selves in common relation to God is the essential mark of public worship."[92] Whether viewed individually or socially, however, prayer is of necessity, a "reciprocal relation of spirit to spirit,"[93] "the intercourse of the human spirit with a reality, or being, realized as greater-than-human and either conceived or treated as personal."[94]

Calkins' solution to the problem of evil is the one so vehemently attacked by Howison, viz., that evil is simply incomplete good. The absolute self is "all-real, all-powerful,

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89. R. Calkins, Art. (1931), 15.
90. Calkins, Art. (1911), 489.
91. Ibid., 491.
92. Ibid., 499.
93. Ibid., 498.
94. Ibid., 489.

of the subject of prayer," wrote Reginald Dalkins of the occasion, "that her thoughts grovelled upon her at the close for further consideration."[89] Dalkins pointed out on that occasion that prayer does not presuppose "a metaphysical idea of God as personal being,"[90] although it is the "address of spirit to spirit," "a personal activity by which the divine self is conceived to be affected in essentially the way in which one personality is affected by another."[91] The answer to prayer is God's assurance that one human soul is speaking to us. Prayer is moral as well as religious; it is more than the relating of two simple wonders to God. In fact, public worship is corporate prayer; "communings or other saints in common relation to God is the essential work of public worship."[92] Whether viewed individually or socially, however, prayer is of morality, a "moral-spiritual relation of spirit to spirit."[93] "The intercourse of the human soul with a moral, or holy, God is to create-then-human has either conceived or created as personal."[94]

Dalkins' solution to the problem of evil is the one as vehemently attacked by Parker, viz., that evil is simply incomplete good. The absurdity will be "all-good, all-powerful,

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89. R. Dalkins, Op. cit. (1911), 18.
90. Dalkins, op. cit. (1911), 20.
91. Ibid., 24.
92. Ibid., 100.
93. Ibid., 80.
94. Ibid., 230.

and all-knowing, but all-good."[95] Evil, on this basis, although real, is an element of good, a subordinate factor. To use Calkins' figure, evil is in isolation, but capable of "forming part of a total good" as a musical discord may form part of a larger harmony. It will be recalled from an earlier chapter that this view comes direct from Royce, who held that the Absolute Person transcends all the imperfections of the finite space-time world. The temporal becomes triumphant in the eternal.

Calkins uses two Roycean arguments to support her view. First, one is conscious of the fact that suffering and evil nobly borne have greatly enriched personality and strengthened character, thereby revealing themselves to be "elements of a wider good." One might ask why an "all-powerful" God would use evil as a tool to build character. Calkins anticipates this query, saying only one reply can be made: Inasmuch as the absolute experiences all that finite selves experience, he shares in our sorrows, "is afflicted in our affliction, [and] knows our grief." This idea of a suffering God reveals insight on the part of Calkins, but does not complete her partial reasoning, for she merely transfers the evil from the part to the whole without going to the inevitable conclusion that if the "all-inclusive" experiences evil, he must be either finite or not "good," and without showing

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95. Calkins, PPP (1st ed.), 431.

why we must be afflicted or grieved in the first place. Second, Calkins suggests that although the absolute is conscious of evil as bad, it is only in the sense that a good man is conscious of temptation. The Absolute is, therefore, not "morally defiled by his awareness of evil." He is conscious of evil only by conquering it, not by "including" it. Calkins recognizes the magnitude of the problem, for she wrote: "No finite self, indeed, has ever probed this tragic mystery."[96] It is sufficient to point out here, that in understanding Calkins' philosophy of religion, one must recognize that her solution to the problem of evil is that "the absolute self has willed his own evil, as well as ours; and would not have affirmed it save as subordinated to a wider good."[97]

A final point in Calkins' philosophy of religion is her view of immortality. One would assume, with the critics of monism, that the finite self is swallowed up in the absolute at death, but such is not Calkins' contention. Rather, "the personalist, absolutist no less than pluralist, may hold to the immortality of the moral self."[98] Professor Procter corroborates this interpretation of Calkins' view, writing: "It is natural that one who in her philosophy placed so great an emphasis on personality, and who in her life so demonstrated the worth of personality, should have believed in

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96. Calkins, PPP (1st ed.), 433.
97. Ibid., 434.
98. Ibid., 481.

ably so would be exhibited or achieved in the finite sphere. Secondly, Dalkins suggests that although the absolutes in connections of evil are here, it is only in the human case a good man in connections of reconciliation. The absolute is, therefore, not "morally defiled by his awareness of evil."[29] So in connections of evil only by occupying it, not by "finding" it, a finite recognizes the magnitude of the problem, for she wrestlers with it, indeed, has over-posed this single question. But it is sufficient to point out here, that in wrestlering within philosophy of religion, one must recognize that the solution to the problem of evil is that "the absolute self has allied his own evil, as well as ours; and would not have offended if we had not contributed to a state of good."[30]

A final point in Dalkins' philosophy of religion is his view of immortality. One would assume, with the critics of Hegel, that the finite self is swallowed up in the absolute at death, but such is not Dalkins' conclusion. Rather, "the personality, absolutely no less than finite, may hold to the immortality of the moral self."[31] Professor Foster corroborates this interpretation of Dalkins' view, stating: "It is natural that one who is in our philosophy placed so much an emphasis on personality, and who in her life so determined the worth of personality, should have believed in

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29. Dalkins, op. cit. (2nd ed.), 453.
30. Ibid., 454.
31. Ibid., 458.

immortality."[99] Brightman also addresses himself to this point, in a statement regarding Calkins' view of immortality:

> Notable among her contributions in this respect is her proof that absolutism is compatible with personal immortality and does not require the view that the partial selves are "mere illusions of personality" which "will succumb to the vicissitude of death."[100]

Calkins based her view on the uniqueness of the moral person. One may not realize himself as immortal, yet moral consciousness leads one to awareness of "a specific duty," and "it is of the nature of duty to be endless."[101] If one is to fulfil his duty eternally, he must be immortal.

The philosophy of religion for personalistic absolutism, as represented by Calkins, includes several significant ideas. God is a cosmic Person. Prayer is a reciprocal relationship of spirit with spirit. Evil is transcended by the greater good. The moral self is individually and uniquely immortal. The One "includes, without annihilating, the many;" he "guarantees the individuality of the particular selves;" and he assures the finite self "of an eternity which transcends yet does not negate time." One gains the "vision" of an immortality required by the deathless ideals of every moral self."[102]

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99. Procter, Art. (1931), 32-33.
100. Brightman, Art. (1931), 47.
101. Calkins, PPP (1st ed.), 455.
102. Ibid., 455.

9. Calkins' Place and Influence in American Philosophy.

Calkins occupies an important place in the development of American thought. That she had considerable influence during her lifetime was mentioned earlier, and established on the basis of remarks of her students, by her writing and by the honors that came to her. As previously stated, she was elected president of the American Psychological Association and of the American Philosophical Association, and was elected to the British Psychological Association, as well as being honored with doctoral degrees by Smith College and Columbia University. She exerted great personal influence in the numerous progressive programs with which she was affiliated.

While she is considered here chiefly as a philosopher, it must be recognized that she also pioneered in the field of psychology, where she made a permanent contribution. At Wellesley she established the psychological laboratory which was the first to be founded in any college for women. She published two books in the field, An Introduction to Psychology (1901) and A First Book in Psychology (1909), and contributed particularly to the study of dreams, of time and space experience, and association. It was her study of dream-psychology that "first brought her into prominence,"[103] yet she is

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103. R. Calkins, Art. (1931), 9.

C. Dallin: Plans and Influence in American Philosophy.

Dallin contrasts his theoretical plans in the development of American thought. Have been comparatively little due to his initiative was premeditated realist, but established on the basis of reasons or for effects, by him relating and by the forces that came to him. As previously stated, also was elected president of the American Psychological Association and of the American Philosophical Association, and was elected to the British Psychological Association, as well as between with doctoral degrees by Smith College and Columbia University. He exerted great personal influence in the numerous graduate students with which he was affiliated.

While also he contributed here chiefly as a philosopher, it must be recognized that he also pioneered in the field of psychology, where he made a permanent contribution. At Wesleyan he established the psychological laboratory which was the first to be founded in any college for women. He published two books in the field, An Introduction to Psychology (1901) and A First Book in Psychology (1903), and contributed particularly to the study of dreams, of time and space experience, and association. It was our study of dreams-psychologically that "light brought his high reputation," plus his role in

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[illegible]. Dallin, Op. (1924), 5.

particularly accredited with experiments in association. Gardner Murphy suggests this in his masterful book, An Historical Introduction to Modern Psychology. He says that her method of paired associates was later adopted by Jost in 1897, Müller and Pilzecker in 1900, and by Thorndike in 1908.[104] Many leading psychologists speak of her general psychological contributions with respect. The well-known elementarist, Titchener, has said she was influential in American psychology.[105] Brett, the English psychologist, quotes her as authority.[106] Boring, in his monumental book, A History of Experimental Psychology, refers to her work,[107] as does Charles Morris, in seeming agreement, in Six Theories of Mind,[108] and also Allport, in his significant book, Personality.[109] She is often grouped with the leading early psychologists of America such as Angell, Thorndike, Woodworth, and Yerkes.[110]

Her distinctive contribution to the field of psychology, however, was her self-psychology. Murphy has pointed out that her view of mental states and processes as being manifestations of a self (as indicated in the present exposition

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104. Murphy, HIMP, 198-199. See also Woodworth, EP, 10. Woodworth points out that Calkins was a leader in the problems of recall. P. 61. Kantor also refers to this aspect of Calkins' permanent contribution in SOS, 279, as does Flügel in HYOP, 204.
105. Titchener, LEPTP, 200.
106. George Brett, HOP, 117.
107. See 429, 593, 625, and 632.
108. See 165.
109. See 36, and 557.
110. See especially Murphy, HIMP, 220n, and Flügel, HYOP, 154-155.

particularly concerned with correlations to mental illness. Gardner Murphy, mentioned this in his seminal book, *An Introduction to Modern Psychology*. He says that the notion of natural association was later adopted by Jung in 1907, Miller and Dollard in 1900, and by Dorcus in 1908.[105] Many leading psychologists spoke of their personal parapsychological experiences with respect. The well-known physiologist, Ribbonner, has made also was instrumental in American psychology.[106] Brett, the Dutch parapsychologist, spoke for an hour, in our abbreviated book, *A History of Parapsychology*, refers to her work.[107] as does Murphy, in another appendix, in *Six Theories of Mind*,[108] and also Allport, in his significant book, *Personality*.[109] She is often quoted with the leading early parapsychologists of America such as Angell, Dunlap, Woodworth, and Thomas.[110]

Her distinctive contribution to the field of parapsychology, however, was her anti-psychology. Briefly, she postulated that her view of mental phenomena and processes as being manifestations of a unit (as involved in the general response) or

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105. Murphy, Gardner. 1949-1947. An intro modern psy. p. 10.
Woodworth psychologist Brett Dorcus was a lecturer in the psychology of mental. p. 83. Murphy also refers to this method of "direct" correlation in 1947, 1949, on Dorcus Ribbonner in 1908, 83.
106. Ribbonner, Lucien. 1949.
107. Dorcus Brett. p. 1V.
108. See 1929, 1947, 1950, and 1952.
109. See 1931.
110. See 1931, and 1937.
111. See Angelically Murphy, Brett, and Allport, Dorcus, Ribbonner, 1949.

of her thought) was always "defended with especial vigour."[111] James Bissett Pratt and George Albert Coe also accredit her with this distinctive contribution. The former has referred to Calkins as a representative of the psychology that is "a description of the way in which persons usually think and act."[112] The latter refers to her self-psychology as "psychology *par excellence*, because its data are the most concrete and the most distinctive."[113]

The view which Calkins championed was not so acceptable in her day as it later became. Hers was a minority voice in the early psychological atmosphere of elementarism, behaviorism, and functionalism, and similar views as advocated by Wundt, Pavlov, Titchener, Watson, James, Dewey, and Angell. Present-day emphasis upon the "whole" view is increasingly validating her contentions, for a host of leading psychologists such as McDougall, Jung, Adler, Stern, Wertheimer, Köhler, Koffka, and Allport have adopted a total, purposive view as over against the older analytic views. Personality as a concept is assuming increasing importance in all areas of psychological research.[114]

Miss Calkins enjoys a permanent place in American

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111. Murphy, HIMP, 391.
112. Pratt, TRC, 456.
113. Coe, POR, 19.
114. Professor Allport, for instance, in the final chapter of *Personality*, speaks of "The swiftly rising tide of interest in the systematic study of personality . . ." P. 549.

of her husband) was always "darkened with conjugal vigour."[111] James Hissett Irvine and George Albert Coe also according her with this directive contribution. The former has referred to Daikins as a representative of the mythology that is "a description of the way in which persons usually think and act."[112] The latter refers to her self-psychology as "psychology par excellence, because its data are the real concrete and the most distinctive."[113]

The view which Daikins championed was not as acceptable in her day as it later became. There was a minority voice in the early psychological atmosphere of structuralism, behaviorism, and functionalism, and similar views as advocated by Wundt, Fechner, Titchener, Watson, James, Dewey, and Angell. Present-day emphasis upon the "whole" view is increasingly validating her contributions, for a host of leading psychologists such as McDougall, Tuner, Adler, Stern, Werthemer, Ehlers, Koffka, and Allport have adopted a total, synthetic view as over against the older analytic views. Personality as a concept is assuming increasing importance in all areas of psychological research.[114]

Miss Daikins enjoyed a prominent place in American

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111. Murphy, Kurt, op. cit.
112. Hart, Op. cit.
113. Coe, op. cit.
114. Professor Allport, for instance, in the final chapter of Personality, speaks of "the activity vision idea of interest in the systematic study of personality . . ." p. 549.

philosophy for several important reasons. First, she was among the earliest thinkers who insisted upon the importance of personality as the ultimate category for all reality. She arrived at this view rather independently, although she does recognize the influence of Charles Renouvier upon her thought.[115] The degree to which personalism was original with her, however, is indicated by a letter from her brother, Raymond Calkins, to the present writer. He wrote: "The source of her own personalism lay in her thorough exploration of the various types of metaphysical theory plus her deep religious intuition."[116] Miss Calkins was familiar, too, with Thomas Davidson, through Josiah Royce, was perfectly familiar with the views of Howison, and not only gained much from Borden Parker Bowne "intellectually and professionally," but also "admired him deeply."[117] Miss Calkins will be long remembered as a brilliant exponent of personalism.[118]

Second, Calkins is assured a permanent place in American philosophy as "the most prominent disciple of Royce,"[119] who has been designated "the most brilliant American ideal-

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115. See Brightman, Art. (1931), 43.
116. Dated November 28, 1942.
117. From the above-mentioned letter by Raymond Calkins.
118. Knudson has written of Calkins in this regard: "Indeed, so prominently has she espoused the 'personalistic' cause that she may properly be regarded as the most conspicuous representative of personalism in the form of absolute idealism." POP, 33.
119. Rogers, EAAP, 298.

philosophy for several successive seasons. First, his man among the medical thinkers the insistent upon the importance of personality as the ultimate category for all reality. His arrival at this view rather independently, although he does recognize the influence of Charles Dupuytren upon her thought.[116] The degree to which correspondence was original with Ion, however, is indicated by a letter from her to Edmund Gaither, in this present writer. In stress: "The author of her own conversation lay in her thorough explanation of the various lines of metaphysical theory plus her deep religious insight."[117] Miss Gaither was familiar, too, with Josiah Royce's lectures, through Jennie Royce, sufficiently familiar with the views of Royce, and not only gained much from Gordon Porter Bowne "intellectually and spiritually," but also "adopted his theory."[118] Miss Gaither will be long remembered as a brilliant exponent of personalism.[119]

Second, Gaither is assured a permanent place in American philosophy as "the most creative thinker of Bowne," who has even destroyed "the weak intellectual structure Lotze-

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115. Ion Gaither, Art. (1931), 43.
116. Dated November 22, 1932.
117. From the above-mentioned letter by Edmund Gaither.
118. Another has written of Gaither in this manner: "Indeed, so consciously does she emphasize the 'intuitionalistic' nature that she may properly be regarded as the most consistently anti-rationalistic of pragmatic idealists." 'Ion', 43.
119. Ibid., 43.

ist."[120] She is not a lesser thinker than Royce, however. Rather, she espoused much of his philosophy because it so admirably coincided with her own intellectual background, views, and interests. That is to say, she held Roycean views, not merely because she studied under him, but because of her original research and study.[121] She was an absolutist and personalist not only because of Royce, but also because of "her thorough exploration of the various types of metaphysical theory."

Finally, Calkins will continue to exert influence in American thought because of "her particular combination of personalism and absolutism."[122] Her view was, in some ways, the result of a search for a position that would do justice to the truths of the older monisms of Hegel, the British idealists, and Royce on the one hand, and to the pluralisms of such thinkers as Davidson, Howison, McTaggart, and James

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120. See Wright, HOMP, 485.
121. Thilly, for instance, mentions her as one of the company of great American philosophers who were influenced by Kant, the post-Kantians, and kindred German thinkers. HOP, 562. Leighton speaks of her and Royce with equal respect. See FOP, 260 and 297. In his book, Man and the Cosmos, he implies that as far as self-psychology is concerned, he is in essential agreement with Miss Calkins, p. 294. Henry Nelson Wieman puts Calkins on a par with eminent independent thinkers when he says "The influence of Hegel is evident in Royce, Calkins, Dewey, and Hocking. . . ." APOR, 321. This is further expressed by Brightman, POI, 32 and 184; POR, 220; and ITP, 73n, 88n, 138. See also Gamertsfelder and Evans, FOP, 439; and Wilson, SAIW, 167.
122. Brightman, Art. (1931), 44.

on the other. Also, she was aware of the necessity, demanded by her psychological investigations, for a more adequate account of the variability and complexity of conscious experience than had been given by the older idealism. Thoroughly empirical and scientific in her approach, she was in quest of a philosophy that would account for all factors of experience.

Her recognition of a need for reconciliation of the numerous conflicting points of view led her, in fact, to a more mellow and melioristic position as the years went by.[123] Among her unpublished manuscripts is a paper that was written some time after 1925, entitled "A Point of Convergence in Differing Philosophical Systems." In it she maintains that most systems agree to the existence of selves and to the awareness by the self of a world other than itself. One of the two main purposes of writing an article in 1920 was "to show the compatibility of the pluralistic conception of society with the monistic (absolutistic) philosophy of the universe."[124] She concluded an article that was written some time after 1926, and that was published in 1930, with

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123. In an exchange of statements with Brightman regarding a "Platform of Personalistic Idealism" (previously mentioned), Brightman had crossed out her "Absolute" and inserted "Supreme" before "Person." Calkins agreed, but effected a further compromise, for the final word adopted was "Cosmic" to "include both the God of theism and the Absolute Person." See her unpublished manuscripts, 2.
124. Calkins, Art. (1920), 682.

the words:

> I urgently invite all such realists as assert the existence of mental beings to make common cause with idealists of every type against the materialism which, under different names, presumes to deny the experienced reality of the mental life.[125]

It was this keen analytical ability of Miss Calkins to see the merits of opposing systems that led her to advocate the uniqueness of the individual person within the Absolute so that it experienced freedom and immortality.[126]

American thought has been greatly enriched by the life and work of Miss Calkins. She pioneered in the field of psychology and will be remembered particularly for her superlative exposition of self-psychology. It was in philosophy, however, that she was most conspicuous. In that area of thought she will remain of lasting significance for insisting

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125. Calkins, Art. (1930), 217.
126. This tendency to broaden her absolutism "did not lessen her conviction of the truth of idealism." See Brightman, Art. (1931), 46. It simply strengthened her position. Many eminent thinkers commend Calkins for her clear analysis and interpretation of numerous philosophical systems. See especially Hocking, who refers to her book The Persistent Problems of Philosophy as of "notable merit." TOP (1st ed.), 24. See also Dresser, POS, 258, 388, and 391. Patrick includes this book of hers in a select list of books that "should be read by every student in philosophy. Their wholeness and their ethical idealism insure their lasting value." ITP, 222. Pratt credits her with the same ability in surveying psychological literature. See his Personal Realism, 312. Among Miss Calkins' unpublished manuscripts there are six chapters and an appendix, written after 1925, that seem to be part of a projected book possibly entitled "Contemporary Systems of Philosophy."

the words:

> I respectfully invite all men everywhere to assume the responsibility of seeking to make common cause with idealists of every type working the material-ism which, under different names, promises to deny the unfettered freedom of the mental life.[125]

It was this human analytical ability of Alex Dejkina to see the merits of opposing systems that led her to advocate the uniqueness of the individual person within the Absolute so that it characterized freedom and transcendence.[126]

American thought has been greatly enriched by the life and work of Alex Dejkina. She interested in the field of psychology and will be remembered especially for her speciale-tive exposition of self-psychology. It was in philosophy, however, that she was most triumphant. In that area of thought she will remain of lasting significance for Jamesian

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125. Dejkina, Alex. (1950). 217.

126. Dejkina remarkably in-corporates her absolutism "did not lessen her convinction of the worth of individuals." See Dejkina, Alex. (1950). 16. It clearly strengthens her tran-sition. Many years at Princeton allowed Dejkina for her plural analysis and interpretation of numerous philosoph-ical systems. See on personality theories, she refers to her book, The Treatment of Philosophy as of "metaphysic." 107 (1st ed.), 23. See also Dewey, 109, 288, 340, and 301. Dejkina implies this book of hers in a select list of books that "should be read by every student in philosophy." Study Philosophy and treats plural idealism through Jamesian values." 107. Dejkina Frank Oppenheim has also shown in surveying psychological literature. See his Psychological Analysis. Among this Dejkina's emphasis on these are his discussions on "morality," written after 1918, that seem to be part of a projected book tentatively en-titled "Jones, Dewey and the Problem of Philosophy."

upon personality as a category of reality, for being the leading exponent of Roycean idealism, and for the rare skill with which she made absolutism personalistic.

10. Summary.

Mary Whiton Calkins is a conspicuous representative of absolutistic personalism. Her dynamic personality, keen mind, and warm radiant spirit enabled her to pioneer in the field of psychology, and to distinguish herself in the field of philosophy. She arrived at her particular type of personalism through wide reading and critical appreciation of numerous systems of philosophy, especially those of Berkeley, Kant, and Hegel, through her study with Royce, and her appreciative knowledge of the thought of Davidson, Howison, Ward, McTaggart, and Bowne. She derived the use of the word personalism from Renouvier.

Her entire thought centers in the idea that the Absolute Self constitutes the whole of reality. Such a self is supra-temporal, supra-spatial, and conscious of the experience of all finite selves. The finite selves are expressions of the absolute self, representing its different purposes, emotions, and thoughts. Each finite self, while a part of the absolute, is unique, individual, and free. The physical universe is the experiencing and willing of the absolute self. The relationship between the selves within the abso-

upon personality as a category of reality, for being the leading exponent of Hegelian idealism, and for the more elaborate which also upon subjective personalities.

10. Summary.

Mary Ellen Collins is a conscientious representative of absolutistic personalities. Her thematic personality, however, and some realism exists mingled but be pioneer in the field of sociology, and so distinguish herself in the field of philosophy. She arrived at the dualistic type of personality through the medium and critical appreciation of impersonal systems of philosophy, especially those of Spencer, Kant, and Hegel, through the study of these, and by speculative logistics of the thought of Davidson, Dewing, Ward, Royce, and James. She derived the use of the word personality from Royce.

Her entire thought centers in the idea that the Absolute is conservative the world of reality, even a unity in hyper-conscious, and a-rational, real consciousness of the universe of all finite selves. The finite selves are manifestations of the absolute self, representing the different consciousness, are elements. Each finite self, while a part of the absolute, is unique, individual, and free. Therefore, the universe is the manifestation and activity of the absolute self. The relationship between the selves within the abso-

lute is best understood as a great society of selves held together by the consciousness of the absolute. One achieves his greatest self-expression by complete loyalty to the total society.

From such a metaphysical position, Miss Calkins arrived at several significant philosophical views. Persons are of supreme importance in her social philosophy. She advocated among other things free speech, profit-sharing, and the elimination of the causes of war. Her ethical system centered on personality. The moral man becomes transformed by participating in the moral development of the universe. Her philosophy of religion involves a Cosmic Person as God, prayer as a "reciprocal relation of spirit to spirit," the idea that evil is merely a subordinate factor in good, and the idea that the individual self experiences immortality.

We have seen that Miss Calkins occupies a significant place in both American psychology and American philosophy. She was one of the leaders in the then new field of psychology, and while she is still recognized for some of her experiments, her distinctive contribution was her point of view; she championed self-psychology. She will continue to exert an influence in philosophy for several reasons. (1) She was one of the leading thinkers of her time to insist upon the importance of personality as the ultimate category for all reality. (2) As "the most prominent disciple of Royce," she represents one of the most notable forms of American ideal-

Iago is best understood as a great quality of evil-in-
action by the contradictory of the character. One believes
his personal self-expression by possible loyalty to the total
society.

Thus such a mechanical conflict, Miss Rankine re-
lived as several significant philosophical views. Perhaps
are of supreme importance in the social philosophy. Man ad-
vanced among other things free speech, profit-sharing, and
the elimination of the causes of war. The ethical system
founded on reversibility. The moral man becomes transformed
by reciprocities in the moral development of the universe.
The philosophy of Jaeger involves a Jesuit person as God,
person as a "mechanical relation of equity to equity," and
man does evil to avoid a subordinate thought in good, and
this line that the individual self experiences immortality.

We have seen that Miss Rankine occupies a significant
place in both Western cosmology and American philosophy.
She was one of the leaders in the first rank of psycholo-
gy, and while she is well remembered for such of her psycho-
logy, her distinctive contribution was her study of varied
aspects of psychology and cosmology. She will continue to exert
an influence in philosophy for several reasons. (1) She was
one of the leading thinkers of her time to develop upon the
importance of personality as the ultimate category for all
reality. (2) As "the most prominent advocate of women," she
promoted one of the most notable cause of American intel-

ism. (3) She made an original synthesis of modern absolutism and the more recent personalism.

CHAPTER V

PLURAL-MONISTIC PERSONALISM

The third distinctive type of personalism in the United States is plural-monistic, a logical synthesis of the two types which have been previously considered. It is similar to the view of the pluralists, Davidson and Howison, in that the distinct reality of every person in the universe is recognized; it differs from the pluralistic position, however, in subscribing to a creative and sustaining Cosmic Person. Its position of regarding ultimate reality as a Cosmic Person is in harmony with that of the absolutists, Royce and Calkins; yet it differs from absolutistic personalism by its insistence upon the eternal reality of each distinct person. Plural-monistic personalism, then, regards all reality as personal, but maintains in addition that finite persons are distinct from their Creator, the Supreme Person.[1] "It holds the essential fact [of reality] to be a community of persons with a Supreme Person at their head while the phenomenal world is only expression and means of communication."[2]

In the developing stream of American thought this

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1. See Knudson, a student and follower of Bowne, who defines personalism, in part, as "that form of idealism which gives equal recognition to both the pluralistic and monistic aspects of experience. . . ." POP, 87.
2. Bowne, Art. (1905), 172.

CHAPTER V

FLORAL-MONISTIC PERSONALISM

The third distinctive type of personalism in the United States is floral-monistic, a logical synthesis of the two types which have been previously considered. It is akin to the view of the pluralists, Levinson and Davison, in that the distinct reality of every person in the universe is recognized; it differs from the pluralistic position, however, in subscribing to a creative and sustaining Cosmic Person. The position of regarding ultimate reality as a Cosmic Person is in harmony with that of the absolutists, Royce and Ewing; yet it differs from absolutistic personalism by its insistence upon the eternal reality of each distinct person. Floral-monistic personalism, then, regards all reality as personal, but maintains in addition that finite persons are distinct from their Creator, the Supreme Person.[1] "It holds the essential fact [of reality] to be a community of persons with a supreme Person at their head with the phenomenal world as only expression and means of communication."[2]

In the developing stream of American thought this

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1. See Hudson, a student and follower of Royce, who defines personalism, in part, as "that form of idealism which gives equal recognition to both the pluralistic and monistic aspects of experience. . . ." Op. cit.
2. Sorens, Art. (1905), 172.

type of personalism has been represented by Johnson and Edwards, by Alcott, who defined his personalism as "the dependence of the many on the One," by Whitman, who championed both "Individuality" and "En-Masse," and by Harris, who was largely influenced by Alcott as well as by Hegel. The systematizer and chief exponent of plural-monistic personalism—the one who established it as a definite school of thought—was the "typical personalist,"[3] Borden Parker Bowne.

1. Life and Influence of Borden Parker Bowne (1847-1910).

Borden Parker Bowne, the methodical systematizer of the third type of personalism, was born at Leonardville, New Jersey, January 14, 1847.[4] He was particularly suited to give expression to the richest heritage of American philosophy inasmuch as he could trace his own ancestry back to the English Puritans, William and Ann Bowne, "who in 1631 came to Salem, Massachusetts, and thirty years later moved to Monmouth County, New Jersey."[5]

Bowne's parents, Joseph and Margaret Parker Bowne, provided him with an excellent home. The family house was unpretentious, as was any American rural farmhouse of a

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3. See Brightman, Art. (1927), 162.
4. See McConnell, BPB, for the most thorough discussion written of the life and thought of Bowne. See also Knudson, POP, 19n, K.M.B. (Mrs. Bowne), Art. (1921), Marsh, Art. (1937), and Rowe, Art. (1929).
5. McConnell, BPB, 9.

type of personalism has been represented by Emerson and Emerson, by Eliot, who defined his personalism as "the determinate of the many on the one," by Whitman, who dramatized both "Individuality" and "En-Masse," and by Hawthorne, who was largely influenced by Alcott as well as by Emerson. The systematizer and chief exponent of plural-monistic personalism--the one who established it as a definite school of thought--was the "typical personalist," Borden Parker Bowne.

A. Life and Influence of Borden Parker Bowne (1847-1910).

Borden Parker Bowne, the outstanding systematizer of the third type of personalism, was born at Leonardville, Nebraska, January 14, 1847.[4] He was particularly suited to give expression to the richest heritage of American philosophy inasmuch as he could trace his own ancestry back to the English Puritans, William and Ann Bowne, who in 1637 came to Salem, Massachusetts, and thirty years later moved to Monmouth County, New Jersey.[5]

Bowne's parents, Joseph and Margaret Parker Bowne, provided him with an excellent home. The family house was unpretentious, as was any American rural farmhouse of a

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3. See Twightmeyer, Op. cit. (1927), 208.
4. Ivan McDonald, BPB, for the most thorough discussion written of the life and thought of Bowne. See also Buckham, POP, 10n, S.M.B. (Bowne), Op. cit. (1921), Werkmeister, Op. cit. (1927), and Howe, Op. cit. (1912).
5. McDonald, BPB, 8.

century ago, but Bowne's deeply religious mother and morally courageous father made it an intelligently affectionate and righteous home.[6] Here Bowne's religious outlook was first fashioned. Here he had the "unusual opportunity in training in some insights which proved of value to him in his after religious and philosophical study."[7] Here the solid foundation was laid upon which he built his life-endeavor: "to raise religion to a high plane of ethical purpose and clear thinking, and to set forth and defend the rationality of its fundamental concepts."[8]

Bowne's thorough education equipped him well for leadership in the field of philosophy. Before going to New York University he attended Pennington Seminary. His intensive study there of fourteen hours a day enabled him to pass the entrance examinations with distinction.[9] In the Univer-

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6. It was a loyal Methodist home. Here Bowne developed a church consciousness. He was granted a local preacher's license in 1867, ordained a deacon in 1872, and served a church in Whitestone, Long Island, prior to his study in Europe. He rejoined the New York East Conference in 1878 and was ordained an elder in 1882.
7. McConnell, BPB, 18.
8. Coe, Art. (1910), 515.
9. McConnell has written of Bowne's ability to master fields of study by himself, "He was as ready a learner in languages as in physics, making himself proficient in Latin, Greek, German, French, Spanish, Italian, and oddly enough, Norwegian. The only reason discoverable for the interest in Norwegian was that in 1882 Bowne found it possible to take a two weeks' trip into Norway, and he set himself to the slight effort necessary for him to get at least a reading knowledge of the language, with almost as little concern as a tourist would ordinarily show in selecting proper garments to wear in Norway." BPB, 24.

century age, but Royce's deeply religious nature and morally courageous temper made it an intellectually effectiveness and rightness man.[6] Here Royce's religious outlook was first fashioned. Here he had the "unusual opportunity in tracing in some insights which proved of value to him in his after-religious and philosophical study."[7] Here the solid foundation was laid upon which he built his life-endeavor: "to make religion to a high plane of ethical purpose and clear thinking, and to set forth and defend the reasonability of its fundamental concepts."[8]

Royce's thorough education equipped him well for leadership in the field of philosophy. Before going to New York University he attended Fountbyon Seminary. His intensive study there of fourteen hours a day enabled him to pass the entrance examinations with distinction.[9] In the Seminary-

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6. In see a legal Methodist zone. Here Royce developed a church consciousness. He was granted a local preacher's license in 1877, ordained a deacon in 1879, and served a church in Whitestone, Long Island, prior to his study in Europe. He replaced the New York East Conference in 1878 and was ordained an elder in 1882.
7. Woodworth, Ibid., 18.
8. Ibid., Art. (1910), 316.
9. Woodworth has written of Royce's ability to master fields of study by himself. "He was so ready a learner in languages as in physics, making himself proficient in Latin, Greek, German, French, Hebrew, Italian, and Celtic enough, Norwegian. The only reason discoverable for the interest in Norwegian was that in 1890 Royce found it possible to spend a two months' trip into Norway, and he set himself to the night efforts necessary for him to get at least a reading knowledge of the language, with almost as little concern as a boy'sh would evaluate why he is anxious to learn enough Spanish to work in Mexico." Ibid., 36.

sity he took courses in Mathematics, Greek, Oratory, Belle Lettres, Political Economy, German, Latin, Introductory Philosophy, Natural Philosophy, Modern Languages, Modern History, Moral Philosophy, Natural Law, Chemistry, Chapel Oratory, Constitutional Law, Spanish, Logic, Astronomy, International Law, and Physics. His general average for the whole course was 96.3%. He was awarded honors for excellence in Latin, Greek, and Mathematics, and was assigned the Valedictory by vote of the faculty. He received the Bachelor of Arts degree in 1871, and also from the same University, the degree of Master of Arts in 1876, and of Doctor of Laws in 1909.[10]

In Europe Bowne studied in Paris and at the Universities of Halle and Göttingen. He came under the influence of Ulrici, who wished him to translate his Gott und die Natur into English, and Lotze, who wanted him to take a doctorate with him. Although Bowne was greatly indebted to both of these men he fulfilled neither of their wishes. Perhaps the reason was not only that he "never stood in much awe of degrees, and felt that he could not afford the time and expense involved,"[11] but also that he was already doing significant writing of his own and wished to make the most of his own creative powers. While still a student in New York University he had worked out his system of ethics, and when in

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10. See McConnell, BPB, 28.
11. McConnell, BPB, 37.

sity he took courses in mathematics, French, geography, Italian
letters, political economy, German, Latin, astronomy, philo-
sophy, natural philosophy, Spanish language, modern History,
Natural Philosophy, Natural Law, Chemistry, General Anatomy,
Constitutional Law, Spanish, Latin, Astronomy, International
Law, and Physics. His general average for the whole course
was 98.5%. He was awarded honors for excellence in Latin,
Greek, and Mathematics, and was awarded the Valedictory by
vote of the faculty. He received the degree of Area de-
gree in 1873, and also from the same University, the degree
of Master of Arts in 1876, and of Doctor of Laws in 1900.[10]

In Europe Dewey studied in Paris and at the Univer-
sities of Berlin and Heidelberg. He once wrote of his training
of Virchow, who aided him to translate his book and his Metho-
into English, and Lotze, who teached him to take a dialectic
with him. Although Dewey was greatly indebted to both of
these men for philosophic guidance of study, however, Dewey the
thinker was not only that to "never rested in a mere mass of de-
tails, but felt that he must afford the time and ex-
pense involved,"[11] but also that he was already doing philo-
sophic writing of his own and aimed to make the most of his
own creative powers. While still a student in Yale University
he had written out his ideas of ethics, and when in

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10. See Roosevelt, op. cit.
11. McDonnell, op. cit.

Germany he wrote numerous articles for the Methodist Review. He finished his first book, The Philosophy of Herbert Spencer, in 1873 while still in Halle. The book was composed of a series of articles which had appeared in the New Englander in 1872.

Bowne was unable to secure a teaching position when he returned to the United States in 1875. He accepted work on the editorial staff of the Independent and taught modern languages in New York University for a year. He was then invited to the philosophy department of Boston University. There he remained throughout his distinguished career,[12] bringing honor to the University and drawing to his classes the numerous students who carried his influence around the world, and who firmly established the philosophical system which he championed.

It is enlightening to consider the sources of Bowne's ideas. Previous investigators have related his thought to that of Leibniz, Berkeley, Kant, Hegel, Ulrici, and Lotze.[13] Bowne was indeed indebted to these eminent thinkers. He

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12. Bowne was invited to the University of Chicago by President William Rainey Harper, to Yale by President Porter and George Trumbull Ladd, and to Johns Hopkins. Bowne refused to leave Boston University, saying "Ephraim is wedded to his idols. Let him alone." See an unpublished letter of Knudson's to Brightman dated April 13, 1936, McConnell, BPB, 91, and K.M.B., Art. (1921), 9.
13. See, for example, the authoritative statements of Brightman, Art. (1922), 371, and Art. (1927), 162; Jones, LUB; Cleland, ROB.

Trotsky be wrote numerous articles for the Westbrooke Review. He finished his first book, The Philosophy of Modern Science, in 1874, while still in Italy. The book was composed of a series of articles which had appeared in the New Zealander in 1872.

Sorge was unable to resume a teaching position when he returned to the United States in 1876. He accepted work on the editorial staff of the Independence and taught modern languages in New York University for a year. He was then invited to the philosophy department of Boston University. Throughout throughout his distinguished career, he brought honor to the University and dropping to his classes his numerous students who carried his influence around the world, and who firmly established the philosophical system which he championed.

It is delightfully to consider the sources of Sorge's ideas. Invaluable investigations have related his thought to that of Lotzeis, Ferrater, Kant, Hegel, Grimm, and Ibsen. Sorge was indeed indebted to these eminent thinkers. He

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12. Sorge was invited to the University of Gottingen by Professor Hermann Lotze, Germany, to talk by President Porter and Oregon Treasurer Ford, and to Jerne Stanford. Sorge returned to Lotze under Volkmann, saying "Sorge is wedded to his idol. Let his alone." See an unpublished letter of Lotzeis to Hermann Ordal, April 13, 1876, McDonnell, Ord, 81, and S.S.E., Art. (1881), 9. 13. See, for example, the scholarlike statements of Hegelman, Art. (1882), 271, and Art. (1877), 1871; Jones, 1883; Olsen, 1898.

drew from the rationalism and pluralism of Leibniz. He gained his empiricism from Berkeley, and also the idea that matter is simply a means of communication between persons. He was indebted to Kant for his critical approach to the problems of philosophy, and also for the Kantian primacy of the practical reason, the trustworthiness of reason, the creativity of thought, and the idea of personality being an end in itself. He received from Hegel his emphasis upon coherence as a criterion of truth and the rationality of the real. Bowne was also considerably indebted to his two German professors, Ulrici and Lotze. Hildebrand has pointed out that his debt to Ulrici was "much greater than his published works indicate."[14] Be that as it may, Bowne did recognize his relation to Ulrici. He wrote, in the preface to Studies in Theism: "I shall always be under general obligation to my friends and former instructors, Professor Ulrici, of Halle, and Professor Lotze, of Gottingen."[15] His closer relationship to Lotze than to Ulrici is evidenced in the fact that he dedicated the first edition of Metaphysics "in grateful recollection to the memory of my friend and former teacher, Hermann Lotze."[16] Jones has correctly written:

> "Wir sehen, wie der grosse strebende Geist Lotzes denjenigen Bownes zur Lebenstätigkeit

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14. Hildebrand, Art. (1932), 102. See also Ramsdell, Art. (1935)[2], 132.
15. Bowne, SIT, vi.
16. Bowne, MET, iii.

down from the rationalism and philosophy of Dilthey. He
rejoins his predecessor from Danzig, who also saw that
reason is simply a means of communication between persons.
He was indebted to Hans for his original approach to the
problems of philosophy, and also for the Kantian primacy of
the practical reason, the transcendentness of reason, the
sensibility of knowing, and the idea of personality being as
and in itself. He received from Heyl his emphasis upon op-
posites as a unitarian of death and the relationality of the
soul. Jonas was also remarkably indebted to his two ear-
lier teachers, Husserl and Cohn. Hildebrand has pointed
out that his debt to Husserl was "much greater than his pub-
lished words indicate."[14] He does as it may, Jonas did pro-
claim his relation to Husserl. He wrote, in the preface to
Gnosis zu Gnosis: "I shall always be under general obliga-
tion to my friends and former teachers, Professor Husserl,
of Halle, and Professor Cohn, of Marburg."[15] His closer
relationship to Cohn than to Husserl is evidenced in the
fact that he dedicated his first edition of Moralprinzip "in
grateful recollection to the memory of my father and former
teacher, Hermann Cohn."[16] Jonas has correctly written:

"Wir wissen, wie der grosse Mitbewohner unseres
Hauses denkerischen Bereich nur fragmentarisch

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14. Hildebrand, Art. (1928), 108. See also Hildebrand, Ms. (1929), 108.
15. Jonas, Ein, xi.
16. Jonas, Mor, iii.

angeregt hat, und wie weit diese Anregung zu Resultaten im Leben Bownes geführt hat."[17]

Bowne's close relationship to his American antecedents has not, however, been previously pointed out. Inasmuch as thinking is a social process, no great mind is completely original. Bowne made original syntheses of previously isolated ideas, but he was able to do so only because of the heritage and point of view that were his. Personalism had been a dominant note in American philosophy long before he began his distinguished career. It was against the background of a rich personalistic heritage that he developed his own ideas. This dependence upon earlier and contemporary American thinkers does not detract from Bowne; it rather adds to his stature. He stands forth as the thinker who was clear-sighted and far-visioned enough to gather together the significant thoughts left by many eminent minds, and weave them, along with his own contributions, into a distinct philosophical system. The choicest fruits of American philosophy culminated in his systematic exposition of personalism.

Bowne would be the first to recognize his heritage, although it is difficult to trace the sources of his views because he seldom referred to other writers. He was so vigorous and intense a thinker that ideas which appealed to him

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17. Jones, LUB, 117. See also Wilm who wrote that Bowne "was known as a follower of Lotze. . . . Together with Ladd he was perhaps the leading exponent of this type of thought in America." Art. (1910), 422.

> entreegt das, was wir nicht ohne Amerung an
> Identitäten im Leben immer zerfällt das."[17]

Howe's close relationship to his American antecedents has not, however, been universally noticed yet. Inasmuch as shielding is a social process, no great mind is completely original. Howe made original syntheses of previously isolated ideas, but he was able to do so only because of the heritage and point of view that were his. Transcendism had been a dominant note in American philosophy long before he began his distinguished career. It was against this background of a rich personalistic heritage that he developed his own ideas. This dependence upon earlier and contemporary American thinkers does not detract from Howe's stature as a thinker. He stands forth as the thinker who was clear-sighted and far-visioned enough to weave together the significant strands left by many eminent minds, and weave them, along with his own contributions, into a distinct philosophical system. The coalescence traits of American philosophy culminated in his creative exposition of personalism.

Howe would be the first to recognize his heritage, although it is difficult to trace the sources of his views because he seldom referred to other writers. He was so vigorous and intense a thinker that ideas which appealed to him

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17. Howe, 1908, 117. See also Mills who wrote that Dewey "was known as a Kolbrer or leader. . . . Together with Judd he was perhaps the leading exponent of this type of thought in America." Ibid. (1910), 4n.

became at once his own. In the oft-quoted sentences from a letter of 1909 in which Bowne characterized his thought he does not claim priority for personalism as a system of philosophical ideas. To the statement in which he calls himself "the first of the clan" of personalists, he adds "in any thorough-going sense."[18] That is to say, Bowne recognized that many previous thinkers held personalistic ideas not only in Europe, but more particularly in the United States. He was not entirely original; rather he organized and systematized the numerous personalistic ideas into a concrete system. Wilm has pointed out that Bowne's ideas were "the common possession of a whole school of thinkers, the school of personal idealism."[19] Rogers, likewise, corroborates the contentions made in the second chapter of this study that American personalism developed over a long period of time. He wrote that throughout the nineteenth century

> There is the determination to conceive reality in such a way that the ideal values . . . which attain to human life and human nature may be felt to be solidly grounded, and not the precarious by-products of an impersonal evolution."[20]

To this he has also added: "The emphasis upon the self as a source of the categories for rendering reality intelligible . . . is present . . . in most of the recent philosophy of

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18. See K.M.B. (Mrs. Bowne), Art. (1921), 10; and Knudson, POP, 16.
19. Wilm, Art. (1910), 422.
20. Rogers, EAP, 316.

Dewey as were his own. In the self-quoted paragraphs from a lecture of 1908 Santayana defines naturalistical philosophy as a system of anti-dogmatic ideas. In the statements in which he calls himself "the first of the line" of pragmatists, he adds "in any thoroughly-edged sense."[18] What is to say, James recognized that many previous thinkers held pragmatistic ideas not only in Europe, but more particularly in the United States. He was not entirely original; rather he organized and systematized the numerous pragmatistic ideas into a coherent system. He also pointed out that "overall ideas were "the common possession of a whole school of thinkers, the school of personal idealists."[19] James, Lindsay, corroborates the conclusions made in the second chapter of this study that American personalism developed over a long period of time. He wrote that throughout the nineteenth century

> There is the determination to concrete reality in such a way that the ideal values . . . which attach to human life and human nature may be felt to be reality grounded, but not the pre-emptive by-products of an impersonal evolution.[20]

Lindsay has also added: "The emphasis upon the self as a source of the categories for constituting reality identifiable . . . is present . . . in each of the recent philosophy of

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[18] See E.S.S. (Mrs. Dewey), Life, (1921), 101; see Chapter, p. 10.
[19] Miller, Part, (1923), 488.
[20] Lindsay, Ibid., 313.

theism."[21] Müller, too, has written: "Dank Bownes sorgfältiger und systematischer Ausführung . . . ist der Personalismus zu einer bewussten, organisierten Bewegung geworden."[22] Finally, Hocking has written that Bowne's "contribution to metaphysics" was "a summary account of the curve of metaphysical speculation since Kant."[23] Without reading more into the thought of these men than that which they intended, one can conclude that Bowne, by his original systematic organization, did not stand outside the historic stream of thought. It was his genius to organize what he conceived to be the summit thoughts of man's intellectual development into a coherent system. In many ways he went so far as to anticipate the future emphasis upon personality.

Bowne was familiar with the thought of Edwards, who has been considered as a personalistic thinker. He, in fact, defended Edwards against being used as a screen by Huxley for the latter's doctrine of automatism. He recognized that Edwards, along with Calvinism, did "not deny freedom."[24] It

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21. Rogers, EAP, 324.
22. Müller, AP, 179.
23. Hocking, Art. (1922), 374.
24. Bowne, SIT, 417. See elsewhere, however, where Bowne attributed "much fictitious psychology and ethics" and "a general browbeating of human nature" to Edwards. But at this point he also attacked the early Methodists for testing "conversion by its emotional attendants." Bowne, SIC, 215. It is also well to remember Gardiner's statement: "Competent critics unite in regarding Jonathan Edwards as the most original metaphysician and subtle reasoner that America has produced. . . ." Gardiner, Art. (1900), 573.

Edwards.[21] Spiller, too, has written: "Dwight Edwards combines and systematizes Hutcheson . . . but the fundamental ideas are quite original, originalities from Locke revealed."[22] Finally, Hawkins has written that Edwards's "contribution to metaphysics" was "a necessary account of the curve of metaphysical speculation since Kant."[23] Without reading some into his thought of those men upon that which they intended, one can conclude that Edwards, by his original systematic correlation, did not stand outside the historic stream of thought. It was his genius to organize what he conceived to be the essential thoughts of manis intellectual development into a coherent system. In many ways he went so far as to anticipate the future emphasis upon personality.

Edwards was familiar with the thought of Shaftesbury, and has been considered as a pantheistic thinker. He, in fact, defended Shaftesbury against being read as a atheist by insisting for the latter's contrite of authorship. He recognized that Shaftesbury, along with Berkeley, did "not deny freedom."[24] It

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21. Hopkins, Sar. 224.
22. Spiller, AJ. 179.
23. Hawkins, Arc. (1928), 374.
24. Edwards, Sin. 21V. See elsewhere, however, where Edwards attributes "sinful fleshliness beyond anything that Shaftesbury's general development of human nature" to Shaftesbury. But at this point he also attributed the early Methodists for testing "conversion by the emotional phenomena." Edwards, Sin. 21G. It is also well to remember Cardinal's strong comment: "Shaftesbury writing with in regarding Jonathan Edwards as the most original metaphysician and subtle reasoner that America has produced. . . . " Cardinal, Arc. (1900), 874.

can be assumed that Bowne knew Alcott and his thought.[25] Bowne served with Alcott and William F. Warren, of Boston University, on the committee having charge of the Boston Monday Lectures, for which Joseph Cook (1838-1901), a Congregational minister, was the lecturer.[26]

This fact, in itself, was significant, for Cook, a popularizer of "the results of the freshest German, English, and American scholarship on the more important and difficult topics concerning the relation of Religion and Science,"[27] was himself personalistic.[28] He knew the thought of Edwards, was a friend of Alcott, a respecter of Whitman, an admirer of Lotze,[29] and in many ways was an exponent of ideas cham-

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25. It will be recalled that Alcott, a personalist, wrote that the drift of thought in New England was toward "personal Theism."
26. See Cook, HER, vi.
27. Cook, HER, v.
28. The Boston Monday Lectures began in the Meionaon in 1875 and were so well received that they were transferred to Park-street Church in October, 1876, and then to Tremont Temple, "which was often more than full." Cook had studied and travelled widely. He lectured on such subjects as biology, transcendentalism, orthodoxy, conscience, heredity, marriage, socialism, labor, Occident, Orient, and current religious perils. The lectures have been published in eleven books of the above titles. So unique were Cook's lectures that it was written, "One has to go back to the time of Peter Abelard, of the University of Paris, for a parallel to it." See Cook, CON, 2, in back of the book. It is well to note that Cook believed Alcott to be "the first clear formulator of the Personalistic position. . . ." See Shepard, PP, 499.
29. Cook wrote that Lotze was "full of scorn for the idea that the Power that put into us personality does not itself possess personality." BIO, 102. He quoted Alcott as saying to him in a conversation, "You may tell Boston that I, for one, regard Lionel Beale and Hermann Lotze

pioned by Bowne. In 1877 Cook said to his Boston audience:

> As science progresses, it draws nearer, in all its forms, to the proof of the Spiritual Origin of Force; that is, of the Divine Immanence in natural law; that is, of the Omnipresence of a personal First Cause. . . .[30]

In 1878, he stated: "All law in nature is but the uniform action of an Omnipresent Personal Will." Also, "The tangibleness of the moral law in conscience is scientifically known . . . to be identical with the tangibleness of an Omnipresent Personal Will."[31] Further, writing that "The union of mind, free-will, and conscience in any being constitutes personality in that being," he concluded, "The moral designer of the moral law is, therefore, a person."[32] Finally, he thought of "God as Personal."[33] Bowne not only served on the committee for Cook, but can easily be seen to have been somewhat indebted to him. In 1922, Hocking wrote of Bowne's critique of mechanical impersonalism made in 1908, ". . .

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as the rising men in philosophy." BIO, 186. Cook agreed with both Alcott and Bowne when he said: "I am proud to say I have some acquaintance with Hermann Lotze, and that I regard him as the rising, as Germany regards Herbert Spencer as the setting star in philosophy." See Cook, BIO, 103. The applause that followed this statement, so like one of Bowne's, is significant, for Cook's publishers noted in his books that "Mr. Cook's audiences included in large numbers, representatives of the broadest scholarships, the profoundest philosophy, the acutest scientific research, and generally of the finest intellectual culture, of Boston, and New England. . . ." See Cook, BIO, v.

30. Cook, BIO, 32.
31. Cook, CON, 69.
32. Cook, CON, 109.
33. Cook, CON, 128.

Dixon by James. In 1877 Cook said to his Boston audience:

> As modern pessimism, its dreary nature, in all its forms, to the great of the Spiritual Origin of Power; that is, of the divine Immanence in nature; that is, of the Omnipresence of a personal Triune Deity. . . . 30

In 1878, he stated: "All law in nature is but the uniform action of an Omnipresent Personal Will." Also, "The tendencies of the moral law in consciences is unquestionably known . . . to be identical with the tendencies of an Omnipresent Personal Will."[31] Another, stating that "The union of mind, free-will, and consciousness in any being constitutes personality in that being," he concluded, "The moral dominion of the moral law is, therefore, a person."[32] Finally, he thought of "God as Personal."[33] Joyce not only proved an excellent for Cook, but can easily be seen to have been somewhat shocked to him. In 1879, quoting words of Dorsal critique of mechanical impersonalism made in 1878, ". . .

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as the rising man is unfaithful." Ibid., 1879. Cook argued with both Alcott and Spencer when he said: "I am proud to say I have done duty-battles with Kenneth Ashton, and that I regard him as the vision, as important towards true Space Science as the working with La Place." Ibid., Cook, 1878. The epithets that follows this statement, as like one of Kenneth, is ironically, for Cook's indictions quoted in his books that "Mr. Cook's sentiments indicated in Lecture Sunbeam, representatives of the transcendentalists, the pantheistic philosophy, the sentimental idealistic reasoning, and generally of the Fichte, Schelling, Cousin, Kite, Y.

30. Cook, 1878, 40.
31. Cook, 1878, 48.
32. Cook, 1878, 108.
33. Cook, 1878, 108.

There is no more powerful and convincing chapter in American metaphysical writing. . . ."[34] Back in 1880, Bowne wrote of Cook's personalistic discussion on theories of life: "In the present state of the debate there is no better manual of the argument than the work in hand. The emptiness of the mechanical explanation of life was never more clearly shown."[35]

Bowne was also related to other American personalists. In a "little philosophical club," he met with, among others, Davidson, Harris, and Howison.[36] He knew the thought of Royce, but felt that "Royce had not pulled himself clear of Hegelianism."[37] Royce wrote to Brightman, after Bowne's death, "I suppose that our agreements were rather on the increase toward the end of his work. I always prized him much."[38] He surely knew the thought of Calkins also, although he had finished most of his writing when she was just beginning hers. For her part, "she gained much from him

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34. Hocking, Art. (1922), 374.
35. See Cook, LAB, 6, in the back of the book. Cook referred to Bowne on several occasions. See especially HER, 44-45 and 49.
36. See the previously quoted statement by James, Art. (1907), 111.
37. See McConnell, BPB, 132.
38. See Brightman, Art. (1922), 370. Bowne served as Chairman of the Department of Philosophy at the International Congress of Arts and Science in St. Louis. Royce spoke just before him on September 20, 1904, and Howison, as well as Ladd, spoke after him. Each must have heard the others' addresses and exchanged ideas later. Harris also addressed the Congress the same day at the same time, although in another hall. He, too, would have visited and exchanged ideas with his old friends. See Rogers, COAS (Cambridge Edition), 74, 152, 171, and 173.

intellectually and professionally and admired him deeply."[39]

In method, Bowne was both rationalistic and empirical, rigorous and pragmatic. He held that life is more than logic, yet that logic must be applied to life. In this respect he was similar to Whitman (and recent psychologists who recognize the irrational elements in the total personality), who said:

> Do I contradict myself?
> Very well then I contradict myself,
> (I am large, I contain multitudes).[40]

Bowne is more widely known as a rationalist than as a pragmatist; hence it might be well to note that latter aspect of his many faceted intellectual outlook, and also to indicate his relationship to the thought of William James.

Bowne wrote:

> We must study facts in the light of principles, and we must also study principles in the light of facts. Without the former we are lost in a rabble of details; without the latter we make no connection with reality and simply hang in the air.[41]

When dealing with the problem of ethical behavior, he continued in the same manner:

> Life must be moralized by being brought under the control of moral principles, and morals must be vitalized by being brought into connection with our everyday human life in the world that now is.[42]

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39. From the previously mentioned letter by Raymond Calkins.
40. Quoted by Furness, Art. (1932), 5.
41. Bowne, Art. (1900), 247.
42. Bowne, Art. (1909), 708.

In all of Bowne's writing he championed the rights and needs of the self, which are more than mind alone, or will, or feeling. The self has irrational impulses, urges, and propensities. It lives in a universe of many irrational facts of experience to which it must become adjusted. The self and the universe also reveal possibilities of conserving and increasing values that are beyond water-tight rational categories. The self, through reason, assumes the world to be an expression of reason. Through feeling it experiences aesthetic values. Through will it experiences morality. Life is enriched by the consequences of these ventures of the personality.[43] Ramsdell has pointed out that Bowne's pragmatism is evidenced in (1) his view of the mind, (2) his use of the criterion of interest satisfaction, (3) his use of the criterion of workability or results, (4) his criterion of survival, and (5) his view of truth as teleological.[44]

It is interesting, at this point, to consider Bowne's relationship to the thought of James. Ramsdell, who concedes that Bowne was under the indirect influence of Kant, Lotze, Herbart, and Spencer, has maintained that Bowne owed his pragmatism to James.[45] It is Ramsdell's thesis that "the most direct and decisive pragmatic influence upon the

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43. See McConnell, BPB, 151. McConnell also states: "If . . . we could speak of a higher pragmatism, Bowne was a pragmatist." 151.
44. Ramsdell, Art. (1934).
45. See Ramsdell, Arts. (1934), (1935)[1], and (1935)[2].

In all of Donnell's writing he emphasizes the rights and needs of the self, which are more than mind alone, or will, or feeling. The self has irrational impulses, urges, and aspirations. It lives in a universe of many irrational forces of experience to which it must remain aligned. The self and the universe also beyond quantitative or conservative and integrating values that are beyond mere-sight rational analysis. The self, through prayer, becomes one world in an appreciation of reason. Through finding it experiences mystic values. Through will it experiences reality. Life is enriched by the consciousness of these vocations of the personality.[42] Donnell has pointed out that Donnell's philosophy is evidenced in (1) his view of the sense, (2) his use of the criterion of transient relationship, (3) his use of the section of reality or reality, (4) his criterion of survival, and (5) his view of creed as belongingness.[43]

It is interesting, at this point, to consider Donnell's relationship to the concept of "mana." Randall, who considers that Donnell was under the intrinsic influence of Kant, Hegel, Fichte, and Bergson, has maintained that Donnell's "mana" approaches to Jesus.[44] As is Donnell's thesis that "the soul defined not dualistic (Cartesian) intrusions upon the

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42. See Donnell, Ibid., 141. Donnell also states: "If . . . we could speak of a static universe, there would be . . . a transcendent." 143.
43. Donnell, Ibid. (1944).
44. See Donnell, Ibid. (1934), (1935), and (1937).

thought of Bowne came from William James."[46] Investigation does not seem to warrant such a conclusion.

If anything, Bowne seems to be prior,[47] and James somewhat indebted to him. (James' cosmopolitan philosophical background is so broad, however, that throughout his life and work he remained an incorrigible individualist indebted to none specifically. Therein lay his charm as a person as well as a philosopher.) James published The Will to Believe in 1896. As early as 1874, when James was still an instructor in Anatomy and Physiology in Harvard College, Bowne wrote, "Will is the sum-total of the dynamic idea. . . ."[48] Further, "The conscious ego is a being capable of knowledge and thought, and able to direct its own activity into such channels as it may choose. . . ."[49] Bowne also criticized science for having "fallen upon evil days" because its assertions could not be pragmatically "put to a test."[50] In 1879,

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46. Ramsdell, Art. (1935)^2, 133.
47. See Flewelling, who has written: "It is no distraction from James to call attention to the fact that the distinction of Bowne's philosophy from that of other idealists . . . lay just in his insistence upon the pragmatic test for truth in both philosophy and religion. In the publication of these views, Bowne possessed priority." Art. (1922), 378. See also Strickland, who has pointed out that James, Dewey, and Schiller merely popularized the pragmatic method; they were not its founders. Art. (1910). Likewise, Hocking indicates that Fichte, Kant, Vaihinger, Balfour, Nietzsche, and Peirce precede James in the use of pragmatism. TOP, 146.
48. Bowne, POHS, 112.
49. Bowne, POHS, 168.
50. Bowne, POHS, 282.

thoughts of James came from William James."[43] Investigation does not seem to support such a conclusion.

It suggests, James seems to be right,[47] and James concerned himself to him. (James' conception philosophical background is so broad, however, that Bergsonian ideas and work be reminded an inscrutable individuality tendency to make specifically. Thus in his chapter on a person as well as a philosopher.) James recalled the will to believe in 1896. It early as 1871, when James was still an instructor in Anatomy and Physiology in Harvard College, Henry wrote, "Will is the ever-local or the dynamic idea. . . ."[48] Further, "The nonsense ego is a being capable of breaking and changing, and able to direct its own activity into such channels as it may choose. . . ."[49] James also articulated motive for leaving "Talion upon evil days" however its energy-stone could not be practically "put to a test."[50] In 1896,

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43. Bergson, Jr., (1943), 155.
47. See Crawshay, who says Bergson: "It is no disparagement from James to call attention to the fact that the signification of Bergson's philosophy from that of other idealistic . . . . Let just in his lectures upon the pragmatic test for truth in both philosophy and religion. In the modification of these views, James expressed a lively." Arr. (1928), 279. See also Strickland, who has pointed out that James, Dewey, and Schiller merely popularized the pragmatic method: they were not the founders. Str. (1910). Likewise, Boutroux indicates that Fichte, Kant, Wallace, Ballou, Bishopsbe, and Tolman towards James in the use of pragmatism. (37, 143.
48. Rowe, 1906, 112.
49. Rowe, 1906, 108.
50. Rowe, 1906, 272.

when James was just beginning work on his Principles of Psychology, Bowne wrote in language that later became James': "We live and act long before we reflect and speculate."[51] In the same book, Bowne suggested that action must be tested by pragmatic consequences. He wrote: ". . . Struggling, agonizing, etc., are not heroic in themselves. . . . To struggle for nothing is the mark of a fool and not of a hero."[52] James published his monumental book, The Principles of Psychology, in 1890. Bowne finished his Introduction to Psychological Theory four years earlier, in 1886, and indicated his pragmatic leanings in the statement:

> The dreary folly of laboriously building up speculative theories, which every hour we practically deny, may seem very brilliant for a while, but it grows tiresome at last.[53]

Here Bowne also stated his empirical concern for evidence. He criticized Schopenhauer, Hartmann, Spinoza, Leibniz, and Herbart in their views of will because they were "deductions from some general metaphysical or psychological theory, rather than foundations of psychological facts. We shall do better to begin with facts."[54] In 1907 James wrote in Pragmatism that the pragmatist "turns towards concreteness and adequacy, towards facts, towards action and power."[55] This

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51. Bowne, SIT, 411.
52. Bowne, SIT, 432.
53. Bowne, IPT, 38.
54. Bowne, IPT, 219.
55. James, PRA, 51.

Adam James was just beginning work on his *Principles of Psychology*. James wrote to Shadworth Hodgson that later became James's "We live and act long before we reflect and speculate."[51] In this same book, James emphasized that action must be guided by reasonable consequences. He wrote: ". . . Strategies, economics, etc., are not bounds in themselves. . . . To attempt to reason in the name of a tool and not of a hero."[52] James published his argument book, *The Principles of Psychology*, in 1890. Sewall finished his *Introduction to Psychological Theory* four years earlier, in 1886, and indicated his ideographic leaning in the statement:

> The dreary folly of inductively building up psychological theories, which every hour on psychologically dark, may seem very brilliant for a while, but be gone a trifle at last.[53]

Here James echo above his emphasis of criteria for criterion, in particular, consequences. Patterson, Sullivan, Lehman, and others in their view of will because they were "conditions from some general anthropological or cytological theory, rather than conditions of psychological force. We shall do better to begin with facts."[54] In 1907 James wrote in *Pragmatism* that the pragmatist "turns towards concreteness and adequacy, towards facts, towards action and power."[55] Pate

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51. James, PSY, 211.
52. James, SIT, 436.
53. Sewall, INT, 58.
54. Sullivan, INT, 210.
55. James, PRA, 51.

must have been what Bowne had in mind fifteen years earlier, when he concluded his Principles of Ethics with the statement:

> The abstract ethics of the closet must be replaced by the ethics of life, if we would not see ethics lose itself in barren contentions and tedious verbal disputes.[56]

James indicated, in correspondence, his use of Bowne's ideas. When James was in Rome caring for his health and writing his Gifford lectures he heard that Bowne had published some earlier articles in book form. James wrote to Bowne, speaking of the previous articles: "They seemed to me important; and I need the book for my work."[57] Bowne sent James a copy of The Christian Life to which James replied: "I have found this book so very useful to my own thought that since you write of having published 'two others of the same sort' (happy fecundity!) I am going to ask you to send them to me also!"[58] It would be interesting to know what James found of value in these books. He may have been attracted to the statement: "religious truth can be expressed only by figures borrowed from the relations of the life that now is."[59] Or to, "we do not bring men to God by means of theology."[60] Or, "We must expand our conception of religion

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56. Bowne, POE, 309.
57. The letter is quoted by McConnell, BPB, 274. Marsh also refers to this communication between Bowne and James. See Art. (1937), 4.
58. The letter is quoted by McConnell, BPB, 275.
59. Bowne, TCL, 33.
60. Bowne, TCL, 67.

Jesse have been what Joyce had in mind "fifteen years ago" when he commented on his friendship with the aesthetes:

> The aesthetes objects of the object must be prepared for the effects of life, if we would not see beauty lose itself in degree of nonsensions and hollows verbal strokes.[89]

Jesse finished, in correspondence, his use of Joyce's image. Also there was in home during for his health and visits his different locations on board ships Jesse had published more derived articles in book form. Jesse wrote in frame, knowing of the previous epistles: "They seemed to me important; and I read the book for my work." Joyce said Jesse's copy of the Overview into to which Jesse responded: "I have found this book so very useful to my own thought that please you write of having published two volumes of the base-level library fundamentally I am going to ask you to send them to me also!" It would be interesting to know what Jesse found of value in these books. They have been attributed to his concern; particularly which can be expressed only by figures borrowed from the relations of the life zone [illegible]. Or so, "we do not [illegible] even to look by means of [illegible]."[90] Or, "We must expand our conception of religion

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[illegible]. Joyce, 108, 302.

[illegible]. The Jesse is quoted by McDonnell, 225, 228. Wrote also [illegible] to this correspondence between Joyce and Jesse. [illegible] (1957), 6.

[illegible]. The letter is quoted by McDonnell, 229, 228.

[illegible]. Joyce, 108, 32.

[illegible]. Joyce, 108, 37.

until it becomes the principle of all living, and includes all life within its scope."[61] Or, he must have appreciated Bowne's pragmatic test of the value of the Bible. Bowne wrote, "The only abiding significance of the Bible lies in helping us to this view," that is, to the "Christian view of God and man and their mutual relations."[62] Surely he was attracted to the section entitled "Types of Religious Experience."[63] James referred to these books in his Gifford lectures, and although he called them "rationalistic booklets," he said they were "wonderfully able," and that they were books "which everyone should read."[64] More closely related to Bowne's personalism, however, are the statements by James: "Religious thought is carried on in terms of personality, this being, in the world of religion, the one fundamental fact."[65] Further, James writes of "a concrete bit of personal experience," and says:

> That unsharable feeling which each one of us has of the pinch of his individual destiny as he privately feels it rolling out on fortune's wheel may be disparaged for its egotism, may be sneered at as unscientific, but it is the one thing that fills up the measure of our concrete actuality, and any would-be existent that should lack such a feeling, or its analogue, would be a piece of reality only half made up.[66]

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61. Bowne, TCL, 149.
62. Bowne, TCR, 10-11.
63. Bowne, TCL, 119-130.
64. James, VRE, 502.
65. James, VRE, 491.
66. James, VRE, 499. In a footnote, James also refers the reader to Lotze, who was, it will be recalled, the one

each is become the principle of all living, and includes all life within its bounds."[91] Or, we might have quotations Bonnie's arrangements took of the voices of the Bible. Some words, "The only absolute significance of the Bible lies in holding to its view," that is, to the "dialectical view of God and man and their mutual relations."[92] Merely he was irritated by the section entitled "Forms of Religious Experience."[93] Jones referred to these books in his different lectures, and although he called them "fascinating bedtime reading" he said they were "wonderfully odd," and that they were books "which everyone should read."[94] More closely related to Bonnie's personalism, however, are the viewpoints by James "Religious thought is centred on the terms of personality," this being, in the world of religion, the one fundamental fact.[95] Further, James refers of "a concrete bit of personal experience," and says:

> That unutterably feeling within each one of us of the coming of his individual destiny as being, relatively, to his fellows, and on Tremendous Great day to be distinguished for its results, may be accepted as a sensibility, but it is in the one sphere where it lies on the boundary of one's own-most sociality, and may reveal to everybody that should that such a feeling, or its equivalent, would be a proof of reality only that such was the.[96]

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91. Jones, VRE, 140.
92. Jones, EPA, 10-11.
93. Bonnie, EPR, 119-120.
94. Jones, VRE, 302.
95. James, VRE, 491.
96. James, VRE, 490. In a footnote, James also refers the reader to Jones. Too was, it will be recalled, his one

One must conclude that Bowne's method was pragmatic and functional as well as rationalistic. While recognizing the value of the pragmatic method, however, he also knew its limitations, hence went beyond it to a more complete, coherent method. He wrote, in a letter to Knudson January 18, 1905, that he found Schiller's Humanism, Dewey's Pragmatism, and James' Will to Believe "one-sided but useful," and simply a "reaction against an overdone intellectualism."[67] Hocking has pointed out the greater comprehensiveness of Bowne in relation to the thought of James in the statement:

> The real difference, however, was profound. For the "life" which provides the evidence of metaphysical truth was, for Bowne, not simply a state of resolve, or feeling, but a state of empirical cognition. It is possible to know the truth, and not merely to choose it as one's adopted hypothesis. Life is will, plus thought and experience. . . .[68]

Flewelling adds: "Bowne did a larger work, in that he not only laid down a method for judging truth but also accompanied it with an appropriate metaphysics."[69] Bowne was pragmatic, but more. "Our natural life," he wrote, "is no accident but the raw material which we are to build into the

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to whom Bowne dedicated the first edition of his Metaphysics.

67. Quoted by McConnell, BPB, 149. See also Strickland, Art. (1910).
68. Hocking, Art. (1922), 372.
69. Flewelling, Art. (1922), 378-379. So, too, Marsh has written that "Bowne went further than his friend [James], not only laying down a method for judging truth, but accompanying it with an appropriate metaphysics." Art. (1937), 7.

ideal form."[70] Life is more than logic, yet logic must be applied to life if it is to achieve its fullest expression.

Another interesting phase of the life and influence of Bowne was the sources of his power. Brightman has indicated four sources, viz., (1) his thought and expression were clear, (2) he had a remarkable grasp on the systematic whole of his philosophy at every point, (3) he had rare skill in polemic, and (4) he possessed a deep and sincere religious experience.[71] Snowden has written that Bowne was a "clear and keen and strong thinker in the field of philosophy" and that he expressed himself in both philosophical and literary style. "His pages," Snowden wrote, "are the most brilliant philosophical writing of our day and will long remain as a difficult standard and model for others to imitate."[72]

Bowne was the first personalist to organize his philosophy methodically into a reasonably complete and coherent system. It is for this reason that he has been erroneously looked upon as the founder of personalism. Because of his

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70. Bowne, Art. (1909), 711. See also Coe, Art. (1922), especially 381 and 382.
71. Brightman, Art. (1922), 370-371.
72. Snowden, Art. (1922), 388-389. Flewelling has added that "Because of this quality of clearness Bowne was a forerunner in many positions towards which the world of modern thought is more slowly making its way." Art. (1922), 378. Marsh has likewise written of Bowne: "His pellucid, beautiful literary style reminds one of the older English masters of philosophy: There is a certain primitive strength in his words, and an elemental power in his sentence structure." Art. (1937), 10.

ideal form.[VI] Life is more than logic, yet logic must be applied to life if it is to achieve its fullest expression.

Another interesting phase of the life and influence of Dewey was the decline of his power. Publishers has indicated four reasons, viz., (1) his language and expression were clear, (2) he had a remarkable grasp on the operational work of his philosophy at every point, (3) he had zero spirit in polemics, and (4) he possessed a deep and sincere religious appreciation.[VII] Thomlinson has written that Dewey was a "clear and keen and strong thinker in the field of philosophy" and that he expressed himself in both philosophical and literary style. "His pages," another wrote, "are the most brilliant philosophical writing of our day and will long remain as a difficult standard and model for others to imitate."[VIII]

Dewey was the first personality to crystallize his philosophy holistically into a reasonably complete and coherent system. It is for this reason that he has been overwhelmingly looked upon as the father of pragmatism. Because of his

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[VI] Dewey, Art. (1909), VII. See also Dewey, Art. (1929), respectively XII and XIX.

[VII] Publisher, Art. (1931), XVI-XVII.

[VIII] Thomlinson, Art. (1930), XVIII-XIX. "Her living has added that "Summary of this quality of clearness, force and forcefulness in every operation brought a rare joy to the social or intellectual life in some highly unique way." Art. (1930), XVI. Dewey has literally scores of letters of praise: "His writing, essential literary style, reaching one of the clear-cut qualities seldom of philosophers: There is a certain mysterious element in his mind, and an elusive power in his personal influence." Art. (1930), I.

systematic work, however, and of the fact that he gave expression to the rich American personalistic heritage in the young, expanding Boston University and its vigorous School of Theology, he gathered around him an eager group of followers who looked to him as the father of personalism. In the sense of having established a Bowne tradition he is the father of American personalism. None of the earlier personalists, including Howison and Calkins, had established a school.

Those indebted to Bowne are legion.[73] He has influenced Edgar Sheffield Brightman, Albert C. Knudson, George Croft Cell, Francis L. Strickland, George Albert Coe, George A. Wilson, Ralph Tyler Flewelling, Herbert A. Youtz, L. R. Eckardt, H. C. Sanborn, I. R. Beiler, Daniel L. Marsh, W. H. Sheldon, Randolf F. Foster, Francis John McConnell, Lynn Harold Hough, S. Parker Cadman, Harry Emerson Fosdick, Charles R. Brown, John Wright Buckham (a student of Howison's), James H. Snowden, "and many others." The "many others" are continually increasing under the able leadership of Brightman, who holds the Bowne Chair of Philosophy at

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73. Coe has written that the attractiveness of Bowne's doctrines "brought him a remarkable large following. In addition to his immediate pupils, the number of which is large, those who have found in his published writings a new wine that rejoices the intellect of man are literally a multitude. And they girdle the earth." Art. (1910), 521. Brightman has given the most complete list in his address to the Sixth International Congress of Philosophy which met at Harvard University in September, 1926. See Brightman, Art. (1927), 164-165.

systematic work, however, and of late years has given expression to the rich American personality previous in the young, expanding Boston University and its School of Theology, he gathered around him an elite group of writers who looked to him as the father of personalism. In the course of having established a home tradition on in the values of American personalism. Some of the earlier personalists, including Bowne and Calkins, had established a school.

Those intimated to Bowne are Lyman, [illegible] Edward Cowen Mayflin Brightman, Albert C. Knudson, George Burt Mayflin, Francis J. Mitchell, Edward C. Wilson, Ralph Tyler Flewelling, Herbert A. Jones, G. [illegible] Flewelling, G. C. Lorenzen, I. M. Bellows, Donald L. Norton, E. M. Hamilton, Benjamin F. Foster, Francis John McConnell, Lynn Harold Hough, A. Fowler Tatum, Harry Emerson Fosdick, Charles S. Brown, John Wright Buckham (a graduate of Boston University), James [illegible] Lowman, "and many others." The "many others" are continually increasing, later coming while Jacksonville [illegible], who joins the Boston Chair of Philosophy at

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[illegible]. Bowne's writings show the extensiveness of Kant's influence. "Perhaps his is a remarkable large following. In addition to his Jacksonville period, his months at Boston University, there are seven Bowne Ph. D. (philosophy) writings, now using that religious [illegible] of Kant, and [illegible] a [illegible]. Are they simply the earth." Arc. (1910).

[illegible]. Brightman has given the most comprehensive list in his addition to the Kantian international conference of Philosophy which met at Harvard University in September, 1924. See Personalism, Arc. (1927), 124-126.

Boston University, Knudson, Dean Emeritus of Boston University School of Theology, Dean Earl B. Marlatt, L. Harold DeWolf, Paul E. Johnson, and F. Gerald Ensley of the same university, Walter G. Muelder, of the School of Religion at the University of Southern California, Carroll DeWitt Hildebrand of DePauw University, Louis Norris, of Baldwin-Wallace College, Peter A. Bertocci, of Bates College, Clare McKellar, of Central College, and others who follow the Bowne tradition under these men.[74] It should also be noted that a "personalistic discussion group" has met several times during the annual meeting of the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association.

Recognition of Bowne's influence in American philosophy may be seen in a few comments by eminent thinkers.[75]

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74. It is to be recognized that the followers of Bowne, through whom he has made a significant contribution to American philosophy, are independent and original in their own thinking while remaining within the Bowne tradition. Some are more pluralistic, some more monistic; others are more realistic or pragmatic. Some subscribe to an Absolute God while others hold to a Finite God, etc. For evidence of the varying degrees of originality of those influenced by Bowne, see Wieman, who has written: "Whether E. S. Brightman should be classed with liberals or with naturalists . . . is uncertain. His independence and originality make it hard to classify him." GOR, 487n. See, incidentally, Brightman's answer to Wieman's doubt in Brightman, POR, 213n.
75. Bowne's influence was not as wide as it might have been. This was partly due to the fact that he disliked publicity, did not refer much to contemporary philosophers except for polemic purposes, and declined opportunities to teach in positions that might have given him wider public acclaim. McConnell specifically lists four reasons why he did not, in his lifetime, receive greater

Flewelling described Bowne as "the morning star of this greater humanism."[76] Buckham designated Bowne's volume Personalism "one of the outstanding products of American idealism."[77] Iverach, the Principal of the United Free Church College in Aberdeen, declared that Bowne was "the equal of any other thinker" in America.[78] Duncan acknowledged his indebtedness to Bowne's books "for much stimulus, help, and enrichment."[79] So, too, Fosdick has written regarding Bowne's book, Personalism: "I still recall the thrill with which I followed his argument [for a rational basis for faith in God]. It was, at the time of reading, one of the most stimulating books I ever went through."[80] Finally, it must be recognized that American thought was much nearer Bowne's philosophical position at the time of his death than it was when he first began his professional career.[81]

A final indication of the richness and influence of

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recognition. They are: (1) He was a theist. (Many philosophers suffer from theophobia.) (2) Bowne was a Methodist. That strengthened him in one denomination, but limited him in others. (3) He "was not the voice of his day," i.e., as was Spencer, whom he attacked, and who also outlived his own acclaim. (4) His style of writing was not as "popular" as was his style of lecturing. McConnell, BPB, 270-273. See also Brightman, Art. (1927), 166-167.

76. Flewelling, Art. (1922), 379.
77. Buckham, Art. (1920), 29.
78. Iverach, Art. (1920), 33.
79. Duncan, Art. (1922), 384.
80. In an unpublished letter to Brightman from Fosdick in the American Colony in Jerusalem, May 8, 1926.
81. See Coe, Art. (1910), 522-523, and Cell, Art. (1928), 390-391.

Tiamatling described Bowen as "the leading star of this [illegible] movement."[75] Brookes described Bowen's writing as "one of the outstanding products of American journalism."[76] Finally, the Friends of the Union from Bowen's Galion in Ohio, declared that Bowen was "the equal of any other talker" in America.[77] Bowen encouraged his devotedness to Lincoln became "for many editions, daily, and statement."[78] So, too, Boehler has written regarding Bowen's book, Reconstruction: "I shall always be grateful with which I believed his approach for a national basis for Union in Ohio."[79] So, at the time of reading, one of the most valuable books I have ever read through."[80] Finally, it must be recognized that Lincoln himself was much moved. Lincoln's abolitionistic position at the time of his death than it was when he first began his proclamation course.[81]

A final justification of his eloquence and influence of

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recognition. They are: (1) He was a thinker. (Many [illegible] [illegible] from [illegible]) (2) Bowen was a Methodist. That strong Methodist [illegible] in [illegible] [illegible] (3) He "was not the voice of his day," i.e., in [illegible], also be [illegible], and was also qualified his own [illegible]. (4) His [illegible] of [illegible] was not as "[illegible]" as was his [illegible] of [illegible]. McDonnell, [illegible], 177-179. See also [illegible], [illegible] (1927), 158-159.

75. Tiamatling, Art. (1888), 375.
76. Brookes, Art. (1890), 57.
77. [illegible], Art. (1890), 55.
78. [illegible], Art. (1890), 55.
79. [illegible], Art. (1890), 55.
80. In an [illegible] letter to [illegible] from [illegible] in the American Colony in [illegible], May 6, 1865.
81. See [illegible], Art. (1910), 455-456, and [illegible], Art. (1908), 380-382.

Bowne's life is found in the honors he received and the esteem in which he was held on his trip around the world in 1905 and 1906. He visited Japan, China, India, Turkey, Egypt, and the European countries and "was enthusiastically received in university circles from the first." "In Japan, particularly, he received such honors as fall to few scholars,"[82] being presented with, among other gifts, a gold medal by the Imperial Education Society. He addressed the entire staff and student body of Bombay University on the subject "The Religion of the Future." The group consisted of Parsees, Mohammedans, Christians, Anglo-Indians, Eurasians, and Hindus of all castes. The Reverend A. W. Mell, who heard the address, wrote:

> It was enthusiastically and delightfully received. The students cheered heartily its main points, and at the close the cheering developed into a great ovation. For five minutes Doctor Bowne had to stand and receive the applause of the great crowd. Students and professors thronged to the front to greet this prophet of the future.[83]

The life and influence of Bowne marks an important chapter in the "coming of age" of American philosophy. A vigorous and prolific personalistic writer, he organized the personalistic streams of thought of both his American and European antecedents to become the chief representative of "typical" personalism. His philosophy, which was as broad

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82. Coe, Art. (1910), 521.
83. McConnell, BPB, 261.

Dorothy's life in Japan before the Second World War, the reactions she which he was held on his arrival in the world in 1908 and 1909. He visited Japan, China, India, Turkey, Syria, and the European countries and "was enthusiastically received in twelve-city circuits from the times." "In Japan, particularly, he received such honors as fall to few subjects," he noted in his diary, among other gifts, a gold medal by the Imperial Theatrical Society. He addressed the entire staff and student body of Keiogi University on the subject "The Religion of the Future." The group consisted of Baptists, Methodists, Christians, Anglo-Israelites, Buddhists, and atheists of all creeds. The secretary A. K. Hall, who heard the address, wrote:

> In the evaluation-clarity and definitely creative. The students received perfectly the main points, and at the close the discussion developed into a great question. For five minutes longer Porter had to stand and answer the questions of the great crowd. Students and professors thronged to his front to press this problem of the future.[1]

The Bible and literature of other works as important display in the "course of life" of Paulsen philosophy. A vitality and positive correspondingly written, he organized the correspondingly numerous of changes of both his American and Korean subscribers to become the outer expression of "spiritual" personality. The publication, which was he intend

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1. Op. cit. (Hall), 101.
2. Op. cit., 101.

and deep as life itself, gave equal recognition to both the pluralistic and monistic aspects of experience. It was, thus, a culmination of the views of earlier American personalists and a logical synthesis of the positions represented by Howison and Calkins. Bowne was a leader of the liberal American tradition which views reality as "a community of persons with a Supreme Person at their head."[84]

2. Epistemology.

Consider Bowne's view of the problem of knowledge. When one knows the answers Bowne gives to the questions of whether or not the mind is active or passive, what is the relationship between thought and thing, what is the relationship between knowledge and belief, and kindred questions, he knows the general direction of Bowne's thought. Epistemology is basic to an understanding of his philosophical position.

Bowne, as the other personalists, rejects skepticism at the outset. To have any rational standing whatever, skepticism must meet several conditions. (1) It must be supported by reasons. (2) It must give unsupported assertions or "admit the laws and principles of logic as binding upon all thought as at least negative conditions of truth." (3) The skeptic "must assume the community and identity of intel-

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84. Bowne, Art. (1905), 172.

ligence." (4) He must "assume the identity of the object in experience." (5) The skeptic must know something.[85] In each case the skeptic vitiates his own position in meeting any of these presuppositions of thought. Skepticism may be excellent as a method arising out of rational criticism; as a system it is untenable. It cannot maintain its position without denying itself. "The validity of knowledge is pretty sure to get itself recognized in the long-run in spite of the skeptic. . . ."[86] The question then becomes, not is knowledge possible, but how is knowledge possible?

In answering the latter question, Bowne agrees with Samuel Johnson, the first American personalist, that the mind is active, and with Kant and other personalists that it is also creative. Bowne's emphasis upon activity is in harmony with all of his American antecedents. It will be recalled, for example, that Edwards referred to the mind as an "active cause," that Alcott viewed nature as "thought in solution," that Harris believed consciousness "presupposes an absolute ego or person," that Howison maintained that objective nature was created by the community of minds, and that Calkins held the finite mind to be active and assertive within the framework of the absolute. Bowne wrote, as had each of them in turn: "The principles of knowing are primarily

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85. Bowne, TTK, 269-270.
86. Bowne, TTK, 294.

immanent laws of mental activity,"[87] and "The world I perceive is the world I construct."[88] Empiricism is, thus, insufficient; experience itself depends upon mental activity. One organizes and interprets sensations and impressions in the knowing process until he arrives at clear perceptions and conceptions. The world of objective "things" exists "only as the mind reconstructs it as a world of thought."[89] It is the mind that is active and creative, that "builds up in consciousness a system of conceptions." Not only is this the process for arriving at individual knowledge, but it is also the method whereby the active, creative minds of interrelated persons build up the sciences, arts, and humanities, that organize and systematize knowledge. Without mental construction by a self there would be no knowledge. Bowne wrote of this in his Harris Lectures:

> The flitting and discontinuous impression is interpreted into a continuous and abiding world only by a permanent self with its outfit of rational principles; and if this were taken away there would be only an inarticulate flux of impressions without rational contents.[90]

Two more basic ideas in Bowne's epistemology are the conditions of thought and the categories of thought. Regard-

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87. Bowne, PER, 57.
88. Ibid., 72. McKellar, in an unpublished doctoral dissertation, CAOM, deals effectively with the question of the creative activity of mind, and also points out that Bowne makes this principle "fundamental" in his view of personality.
89. Bowne, TTK, 56.
90. Bowne, PER, 69.

ing the first, Bowne is not concerned with the multitudinous physiological and psychological conditions of thought, rather with the conditions given in the structure of thought itself. There are three conditions, other than the fundamental one that consciousness presupposes all thought. (1) For any thought whatsoever there must be unity and identity of the thinking self. Apart from a conscious and abiding subject, thought is an "unreal abstraction." (2) Thought presupposes the law of identity and contradiction. "Conceptions must have fixed meanings and must be used consistently therewith."[91] (3) Thought is possible only because of the positive principle of "the fact of connection among the objects of thought." It "can never escape making a general metaphysical assumption about its objects and their systematic connection."[92]

Regarding the categories, one deals with "those immanent mental principles which underlie articulate experience and make it possible."[93] Categories, denied by the protagonists of common-sense and empiricism, have had an honorable place in the history of philosophical thought from the time of Aristotle. The categories suggested by Bowne as organic principles by which one builds up experience are: time, number, space, motion, quantity, being, quality, identity,

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91. Bowne, TTK, 30.
92. Ibid., 35.
93. Ibid., 59.

tag the first, Soma is not concerned with the multitudinous physiological and psychological conditions of thought, rather with the conditions given in the sequence of thought itself. There are three conditions, under which the fundamental one that consciousness presupposes all thought. (1) Any thought whatsoever there must be unity and identity of the thinking self. Apart from a consciousness and abiding subject, thought is an "unreal abstraction." (2) Thought presupposes the law of identity and contradiction. "Concepts must have fixed meanings and may be used consistently throughout."[91] (3) Thought is possible only because of the positive principle of "the fact of connection making the objects of thought." It "can never escape making a primal metaphysical assumption about the objects and their experiencing connection."[92]

Regarding the category, one deals with "three transcendental principles which underlie articulate experience and make it possible."[93] Categories, denied by the proponents of correspondence and empiricism, have had an honorable place in the history of philosophical thought from the time of Aristotle. The categories suggested by Soma as organic principles by which one builds up experience are: time, number, space, motion, quantity, being, quality, identity.

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91. Soma, op. cit., 30.
92. Ibid., 32.
93. Ibid., 32.

causality, necessity, possibility, and purpose. Bowne was not concerned to be systematically complete. Rather, he wished to show that the mind must work according to certain principles, and through them reach knowledge. Whenever such a system of categories is postulated, one is tempted to ask whether or not the list could be extended until one had a category for every object experienced. Bowne anticipated this; he pointed out, however, that while there is a multiplicity of experiences, nothing passes into the mind except through the activity of the mind. The various activities of the mind fall into certain classes which express the nature of the mind itself. Further, there is an objective order of objects, but objects are known only through the activity of the mind. "The thing world must be reproduced in the thought world, and the forms of the thing world must take on the forms of the thought world."[94] While there is an objective order, the key to knowledge lies in the mind itself. The categories do not precede the mind, "rather they are to be understood through the mind's living experience of itself."[95]

It follows from such an epistemological viewpoint that although Bowne maintains a basal monism of active intelligence, he subscribes to a dualism of thought and thing. Attempts have been made to remove this dualism on the part

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94. Bowne, TTK, 116.
95. Bowne, PER, 105.

certainty, necessity, universality, and purposive. Kant was not concerned to do psychological analysis. Rather, he claimed to show that the mind must work according to certain principles, and thereby have a priori knowledge. Therefore such a priori of science is transcendental, which is defined as knowing on what the life could be established until one had a memory for every object encountered. Hence psychologism would be rejected but, however, such will there is a multiplicity of experiences, whether phenomena into the mind cannot therein the activity of the mind. The various activities of the mind [illegible] time concrete objects which exposure are because of the mind itself. However, there is an objective order of objects, but objects are known only through the capacity of the mind. The order world must be represented in the changing world, and the form of the order world must take on the form of the changing world.[54] While there is an objective order, the key to knowledge lies in the mind itself. The categories do not provide the mind, rather they are to be understood through the mind's living experience of itself.[55]

It follows from such an experimental viewpoint that although Kant mentions a moral motive or motive transcendental, he subscribes to a theory of thought and rules. Accounts have been made to [illegible] with analysis of the [illegible]

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54. Kaufman, op. cit., 114.
55. Kaufman, op. cit., 115.

of materialism and absolute idealism, but Bowne holds these to be irrelevant. Dualism is "ineradicable." The knower is distinct from the known; the "me" is separate from the "not-me"; the "thought cannot become the thing, neither can the thing pass bodily into" the thought. "As a concrete process knowing is necessarily individual, a gathering by the 'me' of information respecting the 'not-me'."[96]

Before leaving the problem of epistemology it is well to consider Bowne's idea of the relationship between knowledge and belief. Here he very clearly relates himself to the practical, living, functional point of view. Knowledge is that which is "self-evident in the nature of reason," while belief is based upon rationality, but is not necessarily proved. Belief is practical; it is a matter of hearsay rather than of demonstration. Much of belief grows out of life, and much is real only in life. Beliefs are tested by will and action, by living convictions. One's beliefs "are not the product of speculation; they have to be achieved, or conquered, in life itself."[97] While one must believe the necessary truths of intelligence, he may believe "all those practical principles which are necessary for the realization of our highest and fullest life."[98] Belief builds upon knowledge to lead one into a richer, fuller life. It leads one

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96. Bowne, PER, 59.
97. Bowne, TTK, 381.
98. Ibid., 384.

of materialism and possible immortality, but never quite bound to be involved. Dealing in "incomprehensible," the Unknown is distinct from the known the "Not" is separate from the "Ever-Not"; the "thought cannot become the thing, neither can the thing ever be bodily like" the thought. "As a reasonable creature living in necessarily individual, a conferring to the test of information concerning the Unknown."[25]

Before leaving the problem of epistemology it is well to consider Jones's idea of the relationship between knowledge and belief. Jones has very clearly related belief to the personal, living, theological point of view. Knowledge is that which is "self-evident in the realm of reason," while belief is based upon rationality, but is not necessarily proved. Belief is personal; it is a matter of feeling rather than of demonstration. Much of belief comes out of life, and goes to feel only in life. Beliefs are tested by will and action, by living convictions. Jones believes "that our ideas of spiritualities they have to be modified, or perhaps, in life itself."[26] While one must believe the possibility of intelligence, he may believe "all things from ultimate principles which are necessary for the realization of our history and future life."[27] Belief motivates man toward one to live on Jesus's plane, during life. It leads one

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26. Jones, op. cit., 24.
27. Jones, op. cit., 24.
28. Ibid., 25.

from the syllogisms of the closet "out into the open field of the world and life and history; . . . there is where, in matters of practice, the decisive debate is carried on."[99]

It is evident that Bowne's epistemology is the most systematic and thorough in the development of American personalism. He begins with self-activity and ends with the conviction that "this world can never be explained on any impersonal plane."[100] The mind creates its own world through specific conditions and categories and is distinct from the object of its thought. Knowledge is possible only on the basis of personal experience. His mature conclusion is that

> The world of experience exists for us only through a rational spiritual principle by which we reproduce it for our thought, and it has its existence apart from us only through a rational spiritual principle on which it depends, and the rational nature of which it expresses.[101]

3. Metaphysics.

Metaphysics, according to Bowne, answers the question, what is reality?[102] His preliminary answer that "Those things exist which act,"[103] is similar to Johnson's idea of

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99. Bowne, TTK, 385.
100. Bowne, PER, 110.
101. Ibid., 110.
102. See Bowne, MET, Rev. ed., 1. This is similar to his teacher Lotze's definition: "Metaphysics is the science of that which is actual, not of that which is merely thinkable." Lotze, COM, 15.
103. Bowne, MET, 27.

self-activity, to Edwards's, that all existence is to be thought of in terms of consciousness, and to Berkeley's "spirit is activity." His final answer that personality is the key to reality is more similar to Alcott's statement, "The Person is the presupposition of all things and beings,"[104] to Harris' thought that the first principle is "Self-Activity," and to Royce's view that reality is "Absolute Personality." He agrees here, of course, with Calkins and Howison, although he differs from them in his pluralistic monism. His final view is that reality is "a world of persons with a Supreme Person at the head."[105] Personality is to be understood as meaning "selfhood, self-consciousness, self-control, and the power to know."[106]

Bowne's most brilliant and succinct attack upon impersonalism is found in his chapter by that title in his Harris lectures. There he has pointed out that impersonalism may be reached by "the sense-bound mind" which arrives at naturalism and by the "uncritical" mind, which, through the fallacy of the abstract, arrives at the general principles of an abstract idealism. Materialistic mechanism and abstract idealism, the two forms of impersonalism considered by Bowne, are metaphysically "impossible."[107]

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104. In his diary, as quoted by Shepard, JOBA, 450.
105. Bowne, PER, 277.
106. Ibid., 266.
107. Ibid., 263.

Self-activity, to Jung's, that all existence is to be thought of in terms of organismic-and, so Bertalanffy points to activity.[104] His final answer that personality is the key to reality is more similar to Jung's statement, "The Person is the creative position of all things and no-thing, [105] to Jung's claim that the latter reminiscing is "Self-Activity," and to Jung's view that reality is "Absolute Personality." In extreme form, of course, with dialtes and bywaves, although be differs from them in his idealistic metaphysics. His final view is that reality is "a world of personal acts" a Cosmic Person as the Ground.[106] Personality is to be understood as meaning "maldoom, self-consciousness, self-control, and the power to know."[107]

Jung's more brilliant and analytic attack upon temporality is found in his objects by that title in his Zurich lectures. There he has pointed out that synchronicity may be treated by "the acausal-connecting" which applies as non-relative and by the "unrelated" mind, which, through the failure of the absolute, arises as the central principle of modern thought. Subjectivity reasonable and objective idealism, the two forms of temporality conceived by Jung, are subjectively "incorrect."[108]

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104. In his theory, as quoted by Jungerg, 1955, 400.
105. Jung, 1955, 397.
106. Ibid., 260.
107. Ibid., 262.

> They are empty forms of thought to which no reality can be shown to correspond, and upon criticism they vanish altogether. If we next ask what insight impersonalism gives into the problems of experience, we find nothing but tautology and infinite regress. Such a theory does not pay expenses. The alternative is personalism or nothing.[108]

Bowne summarized the limitations of impersonalism even more succinctly in an earlier article in which he wrote:

> On the impersonal plane we can never reach unity from plurality, or plurality from unity; and we can never find change in identity, or identity in change. Continuity in time becomes mere succession without the notion of potentiality, and this in turn is empty. Existence itself is dispersed into nothingness through the infinite divisibility of space and time, while the law of sufficient reason loses itself in barren tautology and the infinite regress. The necessary logical equivalence of cause and effect in any impersonal scheme makes all real explanation and progress impossible, and shuts us up to an unintelligible oscillation between potentiality and actuality, to which there is no corresponding thought.[109]

Bowne's personal metaphysics involves several significant concepts. He agrees, first of all, with the previous American personalists that being is active; the nature of a thing is found in its activity. This reality is not found in the sense world; it is

> grasped only in the unpicturable notions of the understanding. . . . We must rise from the world of lumps into the world of energy. . . . The universal nature of being is to act.[110]

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108. Bowne, PER, 267.
109. Bowne, Art. (1905), 172. In MET Bowne (wrongly) denies that you can take change into intelligence.
110. Bowne, MET, 28-29.

Further, the physical world is phenomenal. Nature, as matter and force, a mechanism in space and time, is a "phantom of sense thinking." It is not an order of law, nor is it absolutely continuous. Evolution does not help solve the problem; it only describes phenomenal order. Nature is idea; it is a "function of will and purpose;" it exists "only in, for, and through intelligence."[111]

Space and time are also phenomenal. They are real for finite experience; but they are not independent of experience. They are the forms of outer and inner experience, the functions of self-conscious intelligence. Personality is not within a space-time continuum. Rather the space-time continuum exists only for the self-conscious, intelligent experient.

So with causality; it cannot be explained on the basis of mechanism. The mechanical notion of causality involves infinite regress, tautology, and the denial of change. It is a "perfect nest of contradictions and impossibilities."[112] Volitional causality, however, is experienced. It "is immanent in the process of change," and provides for unity, self-direction, change and identity. "Volitional causality, that is, intelligence itself in act, is the only conception of metaphysical causality in which we can rest."[113]

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111. Bowne, MET, 294.
112. Bowne, PER, 196.
113. Bowne, MET, 92.

Finally, Bowne's plural-monistic metaphysics is to be understood in terms of a world-ground. Here his thought is similar to that of Alcott, but quite distinct from that of Howison and Calkins. Bowne explains "the existence and community of the many" by "affirming a fundamental reality which is truly one, and which produces and coördinates the many."[114] The world-ground is unitary, unchangeable, eternal, omniscient, and omnipotent.[115] The world-ground of speculation is the personal God of religion. One discovers complete personality in the "absolute and infinite being."

4. Ethics.

One of Bowne's contributions was to the field of ethics. Here his primary concept of the intrinsic worth of personality was a solvent for the knotty ethical problems and the traditional points of view. Moral life, for Bowne, begins with "Duty Ethics," not with the abstract theories of hedonism, utilitarianism, or naturalism. So, too, it begins with the normal unfolding of the potentialities of human life in concrete situations; it begins in the thick of life.

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114. Bowne, PER, 278. Howison holds that the "world-ground" does not produce the many. Calkins maintains that the many are part of the One. Bowne declares that one can easily "fall into pantheism at this point." PER, 280. It will be recalled that an earlier personalist, Whitman, often fell prey to Hegelian pantheism.
115. For a succinct account of these attributes see Bowne, POT, 139-170.

Although Bowne was not concerned with erecting an ethical system of his own, he was interested in discovering ethical truth and the principles which underlie conduct. His emphasis upon the complete development of each personality in its social interaction makes him an exponent, however, of the ethics of perfection, or what has been called the self-realization theory. He wrote specifically that the moral life is "the expression of personal choice and self-realization."[116] Representatives of this point of view are legion, and although Bowne transcends his predecessors in some respects, it is enlightening to see what he has in common with them. He advocated the idea of purpose and harmony with Plato, the importance of well-being with Aristotle, and the principle of the law of love with the early Christians. He championed views of modern ethical thinkers: Kant's concept of the moral law, Hegel's idea of the self-realization of the human spirit, T. H. Green's view of the ideal of personality, and Lotze's idea that ethics is basic for metaphysics. So, too, Bowne's ethical position is similar to that of his American predecessors. He was concerned with the "intelligent free agents" and "right reason" of Samuel Johnson, the "moral agency" of personality with Edwards, the "moral purpose" in the "Kosmos" with Whitman, the emphasis of Davidson upon moralizing life, the importance of the will in ethical

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116. Bowne, Art. (1909), 710.

experience as a "self-determining power" held by Harris, and the free moral agency of finite selves as advocated in different degrees by Royce, Calkins, and Howison. In his ethics, Bowne was concerned with uniting the intuitive and experience schools of thought, and aiming morality at the "fulness and richness of life." "Our moral task," he wrote, consists "in the moralization of life."[117]

Among the fundamental ideas in Bowne's system of ethics are those of the good, duty, and virtue. These concepts are not to be viewed abstractly, however. Apart from experience they are meaningless. The good is "the realization of normal human possibilities." Duty is "to help . . . whatever ministers to the enlargement and enriching of life." Virtue is "working for the common good." Bowne has written of the good:

> The ideal good is conscious life in the full development of all its normal possibilities; and the actual good is greater or less as this ideal is more or less approximated. For man the attainment of this good involves the perfection of individual life and of social relations. For man the good is perfectly realizable only in and

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117. See Bowne, POE, viii. For the high regard in which Bowne's ethical treatment is held, see Knudson, Art. (1922), 396, and McConnell, BPB, 163. For further views of the relationship of Bowne's ethical position to that of other thinkers see Brightman, ML, especially 294, and Titus, EFT, 87-88. It is also significant to note, in view of our contention that personalistic ideas preceded Bowne in American thought, that Bowne outlined what later became his book on ethics in 1869-70 when he was still a young student. See McConnell, BPB, 30.

> through the co-working of the community; indeed, the good exists mainly in a social form. Hence virtue itself largely takes on the form of working for the common good; and unselfishness is often set forth as the chief if not the sole virtue.[118]

The development of morals is also an important idea in Bowne's ethical position. In subscribing to such a view he utilized the evolutionary method of his day without taking its naturalistic content, and anticipated to some extent such a later work as Westermarck's Origin and Development of Moral Ideas (1906). He went beyond even such later productions, however, in his emphasis upon the fact that moral development has for its goal and criterion the enrichment of each person in a society of persons in which value experience is ever increased and expanded.

Fundamentally empirical, Bowne has written that "our human life does not begin ready-made but grows, and it not merely grows but it grows out of subnormal and subrational conditions."[119] Life begins as potentiality. Man does not begin physically, rationally, or morally perfect. He must attain "his true self," transcend the irrational and unmoral. He must bring the natural under the control of the spiritual.[120] This moral development takes three general direc-

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118. Bowne, POE, 69.
119. Bowne, Art. (1909), 708. See also Bowne's criticism of professional moralizers for dealing only with moral abstractions and not duly considering the concrete conditions of existence. Art. (1900), 248.
120. Hocking has ably illustrated the neutrality of human

tions. (1) The moral ideal unfolds and the sense of duty is strengthened. This is within the free moral agent himself. (2) The moral principles become embodied in codes and institutions. This is the "extension of practical wisdom." (3) The moral field is extended until it includes "the entire life of the individual and of society, and also the inclusion of at least all human beings within the sphere of moral relations."[121]

Bowne recognizes that the complete moralization of life is a long way from realization. There is incomplete harmony in the codes of men and social groups. This diversity does not, however, vitiate the validity of moral principles nor the ideal of moral behavior. General agreement in the principles of action, even if not in specific codes of behavior, is evidenced in the feeling of obligation, in the postulation of specific virtues, and in the direction of the moral ideal. One must not give up the principles, but work for a "far greater mental and moral seriousness . . . than obtains at present."[122] So, too, with the moral ideal. It ought not to be surrendered because it is at any given moment impossible of realization. "We must also remember," Bowne

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nature, i.e., its possibilities for both good and for evil, and also the necessity of man making "of himself what he will." See HN, 15-16, and also What Man Can Make of Man.

121. Bowne, POE, 133.

122. Ibid., 163.

has written,

> that until the perfect is come we shall have to work with imperfect instruments, imperfect motives, and imperfect men, and not allow a moral aestheticism to degenerate into a weakness of mind and character resulting in practical impotence. There is something wrong with the ideal when it thus defeats itself.[123]

Despite the lack of perfection, or complete self-realization, moral principles must be maintained, and ideals be pursued. And the dynamic within the individual and within society for continual development comes from the very structure of the universe, from the fact that persons are ends in themselves.

A final concept of importance in Bowne's ethical viewpoint is his idea that ethics and religion are related. Throughout the history of thought this alliance has been held by some to be fictitious, by others to be necessary. Bowne holds to the latter position because of the nature of reality. The objective moral order can be completely understood only on the basis of the meaning and destiny of human life, which in turn follows from the structure and meaning of the universe. Bowne wrote:

> The aims we purpose for ourselves and others are necessarily involved in our general theory of life and existence, that is, in our religious and speculative conceptions.[124]

When one thinks the problem through, he assumes, according to Bowne, "a moral world order, a future life, and a moral

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123. Bowne, Art. (1900), 261.
124. Bowne, POE, 195.

world governor who assures the final triumph of goodness."[125] The moral law and ideal become, on this basis, not only facts of finite experience, but also expressions of the will of the Supreme Person.

Rather than applying these ethical ideas to the leading ethical relations at this point in the discussion, let us make the applications when considering Bowne's social philosophy. Before leaving the ethical problem, however, it will be well to point out the significance of Bowne's viewpoint. He empirically recognized the natural, related ethics to the problems of life and conduct, emphasized the common good, pleaded for the "will to do right," renounced abstractions such as virtue, pleasure, and happiness, and cautioned against an abstract and impracticable idealism. Living persons actively achieve morality by increasing the fulness of life in harmony with the will of the Supreme Person.

5. Social Philosophy.

One develops a person-centered social philosophy from a personalistic ethical system. Bowne was no exception. Although he did not write a specific social philosophy, he made a vigorous application of his ethical views to many

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125. Bowne, POE, 200.

world government and conceive the final bringing of goodness.[1]

The moral law and ideal become, on this basis, not only forms of finite experience, but also expressions of the will of the supreme person.

Rather than applying these ethical ideas to the inter-and national relations as this point is the discussion, let us make the applications that constructive Bowne's moral philosophy. Before leaving the ethical problem, however, it will be well to point out the significance of Bowne's view-point. In especially recognizing the natural, relative, ele-ies in the problems of life and conduct, emphasized the ele-ment good, stated the "will to do right," recognized obligations upon to virtue, pleasure, and happiness, and cautioned against an abstract and impractical idealism, Bowne presents actively active morality by insisting on changes of life in harmony with the will of the Supreme Per-son.

c. Social Philosophy.

Bowne develops a non-dogmatic social philosophy from a personalistic ethical system. Bowne has no reasonable ob-ection to the fact that exists a specific social philosophy, he finds a stupendous moral sign of the ethical union to make

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1. Bowne, Op. cit.

challenging areas of social activity. His wide social concern touched such problems as government, woman suffrage, war, the family, subject people, poverty, and the necessity of material productivity to increase the abundant life for all. McConnell has written that Bowne's thought "suffered from an excess of individualism," but also that such a view was the temper of his day.[126] Bowne, nevertheless, dealt so sharply with critical problems that his principles are acutely contemporary.

He was, for one thing, sensitive to the impelling need for a social philosophy. Like Alcott and Davidson, he lamented the disorganization of much in civilization up to and including his own day. With compassion he wrote:

> It is a grim scene which the historical procession of humanity presents—the many races, their alienation, their wars and mutual slaughter, the failure to reach anything in most cases and the scanty and insecure result in all. The great mass of individuals have not had the conditions of a properly human existence—buried in ignorance, pursued by disease, persecuted by pain, and all the while, like some tremendous Niagera, pouring over into the abyss of death and darkness. . . .[127]

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126. See McConnell, BPB, 168-170. For an able discussion of Bowne's contribution to social thought see Pritchard's unpublished Boston University Master's thesis, SPRB, especially 166-176. See, more especially, Bristol's appreciation of "social-personalism" as suggested by Bowne. Bristol concludes with ideas similar to those held by Bowne after a thorough study of adaptation as a theory of social progress. See SA, particularly 328 and 331.
127. Bowne, Art. $(1910)^2$, 889.

dialectical sense of social activity. His wide social concern broaded such problems as government, human nature, war, the family, modern people, poverty, and the possibility of material productivity to increase the abundant life for all. Woodcock has written that Hornell showed "sufficient proof on causes of individuality," but also that such a view was the temper of his day.[126] Above, nevertheless, Hornell is shrewdly aware of critical problems that his principles are subject to contemporary.

He was, for one thing, sensitive to the dangling, need for a social philosophy. Like Alcott and Emerson, he lamented the disorganization of ends in civilization up to and including his own day. With compassion he wrote,

> In is a crisis among the historical processes of humanity presently--the same today, tomorrow, always, thus were and mutual strangeness, one failure to reason anything in most cases and the scarcity and inadequate results in all. The great mass of individuals have not such conditions or a properly mean existence--buried in ignorance, impelled by disease, poisoned by sin, and all the while, like some enormous cancer, creeping over them the curse of death and decay. . . .[127]

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126. Woodcock, op. cit., 169-170. For an also discussion of Hornell's contribution to social thought see Wilhelmina Hornell, unpublished Boston University Master's thesis, 1933, especially 141-142. See, more especially, Hornell's expressions of "social-evaluations" as presented by Sorokin. Sorokin's relation with Hornell which relates to Sorokin's by Hornell also gives a historical study of education as a society of social agents. See M. Sorokin, Society, Culture and Personality.

127. Hornell, Ant. (Jan)[3], 220.

To remedy this the social order must be moralized, spiritualized by the dynamic of a religious concern for persons. To such a task Bowne devoted his life.

Among other things, Bowne advocated woman suffrage, a burning issue of his day. This put him in the liberal personalistic tradition of Alcott, Whitman, Davidson, Cook, and Calkins, who in their turn championed equal suffrage. Bowne recognized the ancient origin of the subjugation of women and the fact that social evolution in the light of the ideal is a slow process, yet he was vitriolic in denouncing those who impeded recognition of the rights of women. He wrote regarding this:

> . . . If we should call the roll of opponents, we should find among them all savages, enemies of society, of the family and good government, rumsellers, drunkards, constitutional standpatters and weak-minded men in general.[128]

The social order, he maintained, would never be at its best until this specific problem was remedied. Women, as moral persons, must share in the privileges as well as the responsibilities of a moral society.

Bowne also considered the perennial problem of war. He recognized the horror and wastefulness of war and the fact that fighting is the "lowest and cheapest of all forms of public service,"[129] yet he held that "the horrors of peace

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128. Bowne, Art. (1910)[1], 536.
129. Ibid., 531.

In reality this social order must be sanctioned, rationalized by the dreams of a religious concept for reasons. In such a task Kant devoted his life.

Among other things, Kant advocated women suffrage, a burning issue of his day. This put him in the liberal nonconformists tradition of Aquin, Milton, Davidson, Locke, and Calvin, who in their turn championed equal suffrage. Kant recognized the ancient origin of the subjugation of women and the fact that social evolution is the right of the legal in a slow process, yet he was helpful in overcoming those lagged recognition of the rights of women. In which he wrote:

> . . . If we should call the roll of operatives, we already find among them all analogs, models of society, of the family and good governments, whether, dramatists, constitutional lawyers, teachers and well-minded men in general.[1]

The social order, be maintained, which never be as the best until this erotic problem was resolved. Kant, as good teacher, seek where is the reality, as well as the tendencies of a moral society.

Kant also considered the sociological problem of sex. He recognized the danger and uncertainness of sex and the fact that fluctuating in the "lorses and opposite of all forms of erotic desires, also" yet he held that "the harmony of love,

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[1]Kant, Kant, sec. (1)(b)[4], 344.
[2]Ibid., 345.

may be greater" than those of war. "War would be very much out of place in heaven;" he wrote, "but it is sometimes very much in order on earth."[130] Bowne was able to take this position on the basis of his distinction between morally justifiable and unjustifiable wars. The first type includes wars of self-defense and those which have secured the rights of humanity. These have both been "historically necessary and beneficent." The second type includes "war for passion's sake" and "war for ambition's sake," both of which are the "sum of all crimes."[131] Despite the usefulness of some wars, Bowne hoped that the achievements of science, the development of an industrial society, and the spread of the Christian idea of man would eliminate war from human society. The earlier type of patriotism, which held "My country, right or wrong," and the idea that the state is supreme must both be supplanted by the idea that "humanity has become more than all states." Only then will men and nations arrive at their full moral stature.

A vital social problem in which Bowne preceded his

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130. Bowne, Art. (1900), 259. Bowne differed here in his judgment of war with Whitman and Calkins, both of whom were outspoken against it.
131. See Bowne, POE, 300-301. Bowne's concern for the elimination of war was similar not only to the views of other personalists, but also, in some respects, to such modern thinkers as Voltaire, Rousseau, Kant, Comte, Tarde, and Spencer. Voltaire, in particular, has said: "War is the greatest of all crimes. . . ." Quoted by Durant, SOP, 267.

may be greater" than cause of war. "War would be very much out of place in Heaven," he wrote. "God is in something very hard to under-go earth."[130] Bowen was able to look this problem on the basis of his distinction between merely inescapable and unmodifiable wrong. The first type includes acts of mal-feasance and those which have created the rights of necessity. These have been "historically necessary and essentially." The second type includes "war for aggression" and "war for monitions's sake." Both of which are "sins of all orders."[131] Despite the deficiencies of some sects, commended then the endeavoured to estimate, the development of an international society, and the spread of the Christian idea of the social alternative was from human society. The unique type of pacifistic, which holds "by conscience, right or wrong," and the idea that the state is subverse and both be supplanted by the idea that "humanity has deeper more than any state." Only then will man and nations survive at their full moral stature.

A vital social problem in which Bowen presented his

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130. Bowen, ibid. (1939), 300. Bowen differed here in his judgment of war with Hitler and Italian, both of whom were aggressive regimes at.

131. See Bowen, 302, 300-302. Bowen's concern for the alienation of war was which only to the values of other personalities, are also, in some respects, in many modern thinkers as Voltaire, Bourgeon, Kant, Tolstoy, Gandhi, and Jesus. Voltaire, in particular, has said: "War is the greatest of all mistakes. . . ." (quoted by Bowen, 304, 305).

day was that of the handling of subject and backward people on the part of the Western Powers. The contemporary world revolution hinges on some of the problems which he clearly foresaw forty years ago. He regarded the white race not as "the" race, but only as a pioneer race in achieving a worthful civilization. So great was his respect for the Oriental people that he remarked a few weeks before he died that if he had his life to live over again he would teach in China.[132] This attitude, not evident in his earlier writing, was developed largely on the basis of his trip around the world in 1905 and 1906. Two incidents from that trip illustrate his social vision. The first occurred in Japan in the home of a friend. Roused from deep meditation, he said:

> "I have never before had such a vision as this."
> "What vision?"
> "Just the vision of these masses of mankind, their possibilities in themselves and in their possible relation to the welfare of the whole world."[133]

The second incident occurred in India, where Bowne enjoyed the beautiful sights but was impressed with the human misery. He was especially distressed over the treatment of the native Indians by the foreigners who ruled them. Referring to Bowne, McConnell has written:

> He had a carrier, or porter, accompany him out of the hot land into the mountains, where at night the air is bitingly cold. The porter was

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132. See McConnell, Art. (1922), 352.
133. Quoted by McConnell, BPB, 256.

> barelegged. As night came on Bowne inquired of the keeper of the home where he was to be entertained, what arrangements were to be made for the shivering servant. The indifferent answer was that the servant could sleep under a porch, almost wholly exposed to the night air. It came near making a scandal and rocking the foundations of the British empire, in the judgment of the host, when Bowne insisted that some quarters be provided inside the house.[134]

Almost forty years later, it is only the more liberal social thinkers who have a grasp on the problem which Bowne clearly foresaw. Society can achieve its full potentialities only insofar as it becomes a moral institution—only insofar as all persons contribute to and share in its beauty and majesty.

Of final importance in Bowne's social philosophy is his view of government. He advocated a liberal democracy in which "the largest possible life and liberty for each" is "compatible with the highest good of all."[135] In such a democracy power and wealth are to be distributed on a humanitarian basis; political rights are to be equal; opportunities are to be open to all. Any government, then, as society itself, is purely instrumental. It is merely a medium through which persons reciprocally attain the fullest life. Whitman

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134. McConnell, BPB, 259.
135. Bowne, Art. (1910)[1], 527. Bristol has pointed out that Bowne was progressive in his social philosophy for holding to the idea that there are two constituent factors in well-being, "outward fortune and inner worth and peace." Both elements are necessary for "individual and social activity that shall attain ultimately the coveted goal." SA, 331.

had perhaps as clear and progressive a view as any of the personalists heretofore mentioned regarding the relationship of the many to each other in social interaction, but here one sees that Bowne is just as forward-looking. In fact, considered in the light of contemporary totalitarian and oppressive systems of government, he sounds revolutionary. Pointing out that governments "derive their rights solely from the service they render their subjects," he adds:

> . . . Whenever government fails to render service, or becomes the oppressor of the people, it loses all reason for existence and may rightly be overthrown by any power able to render the service demanded by the true interests of the people.[136]

Bowne was continually related to the practical, however, and recognized that an ideal government is possible only with ideal men. The chief task of any group of people is, therefore, to educate and moralize itself. The good society is not developed by legislation; it grows only through the mutual high regard for personality. When this occurs government becomes a well-sharpened tool whereby each citizen builds for himself and others the fullest moral and spiritual life.

If Bowne's social philosophy began empirically with a recognition of the tremendous need for social improvement—the cognizance of the many evils inhibiting social progress—it ended with an unshakable faith in an ideal for society, the mutual co-operation of enlightened persons. Though

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136. Bowne, Art. (1900), 258.

humanity does much to deny the validity of a social ideal of interacting personalities, its existence is both certain and increasingly worthful. With rare faith in his own social views, Bowne wrote the year before his death:

> One loves to dream of a time when humanity shall come to its own, when physical nature shall be subdued to human service beyond all present conception, when sin and disease shall have disappeared, when the social order shall be an expression of perfect justice, when the race shall be rich enough to afford all its members the opportunity of a truly human existence, when the bondage of physical drudgery shall be taken off human shoulders, when the treasures of knowledge shall be a universal possession, and when, in antithesis to these things and conditions there shall be in man a moral spirit wise enough to use them and strong enough to control them. Then the kingdom of man, which is also the kingdom of God, will have finally come, and the new heaven and the new earth which were seen in ancient vision will be here.[137]

6. Philosophy of Religion.

Bowne was essentially a philosopher of religion. His personalism was, by definition, the view that a "Supreme Person" created and sustained the "community of persons" which, together with Himself, constitutes reality. Throughout a long fruitful life Bowne was closely related to religious interests and was, in particular, a minister in the Methodist Church. Although he wrote in many areas of philosophy, most

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137. Bowne, Art. (1909), 722. Bowne used these same words to conclude his discussion of "The Modern Conception of the Kingdom of God." See SIC, 325-326.

of his writing was in, or related to, religious fields.[138] His philosophy of religion may be understood by a discussion of his views of God, man, prayer, the church, and the Christian life.

Bowne was preëminently theistic. His argument for that position was chiefly one of faith, or belief. He used the design argument somewhat, and occasionally appealed to the idea of cosmic causation, yet he felt that Kant was correct in pointing out that "the ontological argument properly proves nothing, and that the cosmological and design argument depend on the ontological." He went beyond Kant, however, to maintain that "there is an element of faith and volition latent in all our theorizing." Faith and belief are necessary in every field of thought. Hence one has just as much certainty in believing in God as in holding to the postulates of scientific knowledge, or knowledge in any area

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138. Bowne wrote such books as Studies in Theism, The Christian Revelation, The Immanence of God, and Studies in Christianity. Among his numerous articles he dealt with such subjects as "But Are They Converted?" "Comparing Religions," "Faith in Our Immortality," "The New Gospel," "Religion in Education," and "Gains for Religious Thought in the Last Generation." Three of Bowne's students corroborate this view of Bowne's religious intensity. Knudson termed Bowne a "vigorous defender of the faith" and wrote that "his philosophy was of the theological type." See Art. (1934), 1057. Brightman has written: "Philosophy for Bowne must be religious because life is religious. . . ." See Art. (1922), 371. Marsh, in a Founders' Day address at Boston University, said: "One of the most sovereign marks of our great philosopher was his profound religious nature." See Art. (1937), 12.

of his critics was in, or related to, metaphor rather, his philosophy of religion may be understood by a discussion of his views of God, man, language, the universe, and the christian life.

Tonne was profoundly dualistic. His argument for such dualism was actually one of faith, or belief. He used the terms argument and evidence, and occasionally appealed to the idea of logical correlation, yet he felt that faith was superior to reasoning and that "the ontological argument properly proves nothing, and that the cosmological and design arguments depend on the ontological." It went beyond fact, however, to maintain that "there is an element of faith and volition lacking in all our thinking." Faith and belief are necessary in every field of knowing. Hence one has just as much opportunity in believing as not as in relating to the postulates of scientific knowledge, or knowledge in any area

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[1]. Tonne wrote some books as articles in journals, the Christian Revelation, The Lamp of Life, and Christian in Christianity. Among his numerous articles are those with such titles as "Not Two, But Three," "Some Reflections," "Walk in Our Tomorrows," "The Ten Voices," "Volition in Humanism," and "Faith for Religious Dualism in Conversation." Tonne of course, studied contemporary trends in philosophy and theology. Kierkegaard loved a "religious dialectic of the faith" and wrote that "his philosophy was of the dialectical type." See Ibid. (1934), 1047. Tonne's two volumes "Philosophy for Human Work in Relations Human Life in Relations. . . ." See Ibid. (1934), 1047. Barth, in a foundational for modern or human dialectic, said: "One of the most convenient means of our time is dialectics was his profound religious relations. See Ibid. (1937), 15.

of life. One cannot see God, but likewise, Bowne wrote in his early Studies in Theism, one cannot see an atom, nor ether. The reality of God is discovered in life—in nature, in history, in every pursuit of the mind and spirit. Skepticism, agnosticism, and atheism are merely assumptions which "wreck both life and conscience." Theism, on the other hand, while not proved, is "an implication of our moral nature and practical life."[139] It is the "fundamental postulate of our total life."[140]

The several divine characteristics according to Bowne are: First, God is a unity, "uncompounded, indivisible, and without distinction of parts." Second, He is unchangeable. Third, He is omnipresent, the "ground of all finite existence and activity."[141] Fourth, He is eternal, that is, He transcends time, and is the "conductor of the world-process." Fifth, God is omniscient. Sixth, He is omnipotent. Finally, and inclusive of all the other attributes, God is the "complete personality."[142]

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139. Bowne, POT, 260.
140. Bowne, POT, iv.
141. Bowne, IOG, 3.
142. So ably did Bowne advocate the personality of God that Buckham wrote in 1920: "The Theism of Professor Bowne is a great advance in philosophic acumen over the conventional theism which it helped to supplant." See Art. (1920), 29. Likewise in a recent statement, McConnell lauds Bowne for his clear affirmation of the personality of God. This, he implies, is valid in contrast to the "somewhat curious turn" of much contemporary theistic thinking which discounts "the personal as relative and therefore not quite appropriate to the idea of God as

Bowne held to a religious view of man. He differed from Howison, who held that God was not the creator of man, and from Calkins, who held that man was part of the absolute. Man, according to Bowne, is a free, independent, and immortal being, created by God to participate with Him in the conservation and increase of values. Bowne was well aware of the fact that man is complex, finite, and a sinner in varying degrees. Nevertheless, he held that men

> are to pass from the unconsciousness of nature and the ignorance of childhood to the conscious recognition and acceptance of the divine will; and then they are to go on with God in deepening sympathy and growing fellowship forever.[143]

Men must accept their lives as a "gift" of God, and their duties as the "will" of God. As "God's children," they are "to be workers together with him in the divine labor of realizing his will and building up his kingdom."[144]

Prayer, to Bowne, was "the very essence of religion." He defined it broadly as the "desire and effort of the soul to relate itself and all its interests to God and his will."[145] One, in this sense, prays without ceasing; he lives with a prayerful attitude; he continuously cooperates

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absolute, or at least above anything as relative as personality." See Art. (1943), 35-38.

143. Bowne, SIC, 220.

144. Bowne, EOR, 243. Regarding Bowne's view of man, McConnell has written: "One of his [Bowne's] sentences which I recall most distinctly was that Love met us as we came into the world and Love will meet us as we go into the next." Art. (1943), 39.

145. Bowne, EOR, 132.

with God. The entire life in all its contents of varied experiences is a sacrament to the divine plan.

In dealing with the subject of prayer, Bowne arrived at several conclusions. (1) One ought not offer prayers which can be answered by himself. It is utterly foolish to petition for those things which man must work for himself. (2) One may, as a child of God, pray about everything, but in the spirit of "Thy will be done." (3) One "must not be disturbed over God's seeming delay." Impatience grows from a belief in spiritual magic. (4) "Alleged answers to prayer" should be intelligently understood.[146] (5) The life of prayer gives prayer meaning. The saying of prayers may become mechanical; the spirit of prayer is the "essence of religion," "life's deepest spring." To pray, then, is to live

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146. One is reminded of the naive faith in prayer in popular thought. Two illustrations occur to the writer: The first is the experience of the wife of a missionary who was returning from the Orient during the early phases of the present war. The ship on which she and her children were sailing was torpedoed and sunk. Most of those aboard were drowned. She and her children were saved. This, she said, was an answer to her prayer. The second illustration is that of the famed Rickenbacker rescue in the Pacific. Several of the men involved maintain that God answered their prayers directly by saving them from death at sea. Bowne would ask: "What of those who went down with the ship and for whom equally fervent and believing prayer was offered?" What of the Master's prayer that was not answered when he asked the cup to pass from him, but was answered when he prayed: "Not my will, but Thine be done?" Bowne was not skeptical of all special providences, but he was critical of claims of special answers to prayer. He was concerned that prayer should not become "blasphemous raving" nor viewed as a "talisman." See EOR, 149.

with a sense of dependence on God and a willingness to do His will.[147]

It has been stated previously that Bowne was reared in a loyal Methodist home, and that he was a lifelong champion of the interests of the church. He was, at one time, tried for heresy by his church, but the event was a discredit to his critics rather than to his churchmanship. If he was a critic of the church, it was because of his love for it, and his desire to make it a more worthy instrument of God for the moral and religious progress of man. There was in the church, according to Bowne, too much "artificial morality and pseudo-spirituality." The church must get "a deeper sense of its relation to the truth and its obligation to it;"[148] it must put itself "where it really belongs, at the head of all the forces in life that make at once for social permanence and social progress."[149] Church organizations are many; the kingdom is one. The Church will realize its high destiny when its body of believers zealously pursue the ideals of the kingdom.

One might also comment on Bowne's view of the Christian life. As all preceding American personalists, he was concerned with the dignity of the soul and its most complete development. As Royce, for instance, had concerned himself

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147. See Bowne, EOR, 153-159.
148. Bowne, SIC, 399.
149. Ibid., 354.

with a sense of dependence on God and a willingness to do His will.[147]

It has been stated erroneously that Donne was reared in a lofty Puritanism home, and that he was a lifelong observer of the tenets of the church. To say, at one time, driled for heresy by his mentor, Dr. Hoe, and then speak as a staunch to his religious mentor when to him a recommendation. If he was a victim of the church, it was because of his love for it, and his desire to make it a more worthy instrument of God's law, mercy and religious principles of man. There was in Donne's church, according to Donne, too much "artificial sociality and unnecessary ceremony." The church must get "a deeper sense of its relation to the church and its obligations to it;"[148] it must inherit "where it really belongs, at the head of all the forces in life that seek at once for moral development and social progress."[149] Through organized church are many; the church is one. The church will realize its high destiny when its body of believers realizingly possess the ideals of the kingdom.

One might also observe on Donne's view of the Christian life. As all reconciliation presupposes, he was concerned with the reality of the man and his moral development. He hoped, for instance, that nonconformist ministers

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147. Sermons, VIII, "Christ."
148. Donne, XIII, 1629.
149. Idem., 1629.

with the "beloved community" of persons within the Absolute, and, as Howison was interested in the "eternal republic" of co-creative selves, so Bowne was engrossed with the process of building "men into the realization of their Divine sonship."[150] His conclusions on the subject appear in a small book, The Christian Life, which was later revised to become a chapter in his larger book, Studies in Christianity. Some of the significant facts in the Christian Life are: (1) Personal religion is the ideal. Rites and formulas are instrumental to personal development. (2) One must distinguish between the language of theology and that of experience. (3) One must distinguish between theory, which is necessary, and the simple truth of God's grace. (4) One must put supreme emphasis upon the ethical and volitional element in conversion, and upon absolute loyalty to the will of God. (5) Religious experience is as complex and multiform as life itself. (6) Attention must be given to Christian training and edification. (7) All the normal interests of humanity—the social, industrial, educational, and political—must be taken into the field of religion; religion must be the principle of all living. (8) Methods are instrumental; it is the spiritual life in which religion must be interested.[151] Man must develop character through his own effort. He must

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150. Bowne, TCL, 143.
151. See Bowne, TCL, 144-152.

with the "beloved community" of persons within the absolutes, and, as Hocking has interpreted in the "spiritual republic" of observation matter, no person may be treated with the presence of utilitarian "and thus the production of effects giving satisfaction." This expression on his subject appears in a small book, The Spiritual Life, which was taken revision to become a chapter in his larger book, Laws for Citizenship. Some of the significant ideas in the conclusion fully read: (1) Personality-building is the ideal. Rules and Formulas are insufficient in personal development. (2) One must distinguish between the language of ideology and that of reasoning. (3) One must distinguish between thought, which is unchanging, and the subject matter of that thought. (4) One must not assume a change upon the ground that volitional element in conversion, and upon obedience directly to the will of God. (5) Religious experience is an organic and multiform as life itself. (6) Attention must be given to Christian training and edification. (7) All the moral energies of humanity--the social, intellectual, conscientious, and religious--must be given into the field of religious edification since to the growth of all living. (8) Methods are subordinated, if to the spiritual life in which religion does be interested, but moral devolop character through its own effort. So said

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(8). Hocking, ICL, 182.
(9). See Hocking, ICL, 184-185.

"plod along the dusty road of daily routine," but aware that the Spirit of Christ is with him. He must be a co-worker with God so that the divine will may be seen and done on earth as it is in heaven. Then will humanity become a "fit organ for the expression of God." Then will "the divine life flow through us and all our thoughts and work, and be the life of our life."[152] Then will man achieve his full stature as a member of the divine community of persons which constitutes reality.

7. Bowne's Place and Influence in American Philosophy.

Bowne's place in American philosophy is secure; his influence is profound. His thought has weathered the test of time for it was rooted in a rich heritage; it "moved in the regions where the central and inevitable problems of philosophy are located;"[153] it gave new depth and range to America's intellectual life.[154]

Many recent and contemporary thinkers have given increased recognition to Bowne—this despite the fact that, as has been previously mentioned, Bowne was not as influential

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152. Bowne, EOR, 285.
153. Brightman, Art. (1927), 167.
154. It has been emphasized that Bowne was aware, to some extent, of his personalistic heritage. At one time, for instance, he wrote: "In the field of metaphysics proper I note a strong tendency toward personal idealism, or as it might be called, Personalism. . . ." Art. (1905), 172.

in his day as he ought to have been. A few references were made in the early part of the chapter to indicate the high esteem in which Bowne was held by his students, his colleagues, and his fellow philosophers. Several more will be made here to validate objectively the contention that Bowne's ideological influence is steadily increasing. Baker has devoted considerable attention to Bowne in her treatment of The Concept of a Limited God.[155] The most succinct statement of Bowne's importance has been given by Brightman in his address to the Sixth International Congress of Philosophy in 1926. There, among other statements, he quoted the distinguished German philosopher, Eucken, who called Bowne "distinctly America's first philosopher."[156] Buckham has written that Bowne's book entitled Personalism "has taken its place as one of the outstanding products of American Idealism."[157] Cell put Bowne foremost in a group of thinkers who, at the turn of the twentieth century, made "eine kräftige, zielbewusste" movement toward a "personalistische Religionsphilosophie" that marked "einen Wendepunkt in der amerikanischen Philosophie."[158] In 1910 Coe wrote: "the general state of thought is much nearer the position for which he [Bowne] contended than it was when he was elected

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155. See especially 104-120 and 148.
156. See Brightman, Art. (1927), especially 165-166.
157. Buckham, Art. (1920), 29.
158. Cell, Art. (1928), 390-391.

his life day as he ought to have been. A few reservations were made in the early part of the chapter to indicate the dangerous in which Zorba was held by his students, his colleagues, and his fellow philosophers. Several more will be made more to validate objectively the conclusion that Zorba's intellectual influence is actually dangerous. Taken has devoted considerable attention to some in his treatment of The Dangers of a Liberal Mind.[125] The book concerns Zorba's work of Lowell's importance has been given by philosophers in his address to the Sixth International Congress of Philosophy in 1926. There, among other observations, he quoted the distinguished German philosopher, Windelband, who called Zorba "historically America's first philosopher."[126] Windelband wrote that Zorba's book entitled Experiences "has taken its place as one of the masterpieces of American literature."[127] Until just some fourteen in a group of philosophers who, as the born of the twentieth century, made "also practice, philosophers" movement toward a "professionalization activities-philosophers" that marked "often withdrawal in the [illegible] Philosophy."[128] In 1910 Zorba wrote: "the general state of philosophy is much poorer the position for which he [illegible] contributed than it was when he was elected

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125. Zorba, op. cit. (1929), 300-301.
126. Zorba, op. cit. (1929), 300-301.
127. Windelband, Art. (1927), particularly 140-142.
128. Zorba, op. cit. (1929), 300-301.

to his professorship in Boston University."[159] Cunningham, too, in his able book, The Idealistic Argument in Recent British and American Philosophy, devoted nineteen pages to Bowne, who, he says, "was very influential as a teacher of philosophy."[160] Duncan has written that Bowne's personalism "furnishes the soundest possible basis for ethics, pedagogy, and civil society," and that "it alone can give an account of the relation of the human self to the divine self . . . upon which religion may securely rest."[161] Ferm, who in his textbook, First Adventures in Philosophy, has devoted some attention to personalism, calls Bowne "the great exponent and father of the school of Personalism."[162] Flewelling, who has been previously quoted, founded in 1920 The Personalist, a quarterly which represents the Bowne tradition. Gamertsfelder and Evans, in their widely used textbook, Fundamentals of Philosophy, refer to Bowne frequently and state that the "present important place" of personalism "is due to the influence of B. P. Bowne."[163] Knudson, who has been called "the outstanding personalistic theologian of the English-speaking world,"[164] paralleled Hocking's well-known

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159. Coe, Art. (1910), 522-523.
160. See 315-333.
161. Duncan, Art. (1922), 386. Italics my own.
162. See 170. Ferm, as most writers, has identified Bowne so closely with Lotze that he has completely overlooked the American strains of thought that have helped make a strong personalism possible.
163. See 480, also 237, 238, 430, 541, 563, and 710.
164. See Brightman, PIT, vii.

in his professorship in Boston University.[185] Quidenham, too, in his sole book, *The Immortality of Science in Recent British and American Philosophy*, devoted nineteen pages to Bowne, who, he says, "was very influential as a teacher of philosophy."[186] Bowne has written that Lotze's personalism "maintains the soundest possible basis for ethics, pedagogy, and civil society," and that "it alone can give an account of the relation of the human soul to the divine soul . . . upon which religion and morality rest."[187] Bowne, who in his textbook, *First Adventures in Philosophy*, has devoted some attention to personalism, calls Bowne "the great exponent and future of the school of personalism."[188] Flewelling, who has been previously quoted, founded in 1903 *The Personalist*, a quarterly which represents the Bowne tradition. Incidentally and hence, in a quite minor and indirect, *Philosophy of Philosophy*, refer to Bowne frequently and state that the "previous American phase" of personalism "is due to the influence of B. P. Bowne."[189] Flewelling, who has been called "the outstanding personalistic exponent of the Christian-spiritual world view,"[190] translated Boutroux's well-known

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185. Cf., Ibid. (1910), 222-223.
186. Ibid. 310-320.
187. Bowne, Op. (1902), 98. Italics my own.
188. The 1910. Bowne, in most matters, was identified Bowne as a disciple with Lotze that he has consistently overlooked the Kantian elements of thought that have figured such a strong personalistic movement.
189. See also Op. 30, 43, 49, 52, 55, and 110.
190. See Quidenham, 313, 321.

tribute to Bowne's metaphysics with one to Bowne's theology. Knudson wrote:

> . . . It may be said that as a summary account of the curve of apologetic thought since the time of Schleiermacher there is no more powerful and convincing chapter in American theological writing than that of Bowne on the nature and basis of religious faith.[165]

Patrick referred to Bowne's Personalism, with several other books on idealism, as representing "the idealistic tradition in its modern form," and as being of "lasting value."[166] Pratt, in his Personal Realism, mentioned Bowne in the distinctive company of Lotze, Green, the Cairds, Royce, Hocking, Ward, and Brightman—all of whom have permanent philosophical significance.[167] So, too, Thilly mentioned Bowne with a group of eminent thinkers in his History of Philosophy.[168] In speaking of Bowne, Wieman has also classified him with others, viz., W. A. Brown and D. C. Macintosh, both of whom he calls "representative liberals."[169] Wilson, a personalist, referred to Bowne as a writer of one of the "improved forms of idealism."[170] It should also be noted that Bowne is referred to, along with the outstanding American philosophers, in one of the ablest histories of modern philosophy

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165. Knudson, Art. (1934), 1057.
166. Patrick, ITP, 222.
167. See Pratt, PR, 216.
168. Thilly, HOP, 562.
169. Wieman, GOR, 455.
170. Wilson, SAIW, 166. Wilson also quoted Bowne in a book written just before his death. See RWL, 104.

to be published in recent years, that by Wright of Dartmouth College.[171] Finally, one of the most interesting tributes to Bowne is that made by a Latin American philosopher of broad background, Fránquiz of the University of Puerto Rico. He says of Bowne what this investigation established for the entire tradition of American personalism; he has not only written that Bowne is "one of the greatest minds of the Western Hemisphere," a superlative tribute in itself, but has gone on to say that his "thought contributed in many ways to the intellectual strengthening of all the values and institutions for which American history and Christian democracy must stand."[172] The personalistic tradition has given continuous force and guidance to the genius of American life. Be that as it may, these several references to Bowne's influence have been cited despite the risk of being tedious, to validate the contention that his thought is significant, his influence profound.

There are several important reasons for Bowne's significant position in American philosophy. First, and foremost, he was the systematic organizer of personalism. There had been many American thinkers before him who had emphasized

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171. See Wright, HOMP, 485.
172. Fránquiz, POC, viii. It is interesting to note that Fránquiz is one of a large number of second generation Bowne enthusiasts. He received his doctorate under Brightman, who, he says, "has nurtured the budding philosophic consciousness of contemporary Latin America." See the front page of POC.

to be published in recent years, that by weight of statements Collins.[171] Finally, one of the most independent thinkers to Dewey is that held by a leading American philosopher of broad background, Brogan of the University of Iowa Also. He says of Dewey that this lived position established for the native tradition of American pragmatism; he has not only written that Dewey is "one of the greatest minds of the Nineteenth," a superlative quote is itself, but has done so by say that his "thought contributed in many ways to the intellectual strengthening of all the values, a lasting place for which American history and Christian democracy must stand."[172] The pragmatic tradition has been continuous and guidance to the course of American life. So that as it may, there several references to Dewey's influence have been added (varying the play of being critics), to validate the conclusion that new insights in scientific, his influence protocol.

There are several important images for Dewey's significant position in American philosophy. First, and foremost, he was the systematic organizer of pragmatism. Since had been many American thinkers before him who had emphasized

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171. See Brogan, op. cit.

172. Principle, ibid, vi 1. It is interesting to note that Principle is one of a large number of second generation Dewey enthusiasts. He received his doctorate from Columbia, and, as says, "has mastered the leading philosophic movements of contemporary Latin America."
See the front page of PDF.

personality as the only adequate concept by which one could understand the problems of life and reality. He, however, amplified that concept, gave it breadth and depth, dealt with it thoroughly in most of the areas of philosophy, and, for the first time, expressed comprehensively its wide-ranged importance. He was not, by any means, the first personalist, even though he did make an independent "synthesis of the contributions to personalistic thought made by Berkeley, Kant, and Lotze." He was original, however, in his systematic organization of preceding personalistic thought both in Europe and in America. And he was indeed, as the first completely systematic personalist, the "father of the school of personalism."

Second, Bowne was a "typical" personalist. As pointed out earlier, his position gave equal recognition to the valid claims of both pluralism and absolutism. He took the Aristotelian golden mean between the two views so ably advocated within the personalistic tradition by Davidson and Howison on the one hand and by Royce and Calkins on the other. As a catalytic agent his thought softened the sharp contrasts between the opposing views not only within personalism, but between the rigors of the older German and British absolute idealism and the newer pluralism of British and American writers. Bowne, with Johnson, Edwards, Alcott, Whitman, and Harris, was less extreme than either Howison or Calkins. He was, therefore, more able to give a balanced

recognition to both the Supreme Person and the finite person, to the group and the individual. As a happy balance between totalitarianism and anarchy, his position represents, more completely than the others, the philosophical foundations of American democracy and Christian culture.

Third, he was a great teacher. Knudson has written that "his professional chair was his throne." Brightman has added that virtually every student in Boston University during Bowne's time was "required to study under" him, and that most of the theological students "elected to do so." It was Bowne's attractiveness as a teacher that enabled him to transmit the fruits of his vigorous mind and radiant spirit to the countless numbers of students who have carried his views around the world.

Finally, Bowne will live as the "father" of a great tradition in American philosophy. He, more than anyone else, is responsible for the existence of personalism as a distinctive school. This is due to the above mentioned combination of facts—his systematic organization of thought, his melioristic position, and his greatness as a teacher. His American antecedents and contemporaries, including such eminent personalists as Wilson and Ladd, as well as those who are more fully treated in this investigation, did not develop as complete a system as Bowne. They were not as prolific. Their views were not as true to the American heritage. They did not gather a large group of enthusiastic students about

recognition to both the Apollonian fashion and the Platte journal, to the group politics indivisible. As a honey Palmer brought voluntarism and energy, his practice was pragmatic, more emphatically than the others, the individualized formulations of American democracy and unreality coincide.

Third, he was a great teacher. Emerson has written that "his personality that was his strength." Dewey was such that virtually every student in Boston University during Bowne's time was "mesmerized by Bowne under him, and that most of the sociological students "almost in awe." It was Bowne's extraordinary as a teacher that enabled him to transmit the fruits of his strenuous mind and reflexive models to the nonetheless numerous of students who have carried his views around the world.

Finally, Bowne will live as the "father" of a great tradition in American philosophy. He, more than anyone else, is responsible for the existence of personalism as a distinctive school. This is due to the above mentioned combination of lucid-his systematic organization of thought, his realistic position, and his prestige as a teacher. His amazing antecedents and contemporaries, including some eminent personalities as allies and lead, as well as those who are more fully treated in this investigation, did not develop as complete a system as Bowne. They were not as prolific. Their views were not as tied to the practical heritage. They did not gather a large group of admirable students about

them who later assumed responsible positions in the religious and educational life of the nation. Each made a significant contribution to personalism, but it was Bowne who established it as a definite school. While Bowne was not as original as he was heretofore thought to be, he may, nevertheless, be considered more than anyone else the founder of personalism in America. He proclaimed, with greater vigor and insight than any of his antecedents or contemporaries, the significance of personality in all areas of thought and life and action. His permanent philosophical significance is assured.

8. Summary.

Bowne, it is thus seen, was the first distinctive representative of plural-monistic personalism. His keen, critical mind, broad interests, and intense love for teaching enabled him to organize the noblest philosophical fruits of the past and transmit them as a system to the future. As a young thinker he gained much from his immediate professors, Clark and Martin of New York University, and Ulrici and Lotze of Germany. As an able student of the history of philosophy he drew personalistic ideas from Leibniz, Berkeley, Kant, and Hegel. As an American with a significant heritage he appreciated the thought of Edwards, was familiar with the views of Alcott and Cook, and knew the personalistic posi-

Bacon who later assumed responsible positions in the religious and educational life of the nation. Each made a signifi-cant contribution to personalism, but it was Bowne who established it as a definite school. While Bowne was not as original as he was Borden thought to be, in any, nevertheless, he contributed more than anyone else the idea of personalism in America. In practical, with greater vigor and insight than any of his antecedents on metaphysics, the adaptiveness of personality to all areas of thought and life and action. His personal philosophical elements is summed.

B. Summary.

Bowne, it is then seen, was the first distinctive representative of pluralistic personalism. His keen, critical mind, broad interests, and indomitable love for truth enabled him to see also the modern philosophical trends of his part and transmit them as a system to the future. As a young thinker he gained much from his immediate predecessors, Dana and Martin of New York University, and Lotze of Gottingen. As an adaptation of the history of philosophy he saw permanent ideas from India, Europe, Greece, and Israel. As an American with a scientific bent, he appreciated the insight of Spencer, was familiar with views of Atomic and God, and knew the mechanistic ideal-

tions of Harris, Howison, and Royce. He clarified and elaborated the preceding thought, took a mediating position between some of the extremes of others, and through a host of students and followers established his general position as a dominant note in American philosophy.

From his central thought—that personality is the key to reality, several basic concepts evolve. Self-activity is central in his epistemology; knowledge is possible through conscious personal experience. Metaphysical reality consists of a plurality of finite persons who are created and sustained by the Supreme Person, the most complete personality. In the field of ethics Bowne held that moral values are achieved by self-realization and by living in harmony with the will of the Supreme Person. His social philosophy began with a recognition of the need for greater opportunities of self-development; it ended with the conviction that the idea of harmonious interaction between persons will be achieved on the plane of local, broad humanitarian, and cosmic experience. In his philosophy of religion, Bowne maintained a forceful theism, proclaimed the divinity of man, championed the validity of prayer, supported the church as an institution, and advocated the supreme importance of living a Christian life.

Further, it has been seen that Bowne's position in American philosophy is tremendously significant for several reasons. First, he methodically organized personalism into

ction of Burke, Dewey, and Royce. He identified and elucidated the governing thought, took a medieval problem between none of the extremes of pitmen, and wrote a book of eloquence and full-grown consciousness his personal problem as a German note in American philosophy.

Thus his central thought--that personality is the key to reality, central basic concepts evolve. Rationalizing is central in his epistemology; involves in metaphysics through consciousness dependence. Metaphysics results from state of a quantity of finite persons who are related and associated in the supreme Person, the most complete personality. In the field of ethics Bowne held that moral values are achieved by self-realization and by living in harmony with the will of the Supreme Person. His social philosophy began with a reconstruction of the dual d'r greater organism of self-development; it ended with the conviction that the idea of harmonious interrelations between persons will be achieved on the plane of local, based humanitarian, and cosmic experience. In his philosophy of religion, Bowne maintained a forceful theism, emphasized the divinity of man, championed the validity of reason, supported the church as institution, and advocated the supreme importance of living a Christian life.

Further, it has been seen that Bowne's philosophy in American philosophy is essentially idealistic--several transcendent. Finally, he emphatically stressed personalism into

a system. Second, his position, which represents a logical synthesis between pluralistic and absolutistic personalism, made him the first important representative of the most comprehensive type of personalism, plural-monistic. Third, as a brilliant teacher and prolific writer, he exerted great influence through his many eminent students and followers. Finally, he is the father of a specific personalistic tradition.

As America matures, and as the philosophical foundations of its life and institutions become more evident, it will be increasingly discovered that Bowne has given brilliant expression to a dominant indigenous philosophy.

CHAPTER VI

COMPARISON OF THE THREE DISTINCT TYPES OF PERSONALISM

The results of the investigation thus far have shown the development of personalism in the United States and have indicated the chief ideas in the three distinct types. The remaining task is to compare the types in terms of the lives and influence of the philosophers, the fundamental issues that led up to the division of types, and the way in which the differences are associated in specific issues.

1. Comparison of the Lives and the Influence of the Philosophers.

Johnson and Edwards came from excellent colonial families, made the most of their educational opportunities, and contributed richly to the life of the young nation through the church and the field of education. They established no school of thought as such. Alcott, Whitman, Davidson, and Harris were contemporaries of varying influence. Alcott, who was unsettled in his early life, had more influence than is usually assumed. He served as a mediator between the East and the West, or more specifically, between the Concord transcendentalists and the St. Louis School, and directly influenced Harris. Whitman led a full, varied life. He is known chiefly as a poet, but will be remembered as the bard

Chapter VI

SUMMARIZING OF THE THREE DISTINCT TYPES OF PERSONALITY

The results of the investigation thus far have shown the development of personality in the United States and have indicated the which lines in the three distinct types. The correlations found in the research are crude in terms of the given and influence of the self-reports, the fundamental issues that led up to the division of types, and the way in which the differences are associated in specific ways.

1. Comparison of the Given and the Influence of the Religious.

Judson and Edwards come from excellent colonial families, have the most of their educational opportunities, and contributed nicely to the life of the young nation through the church and the field of education. They established no series of thought or such. Alcott, Emerson, Brownson, and Parker were contemporaries of varying influence. Alcott, who was idealistic in his early life, had more influence than is usually assumed. He served as a mediator between the East and the West, or more specifically, between the Unitarian transcendentalists of the St. Louis School, and directly influenced Emerson. Emerson had a full, varied life. He is known mainly as a poet, but will be remembered as the leader

of personality and democracy who was concerned that America rise to its full stature by placing personality central in its life. Davidson was born in Scotland, became well educated, travelled back and forth from continent to continent, and poured his passion for persons into the life of the world. Harris dominated the American philosophical and educational scene for many years, yet he does not have the permanent significance of some of the other thinkers such as Edwards or Whitman. Royce, who began his life on the frontier of California and rose to eminence as one of America's most brilliant philosophers, had few followers and has been relatively neglected in recent years. He was not self-consciously personalistic to the extent that he was aware of belonging to that school of thought.

Of chief concern perhaps is the difference in the lives and influence of Howison, Calkins, and Bowne. Howison came to prominence slowly; he did not secure the position in which he was most completely happy until he was fifty years of age. His writing, although significant, was limited. He was a brilliant teacher, however, and contributed to the personalistic consciousness of American philosophy. Calkins began her life in a parsonage, was well educated, and gave early promise of a fruitful career. She had no disciples, yet wrote considerably, and championed personalism vigorously in both American philosophy and psychology. Bowne, too, indicated promise early in life. He became a prolific writer,

of personality and discovery who was concerned that America rise to the realization by placing personality central in its life. Dreiser was born in Indiana, became well educated, travelled deep and long from vagrancy to continents, and poured his passion for personal into the life of the nation. Dreiser dominated the American multilingual and cosmopolitical scene for many years, yet he does not have the economic significance or mass of the other subjects such as Twenty or Whitman. Joyce, who began his life on the frontiers of Dublin and was to emigrate as one of America's most brilliant verbalizers, had few followers and has been relatively neglected in recent years. He was not self-consciously preoccupied to the extent that he was aware of belonging to that school or element.

Of equal concern perhaps is the difference in the lives and influence of Joyce, Dreiser, and Twenty. Having been of prodigious ability he did not assume the position in which he was most creatively large until he was fifty years of age. His writing, at once a significant, was lonely. Dreiser's brilliant tenacity, however, was connected to the pragmatic consciousness of American philosophy. Twenty began his life in a personality, was well educated, and gave early promise of a literary career. She had an integrity, yet were considerably, and abundant accomplishing vigorously in such American writing and periodical. Dreiser, too, integrated problems early in life. He became a prolific author,

a churchman, and an able teacher. He was the first to organize personalism systematically into a definite school of thought. His plural-monistic position represents the typical strain of personalistic thought in America and is a logical synthesis (arrived at independently) between the extremes of Howison and Calkins. He gained many followers (although they differ from him and from each other in several significant ways) and may be considered the most influential exponent of personalism up to and including his own day.

2. The Fundamental Issues that Lead up to the Division of Types.

The fundamental issues that lead to the division of personalism into pluralistic, absolutistic, and plural-monistic types are the basic questions that have concerned philosophers ever since Thales. How can a person know, and what can he know? What is the nature of reality? Is it one or many? What is the nature of moral experience and behavior? What is the nature of society? Is it a totalitarian whole in which the parts are subservient? Is each part a law unto itself? Or, is each part related to the other and to the totality in some rational manner? What is the nature of God? Is he absolute, one among many, or the Supreme Being who creates and sustains all other persons? What of the finite person? Is he a part of the whole, an independent entity,

or a free co-worker with God? These questions, basic for all philosophers, concerned the personalists of America. The answers they gave were different in some respects and similar in others. The differences, from the time of Johnson on, are seen most clearly in the views of Howison, Calkins, and Bowne.

3. The Way in Which the Differences Are Associated with Specific Issues.

All the American personalists agree, when dealing with the problem of epistemology, that an active self is basic. Pluralistic personalism, however, makes knowledge almost a matter of coincidence. Davidson makes feeling the unifying factor while Howison holds to a "spontaneous objective cognition" by each mind. Absolutistic personalism goes to the other extreme of holding that each person is directly aware of his world inasmuch as he is part of the absolute. Plural-monistic personalism, as represented by Johnson, Edwards, Alcott, Whitman, Harris, and Bowne, holds that the mind is active and creative. Bowne, in particular, pointed out that the mind creates its own world and is distinct from the object of its thought.[1]

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1. These thinkers did not hold, however, as did Howison, that the finite mind creates the objective phenomenal world.

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3. The Way in which the Differences Are Resolved with Concrete Issues.

All the American personalities agree, when dealing with the problem of spirituality, that an active soul is basic. Idealistic personalities, however, make knowledge almost a matter of consciousness. Emerson seems feeling the unifying factor while Jonathan joins to a "consciousness, objective cognition" by such ethic. Absolutistic personalities go to the other extreme of holding that each person is thoroughly aware of his world inasmuch as he is part of the objective literal-monistic personality, as realized by Johnson, Edwards, Alcott, Whitman, Lowell, and Dewey, holds that one and is active and creative. Dewey, in particular, points out that the idea changes in one world and is distinct from the object of its knowledge.[1]

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1. Dewey quite was all not only, however, as did Emerson, that the finite will creates the objective phenomenal world.

In the field of metaphysics the three types agree that reality is personal. From that point on, however, the differences become acute. The pluralists maintain that all persons have infinite and eternal individuality. The world of order and system is attained for Howison by the attraction of the metaphysically distinct personalities to the "One Ideal." Final causation is the basic concept in his "harmonic pluralism." The absolutistic position is that things and persons are varying expressions of the One Absolute Person. Royce, Calkins, and Hocking all agree on this point. The Absolute preserves order and system, is the ultimate cause, embodies the absolute unity of all experience, and is supra-temporal and supra-spatial. Every aspect of the universe is part of the Absolute Person's self-experiencing. Plural-monistic personalism takes a mediating position. It holds, with Alcott, that "The Person is the presupposition of all things and beings." The Supreme Person "produces and coordinates the many." The World-Ground is, thus, neither one among many nor the all-inclusive Absolute. He creates and sustains, yet allows freedom and independence for his creatures; in fact, he needs finite persons to express his own personality as a social being. Freedom is more intelligible in the third type.

The differences in the field of ethics are not too acute. To be sure, the pluralists hold to a "self-determining power" on the part of the finite person, the absolutists

In the field of metaphysics the three types appear thus reality is pictured. From this point on, however, the differences become more. The idealistic subjects take all things have definite and external individuality. The world of order and system is attained for Emerson by the subjection of the metaphysically distinct personalities to the "One Ideal." Final unanimation is the basis concept in his "Universal Spiritism." The absolutists posited in what things and persons are varying expressions of the one absolute Person. Royce, Dewey, and Bowne all agree on this point. The Absolute preserves order and system, in the ultimate sense, embodies the absolute unity of all experiences, and is super-personal and super-material. Every aspect of the universe is part of the Absolute Personal Spiritualism. Plural-monistic teleologists leave a modifying problem. Dewey, with Royce, that "The Person is the transcendent of all things and beings." The Universe Person "Does and coordinates the many." The World-Ground is, then, neither one among many nor the all-inclusive Absolute. In strength and structure, you minus freedom and independence for the creatures. In fact, he sees finite persons in the person his own personality as a social being. Freedom is more inevitable in the Dewey type.

The differences in the fields of ethics are not so acute. To be sure, the idealists held up a "perfectionism" over" on the part of the finite person, the absolutists

are concerned with moral experience for the "beloved community," and the plural-monistic personalists are interested in individual achievement of morality by living in harmony with the will of the Supreme Person. These differences are elemental from the speculative viewpoint, yet they become less important when one considers the fact that all of the American personalists were vitally concerned with "the moralization of life." Every self realizes its own potentialities as it conserves and increases the "fulness and richness of life" for the total society of persons.

One finds no systematic treatment of social philosophy by any of the personalists considered in this investigation. All of the thinkers were interested, however, in social problems and treated them in various parts of their writing. Johnson and Edwards, for instance, worked through the church and educational institutions for the improvement of society. Alcott was concerned with opportunities for the negroes, with woman suffrage, and with improving the status of labor. Whitman was passionately interested in the elimination of war and with the establishment of personalistic democracy in the "new world." Davidson championed economic justice, political freedom, and educational opportunity for all. He criticized the whole structure of civilization for using persons as tools rather than as ends. So, too, with Harris, Royce, Howison, Calkins and Bowne. The last two were perhaps more systematic than the others in their social philosophy.

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One finds no systematic treatment of social philosophy by any of the personalists considered in this investigation. All of the thinkers were interested, however, in social problems and treated them in various parts of their writings. Johnson and Howard, for instance, wrote concerning the church and governmental institutions for the improvement of society. Ahlstrom was concerned with opportunities for the masses, with human welfare, and with improving the status of labor. Bowne was practically interested in the elimination of war and with the establishment of personalistic democracy in the "new world." Davidson championed economic justice, political freedom, and educational opportunity for all. He criticized the whole economic of civilization for making "means as tools rather than as ends." So, too, with Bergle, Jones, Flewelling, Taylor and Brown. The fact has been mentioned more systematic than the others in their moral philosophy.

The reason the differences in the social philosophies of the three types are not acute is because all three types make personality of supreme importance. That is, they are all concerned with spiritual reality. If any type were materialistic or impersonal then indeed there would be an ideological conflict between the personalistic camps. As long as personality is basic in the social structure the speculative differences are lost sight of in the practical treatment of persons as ends in themselves.

A final question of difference in the three types of personalism is that of philosophy of religion. All the American personalists that have been considered were, in varying degrees, religious in both their private lives and their philosophic outlook. There are significant differences, however, in their philosophies of religion. God, for the pluralists, is only one among many. Especially is this true for Howison who holds that God is not creative, but the "Ideal," the Final Cause of the "Eternal Republic." On the other hand God is the All in All for the Absolutists, and with the exception of emphasis upon personality, one recognizes a close relationship to the thought of such men as Plotinus and Hegel. The plural-monistic personalists again take a mediating position. God is, for them, the Supreme Creative Self who allows independent activity for his finite persons. This view was championed with particular vigor by Alcott and Bowne; the latter, however, was far more system-

atic and comprehensive in his treatment. None of the plural-monistic personalists whose thought has been examined here championed the doctrine of a finite God, a view that has several ardent advocates among the followers of Bowne.

A distinct difference in the three types is evident in the view of man. Man is of greatest significance for the pluralists. Howison holds that man is the co-creator with God of the entire universe including physical nature. God is simply the Ideal. Man is of least cosmic significance for the absolutists; he is part of the whole even though he does exercise considerable freedom. The mediating position of those who hold to pluralistic monism makes man not a co-creator of physical nature, but a co-creator and sustainer of values, and a co-worker with the Supreme Person in building the Kingdom of God. The self is immortal for all types of American personalism. The pluralists find immortality in the consciousness of the reality of the City of God; the absolutists maintain that each self is an eternal expression of the Absolute in a non-temporal form; the pluralistic-monists hold that the life of each self continues as an independent consciousness relating itself to the will of the Supreme Person.

Prayer is valid in all three types. For the first, prayer is conscious interaction between the entire community of selves based upon "Inclusive Reason." For the second, prayer is direct; it is social and private; it relates the

sis and comprehensive in his treatment. Some of the philosophic speculations whose thoughts are here examined have discussed the doctrine of a finite God, a view that has several ardent advocates among the followers of Bowne.

A distinct difference in the three types is evident in the view of man. Man is of greatest significance for the pluralists. Bowne holds that man is the co-creator with God of the entire universe including physical nature. God is simply the Ideal. Man is of lesser importance for the absolutists; he is part of the whole and can change by does therefore contribute freedom. The metaphysic position of these two hold to a unrelated contradiction and not a co-creator of the ideal nature, but a co-creator and contributor of values, and a co-worker with the Supreme Person in building the Kingdom of God. The only is important for all types of theistic personalism. The pluralists find importance in the correlativeness of the reality of the City of God; the absolutists maintain that man's self is an eternal manifestation of the Absolute in a non-temporal form; the pluralists-relists hold that the life of each self contributes as an independent component relating itself to the will of the Supreme Person.

Prayer is valid in all these types. For the first, prayer is communion interaction between the finite personality of values based upon "mutually free." For the second, prayer is directly in its social and relational relates the

worshiper to the Absolute and to the other selves who are part of his being. The third type holds that prayer is social and individual, but emphasizes freedom more than the absolutists and, also, the necessity of praying to do the will of God more than do the pluralists.

All types are concerned with the church and the Christian life. Davidson and Howison were not too closely related to the church, although Howison had studied for the ministry. Royce and Calkins were interested in the church, but, again, were not a vital part of it. Johnson, Edwards, and Bowne in particular, of the third type, were clergymen as well as philosophers and championed the Christian life.

4. Similarities and Differences in the Three Types.

An interesting similarity among the personalists themselves is the fact that they all gained national and international recognition for their vigorous points of view, their exemplary lives, and their contributions to the life of our nation. The types are also similar in several matters of thought. All base knowledge upon the experience of a self. All maintain that ultimate reality is personal. The three types are religious in outlook and furnish a satisfactory philosophy of religion for the separate exponents. Each type is concerned with a moral order and a just social system. Of the three significant representatives of each type,

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back of his being. The ideal type holds that prayer is so-
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d. Similarities and Differences in the three types.

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type is concerned with a moral order and a just social sys-
tem. In the three significant representatives of each type,

Howison champions the "Eternal Republic," Calkins the "Great Society," and Bowne the "Kingdom of God." These specific thinkers were particularly outspoken in their attacks upon impersonalism, skepticism, and the false claims made by the exponents of a crude evolutionism. They were in the vanguard of the American philosophers who reacted against the limitations of a philosophy based upon natural science while utilizing the fruits of the exact scientists and doing justice in their systems to the newer sciences of biology, sociology, and psychology. They were the vikings of a more comprehensive philosophy than was possible during the early nineteenth century, the champions of one that has expanded in the twentieth century.

The chief difference in the three types of personalism is metaphysical. The pluralistic personalists hold that reality consists of a plurality of co-creative and co-eternal selves. The absolutists subscribe to the view that reality is one—the Absolute. Every last fact in the universe is a part of the absolute's experience. The pluralistic-monists attempt to do justice to all factors of experience. In such a position there is a basal monism in the unity of the world ground and in the quality of reality; there is a pluralism of quantity, for while each self is dependent upon the Supreme Person it possesses its own unique individuality. This three-way difference, as was indicated in the treatment of the manner in which the differences are associated with

Kayano characterizes the "Eternal Recursion," Guéroult the "Great Anatomy," and Dewey the "Kingdom of Job." Those specific thinkers were particularly susceptible to their attacks upon improvisation, speculation, and the false claims made by the supporters of a crude rationalism. They were in the vanguard of the American philosophers who required equivalent the identity of a philosophy based upon neutral entities which mirror the truths of the exact naturalists and define in their system to the mere relations of biology, anatomy, and psychology. They were the vitalists of a kind overcome-ava philosophy than was possible during the early nineteenth century, the absence of one that has expanded in the twentieth century.

The major difference in the three types of personalism is methodical. The pluralistic personalists hold that reality consists of a plurality of co-operative and self-sufficient selves. The objectivists subscribe to the view that reality is one--the Absolute. Every lost life in the universe is a part of the absolutely perfectness. The dialectic-monists attempt to do justice to all degrees of experience. In such a position there is a basic unity in the unity of the world ground and in the quality of reality; there is a dialectic of quantity. For while each self is distinguishes upon the 1-1 from Prince it possesses the one higher individuality. This three-way difference, as was indicated in the treatment of the essays in which the differences are discussed with

specific philosophical issues, runs throughout the whole range of speculation, and, to a lesser degree, throughout the practical application of ideas to life. Pluralism and monism are usually extreme. Plural-monistic personalism accounts for the claims of each and arrives at a logical synthesis. It has consequently been more dominant than the other two types throughout the history of American philosophy. Bowne was both its most systematic organizer and its most vigorous exponent.

5. Summary of the Comparison of Types.

It has been seen that pluralistic personalism is represented by Davidson and Howison, and absolutistic personalism by Royce and Calkins. Plural-monistic personalism was held by Johnson, Edwards, Alcott, Whitman, Harris, and Bowne. Of the entire group, Bowne was the only thinker to establish his position firmly as a definite school of thought. He was, therefore, the most influential personalist up to and including his own day.

The fundamental issues which lead up to the division of types centered about the chief questions of philosophy. Similarities and differences are, therefore, evident in the fields of epistemology, metaphysics, ethics, social philosophy, and philosophy of religion. All types are preëminently similar in the fact that each forms the basis for a spiritual

specific philosophical issues, thus throughout the whole range of speculation, and, to a lesser degree, throughout the practical application of ideas to life. Extremes and middles are usually extreme. Pluralistic personalism accounts for the claims of each and everyone as a logical syncrasis. It has consequently been more dominant than the other two types throughout the history of American philosophy. Hence one finds its most systematic expounders and its most vigorous champions.

E. History of the development of types.

It has been seen that pluralistic personalism is represented by Davidson and Dewey, that monistic idealism by Royce and Cohen. Pluralistic personalism was held by Jackson, Edwards, Alcott, Whitman, Howison, and Brown. At the earlier period, Jones was the only thinker to maintain the position fully as a definite school of thought. He was, therefore, the most influential personalist up to and including his own day.

The fundamental issues which led up to the division of types centered about the chief questions of philosophy. Dualism, i.e. a difference here, therefore, evident in the field of epistemology, metaphysics, ethics, social philosophy, and philosophy of religion. All types are confident in the last that each has found the basis for a satisfactory

view of life. Each is concerned with the dignity of man and the harmonious relationship of all persons within the universe. The most important difference, and one which is felt to some degree in every field of thought, is that the pluralists emphasize the complete independence of every self, the absolutists make every self a part of the whole, and the pluralistic-monists recognize the freedom and uniqueness of every self while holding that each is dependent upon (not a part of) the Supreme Person. The latter type has been the most influential in the history of American philosophy.

CHAPTER VII

A CRITICAL CONCLUSION

Personalism has been a dominant philosophy in the history of American thought. It has grown in strength and breadth throughout each period as various thinkers have made their individual contributions. The interdependent interplay of personalistic ideas found its fullest expression in the views of Howison, Calkins, and Bowne, each of whom represents the different points of view that have been referred to throughout this investigation as distinct types of personalism. Despite this three-fold division, personalism has always regarded personality as the ultimate category of reality and life. Each of the many thinkers, therefore, not only added to the cumulative deposit of personalistic thought, but also played an important role in the life of the nation; democracy and a Christian culture have been made possible in America through the belief in the intrinsic worth of the individual and in the necessity of each person living harmoniously with the total group of persons.

The investigation has been chiefly historical and academic. Its significance, however, is contemporary and creative. For that reason the conclusions are historical, comparative, and critical.

First, personalism's position in the historical devel-

CHAPTER VII

A CRITICAL CONCLUSION

Personality has been a dominant philosophy in the history of American thought. It has grown in strength and depth throughout such period in various philosophers have made their individual contributions. The anthropomorphic interpretation of personality takes first its fullest expression in the views of Dewey, Perkins, and Bowne, each of whom represents the different points of view that have been preferred in throughout this investigation as distinct types of personality. Despite this three-fold division, personality has always supported personality as the ultimate category of reality and life. Each of the many thinkers, however, not only added to the cumulative deposit of personalistic thought, but also played an important role in the life of the nation: democracy and a Christian culture have been made possible in America through the belief in the intrinsic worth of the individual and in the necessity of each person living harmonously with the total group of persons.

The investigation has been critically historical and analytic. Its significance, however, is contemporary and creative. For that reason the conclusions are historical, comparative, and critical.

First, personality's position in the history shows

opment of philosophy should be more widely recognized. The earlier American personalists were unaware of their philosophical heritage. By the time of Bowne the broad general background of personalism was becoming evident. Bowne intended to write a history of philosophy with this in mind, but was unable to before his death. Knudson has stated this development most succinctly by placing in the "personalistic Hall of Fame" Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, Augustine, Aquinas, Descartes, Leibniz, Berkeley, Kant, Hegel, Lotze, and Bowne. He has steadily maintained that personalism

> represents one of the oldest and broadest currents in the history of human thought; it stands organically and structurally related to the spiritual philosophy of all the ages. It is the ripe fruit of more than two millenniums of intellectual toil, the apex of a pyramid whose base was laid by Plato and Aristotle.[1]

Flewelling, too, has written of the historical development of personalism. Among other things, he has pointed out that

> the great epochs of progress in western society have centered upon some phase of this conflict over the place of the person in the structure of society, some new discovery of the person in respect to social relations.[2]

Other personalists have referred to historical backgrounds,

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1. Knudson, POP, 434.
2. Flewelling, Art. (1943), 174. See, also, his recent discussion of The Survival of Western Culture. In this new book he answers Spengler by concluding that Western culture will survive. Among his several reasons for this view is his idea that "there is coming in philosophy a new understanding of the importance and place of the person in any adequate view of reality and the cosmic order." SOWC, 298.

cement of philosophy should be more clearly recognized. The neoplatonic Alexandrian-Christian mystics were masters of their philosophical heritage. By the time of Sparks the broad general background of personalism was necessarily obscured. Sparks succeeded in writing a history of philosophy with bias in what, had was unable to betray his death. Sandman has stated this development most succinctly by placing in the "personalistic Hall of Fame" Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, Augustine, Aquinas, Descartes, Leibniz, Berkeley, Locke, Hegel, Lotze, and Bowne. He has already mentioned that personalism

> recognizes one of the oldest and broadest conceptions in the history of human thought; it accords organically and chronologically related to the political philosophy of all the ages. It is the view that of more than two millennia of intellectual toil, the goal of a rational whole's goals was laid by Plato and Aristotle.[1]

Finally, too, has critics of the historical development of personalism. Among other things, he has pointed out that

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Other personalists have referred to historical backgrounds.

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1. Sandman, op. cit.
2. Flewelling, op. cit. (1944), iv. See, also, Flewelling's discussion of the Survival of Western Culture. In this vein he has an answer Spencer by conditions that Western Culture all survive. Among the several reasons for this view in his book "Where is Science in Philosophy" a new understanding of the importance and place of the person in any adequate view of reality and the cosmic order, 209.

but no systematic treatment of the full sweep of personalism's development has appeared.

Second, and more obvious from this investigation, personalism is to be considered as an indigenous American philosophy. It has been said that America has no philosophy of its own, that it "plays an inherited European game," that American philosophers lack "imagination in generating leading ideas," are "afraid of speculative ideas," and "do over and over again, an immense amount of dead specialized work in the region of 'facts'."[3] A new nation, to be sure, is dependent in all areas of its life, to some extent, upon its inheritance. So American philosophy has taken much from British, French, and German thought. The democratic Christian culture of the United States, however, was nurtured and developed by thinkers who consistently and comprehensively, for the first time in history, championed the sacredness of the person. In every area of our national life the effort has been made to recognize certain inalienable rights of the individual. Personalism has championed, from the colonial days to the present, political equality, educational oppor-

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3. See Dewey, who also pleads for an American philosophy regardless of its nature. He would welcome any so long as it is "sufficiently bold" and "in the degree in which it marked the coming to consciousness of a group of ideas which formulated a coming to self-consciousness of our civilization and thereby furnished ideas, supplied an intellectual polity, to direct further observations and experiments and to organize their results on a grand scale." Art. (1927), 542.

tunity, economic, social, and industrial reforms, scientific progress, and religious freedom. This fact has been generally overlooked by both personalists themselves and by the historians of American philosophy. Although the personalists considered in this investigation were dependent to some extent upon older streams of thought, each felt himself to have an original point of view. The interpenetration of the respective viewpoints, however, assumed increasing clarity and similarity as the American intellectual enterprise matured. Personalistic ideas cohered "on a grand scale," to use Dewey's phrase, and in the United States a new system self-consciously evolved.

Third, as personalism improved upon the "genteel tradition" in American philosophy by emphasizing the concrete and specific, so it ought continually to redefine itself in terms of recent theoretical and practical developments. It must become less rationalistic and more functional—functional in the sense of harmonious activity as meant by Plato and Aristotle rather than as used exclusively by pragmatism or instrumentalism. Brightman has suggested that "as science has developed, so has personalism. . . ."[4] One might add that as the total life of man has developed, personalism has grown in breadth and depth. If personalism gives the most coherent account of the total experience of man, let it

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4. Brightman, Art. (1943)[1], 42.

recognize with more confidence the vast, almost unknown, aspects of personality that are being investigated and utilized in the various branches of learning. It will then express itself more in harmony with the temper of the present day by including, yet transcending, irrational psychologies, humanistic philosophies, and impersonal ways of life. Personality will then be seen as a functional unity which is life itself. It is a functioning personality that makes possible Whitehead's "concrescence" or "nexus of events," that integrates what Dewey calls an existential act or process, that is necessary for what Wieman terms "the unpredictable fullness of value to be found in the creative synthesis of decisive moments,"[5] that gives meaning to value experience, to war and peace, to life and death. In short, although self-activity has been emphasized by all the personalists considered, personality ought to be seen as a functioning reality that is basic in every area of life. Personalism then becomes not only the voice of a rationalistic heritage, but also the expression of contemporary insights.

Fourth, personalism ought to express its social philosophy vigorously and systematically. All of the personalists considered were tremendously concerned with the crucial social problems of their day, yet none of them, as has been previously mentioned, gave a complete treatment of the

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5. Wieman, GOR, 480.

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. Simons, op. cit.

problem. Personalism, as a philosophy, has been most ably expressed in its exposition of religion and in its critique of science. The individual has, therefore, gained recognition in philosophic and religious literature and in scientific thought. An increasingly regimented and impersonal politico-industrial society, however, demands a new proclamation of the worthfulness of the individual in the social sciences where the battles of men and nations are now being fought.[6]

Two acute thinkers of the Bowne-Knudson-Brightman tradition indicate what is needed within the ranks of personalism. Oxnam, who has dealt brilliantly with this question of collectivism versus individualism, has written:

> It must be apparent to any thinking man that some synthesis must be found which will conserve the proved values that lie in the creative initiative that emerges from individualism and which will appropriate the values that lie in collective action with its elimination of waste, development of the spirit of co-operation, and

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6. McConnell, a recognized social prophet of the present day, has made personalistic contributions to numerous areas of social thought and action. See particularly his lecture on "Social Cross-Bearing," in which he discusses the problem of "the method by which the Christian ideal is to be put into effect." CIASC, 117-144. Bristol, who was influenced by Bowne, has indicated what could be done by a personalist in the way of a systematic exposition of social thought. See SA. The nearest approach to what the present investigator has in mind has been done by Knudson in his "truly great book," The Principles of Christian Ethics. Here, in one section, Knudson deals systematically and critically with such burning social problems as the individual, the family, the state and war, the church and culture, and the economic order. See POCE, 176-280.

> protection of the group. It must be found by intelligent men.[7]

Muelder, who speaks of personality as a "communitarian category," has written that a "voluntary commitment to fellowship" which is "social as well as individual"

> would bring into being a pluralistic socialism which recognizes social solidarity, objective social wholes, social justice, forgiveness and redemption. What we seek is an individualism which is productive of the highest sociality and a socialism which is productive of the richest individuality. It would be a democratic collectivity which recognizes that reality is a society of persons in which, among other tasks, are the creation of a social mind among men responsive towards and responsible to the Supreme Mind to whom they owe their existence, their ultimate value ideals, and their final redemption.[8]

This social expression of personalism should be amplified until it effectively touches every political, social, and economic problem in the life of our nation. As the thought of Edwards, Royce, Howison, Calkins, and Bowne, in particular, has furnished the foundation for brilliant expositions in the fields of metaphysics, ethics, philosophy of science, and religion, so the insistent social demands of Alcott, Whitman, Davidson, Calkins, and Bowne could be expressed in a systematic social philosophy.

Finally, it is evident from this investigation that the types of personalism in America can unite to become an

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7. Oxnam, BTSC, 158.
8. Muelder, Art. (1943), 202-203.

authentic voice of a new order--one in which both the dignity of the individual and the worth of his corporate life will be fully achieved.

It has been frequently pointed out that every writer would experience satisfaction in discovering that the general trend of philosophy was in the direction of his own ideas and even that philosophy is a tool of culture rather than creative of culture.[9] This may often be the case, yet a broader, more objective view is found in Hocking's use of the legend of Merlin. Merlin, who was imprisoned in the forest, would not be free until the travellers who had heard fragments of the secret that would release him put their various parts together. So each of the various philosophies have a part of the secret of the universe. Personalism, therefore, can not pretend to be the final truth. It can claim, however, to be one of the powerful factors in the genius of our American heritage, and a shining hope for the future of all men. Philosophy is essentially creative; it has the nomative function of directing history, of "transforming life," as Radhakrishnan would say. It must "put forth a constructive theory of life"[10] that is fair to all the facts of

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9. See especially Muirhead, Art. (1925), 12, and Spengler, Der Untergang Des Abendlandes.
10. See Radhakrishnan, Art. (1927). Radhakrishnan gets at the heart of the personalistic view of culture when he points out the limitations of impersonalism. "Without serenity and poise," he writes, "restraint and self-control, we are not truly civilized, however great may be

authentic voice of a man or woman--one in which both the objective and subjective and the words of his experience life will be fully achieved.

It has been frequently claimed that every writer would experience satisfaction in discovering that the general trend of philosophy was in the direction of his own ideas and even that philosophy is a tool or a force rather than a complete or original. This may often be the case, yet a broader, more objective view is found in Hocking's use of the legend of Faust. Faust, who was imprisoned in the form of, would not be free until the deceptions who had based fragments of the secret that would release him from their vacuous world vanished. In each of the various philosophies have a part of the secret of the universe. Personalism, therefore, can not pretend to be the final truth. It can claim, however, to be one of the powerful forces in the culture of our American heritage, and a valuable hope for the future of all men. Philosophy is essentially positive; it has the positive function of "creating objects, of "creating life," as Hutchinson Cosmo says. It must "put forth a constructive theory of life."[10] Thus in fair to all the forms of

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9. See especially Hocking, Op. Cit., 32, and Spaulding, The Emergence Has Consciousness.

10. See Hutchinson, Op. Cit. 1927. Hutchinson sets up the basis of the pragmatic view of philosophy when he points out the limitations of an overcomplete. "Philosophy merely and poets." In effect, "Philosophy and civilization, we are not study civilization, however, first may be

experience and that proclaims the worth of personality in every significant relationship.

Personalism does this. America and the coming order do not necessarily need new ideas and systems; rather they need clarified and more emphatic expressions of the coherent ideas present in a developing American personalism. Personalism insists, with Sorokin, that man must transcend his "sensate form of culture" by incessantly striving for "the greater nobility of Man" and "the greater glory of God."[11] It agrees with Howison that when "the shallow philosophy of law and rights" is replaced by the person centered philosophy we will possess "the Superstructure of a national life at once genuine and devoted."[12] Personalism contends with Flewelling that

> Just so long as the freedom of the person is only partially achieved, so long as it is denied to any portion of society, high or low, so long as there exists in the world those who are not accorded the rights of the person, so long there will remain the causes for revolution. The New Order, then, if we mean by that the ultimate one, can be founded alone upon the personalistic and Christian principle of the intrinsic worth of the individual which is the basis of all true democracy.[13]

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our outward accomplishments. A monkey trained to ride a bicycle and smoke a pipe is still a monkey." Art. (1927), 550.

11. Sorokin, COOA, 316 and 318.
12. Howison, Art. (1934), 379.
13. Flewelling, Art. (1943), 186. See also Flewelling's brilliant book, The Survival of Western Culture. Here he maintains that "the destiny of the West" will be achieved only when personality becomes the creative goal of history.

So, too, personalism offers what Beard claims for the "idea of civilization,"

> a construct, or view of life, summational and relative—universal in scope but applicable to times, places, and circumstances—from which inspiration and guidance may be derived in the search for individual and social perfection.[14]

Personalism, a dynamic power within the matrix of a developing nation, crosses the frontiers of mankind to proclaim for all persons that which it has fostered in America—individualism based upon recognition of the rights of others and a passion for freedom which emanates in a full life for all men. Personalism, to use a phrase of Carl Sandburg's, has always said "Yes to life." It looks to a new order affirming: "The last word of spirit is Victory."[15]

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14. Beard, TAS, 673-674. It is to be noted, however, that Beard thinks the American philosophy is pragmatism, relativism, or instrumentalism as opposed to absolutism. He thereby indicates his bondage to James and Dewey. See TAS, 661.
15. Brightman, TSL, 213.

ABSTRACT

Any system which emphasized personality as a fundamental principle in several fields of philosophy has been considered personalistic in this dissertation. Personalism has developed into pluralistic, absolutistic, and plural-monistic types in the United States. The chief representatives of these positions have been Howison, Calkins, and Bowne. Personalism was a dominant philosophy in America, however, long before these writers did their significant work. It was part of the purpose of the dissertation, therefore, to investigate and evaluate the thought of the eminent men who contributed to the development of American personalism prior to the time of Howison, Calkins, and Bowne. The sources of the study were chiefly the original writings of the various American personalists.

Personalism was first represented in America by Samuel Johnson, a noted clergyman and educator who was influenced most permanently by Berkeley. Johnson emphasized self-activity in epistemology, metaphysics, and ethics. Another significant colonial was Jonathan Edwards. He held to an active mind in epistemology, a dynamic soul in psychology, consciousness of the real in metaphysics, and the action of a moral agent in ethics. During the period of American philosophy from the time of Edwards to that of Alcott—called the period of enlightenment—the deists and the transcendent-

ABSTRACT

Any system which dramatizes personality as a fundamental principle is rooted firmly in romanticism. Romantic individual nonconformists in this dramatization, frequently the heroes of novels, have dramatized, adjudicated, and dramatized-dramatized types in the United States. The chief representatives of these traditions have been Melville, Twain, and Crane. Romanticism was a dominant philosophy in America, however, long before these writers did their significant work. It was part of the tradition of the dramatization, romantic, in invention and involving the thought of the writers who are contributors to the development of American nonconformity prior to the time of Melville, Twain, and Crane. The concerns of the study were chiefly the critical writings of the various American nonconformists.

Romanticism was first recognized in America by Emerson. A young clergyman and scholar who was influenced most powerfully by Carlyle, Emerson emphasized self-reliance in metaphysics, morals, and ethics. Emerson's dramatic potential was formative himself. He said to an audience and in metaphors, a dramatic and in metaphor, correlations of the soul in metaphysics, and the action of a moral sense in ethics. During the period of American nonconformity from the time of Emerson to that of Melville, the period of antebellum--the period of antebellum--the period and the transcendentalists

alists contributed roughly to the personalistic tradition. They held that God is rational, that man is a moral agent, and that sentient beings, not the physical universe, are metaphysically real.

The third important personalist was Amos Bronson Alcott. He was familiar with Plato, Locke, Berkeley, Kant, and Edwards, was a frequent visitor at the St. Louis School, and knew Brokmeyer, Whitman, Davidson, Harris, and Howison. He maintained, in all fields of philosophy, that "the person is the presupposition of all things and beings." Walt Whitman, the fourth personalist, was the first American to publish an article entitled "Personalism." (It appeared in Galaxy, May, 1868.) As "the bard of personality," he proclaimed the necessity of a person-centered educational system, championed a personalistic social philosophy, and, more than any previous thinker, identified personalism with the genius of America as a nation. Thomas Davidson, the fifth eminent personalist, held to an uncompromising pluralism. He was part of the St. Louis group and the Concord School, was a warm friend of Howison, and knew Bowne. He held reality to be an ideal world of sentient individuals. His social philosophy was, therefore, a critique of the civilization that uses men as tools rather than as ends; his philosophy of education aimed at the production of free, self-directing persons ready and able to act strongly in the affairs of life. Sixth in the personalistic tradition is William Torrey

Harris. He was influenced by Alcott and the St. Louis and Concord Schools. Self-activity was central in all areas of his philosophy. Finally, Josiah Royce made a contribution to personalism by maintaining that reality is an Absolute Person. He was familiar with the work of Whitman and Harris, often exchanged views with Howison, was the beloved teacher of Calkins, and admired the work of Bowne. This rich native heritage, so largely overlooked heretofore, was a major productive force of the most worthful in American civilization. It prepared the way for the later types of personalism.

Pluralistic personalism is most ably represented in the United States by George Holmes Howison (1834-1916). He developed his personalism from his American heritage (particularly from the St. Louis Group and Alcott), from the views of his European friends (chiefly Eucken, Schiller, and Ward), and from his appreciative study of the works of Aristotle, Leibniz, Berkeley, Kant, and Hegel.

Pluralistic personalism, according to Howison, views reality as a universal society of persons, who, although held together by reason, are completely individual and eternal. Mind functions spontaneously to make perception possible. Nature is dependent upon the "assemblage of individual minds," and is created, not by God, but by the final causation of a society of minds experiencing themselves and each other. In the "eternal republic," the individual person achieves moral goals in terms of the ideal (God), experiences

free choice, and attains immortality. God is not a creator, but the "ideal Type," "the way of absolute perfection."

Howison made a permanent contribution to a developing American culture. (1) He helped give philosophy an important role in American life. (2) He was a superlative teacher who influenced students that later assumed responsible positions in American education. (3) He is the chief American representative of pluralistic personalism.

Absolutistic personalism is most conspicuous in the thought of Mary Whiton Calkins (1863-1930). Royce has gained more recognition, yet he was not so self-consciously personalistic as his student and disciple. Calkins arrived at her particular type of personalism through a critical appreciation of numerous systems of philosophy (especially those of Berkeley, Kant, and Hegel), through her study with Royce, and through her appreciative knowledge of the thought of Davidson, Howison, Ward, McTaggart, and Bowne. She derived the word personalism from Renouvier.

Absolutistic personalism views the absolute self as constituting all reality. Finite selves are expressions of the different purposes, emotions, and thought of the absolute self. The physical universe, too, is the experiencing and willing of the absolute self. The relationship between the selves within the absolute is best understood as a great society of selves held together by the consciousness of the absolute. One achieves his greatest self-expression by

free choice, and relative immortality. God is not a creature, but the "Ideal Open," the end of absolute participation."

Fichte made a necessary contribution to a dynamic monism unknown. (1) He helped give philosophy an dynamic task role in American life. (2) He was a speculative transcendentalist who emphasize that intra-mental temporalistic positions in American education. (3) He is the chief exponent transcendentalism of idealistic personalism.

Absolutistic personalism is most conspicuous in the thought of Mary Whiton Calkins (1863-1930). Never has religion been transcendental, yet he was not to dualistic personalistic as his mentors and friends. Calkins arrived at her particular type of personalism through a political appropriation of empirical criticism of philosophy (essentially Royce's of Fichte), Kant, and Hegel, through her study with Royce, and through her appreciative knowledge of the thought of Berkeley, Descartes, Kant, Hegel, and Royce. She developed the more personalistic Kant (Royce).

Absolutistic personalism views the universe not as constituting all reality. Finite selves are conscious of the different purposes, feelings, and thoughts of the absolute soul. The physical universe, too, is the objectification and writing of the absolute self. Consciousness involves the notion which the absolute is such understood as a great society of selves held together by the consciousness of the absolute. One selfness sin, however, self-consciousness by

complete loyalty to the total society. On this basis Calkins championed a person-centered social philosophy, ethical system, and philosophy of religion.

Miss Calkins will continue to occupy a significant place in American philosophy. (1) She was one of the leading thinkers of her time to insist upon the importance of personality as the ultimate category of reality. (2) As "the most prominent disciple of Royce," she advocated one of the most notable forms of American idealism. (3) She made an original synthesis of absolutism and personalism.

Plural-monistic personalism is most ably represented by Borden Parker Bowne (1847-1910). He was influenced by Clark and Martin of New York University, Ulrici and Lotze of Germany, and the thought of Leibniz, Berkeley, Kant, and Hegel. He was also familiar with the personalistic thought of his American antecedents, Edwards, Alcott, Cook, Harris, Howison, and Royce.

Plural-monistic personalism views reality as a plurality of finite persons who are created and sustained by the Supreme Person. Bowne held that moral values are achieved by living in harmony with the will of the Supreme Person. His social philosophy recognized both the need for greater opportunities of individual self-development and the necessity of harmonious social interaction among persons. In his philosophy of religion, he proclaimed a forceful theism, the divinity of man, and the validity of prayer. He supported

the church and advocated living a Christian life.

Bowne's position in American philosophy is significant. (1) He methodically organized the numerous strands of personalism into a coherent system. (2) His position, which is a logical synthesis between pluralistic and absolutistic personalism, made him the first self-conscious representative of plural-monistic personalism. (3) He influenced many eminent individuals. (4) He is the father of a distinctive personalistic tradition.

A comparison of the three distinct types of personalism indicates that their similarities and differences grew out of the fundamental issues of philosophy. All types are alike in their concern for a spiritual view of life, the dignity of man, and the harmonious relationship of all persons within the universe. Their basic difference is that pluralism emphasizes the complete independence of every self, absolutism views every self as part of the larger self, and pluralistic-monism recognizes the freedom and uniqueness of every self while holding that each is dependent upon (not a part of) the Supreme Person. The latter type has been the most influential in the history of American philosophy.

Several conclusions have emerged:

1. Personalism has developed steadily in the United States through an interpenetration of the work of numerous thinkers.

2. The chief contributors to this development up to

the church and consecrated life in a Christian life.

Joseph's position in Christian philosophy is significant. (1) He realistically appraised the imperfect phenomena into a coherent system. (2) His position, being in a logical system, avoided dualisms and antinomies, presumption, made him the first anti-scholastic proponent of plural-monistic personalism. (3) He introduced many relevant insights. (4) He is the father of a distinctive personalistic tradition.

A comparison of the three distinct types of personalism indicates that their similarities and differences grew out of the fundamental issues of philosophy. All three are alike in their common form: spiritual view of life, the dignity of man, and the harmonious relationship of all persons within the universe. Their basic differences is that pluralistic-monistic the complete interpenetration of every self, and Austin views every self as part of the larger self, and pluralistic-monistic recognizes the freedom and independence of every self while holding that each is responsible upon (and a part of) the supreme person. The latter view has been the most influential in the history of American philosophy.

Several considerations have emerged:

1. Personalism has developed also fly in the United States towards an interpenetration of the work of numerous thinkers.

2. The chief contribution to this development is to

Howison, Calkins, and Bowne were Johnson, Edwards, Alcott, Whitman, Davidson, Harris, and Royce.

3. Three dominant types of personalism have emerged in America, pluralistic, absolutistic, and plural-monistic.

4. Howison represents pluralistic personalism. He views reality as a universal society of eternal persons bound together by reason. God is not the creator, but a final cause. Howison was a superlative teacher, but established no following.

5. Calkins, a more consciously personalistic thinker than her brilliant teacher, Royce, represents absolutistic personalism. From this viewpoint, every fact in the universe is a part of the absolute self's experience.

6. Bowne is the most distinctive representative of plural-monistic personalism, a position which is a logical synthesis of the pluralistic and absolutistic forms. He was first to organize the numerous strands of personalism into a coherent system. This form is the most influential in America.

7. The similarities and differences in all areas of the three types of personalism hinge upon the metaphysical view of reality.

8. Finally, it has been critically concluded that (1) personalistic thought in the development of philosophy should be more widely recognized, (2) personalism is to be considered, in part, as an indigenous American philosophy, (3) it ought continually to redefine itself in the light of

Emerson, Carlyle, and Dewey were Lessing, Novalis, Fichte, Kleist, Schlegel, Herrig, and Royce.

3. These dominant types of personalism have emerged in America, pluralistic, absolutistic, and plural-monistic.

4. Bowne represents pluralistic personalism. He views reality as a universal society of eternal persons bound together by reason. God is not the creator, but a final cause. Bowne was a apologetic teacher, but established by following.

5. Calkins, a more consistent personalist, rather than her brilliant teacher, Royce, represents absolutistic personalism. From this viewpoint, every fact in the universe is a part of the absolute self's experience.

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8. Finally, it has been critically demonstrated that (1) personalistic thought in the development of philosophy should be more widely recognized, (2) personalism is to be accelerated, in part, as an indigenous American philosophy, (3) it appears continually in twentieth century in the light of

contemporary research, (4) it ought to express its social philosophy more systematically, and (5) personalism can become an authentic voice of the emerging order, for it interprets the individual, his corporate life, and the Father of all men, the Supreme Person.

APPENDIX

WALT WHITMAN'S "PERSONALISM"

Walt Whitman was the first writer, as far as I can determine, to have published a magazine article entitled "Personalism." The article is a landmark in the history of American philosophy because of its priority, and also because of its mature personalistic point of view. It helps to substantiate the contention that many thinkers contributed to the development of American personalism prior to Bowne. Whitman thought so much of the ideas he expressed in "Personalism" that he was not content to allow it to remain a fugitive magazine article; he incorporated it, along with an earlier article entitled "Democracy," into his greatest prose work, Democratic Vistas.[1]

"Personalism" expressed Whitman's mature thought. It culminated his journalistic editorials in the Brooklyn Eagle regarding the anti-slavery controversy and the issue of state's rights versus federalism. He was the champion of the individual (regardless of color), but on the other hand, his theory of individualism was greatly modified through the civil war controversy to include the individual's responsibility to the nation. He is here concerned that America

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1. The article was never republished, however, in its original form, not even in the definitive ten volume edition of Whitman's complete works. See The Complete Writings of Whitman (eds. Richard Maurice Bucke, Thomas B. Harned, and Horace L. Traubel), 10 vols. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1902.

A P P E N D I X

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achieve its cultural greatness by developing its own society, literature, drama, music, and art. Both social solidarity and individual liberty will be achieved when great personalities develop democratic institutions in keeping with the "purposes" of the "permanently real."

PERSONALISM

/Galaxy, 5 (1868), 540-547/

To Democracy,[2] the leveller, the unyielding first principle of the average, is surely joined another principle, equally unyielding, closely tracking the first, indispensable to it, opposite, (as the sexes are opposite), and whose existence, co-equal, confronting and ever modifying the other, often clashing, even defiant, paradoxical, yet neither of highest avail without the other, plainly supplies to these grand cosmic politics of ours, and to the launched forth mortal dangers of Republicanism, the analogic counterpart and offset, whereby Nature restrains the deadly original relentlessness of all her first-class laws.

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2. Whitman's idea of democracy, later defended in "Personalism," is that the individual and the group are not mutually exclusive, rather they are compatible; individualism finds its expression through the group. This point of view is maintained in a long introduction to Democratic Vistas that did not appear in either of his earlier articles, "Personalism" or "Democracy." There Whitman wrote: "This idea of perfect individualism it is indeed that deepest tinges and gives character to the idea of the aggregate." DV, 275. Further, the mission of government "is not repression alone, and not authority alone, not even of law, nor by that favorite standard of the eminent writer, the rule of the best men, the born heroes and captains of the race, (as if such ever, or one time out of a hundred, get into the big places, elective or dynastic)—but higher than the highest arbitrary rule, to train communities through all their grades, beginning with individuals and ending there again, to rule themselves. What Christ appear'd for in the moral-spiritual

achieve its cultural greatness by developing its own society, literature, drama, music, and art. Both social solidarity and individual liberty will be achieved when great personalities develop democratic institutions in keeping with the "purposes" of the "permanently real."

PERSONALISM

[Dalaky, 3 (1954), dec-May]

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This second principle is Individuality, the pride and centripetal isolation of a human being in himself,—Identity—Personalism.[3] Whatever the name, its acceptance and thorough infusion through the organizations of political commonalty now shooting Aurora-like about the world, are of utmost importance, as the principle itself is needed for very life's sake. It forms, in a sort, or is to form, the compensating balance-wheel of sine qua non of the successful working machinery of America.

—And, if we think of it, what does civilization itself rest upon—and what object has it, with its religions,

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field for human-kind, namely, that in respect to the absolute soul, there is in the possession of such by each single individual, something so transcendent, so incapable of gradations, (like life,) that, to that extent, it places all beings on a common level, utterly regardless of the distinctions of intellect, virtue, station or any height or lowliness whatever—is tallied in like manner, in this other field, by democracy's rule that men, the nation, as a common aggregate of living identities, affording in each a separate and complete subject for freedom, worldly thrift and happiness, and for a fair chance for growth, and for protection in citizenship &c., must, to the political extent of the suffrage or vote, if no further, be placed, in each and in the whole, on one broad, primary, universal, common platform." DV, 280-281. It is evident that Whitman not only considered his idea of personalism to be his most important one (see DV, 292.) but also that he continued to develop it long after having written this article.

3. Whitman here defines personalism as individualism. Before he finishes the article, however, he uses personalism to mean the dependence of the many on the one, and vice versa (as defined by Alcott in 1877, in his book Table-Talk, 153.) He holds to a reciprocal relationship between the one and the many. He first hints at this idea on page 542, where he speaks of "ensemble-Individuality." Whitman views democracy as the many and the individual as the one. Both are necessary for balance. A burning issue during Whitman's day was that of state's rights versus federalism. Whitman first favored state's rights, or individualism (here he agreed with Goethe and Emerson that the highest form of civilization is the culture of the individual.). Finally Whitman decided that both were necessary, that personality is the justification of all government. He came to realize that it was not a question of the state versus the nation, nor the individual versus the state, but that the part and the whole, the one and the many mutually enriched each other.

This second principle is Individuality, the pride and overtipped isolation of a human being in himself,—identity—personality. Whatever the name, its acceptance and thorough infusion through the organizations of political community now affecting America-like about the world, are of almost importance, as the principle itself is needed for very life's sake. It forms, in a word, or is to form, the governing balance-wheel of *sine qua non* of the successful working machinery of America.

—And, if we think of it, what does civilization itself rest upon—and what object has it, with its religions,

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field for human-kind, merely, that in respect to the absolute soul, there is in the possession of each by each single individual, something so transcendent, so incapable of gradations, (like life,) that, to that extent, it places all beings on a common level, utterly regardless of the distinctions of intellect, virtue, station or any height or lowliness whatever—is tallied in like manner, in this other field, by democracy's write that man, the nation, as a common aggregate of living identities, affording in each a separate and complete subject for freedom, worldly thrift and happiness, and for a fair chance for growth, and for protection in citizenship, and, to the political extent of the suffrage or vote, if so furnished, be placed, in each and in the whole, on one broad, primary, universal, common platform." DV, 240-241. It is evident that Whitman not only generalized his idea of personalism to be his most important one (see DV, 292.) but also that he continued to develop it long after having written this article.

C. Whitman here defines personalism as individualism. Before he finishes the article, however, he uses personalism to mean the dependence of the many on the one, and vice versa (as defined by Alcott in 1877, in his book *Table-Talk*, 153.) He holds to a reciprocal relationship between the one and the many. He first links at this idea on page 242, where he speaks of "amalgamic-individuality." Whitman views democracy as the many and the individual as the one. Both are necessary for balance. A burning issue during Whitman's day was that of state's rights versus federalism. Whitman first favored state's rights, or individualism (here he agreed with Emerson and Thoreau that the highest form of civilization is the culture of the individual.) Finally Whitman decided that both were necessary, that sovereignty is the justification of all government. He came to realize that it was not a question of the state versus the nation, nor the individual versus the state, but that the part and the whole, the one and the many mutually enriched each other.

arts, schools, etc., but Personalism? To that, all bends; and it is because toward such result Democracy alone, on anything like Nature's scale, breaks up the limitless fallows of humankind, and plants the seed, and gives fair play, that its claims now precede the rest.

The Literature, Songs, Esthetics, etc., of a country are of importance principally because they furnish the materials and suggestions of Personality for the women and men of that country, and enforce them in a thousand effective ways.[4]

As the topmost claim of a strong consolidating of the Nationality of These States, is, that only by such powerful compaction can the separate States secure that full and free swing within their spheres, which is becoming to them, each after its kind, so will Individuality, with unimpeded branchings, always flourish best under imperial Republican forms.

—Assuming Democracy to be at present in its embryo condition, [see article in GALAXY, December, 1867,][5] and that the only large and satisfactory justification of it resides in the future, mainly through the copious production of perfect characters among the people, it is with regard to the atmosphere and spaciousness fit for such characters, and of certain nutriment and cartoon-draftings proper for them, and indicating them, for New World purposes, that I attempt the present statement—an exploration, as of new ground, wherein, like other primitive surveyors, I must do the best I can, leaving it to those who come after me to do much better. The service, in fact, if any, must be to merely break a sort of first path or track, no matter how rude and ungeometrical.

We have frequently printed the word Democracy. Yet I cannot too often repeat that it is a word which still sleeps, quite unawakened, notwithstanding the [541] resonance and the many angry tempests, out of which its syllables have come,

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4. When "Personalism" is later incorporated into Democratic Vistas, Whitman here appended a long footnote which begins with the sentence: "After the rest is satiated, all interest culminates in the field of persons, and never flags there."

5. Whitman is referring to his earlier article "Democracy," which is later incorporated in his eighty-four page pamphlet Democratic Vistas. The purpose of the later, enlarged discussion is expressed by Whitman in a letter to a Mr. Dowden. He wrote: "I would say that the spine or verterber (sic) principle of my book is a model or ideal...of a complete healthy, heroic, practical modern Man...formed and shaped in consonance with modern science, with American democracy.... I seek to typify a living Human Personality...." Quoted by Perry, WW, 199-200.

arts, schools, etc., but Personalism? To that, all banks; and it is because Soviet art resents Democracy alone, on any-thing like Watson's scale, breaks up the Illustica fallows of humanhood, and plants the seed, and gives fair play, that the claims now precede the rest.

The Literature, Dance, Cathedrals, etc., of a country are of importance principally because they furnish the main-stain and suggestions of Personality for the women and men of that country, and enforce them in a thousand effective ways.

As the topmost claim of a strong consolidating of the Nationality of These States, is, that only by such powerful connection can the separate States secure their full and free swing within their sphere, which is becoming to them, each after its kind, so will Individuality, with undegraded branch-ings, always flourish best under impartial Republican forms.

—Assuming Democracy to be at present in its embryo condition, [See article in DALIAY, December, 1887,] and that the only large and satisfactory justification of it resides in the future, mainly through the copious production of Per-fect characters among the people, it is with regard to the atmosphere and equanimous fit for such characters, and of certain nutriment and season-dwellings proper for them, and indicating them, for new world purposes, that I attempt the present statement—an exploration, as of new ground, wherein like other pioneer surveyors, I must do the best I can, leaving it to those who come after me to do much better. The service, in fact, if any, must be to merely break a sort of first path-or track, no matter how rude and ungeometrical.

We have frequently printed the word Democracy. Yet I cannot too often repeat that it is a word which still already quite unwieldsome, notwithstanding the [Sic] reasonable and the many angry bickerings, out of which its syllables have come.

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from pen or tongue. It is a great word, whose history remains unwritten, because that history has yet to be enacted. It is, in some sort, younger brother of another great and often-used word, Nature,[6] whose history also waits unwritten.

But I must get me to my theme.

—Much is said, and opportunely said, with reference to aggregate-tendencies, masses, those vast and sweeping movements, influences, moral and physical, of humanity, now and always current over the planet, on the scale of the impulses of the elements. Then it is also good to reduce the whole matter to the consideration of a single self, a man, a woman, on permanent grounds. Even for the treatment of the universal, in politics, metaphysics,[7] or anything, sooner or later we come down to one single, solitary Soul.

There is, in sanest hours, a consciousness, a thought that rises, independent, lifted out from all else, calm, like the stars, shining eternal. This is the thought of Identity—yours for you, whoever you are, as mine for me. Miracle of miracles, beyond statement, most spiritual and vaguest of earth's dreams, yet hardest basic fact, and only entrance to all facts. In such devout hours, in the midst of the significant wonders of heaven and earth, (significant only because of

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6. Whitman turned to "Nature" rather than to intellect for inspiration. Here he was close to Rousseau's "Noble Savage."

7. Whitman did not use the word "metaphysics" to mean the science of being or a study of reality. It was a hazy concept to him meaning anything supra-physical. See his poem "The Base of All Metaphysics" in Leaves of Grass. He also uses the word somewhat loosely in his poem "Going Somewhere:"

My science-friend, my noblest woman-friend,
(Now buried in an English grave—and this a memory-leaf for her dear sake,)
Ended our talk—"The sum, concluding all we know of old or modern learning, intuitions deep,
"Of all Geologies—Histories—of all Astronomy—of Evolution, Metaphysics all,
"Is, that we all are onward, onward, speeding slowly, surely, bettering,
"Life, life an endless march, an endless army, (no halt, but it is duly over,)
"The world, the race, the soul—in space and time the universe,
"All bound as is befitting each—all going somewhere."

See LOG, 397.

from pen or tongue. It is a great soul, whose history remains unwritten, because that history has yet to be enacted. It is, in some sort, younger brother of another great and often-used word, Nature,[6] whose history also waits unwritten.

But I must yet go to my theme.

—Such is said, not overfamiliarly and, with reference to separate-temporals, mayhap, those vast and swaying movements, lightnings, moral and physical, of humanity, now and always current over the planet, on the scale of the impulses of the elements. Then is it also good to regard the whole matter to the consideration of a single soul, a man, a woman, on strenuous grounds. Then for the treatment of the universal, in politics, metaphysics,[7] or anything, sooner or later we come down to one single, solitary soul.

There is, in earnest hours, a consciousness, a thought that rises, independent, lifted out from all else, calm, like from a tower, shining eternal. This is the thought of Identity—yours for you, however you are, as mine for me. Miracle of miracles,—beyond statement, most spiritual and vaunted of earth's lessons, yet nearest basic fact, and only entrance to all tests. In such moments, in the midst of the significations, modes of heaven and earth, (significant only because of

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My science-friend, my college-friend,
(Now buried in an English grave—and this a memory-leaf for her dear sake,)
Ended our talk—"The sun, consolidating all we know of old or modern learning, intuitions deep,
"Of all geologies—Hydrocles—of all astronomy—of Volution, Metaphysics all,
"Is, then we all are toward, moving, traveling slowly, surely, hitherward,
"Life, like an endless march, an endless story, (ne'er halt, nor is duty over,)
"The world, the mass, the soul—in space and time the universe, "All toward as is hitherward—all going somewhere."

the Me in the centre,)[8] the creeds, conventions, venerable authorities, fall away and become of no account before this simple idea. Under the luminousness of real vision, it alone takes possession, takes value. Like the shadowy dwarf in the fable, once liberated and looked upon, it expands over the whole earth, and spreads to the roof of heaven.

The quality of BEING, in the object's self,[9] according to its own central idea and purpose, and of growing therefrom and thereto—not criticism by other standards, and adjustments thereto—is the lesson of Nature. True, the full man wisely gathers, culls, absorbs; but if, engaged disproportionately in that, he slights or overlays the precious idiocrasy and special nativity and intention that he is the man's self, the main thing, is a failure, however wide his general cultivation.[10] Thus, in our times, refinement and delicatesse are not only attended to sufficiently, but threaten to eat us up, like a cancer.[11] Already, the Democratic genius watches, ill-pleased, these tendencies. Provision for a little healthy rudeness, savage virtue, sanity, equipoise, is demanded. Negative qualities, even deficiencies, would be a relief. Singleness and

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8. and 9. Whitman was interested in the problems of epistemology. He wrote: "The kernel of every object that can be seen, felt or thought of, has its relations to the soul, and is significant of something there." Quoted by Furness, WWW, 236. He agreed with Bishop Butler that God implanted a rational faculty in man and, with George Fox, that the spirit of God is in each person. He was partially influenced by German philosophy, especially by Kant, in holding that "all knowledge flows out from man into the object." He didn't completely subscribe to the idea of the creativity of thought, however, for he also held that "the object has a reality in itself, which awakens the knowledge in the spirit." Quoted by Furness, WWW, 236.

10. Whitman's emphasis upon personality always prevents him from becoming completely transcendental. Individuality, according to him, must never be lost in the Absolute. His view, here, is similar to that of Bowne, a later personalist, as opposed to that of Calkins or Royce. Whitman was increasingly melioristic. The person gained in stature, however, rather than lost, as it related itself to the total society of selves.

11. This agreement with Rousseau's unregenerated "noble savage" is a reversion to Whitman's earlier views of "blow your own horn" individualism. In 1847 he had written: "Men must be 'masters unto themselves,' and not look to Presidents and legislative bodies for aid." Quoted by Rogers and Black, GOTF, I, 52. Elsewhere, Whitman criticizes Rousseau's collectivism, or contract idea in terms of his own earlier

the fa in the centre,)8 the orrery, conversations, venerable authorities, full away and become of no account before this single idea. Under the luminousness of real vision, it alone takes possession, takes valuing, like the anchoring dawn in the fable, once liberated and looked upon, it expands over the whole earth, and spreads to the roof of heaven.

The quality of earth, in the poet's self,9 according to his own central hope and purpose, and of growing knowledge and thought--not outlaying by other standards, not adjustments dependent--is the lesson of nature. True, the full man wisely relishes, seeks, accepts; but it, encased disproportionately in that, he alights or otherwise the problems idiosyncrasy and special activity and intention tags on in the man's self, the main thing, is a failure. However with his general cultivation,10 Thus, in our times, refinement and delicateness are not only extended to sufficiently, but thrusten to set us up, like a barrier.11 already, the decorrelate vanities weaknes, ill-placed, thus condenolex. provision for a little healthy modesty, serve vision, sanity, equipoise, is tempted. Regardless quality-ties, even delicatenoies, would be a relief. Simplicness and

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10. Whitman's emphasis upon personality always prevents him from becoming completely transcendental. Individuality, according to him, must never be lost in the absolute. His view, here, is similar to that of Emerson, a later transcendentalist, as opposed to that of Dickins or Poyse. Whitman was increasingly realistic. The person valued in stanzas, however, rather than lost, as it related itself to the total society of selves.

11. This agreement with Emerson's unregenerated "noble savage" is a reversion to Whitman's earlier views of "blow your own horn" individualism. In 1847 he had written: "Men must be masters unto themselves, and not look to Prudence and legislative bodies for aid." Quoted by Pepper and Black, 1929, 1, 22. Elsewhere, Whitman criticizes Emerson's individualism, or exercise idea in terms of his own earlier

normal simplicity, amid this more and more complex, more and more artificialized, state of society—how pensively we yearn for them! how we would welcome their return.

In some such direction, then—at any rate enough to preserve the balance—we feel called upon to throw what weight we can, not for absolute reasons, but current ones. To prune, gather, trim, conform, and ever cram and stuff, is the prevailing and enormous pressure of our days. While aware that much can be said even in behalf of all this, we perceive that we have not now to consider the question of what is demanded to serve a rude and barbarous nation, or set of nations, but what is most applicable, most pertinent, for numerous congeries of conventional societies already becoming stifled and rotten with literature, and polite conformity and art.

In addition to established sciences, we suggest a science as it were of healthy average Personalism, on original-universal grounds,[12] the object of which should be to raise up and supply through The States a copious race of superb American men and women, ahead of any yet known.

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individualism, saying: "Where Rousseau is yet undeveloped is in not realizing that the individual man or woman is the head and ideal, and the State, City, Government, or what not, is a servant, subordinate—with nothing sacred about it—nothing in a judge or court either—but all sacredness is in the individual, and the other, at most, is but a reflection of the individuals." From an unpublished manuscript before 1855. Quoted by Furness, Art (1929), 465.

12. Whitman is here beginning to mature. He began the essay with individualism but comes now to "average Personalism," a concept meaning a synthesis of individualism and totalitarianism. This is also evident in the expression, "original-universal grounds," original meaning egoistic, and universal meaning average. The hyphenated words indicate Whitman's growth. He is now thinking in such terms as ego-group, "original-universal," "ensemble-Individuality," "motive-elements," and "mental-educational." This article definitely marked a crossroad in Whitman's career. Prior to the Civil War he saw only the individual; afterwards he began to see the person in an environment. Half the essay, Democratic Vistas, is therefore old, whereas the other half is new, indicating a more mature point of view. Whitman wrote of the influence of the war year's experience upon his thinking: "It has given me my most fervent views of the true ensemble and extent of the States." SD, 97.

—America, leaving out her politics,[13] has yet morally originated nothing. She seems singularly unaware that the models appropriate for former conditions and [542] for European lands, are but exiles and exotics here. No current of her life, as shown on the surfaces of what is authoritatively called her Society, accepts or runs into the just-mentioned theory; but all the currents there set squarely against it. Never, in the Old World, was thoroughly upholstered Exterior Appearance and show, mental and other, built entirely on the idea of caste—never was the sufficiency of mere outside Acquisition—never was Glibness, verbal Intellect, more the test, the emulation—more loftily elevated as head and sample—than they are on the surface of our Republican States this day. The writers of a time hint the mottoes of its gods. The word of the modern, say these voices (and among them the noblest voice in America), is the word Culture.

We find ourselves abruptly in close quarters with the enemy. This word Culture, and what it has come to represent, involves, by contrast, our whole theme, and has been, indeed, the spur, urging us to engagement. Certain questions arise.

As now taught, accepted and carried out, are not the processes of Culture rapidly creating a class of supercilious infidels, who believe in nothing?[14] Shall a man lose himself in countless masses of adjustments, and be so shaped with reference to this, that, and the other, that the simply good and healthy and brave parts of him are reduced and clipped away, like the bordering of box in a garden?[15] You can cultivate corn and roses and orchards—but who shall cultivate the primaeval forests, the mountain peaks, the ocean, and the tumbling gorgeousness of the clouds? Lastly—Is the readily-given reply that Culture only seeks to help, systematize, and put in attitude, the elements of fertility and power, a conclusive reply?

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13. Whitman omitted the expression "leaving out her politics" from Democratic Vistas and inserted "and artistically." When writing for the magazine readers he was concerned for their interest in politics. In the later essay he was more interested in art, and perhaps wished to give himself freer reign with a larger audience.

14. Faith is a keynote in Whitman's thinking. One must always have faith in something.

15. Here again, one sees Whitman's recognition of social forces, and also a concern for the individual within the matrix of events.

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12. Whitman omitted the expression "leaving out her politics" from Democratic Vistas and inserted "and artistically." When writing for the masses the reformer in man concerned for their interests in politics. In the later essay in man was more interested in art, and perhaps wished to give himself free reign with a larger audience.

13. Faith is a virtue in Whitman's religion. One must always have faith in something.

14. Here again, one sees Whitman's recognition of social forces, and also a concern for the individual within the realm of events.

I do not so much object to the name, or word, but I should certainly insist on a radical change of category, in the distribution of precedence. I should demand a programme of Culture, drawn out, not for a single class alone, or for the parlors or lecture-rooms, but with an eye to practical life, the West, the workingmen, the facts of farms, and jack-planes and engineers, and of the broad range of the women also of the middle and working strata of the States, and with reference to the perfect equality of women, and of a grand and powerful motherhood. I should demand of this programme or theory a scope generous enough to include the widest human area. It must have for its spinal meaning the formation of a typical Personality of character, eligible to the uses of the high average of men—and not restricted by conditions ineligible to the masses.

The best culture will always be that of the manly and courageous instincts,[16] and loving perceptions, and of self-respect—aiming to form, over this continent, an Idiocrasy of Universalism, which, true child of America, will bring joy to its mother, returning to her in her own spirit, recruiting myriads of men, able, natural, perceptive, tolerant, devout, real men, alive and full, believers in her, America, and with some definite instinct why and for what she has arisen, most vast, most formidable of historic births, and is, now and here, with wonderful step, journeying through Time.

—The problem, as it seems to me, presented to the New World, is, under permanent law and order, and after preserving cohesion (ensemble-Individuality), at all hazards to vitalize man's free play of special Personalism, recognizing in it something that calls ever more to be considered, fed, and adopted as the substratum for the best that belongs to us (government indeed is for it), including the new esthetics of our future.[17]

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16. Here Whitman is concerned with an ideal program of culture, not culture as it exists. It must mean something to everybody, to the "typical Personality." Whitman is growing away from rugged individualism to a sense of social responsibility. He is reaching for the common denominator.

17. "Ensemble-Individuality" is the keynote to Whitman's position. By "special Personalism" he means "individuality" as used in the second paragraph of the article. Personalism, or "Personality" as used by Whitman, therefore, means both individuality and the group in mutual relationship. The purpose of America is to foster this personalism. Whitman's continual growth away from his youthful individualism is seen in a statement he made in his seventieth year (in 1889):

I do not so much object to the theory, or word, but I should certainly insist on a radical change of category, in the distribution of precedence. I should demand a programme of culture, drawn out, not for a single class alone, or for the parlors or lecture-rooms, but with an eye to practical life, the best, the working-men, the faces of faces, and jackplanes and engineers, and of the broad backs of the women also of the middle and working estates of the States, and with reference to the perfect equality of women, and of a grand and powerful motherhood. I should demand of this programme or theory a scope generous enough to include the widest human area. It must have for its ideal meaning the formation of a typical personality of character, eligible to the uses of the high average of men—and not regulated by conditions ineligible to the masses.

The best culture will always be that of the sturdy and courageous intellects,[16] and loving perceptions, and of self-respect—aiming to form, over this continent, an idiocracy of Universalism, which, true children of America, will bring joy to the mother, redounding to her in her own spirit, recruiting myriads of men, able, natural, perceptive, tolerant, devoutreal men, alive and full, believers in her, American, and with some definite intellect why and for what she has been raised, most vast, most formidable of nativity births, and is, now and here, with unusual step, journeying through time.

—The problem, as it leans to me, presented to the New World, is, under government law and order, and after preserving cohesion (assessable-individuality), at all hazards to vitalize man's free play of special personality, recognizing in it something that exists even more to be admired, and adopted as the substratum for the best that belongs to us (government, indeed is for it), including the new exhibits of our times.[17]

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16. Here Whitman is concerned with an ideal program of culture, not culture as it exists. It must mean something to everybody, to the "typical personality." Whitman is groping away from mere individualism to a sense of social responsibility. He is reaching for the common denominator.

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To formulate beyond this present vagueness—to help line and put before us, the species, or a specimen of the species, of the Democratic ethnology of the [543] future, is a work toward which the Genius of our land, with peculiar encouragement, invites her well-wishers. Already, certain limnings, more or less grotesque, more or less fading and watery, have appeared. We too (repressing doubts and qualms), will try our hand.

Attempting then, however crudely, a model or portrait of Personality, for general use for the manliness of The States, we should prepare the canvas well beforehand. Parentage must consider itself in advance.[18] (Will the time hasten when fatherhood and motherhood shall become a science—and the noblest science?) To our model a clear-blooded, strong-fibred physique, is indispensable; the questions of food, drink, air, exercise, assimilation, digestion, can never be intermitted. Out of these we descry a well-begotten Selfhood—in youth, fresh, ardent, emotional, aspiring, full of adventure; at maturity, brave, perceptive, under control, neither too talkative nor too reticent, neither flippant nor sombre; of the bodily figure, the movements easy, the complexion showing the best blood, somewhat flushed, breast expanded, an erect attitude, a voice whose sound outvies music, eyes of calm and steady gaze, yet capable also of flashing—and a general presence that holds its own in the company of the highest. For it is native Personality, and that alone, that endows a man to stand before Presidents or Generals, or in any distinguished collection, with aplomb; and it is not Culture, or any knowledge or intellect whatever, as claimed of late by the leading American teacher of that theory.[19]

"I find I'm a good deal more of a socialist than I thought I was: maybe not technically, politically, so, but intrinsically, in my meanings." In fact, it was Whitman's concern for a greater sense of social solidarity in America that led him to remark, in his old age, "We've got a hell of a lot to learn yet before we're a real democracy." Both of these statements are quoted by Furness, Art. (1939).

18. Whitman was an advocate of eugenics and physical culture, but only insofar as such programs would contribute to personality.

19. Whitman is referring to Emerson. In his later essay, Democratic Vistas, Whitman omitted the phrase "as claimed of late by the leading American teacher of that theory," for he was not willing to "abuse" Emerson permanently in a book as he was in a fugitive magazine article. It should be noted that Whitman owed much to Emerson that he did not recognize

With regard to the mental-educational part of our model, enlargement of intellect, stores of cephalic knowledge, etc., the concentration thitherward of all the customs of our age, especially in America, is so overweening, and provides so fully for that part, that, important and necessary as it is, it really needs nothing from us here—except, indeed, a phrase of warning and restraint.

Manners, too, though important, we need not dwell upon here. Like beauty, grace of motion, etc., they are results. Causes, original things, being attended to, the right manners unerringly follow. Much is said, among artists, of the grand style, as if it were a thing by itself. When a man, artist or whoever, has health, pride, acuteness, noble aspirations and emotions, he has the motive-elements of the grandest style. The rest is but manipulation (yet that is no small matter.) Whoso dilates to the idea of the Infinite holds the clue of all grandeur, as all meaning. What is here said may be trite; but our current society, with its blare, dandyism, and pettiness—its feasts, presenting infinitudes of little dishes, and so seldom anything large or solid—perpetually needs such hints.

(We should perhaps talk in a still sharper tone, and widely extend our fault-finding, but that we plainly see, even in directions where our scourge might fall the heaviest, only, after all, faults and evils inevitable to the free growth of some of the most precious law-characteristics of our land and age—even those we are here attempting to enforce.)

—Leaving still unspecified several sterling parts of any model fit for the future Personality of America, I must not fail to pronounce myself on one, probably the least attended to in modern times—a hiatus, indeed, threatening its gloomiest consequences after us. I mean the simple, unsophisticated Conscience, the primary moral element. The subtle antiseptic called health is not more requisite to the bodily physiology than Conscience is to the moral and mental physiology. It emanates the first and last splendor of character, and gives what all the beauty and genius of the world cannot make up for. If I were asked to specify in what quarter lie the grounds of darkest dread, respecting the America of our hopes, I should have to point to this particular. I should demand the [544] invariable application, to Individuality, this day, and any day, of that old, ever-true plumb-rule of persons, eras, nations. Our current triumphant Civilizee, with his all-schooling and his wondrous appliances, will still show himself but an amputation while this deficiency remains.

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as was the case of Aristotle in terms of his debt to Plato or Comte and Saint-Simon. Whitman always covered up his indebtedness. See Esther Shephard's book Walt Whitman's Pose.

With regard to the mental-educational part of our modal, enlargement of intellect, stores of capacity knowledge, etc., the consciousness takeover of all the customs of our age, especially in America, is so overwhelming, and provides so fully for that part, that, important and necessary as it is, it really needs nothing from us here—except, indeed, a phrase of warning and restraint.

Manners, too, though important, we need not dwell upon here. Like beauty, grace of motion, etc., they are results, causes, ordinal things, being attended to, the right manners unerringly follow. Much is said, among artists, of the grand style, as if it were a thing by itself. When a man, artist or whoever, has health, poise, autonomy, noble aspirations and emotions, he has the motive-elements of the grandest style. The rest is but manipulation (yet that is no small matter.) Whoso dilates to the idea of the Infinite holds the clue of all grandeur, as all meaning. What is here said may be petty; but our current society, with its blare, bandying, and pettiness—its fevers, reasoning infinitudes of little diseases, and so seldom anything large or solid—perpetually needs such hints.

We should perhaps talk in a still sharper tone, and widely extend our fault-finding, but that we plainly see, even in directions where our courses might fall the heaviest, only after all, faults and evils inevitable to the free growth of some of the most precious law-characteristics of our land and age—even those we are here attempting to enforce.)

—Leaving still unspecified several startling parts of any model fit for the future personality of America, I must not fail to pronounce myself on one, probably the least attended to in modern times—a plinth, indeed, threatening its immediate consequences after us. I mean the simple, unsophisticated Consciousness, the primary moral element. The subtle entelechy called health is not more requisite to the bodily physiology than Consciousness is to the moral and mental physiology. It examines the first and last moleculer of character, and gives what all the beauty and genius of the world cannot make up for. If I were asked to specify in what quarter lie the grounds of darkest dread, respecting the America of our hopes, I should have to point to this particular. I should demand the $\sqrt{\text{Sq}}$ invariable application, to Individuality, this day, and any day, of that old, ever-true plumb-rule of persons, arts, nations. One current triumphant civilizer, with his all-conquering and his wondrous appliances, will still show himself but an amputation while this deficiency remains.

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as was the dame of Aristeas in terms of his dear to Plato: or Combe and Saint-Simon. Matters always covered up his indebtedness. See Father Hyperbole's book with Mr. Newman's name.

Beyond (continuing, but assuming a more hopeful tone), the vertebration of the manly and womanly Personalism of our Western World, can only be, and is to be (I hope), its all penetrating Religiousness.[20] The architecture of Individuality

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20. Religion is central in all of Whitman's thought. In this emphasis (if not as systematic), he is similar to other American personalists such as Samuel Johnson, Jonathan Edwards, Alcott, Howison, Calkins, and Bowne. Whitman was more individualistic in his reaction to institutionalized religion. Religion, he maintained, ought to be released "from all tyranny of authority" and thrown "open to the investigation of great minds." He wrote: "I demand something far more real than that [the "show" of churches] for America. I say that today the mummery of the churches, in which none believe but all agree to countenance, with secret sarcasm and denial in their hearts, is what stands most in the way of a real athletic and fit religion for these States." From Whitman's notes for lectures on religion, as quoted by Furness, WWW, 41-42. In 1888 Whitman expressed his attitude toward charges of irreligion: "I claim everything for religion...yet I have been called irreligious, an infidel...as if I could have written a word of the Leaves without its religious root-ground. I am not traditionally religious...but even traditionally I am not anti: I take all the old forms and faiths and remake them in conformity with the modern spirit, not rejecting a single item of the earlier programs.... People have thought I was powerful 'set agin' the church.... I am done with the letter of the church—with its hands and knees: but that part of the church which is not jailed in church buildings is all mine too, as well as anybody's—all of it, all of it!" Quoted by Furness, WWW, 218-219. How like Voltaire's view of religion that was unappreciated by the church of eighteenth-century France! On another occasion Whitman wrote: "Religion is dead...but the spirit of it, that for which it existed, that which it established—viz. the santity of Man, exists and is the main fact of the present time; the fact that shapes, and controls and governs all others." Quoted by Furness, WWW, 219. Whitman's emphasis upon religion is even stronger in the later essay, Democratic Vistas, than it is in the present article. There he ends the paragraph with this sentence that beyond the "Personalism of our Western World...is to be...its all penetrating Religiousness." He also continues to develop the idea that religion is of the individual and not of the mass. His Quaker, mystical background is evident in the next paragraphs as he writes that the "identified Soul...can really confront Religion when it extricates itself entirely from the churches, ..." and only "one's isolated Self" can "reach the divine levels, and commune with the unutterable."

Beyond (continuing, but speaking a more hopeful tone), the verbalization of the manly and womanly personalities of our western world, can only be, and is to be (I hope), life all permeating delightsomeness.[20] The exuberance of individuality

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20. Religion is central in all of Whitman's thought. In this emphasis (if not as systematic), he is similar to other American personalities such as Samuel Johnson, Jonathan Edwards, Alcott, Hawthorne, Melville, and Twain. Whitman was more individualistic in his reaction to institutionalized religion. Religion, he maintained, ought to be released "from all tyranny of authority" and thrown "open to the investigation of great minds." He wrote: "I demand something for more real than that /the "show" of churches/ for America. I say that today the mockery of the churches, in which none believes but all agree to countenance, with secret sneers and denial in their hearts, is what stands most in the way of a real religious and fit religion for these States." From Whitman's notes for lectures on religion, as quoted by Furness, NWW, 41-42. In 1884 Whitman expressed his attitude towards charges of infidelity: "I claim everything for religion...yet I have been called irreligious, an infidel...as if I could have written a word of the poems without its religious root-ground. I am not traditionally religious...nor even traditionally I am not anti: I take all the old forms and fetches and recycle them in conformity with the modern spirit, not rejecting a single item of the earlier programme.... People have shown it I was powerful 'set against' the church.... I am done with the letter of the church—with its hands and knees: but that part of the church which is not jailed in church buildings is all mine too, as well as anybody's—all of it, all of it." Quoted by Furness, NWW, 219-210. How like Voltaire's view of religion that was unappreciated by the church of eighteenth-century France! On another occasion Whitman wrote: "Religion is land...but the spirit of it, that for which it exists, that which it establishes—viz. the sanctity of man, exists and is the main fact of the present time; the fact that shapes, and controls and governs all others." Quoted by Furness, NWW, 219. Whitman's statements upon religion is even stronger in the later essay, Democratic Vistas, from it is in the present article. There he ends the paragraph with this sentence that beyond the "Personality of our Western World...is to be...its all pervading delightsomeness." He also continues to develop the idea that religion is of the individual and not of the mass. His further, mystical background is evident in the next paragraph as he writes that the "identified soul...can really confront religion when it extricates itself entirely from the churches, ..." and only "one's isolated self" can "reach the divine invoke, and commune with the mysterious."

will ever prove various, with countless different combinations; but here they rise as into common pinnacles, some higher, some less high, only all pointing upward.

The final work of Religion is a work that no organization or church can ever achieve. As history is poorly retained by what the technists call history (those bald fables in the libraries), and is not given out from their pages, except the learner has in himself the sense of the well-wrapt, never yet written, perhaps impossible to be written, history; so Religion, although casually arrested, and, after a fashion, preserved in the churches and creeds, does not depend at all upon them, but is a part of the identified Soul, which, when greatest, knows not Bibles in the old way, but in new ways—the identified Soul, which can really confront Religion when it extricates itself entirely from the churches, and not before.

Personalism fuses this, and favors it. I should say, indeed, that only in the perfect uncontamination and solitariness of Individuality may the spirituality of Religion positively come forth at all. Only here, and on such terms, the meditation, the devout ecstasy, the soaring flight. Only here, communion with the mysteries, the eternal problems, whence? whither? Alone, and identily, and the mood—and the Soul emerges, and all statements, churches, sermons, melt away like vapors. Alone, and silent thought, and awe, and aspiration—and then the interior consciousness, like a hitherto unseen inscription, in magic ink, beams out its wondrous lines to the sense. Bibles may convey, and priests expound, but it is exclusively for the noiseless operation of one's isolated Self, to enter the pure ether of veneration, reach the divine levels, and commune with the unutterable.

—To practically enter into Politics is an important part of American personalism. To every young man, North and South, earnestly studying these things, I should say, Understand that America goes about its development its own way—sometimes, to temporary views, appalling enough. It is the fashion among dillettants and fops to decry the whole formulation and <u>personnel</u> of the active politics of America, as beyond redemption, and to be carefully kept away from. See you that you do not fall into this error. America is doing very well, upon the whole, notwithstanding these antics of the parties, and their leaders, these half-brained nominees, and the many ignorant ballots, and many elected failures and blatherers. It is the dillettants, and all who shirk their duty, who are not doing well. As for you, I advise you to enter more strongly yet into politics. I advise every young man to do so. Always inform yourself; always do the best you can; always vote. Disengage yourself from parties. They have been useful, and to some extent remain so; but the floating, uncommitted electors, farmers, clerks, mechanics, the masters of

will ever prove varied, with nonpolitic different conditions; but here they play on into common phrases, some flippant, some lean high, only all pointing upward.

The final work of Religion is a work that no organization on church can ever analyze. As history is poorly matched by what the dominate call history (those bald fables in the libraries), and is not given out from Sunday pages, except the learner has in himself the sense of the well-erect, never yet written, perhaps impossible to be written, history; so Religion, although usually expected, and, after a fashion, preserved in the churches and chapels, does not develop it all upon them, but is a part of the identified Soul, which, when grasped, knows not bigles in the old way, but in new ways--the identified Soul, which can really confound religion when it excludes itself entirely from the churches, and not before.

Personalize these thus, and favors it. I should say, indeed, that only in the perfect unpersonalization and politicness of individuality may the spirituality of religion practically come forth at all. Only here, and on such terms, the realities--the devout ecstasy, the soaring flight. Only here, connection with the mysteries, the eternal problems, whence art thou? Alone, and identity, and the mood--and the Soul appears, and all amusements, churches, sermons, melt away like vapors. Alone, and silent thought, and who, and explication--and then the interior consciousness, like a hitherto unseen inscription, in magic ink, beams out its wondrous lines to the sense. Bibles may convey, and priests expound, but it is actually from the motionless operation of one's isolated self, to enter the pure atmosphere of veneration, reach the living level, and commune with the immortals.

--To practically enter into politics is an important part of American personalism. To every young man, North and South, earnestly studying these things, I should say, understand that America does above its development its own way--sometimes, to temporary vision, appalling enough. It is the fashion among dilettanti and fops to decry the whole formulation and personnel of the active politics of America, as beyond redemption, and to be carefully kept away from. See you that you do not fall into this error. America is doing very well, upon the whole, notwithstanding these antics of the parties, and their leaders, these hair-brained nostrums, and the many foreign pallets, and many slanted failures and disturbers. It is the dilettanti, and all who shirk their duty, who are not doing well. As for you, I advise you to enter more strongly yet into politics. I advise every young man to do so. Always inform yourself; always do the best you can; always vote. Disengage yourself from parties. They have been useful, and to some extent remain so; but they floating, unconnected elements, factions, clerks, mechanics, the masters of

parties—watching aloof, inclining victory this side or that side—such are the ones most needed, present and future. For America, if eligible at all to downfall and ruin, is eligible within herself, not without; for I see clearly that the combined foreign world could not beat her down. But these savage, wolfish parties alarm me. Owning no law but their own will, more and more combative, less and less tolerant of the idea of ensemble and of [545] equal brotherhood, the ever-overarching American ideas, it behooves you to convey yourself implicitly to no party, but steadily hold yourself judge and master over all of them.[21]

—So much (hastily tossed together, and leaving far more unsaid), for an ideal, or intimations of an ideal, toward American manhood. But the other sex, in our land, equally requires suggestion.[22]

I have seen a young American woman, one of a large family of daughters, who, some years since, migrated from her meagre country home to one of the northern cities, to gain her own support. She soon became an expert seamstress, but finding the employment too confining for her health and comfort, she went boldly to work, for others, to house-keep, cook, clean, etc. After trying several places, she fell upon one where she was suited. She has told me that she finds nothing degrading in her position; it is not inconsistent with personal dignity, self-respect, and the respect of others. She confers

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21. Whitman clearly anticipated tendencies of democracy to resort to fascism in correcting its shortcomings. In fact, after more careful consideration, he inserted after "to no party," in Democratic Vistas, the phrase "nor submit blindly to their dictators." Whitman's growing social consciousness is also evidenced by the fact that in the later essay he italicized the word "ensemble" for emphasis.

22. Whitman never used the word man generically. When necessary, he always added after man, "woman." It is interesting to note that Whitman, who advocated woman suffrage in advance of his day, was related to other thinkers with such ideas. He knew and greatly admired Lucretia Mott, a quiet Quaker woman who was the first woman to speak of equal woman suffrage without restrictions. She was also one of four women to call together the "Equal Rights and Womans' Suffrage Convention" at Seneca Falls, New York, in 1848. There is a statue of her in the basement of the capitol in Washington in the series of statues of national leaders. It all coheres that Whitman, with the Quakers and some of the Transcendentalists, was in the vanguard of taking a stand for woman suffrage and against slavery as a result of the recognition of the sacredness of personality.

parties—seeking aloof, imploring victory with side or that side—each are the ones most needed, present and future. Our America, if eligible at all to downfall and ruin, is eligible within herself, not without; for I see clearly that the combined foreign world could not beat her down. Put these sayings, written partisan claims me. Owning no law but their own will, more and more conclusive, less and less tolerant of the ideas or examples and of [illegible] equal brotherhood, the overwhelmingly American ideas, it behooves you to convey yourself impartially to no party, but steadily hold yourself judge and master over all of them.[21]

—So much (usually tossed together, and leaving far more unsaid), for an ideal, or intimation of an ideal, toward American manhood. Put the other sex, in our land, equally requires suggestion.[22]

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benefits and receives them. She has good health; her presence itself is healthy and bracing; her character is unstained; she has been able to help her parents and educate and get places for her sisters; and her course of life is not without opportunities for mental improvement, and of much quiet, uncosting happiness and love.

I have seen another woman who, from taste and necessity conjoined, has gone into practical affairs, carries on a mechanical business, partly works at it herself, dashes out more and more into real hardy life, is not abashed by the coarseness of the contact, knows how to be firm and silent at the same time, holds her own with unvarying coolness and decorum, and will compare, any day, with superior carpenters, farmers, and even boatmen and drivers. For all that, she has not lost the charm of the womanly nature, but preserves and bears it fully, though through such rugged presentation.

Then there is the wife of a mechanic, mother of two children, a woman of merely passable English education, but of fine wit, with all her sex's grace and intuitions, who exhibits, indeed, such a noble female Personality, that I am fain to record it here. Never abnegating her own proper independence, but always genially preserving it, and what belongs to it—cooking, washing, child-bursing, house-tending, she beams sunshine out of all these duties, and makes them illustrious. Physiologically sweet and sound, loving work, practical, she yet knows that there are intervals, however few, devoted to recreation, music, leisure, hospitality—and affords such intervals. Whatever she does, and wherever she is, that charm, that indescribable perfume of genuine womanhood, attends her, goes with her, exhales from her, which belongs of right to all the sex, and is, or ought to be, the unvariable atmosphere and common aureola of old as well as young.

My mother has described to me a resplendent person, down on Long Island, whom she knew years ago, in early days. She was known by the name of the Peacemaker. She was well toward eighty years old, of happy and sunny temperament, had always lived on a farm, was very neighborly, sensible, and discreet, an invariable and welcomed favorite, especially with young married women. She had numerous children and grandchildren. She was uneducated, but possessed a native dignity. She had come to be a tacitly agreed upon domestic regulator, judge, settler of difficulties, shepherdess, and reconcilor in the land. She was a sight to draw near and look upon, with her large figure, her profuse snow-white hair, dark eyes, clear complexion, sweet breath, and peculiar personal magnetism.

The foregoing portraits, I admit, are frightfully out of line from these imported [546] models of womanly Personality—the stock feminine characters of the current novelists,

benefits and receives them. She has good health; her presence itself is healthy and bracing; her cheerfulness is unsinkable; she has been able to help her parents and educate and get places for her sisters; and her course of life is not without opportunities for mental improvement, and of much quiet, unobtrusive happiness and love.

I have been another woman who, from birth and necessity combined, has come into peculiar effects, centres on a mechanical balance. Partly works as it normally, dashes out more and more into real nervy life, is not checked by the disassociation of the contact. It was how to be free and silent at the same time, holds her own with unvarying coolness and decorum, and will compete, any day, with superior companions, fairness, and even goodness and dexterity. For all that, she has not lost the charm of the womanly nature, but preserves and bears it fully, though through such rugged preservation.

Then there is the wife of a mechanic, mother of two children, a woman of merely passable English education, but of fine wit, with all her nature frank and intuitive, who exhibits, indeed, such a noble female personality, that I am fain to record it here. Never changing her own proper language, dexterous, but always practically preserving it, and what belongs to it--cooking, washing, child-bearing, house-tending, she comes out of all these duties, and makes them illustrations. Physiologically sweet and chaste, loving work, practical, she yet knows that there are interviews, however few, devoted to conversation, music, leisure, hospitality--and affords such intervals. Whatever she does, and whatever she is, that charm, that indescribable perfume of genuine womanhood, exhales her, goes with her, exhales from her, which belongs of right to all the sex, and is, or ought to be, the invariable atmosphere and common aureole of old as well as young.

My mother has described to me a neighbouring person, down on Long Island, whom she knew years ago, in early days. She was known by the name of the "sweetmeat". She was well toward eighty years old, of happy and sunny temperament, had always lived on a farm, was very neighborly, sensible, and discreet, an invariable and welcomed favorite, especially with young married women. She had numerous children and grandchildren. She was unobtrusive, but possessed a native dignity. She had come to be a tacitly agreed upon domestic regulator, judge, settler of difficulties, disinterested, and peacemaker in the land. She was a sight to draw near and look upon, with her large figure, her profuse snow-white hair, dark eyes, clear complexion, sweet breath, and peculiar personal magnetism.

The foregoing personalities, I admit, are far distantly out of line from those lauded [267] models of womanly personality--the stock feminine characters of the current novelists,

or of the foreign court poems (Enids, Guiniveres, Princesses, or Ladies of one thing or another), which fill the envying dreams of so many poor girls, and are accepted by our young men, too, as supreme ideals of feminine excellence to be sought after. But I present mine just for a change.

Then there are mutterings (we will not now stop to heed them here, but they must be heeded), of something more revolutionary. The day is coming when the deep questions of woman's full entrance amid the arenas of practical life, politics, trades, teaching, etc., will not only be argued all around us, but will be put to decision, and real experiment.

—Of course, in These States, for both man and woman, we must entirely recast the type of highest Personality from what the Feudal world bequeaths us, and which yet fully possesses the imaginative and esthetic fields of the United States, pictorial and melodramatic, not without use as studies, but making sad work, and forming a strange anachronism upon the scenes and exigencies around us.

Of course, the old, undying elements remain. The task is, to successfully adjust them to new combinations, our own days. Nor is this so incredible. I can conceive a community, today and here, in which, on a sufficient scale, the perfect Personalities, without noise, meet; say in some pleasant Western settlement or town, where a couple of hundred best men and women, of ordinary worldly status, have by luck been drawn together, with nothing extra of genius or wealth, but virtuous, chaste, industrious, cheerful, resolute, friendly, and devout. I can conceive such a community organized in running order, powers judiciously delegated, farming, building, trade, courts, mails, schools, elections, all attended to; and then the rest of life, the main thing, freely branching and blossoming in each individual, and bearing golden fruit. I can see there, in every young and old man, after his kind, and in every woman after hers, a true Personality, developed, exercised, proportionately in body, mind, and spirit. I can imagine this case as one not necessarily rare or difficult, but in buoyant accordance with the municipal and general requirements of our times. And I can realize in it the culmination of something better than any stereotyped éclat of history or poems. Perhaps, unsung, undramatized, unput in essays or biographies—perhaps even some such community already exists, in Ohio, Illinois, Missouri, or somewhere, practically fulfilling itself, and thus outvying, in cheapest vulgar life, all the rich pages of old-world Plutarch and Shakespeare, or our own Emerson.[23]

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23. Whitman is here re-evaluating personality in the broader terms of communal living. Each individual is a complete personality only as he has a social consciousness of the "general

or of the foreign court poems (Saida, Dikhiavam, Pinnaseen, or ladies of the king or emperor), which fill the anything frames of so many poor girls, and are accepted by our young men, too, as supreme ideals of feminine excellence to be sought after. But I present mine just for a change.

Then there are nuthatches (we will not now stop to hand them here, but they must be heard), of something more revolutionary. The day is coming when the deep questions of woman's full entrance into all the arenas of practical life, politics, trades, teaching, etc., will not only be argued all around us, but will be put to decision, and real experiment.

—Of course, in these states, for both man and woman, as some authority ranges the type of highest femininity from what the Feudal world begrudge us, and which yet fully possesses the imaginative and aesthetic ideals of the United States, historical and methodematic, not without use as models, but making and working, and forming a strange amphibious from the scenes and exigencies around us.

Of course, the old, undying elements remain. The task is, to successfully adjust them to new conditions, our own days. Nor is this so incredible. I can conceive a community, today and here, in wild, on a multitudinant scale, the perfect personalities, without notes, meet; say in some pleasant Western settlement or town, where a couple of hundred best men and women, of ordinary worldly status, have by luck been drawn together, with nothing extra of genius or wealth, but vigorous, healthy, unspoiled, resolute, friendly, and devoted. I can conceive such a community organized in running order, powers judiciously distributed, farming, building, trade, sonnets, schools, elections, all attended to; and then the rest of life, the main thing, freely breathing and blossoming in each individual, and bearing golden fruit. I can see them, in every young and old man, a true, fine kind, and in every woman a true, a sane personality, developed, exercised, proportionately in body, mind, and spirit. I can imagine this area can use not necessarily more or different, but in buoyant accordance with the material and general requirements of our times. And I can realize in it the culmination of something better than any academy and duke of history or poems. Perhaps, nuzzling, undiscovered, unpent in nauqy an hippopotamus—perhaps even some such creature already exists, in Ohio, Illinois, Kansas, or somewhere, prodigally fulfilling itself, and time outlying, in cheapest ways—life, all the main pages of old-world Plutarch and Shakespeare, or our own Emerson.

[illegible]. Whitman is here re-evaluating personality in the formal terms of communal living. Each individual is a complete personality only as he has a social consciousness of the "general

In short, and to sum up, America, betaking herself to formative action (as it is about time for more solid achievement and less windy promise), must, for her purposes, cease to recognize a theory of character formed by merely esthetic or literary standards, or from any ultramarine, full-dress formulas of culture, polish, caste, etc., and must sternly promulgate her own new standard, yet old enough, and accepting the old, the perennial, elements, and combining them into groups, unities, appropriate to the modern, the democratic, the West, and to the practical occasions and needs of our own cities, and of the agricultural regions. Ever the most precious is the common. Ever the fresh breeze of field, or hill, or lake, is more than any palpitation of fans, though of ivory, and redolent with perfume; and the air is more than the costliest perfumes.[24]

And before we close, for fear of mistake, we may not imtermit to beg our absolution from all that genuinely is, or goes along with, Mentality, Education, and even Culture. Pardon us, venerable shades! if we have seemed to speak lightly of your office. The whole civilization of the earth, we know, is yours, [547] with all the glory and the light thereof. It is, indeed, in your own spirit, and tallying the loftiest teachings of it, that we aim these poor utterances. For you, too, mighty ministers! know that there is something greater than you, namely, the fresh, eternal qualities of Being. From them, and by them, as you, at your best, we, too, after our fashion, when art and conventions fail, evoke the last, the needed help, to vitalize our country and our days.

Thus, after all, we pronounce not so much against the principle of Culture; we only supervise it, and promulge as deep, perhaps a deeper, principle. As we have shown, the New World, including in itself, and, indeed, founded upon, the all-levelling aggregate of Democracy, we show it also including the all-varied, all-permitting, all-free theorem of Individuality, and erecting therefor a lofty and hitherto unoccupied framework or platform of Personalism, broad enough for all, eligible to every farmer and mechanic—to the female equally with the male—a towering Selfhood, not physically perfect

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requirements of our times." He began the article equating personalism and individualism; now he equates it with individualism plus a social consciousness. He, therefore, unites with his close friend Alcott in transcending Emerson's one-sided view. It is interesting to note that Whitman omits Plutarch, Shakespeare, and Emerson in Democratic Vistas. For again, he does not wish to go on permanent record against Emerson.

24. Here, again, the many assumes as much, or more importance than the one.

only—not satisfied with the mere mind's and learning's stores, but Religious, possessing the idea of the Infinite (rudder and compass sure amid this troublous voyage, o'er darkest, wildest wave, through stormiest wind, of man's or nations' progress)—realizing, above the rest, that known humanity, in deepest sense, is fair adhesion to Itself, for purposes beyond—and that, finally, the theme, great as it is, of the Personality of mortal life is most important with reference to the immortal, the Unknown, the Spiritual, the only permanently real, which, as the ocean waits for and receives the rivers, waits for us each and all.[25]

Walt Whitman

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25. Whitman's climax is a fitting indication of the growth of his thought through the entire article. The "Personality of mortal life," which at first means individualism and later means relationship to a group is now important only "with reference to the immortal," the "permanently real," which is "Spiritual." Alcott paid a high tribute to Whitman's philosophical conclusions when he called him "the American Columbus, whose sagacity has thus sounded adventurously the sea of our Social Chaos and anchored his thought securely in soil of the newly discovered Atlantides about which the Grecian Plato died dreaming." He later wrote to Whitman, after receiving a copy of "Personalism," "...Your thought is on the track of empire and sees the route to Personal Powers for the nation as for the individual and never a people needed more the Cosmic thought to inspire and guide its action." Quoted by Clifton Furness in an unpublished biography of Whitman. Whitman expresses in his own ideas the poetry he demands for the future; i.e., "consistent with the Hegelian formulas, and consistent with modern science." His idea of the "all" is not pantheistic, however. The soul maintains its "permanent identity"; the all is accompanied with the "idea of eternity," "of itself, the soul...." DV, 323. He wrote of personal identity after death in the words:

> My foothold is tenon'd and mortis'd in granite,
> I laugh at what you call dissolution
> And I know the amplitude of time.
>
> I know I am deathless,
> I know this orbit of mine cannot be swept by a carpenter's compass,
> I know I shall not pass like a child's carlacue cut with a burnt stick at night.

Quoted by Pound, WW, xlii. Whitman recognized the idealistic position of his personalistic ideas when he wrote in his later Democratic Vistas: "What is I believe called Idealism seems to me to suggest...the course of inquiry and desert of favor for our New World metaphysics...." DV, 320.

only—not satisfied with the mere midst's and learning's arrogance, but religious, possessing the idea of the infinite (midst and compass sure and this humbling voyage, star darkness, without wave, through atomless wind, of inner or mechanic progress)—realizing, above the rest, that human humanity, in despair, in fair adhesion to Ideal, for purposes beyond—and that, finally, the theme, great as it is, of the personality of mortal life is most important with preference to the immortal, the Universe, the Spiritual, the only permanently real, which, as the ocean waits for and receives the rivers, waits for us each and all.

Walt Whitman

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26. Whitman's silence is a fitting indication of the growth of his thought shown in the quiet article. The "Personality of mortal life," which is first means individualism and later means relationship to a group is now important only "with reference to the immortal," the "permanently real," which is "Spiritual." Alcott paid a high tribute to Whitman's philosophical-scientific vision. He called him "the American Columbus, whose sagacity has thus notched adventurously the sea of our Social Chaos and rediscovered his sought secretly in sail of the newly discovered Atlantides about which the Grecian Plato did dreamed." The latter wrote to Whitman, after receiving a copy of "Personalism," "...Your thought is on the track of angles and seen the route to Personal Powers for the nation as for the individual and never a people needed more the Gospels Energies to inspire and guide its action." Quoted by Clifton Furness in his unpublished biography of Whitman. Whitman expresses in his own idea the poetry he demands for the future; i.e., "consistent with the Baconian formula, and consistent with modern science." His idea of the "all" is not pantheistic, however. The soul maintains its "permanent identity" the all is accompanied with the "idea of eternity," "of itself, the soul...." Dv, 622. He wrote of personal identity after death in the words:

> By footsteps in taverns and worlds I'm traveling,
> I laugh at what you call dissolution
> and I know the amplitude of time.
>
> I know I am deathless,
> I know this orbit of mine cannot be swept by a
> carpenter's compass,
> I know I shall not pass like a child's carriage out
> with a burnt stick at night.

Quoted by Foerd, Dv, xiii. Whitman accomplished the idealistic position of his personalistic ideas when he wrote in his later Democratic Vistas: "What is I believe really Idealism means to be to succeed...the causes of laxity and dangers of times for our New World demonstrate...." Dv, 380.

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AUTOBIOGRAPHY

Hiram Chester Weld was born in Chicago, Illinois, February 18, 1912, the son of Chester Harry and Lillie Lude Weld. He went from New Trier High School, Winnetka, Illinois, to Simpson College, where he received his A.B. degree in 1934. For Graduate work he attended the School of Theology and the Graduate School of Boston University, receiving an A.M. degree in 1936 and an S.T.B. degree, magna cum laude, in 1937. He was awarded the Frank Howard Fellowship, on which he studied in the Universities of Heidelberg and Oxford during the academic year 1938-1939. Upon returning to the United States he became Resident Fellow of Systematic Theology for a year under Dr. Albert C. Knudson at Boston University School of Theology. From 1940 to the present he has been assistant professor of philosophy and psychology at Baker University, Baldwin, Kansas. While working on his doctorate at Boston University, he also attended Garrett Biblical Institute in the summer of 1941 and Harvard University in the summer of 1942. He served the Methodist Church of Tewksbury, Massachusetts, from 1935 to 1936 and the Hull Methodist Church from 1936 to 1940. He was ordained an elder and became a member of the Kansas Annual Conference of the Methodist Church in 1938. He preached in the First Methodist Church, Topeka, Kansas, in August of 1941 and in the Harvard-Epworth Methodist Church of Cambridge, Massachusetts, during August of 1942. In 1936 he married Mary Elizabeth Williams of Council Bluffs, Iowa. A son, Wayne Robert Weld, was born to them May 25, 1943.